Land Warfare
Future British capability depends
on a £5 billion armoured-vehicle
modernisation programme. As well as
new armoured Scout and utility vehicles,
the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle and
Challenger tank are to be upgraded. The
French are fielding the VBCI wheeled
infantry fighting vehicle and developing
new wheeled APCs and cavalry vehicles.
Yet these plans, as well as the broader
future capability of these armies,
depend on budgets being sustained.
Whilst the Livre Blanc sought to sustain
current French defence spending,
increasing equipment and personnel
costs have required reductions in force
structure. And the current prospects
for the French economy are not
encouraging. Given the White House
and Congress’s difficulty in agreeing a
way out of sequestration and the British
government’s continued struggle to
contain public spending, the sustained
funding of planned UK and US land
capability may also be at risk.
The British Treasury has, however,
agreed to a limited growth of equipment
and support as well as pay budgets.
Yet these increases could squeeze out
operating costs. This is important
because the ranks of the British Army
are now full of battle-hardened soldiers
and officers proven on operations.
Retaining these people and their hardwon experience will require, above
all, that the excitement and challenge
of fighting in Afghanistan is replaced
by tough, realistic training in modern
combined arms warfare. This will be
expensive, in terms of fuel, ammunition
and simulation technology. But activity
costs have not been ring-fenced and
increased spending on equipment and
personnel threatens to impact spending
on training.
These pressures may also be felt
in the US and France. So the greatest
challenge for these armies could well
be that of retaining the combat-proven
talent needed for the future, as well as
recruiting sufficient numbers of fit and
adventurous young men and women.
Brigadier (Rtd) Ben Barry OBE
Senior Fellow Land Warfare, International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
This article is based on the 14 May 2013 IISS
London event, ‘Hard Fighting, Hard Times,
Hard Choices: Strategic Challenges Facing
Modern Armies’, <http://www.iiss.org/
en/events/arundel-s-house-s-events/strategicchallenges-facing-modern-armies-6036>.
An analysis of the British Army’s plans can
be found in the January 2013 IISS Strategic
Comment, ‘Redesigned British Army:
Smaller, with More Reserves’, <http://
www.iiss.org/en/regions/united-kingdom/
redesigned-british-army--smaller--with-morereserves-c53b>.
Details of global defence budgets and their
trajectory are taken from ‘IISS Military
Balance 2013’.
Operation Enquiry: How to Transform
an Army?
Mungo Melvin
The British Army needs to replace its narrow focus on operations in
Afghanistan with more strategic, long-term thinking, trialling fresh ideas
to develop new concepts for a range of contingencies.
T
here is some truth in the notion
that the British Army today faces
‘unparalleled change’. As operations in
Afghanistan wind down over the next
eighteen months, the withdrawal from
Germany will gather pace. Apart from
a small contingent remaining stationed
in Cyprus, the army will be solely homebased by 2020. By that date also, the
army should have fully implemented
July 2013, Vol. 33, No. 4
its new eponymous force structure.
Given their constraints, the designers
of Army 2020 appear to have done a
remarkably good job, for which all due
credit must be given. For the first time
in a generation soldiers should face
stability in location and clarity of role,
becoming members of a ‘contingent
force’, freed from the immediacy of
operations such as Afghanistan. But this
rests on three very big assumptions in
an age of uncertainty: that the threat
to the UK has not changed; the army
has survived further budget cuts; and
the 30,000 reservists needed have been
recruited and retained.
Yet the army faces other challenges
now, up to and beyond 2020, which are
potentially as profound. The army is
generally good at ‘getting on with’ the
5
Land Warfare
unexpected, where agility, improvisation
and pragmatism are called for, as the
events and operations of the last two
decades have shown. But in future these
qualities alone may not prove sufficient.
The transformation required now is as
much one of mindset as of method.
The army needs to convert itself from
one of deploying and derring-do to one
of thinking, trialling and testing fresh
ideas. It needs to develop and engage in
new doctrine and concepts for a wide
range of contingencies: to experiment
and train for war generally, not for
any specific war. The narrow focus on
operations in Afghanistan must now
be replaced by a new, longer-term and
more strategic approach – ‘Operation
Enquiry’.
Operation Enquiry should begin with
a frank re-appraisal and detailed analysis
of all operations conducted since 1991.
It should not leave this vitally important
study too late, repeating the mistake of
the Kirke Report that drew lessons from
the First World War only in 1932. Today’s
examination needs to encompass all
levels of war and of command. It
should be conducted within a joint
context at the strategic level, considering
the associated multinational operational
aspects with Britain’s allies and coalition
partners, and then taking an equally hard
look at a number of tactical actions.
It is only on this sure foundation of
knowledge that one could proclaim
any lessons being learnt over the last
twenty-five years. Crucially, this enquiry
process should extend to all the armed
services, the Joint Forces Command and
the Ministry of Defence. What must be
avoided at all costs is a sterile, interservice, point-scoring debate.
Yet many in the defence establishment
and the British Army are unprepared
psychologically to undertake any serious
introspection. It requires humility to
acknowledge that not all has gone well
in Iraq and Afghanistan, notwithstanding
the immense courage, dedication and
enterprise of the many tens of thousands
who have served in these operations. For
all the battles fought successfully, the
wars may not have been won. Success, let
alone ‘victory’, is proving very elusive in
today’s security environment.
This key strategic issue, as much as
any battlefield performance, demands
detailed study. Yet successive chiefs of
6
the General Staff and their assistants
have allowed the army’s historical branch
to wither on the vine. A recent suggestion
to create a centre of historical analysis
and conflict research at Sandhurst has
likewise foundered. This is particularly a
pity, as one of the most basic functions
of a general staff is the systematic
examination of past operations and
current conditions in order to inform
future force development. If education
and enquiry are considered expensive,
then surely ignorance and associated
failure are many times more so.
The lack of any significant
internal capacity to study current and
potential conflicts, or desire to build
a comprehensive education, training
and experimentation programme for
the army, is alarming. The axing of the
Conflict Studies Research Centre within
the Advanced Research and Assessment
Group at the Defence Academy in
2010 remains a regrettable act. We need
such organisations that can challenge
constructively conventional wisdom
and explore new avenues of enquiry.
The joint Development, Concepts and
Doctrine Centre at Shrivenham can only
do so much: its resources are limited. The
Defence Academy’s potential to generate
research is, currently, largely untapped.
Military academic output
comes relatively cheaply
Such institutional deficiencies will
haunt the British Army for a generation
unless there is a determination to address
this requirement. Military academic
output comes relatively cheaply. Yet
it seems impossible to convince bean
counters that researchers are of most
value during a time of enquiry. Critics
may state that the army (if not the
defence establishment as a whole) no
longer needs to own either historical or
contemporary analysis ‘in-house’, as all is
available ‘online’ or through the likes of
DSTL or QinetiQ. But is this really so?
Operation Enquiry requires a
concomitant shift in the army’s approach
to professional military education.
First of all, it needs to put finally to
rest the anti-intellectualism that still
persists in some quarters. It needs to
tap the experience and intelligence of
young and middle-ranking officers who
can exercise independent, innovative
thought, and who should be encouraged
to ‘speak out of turn’. There are many
such clever and reflective people
serving, but the army presently neither
encourages nor rewards adequately
those who contribute to the institution’s
thinking and development. Therefore
it should breed a new generation of
‘soldier-scholars’, who would find a
home in a new-style general staff, within
the Defence Academy and at Sandhurst,
the latter forming the army’s intellectual
hub. Secondly, the term ‘professional
military education’ is in itself probably
too narrow. Individuals educated not
only in strategy and operational art but
also in a wide range of other academic
disciplines are needed.
The army’s internal debate on officer
education last year was dominated by
discussion of whether there should
be only graduate entry in future. The
decision was made to preserve the
present system that allows non-graduates
to apply for commissioning. This is all
well and good. It was not, however, the
major point at issue: selected officers
need greater opportunities to undertake
postgraduate education in order to
inform the army’s historical analysis,
its doctrinal development, its approach
to procurement and finance, and not
least to influence others’ perceptions
of the army. With this in mind, shortterm ‘penny-wise, pound-foolish’ cuts
should be reversed in language training
or in the funding of MBAs or equivalent
courses that equip individuals for their
careers in general as well as for specific
appointments.
The army needs a new cohort of
talented, lively and inquiring minds that
can engage with senior civil servants
and captains of industry on an equal
intellectual level, backed up with
arguments, facts and figures that compel.
This is not to argue that the army requires
vast numbers of academic types and
PhD and MPhil holders: it does not. Yet
a few more than the current sprinkling
might give greater rigour to the army’s
case within Whitehall and improve the
quality of its engagement and exchange
with key allies.
More fundamentally, Operation
Enquiry should acknowledge readily
RUSI Newsbrief
Land Warfare
that the body of knowledge the army
possesses through its individuals and
institutions contributes to its fighting
power. Assuming an enduring moral
component, and accepting the realities
of a declining physical component
(principally in terms of numbers, but
not exclusively so), this is surely the time
to expand the conceptual component
of the army. A relatively modest
improvement in understanding can
generate significant gains in the quality
of situational awareness and decisionmaking, which in turn can maximise
the operational capability of the force.
Such ‘knowledge quantum mechanics’
has much potential in preserving, if not
in enhancing, the army’s fighting power.
That is why analysis and experimentation
in this field are so important.
The body of knowledge the
army possesses contributes
to its fighting power
Rather than trying to refight old
small wars of counter-insurgency, the
army needs to engage in the study
of new variable-scale, and highly
unpredictable, wars and confrontations
that exhibit a messy amalgam of many
types of conflict concurrently. Over
the last three years, the army’s Force
Development and Training Command
has pioneered many small studies in this
area under its ‘WARRIOR’ programme.
Yet it has not been given the necessary
resources to devise and test new
concepts and emerging doctrine within
an experimental field force. This would
appear to be a significant omission of
Army 2020, which should incorporate
at its heart a wide margin of resources
and effort for thinking, training and
experimentation.
Furthermore, the ‘audience of
transformation’ – as one might call
it – needs to be expanded in wider
educational and training terms. Until
it was cancelled in the mid-2000s,
notwithstanding the contrary views
raised, the army benefited from an annual
‘Future Army’ study period. For many
years it attracted and engaged a very
wide cross-section of participants not
only from the army, but also from sister
July 2013, Vol. 33, No. 4
services and allies. This sort of event
facilitated an open dialogue between
force developers and practitioners.
It created unity of purpose, trust and
mutual understanding. These are all key
principles of mission command that
need to be resurrected and sustained
in the refinement and implementation
of Army 2020, for which at present a
degree of cynicism exists. That is not to
denigrate Army 2020’s well-intentioned
designers, but rather to say that trust in
the chain of command has been taken
too much for granted in recent years,
whether in the regular or reserve forces.
The army should demonstrate how
Army 2020 will work within a demanding
operational setting, including how it is
to regenerate the necessary personnel
and materiel for scenarios and scales
of conflict not necessarily bounded by
current defence planning assumptions.
‘Policy compliance’ should not be a
constraint on army thinking. Enquiry
and experimentation should be allowed
to inform and potentially shape defence
and security policy that is mandated
by ministers. Again, this is an entirely
legitimate area of enquiry for a general
staff, which should seek to maximise
ministerial exposure to emerging
concepts and doctrine.
Operation Enquiry needs fresh
engagement at home and abroad in order
to learn lessons, to discuss new ideas,
to develop new concepts and doctrine
and, not least, to ‘network’ widely.
There is considerable scope to increase
the number of international exchange
and educational postings. These are
valuable, long-term investments.
On this broad foundation, there
is every prospect of building the
intellectual capacity, coherence and
cohesion that Army 2020 requires. The
new force structures for regulars and
reserves alike, and their associated basing
plans, however, will all be to no avail if
the army cannot recruit, motivate and
retain its most precious resource – its
people – and provide the force with the
knowledge and understanding required
for future conflict and war. This is no
easy requirement: it will need intrepid
innovation accompanied by a patient
outlay in both time and effort.
During a time of austerity and
renewed efficiency savings, where
are the required resources going to
come from? The only possible way
is to reduce regular manpower yet
further: the army needs to be prepared
to under-implement some of the
Adaptable Force structure in order to
fund the necessary analysis, education,
training and experimentation that
Operation Enquiry requires. The
totemic establishment figure of
82,000 regulars is just that: it should
be tempered by need and affordability.
There is absolutely no point in trying
to man every platoon of a given unit
if it cannot be given the necessary
training and equipment its soldiers
deserve. More fundamentally, the army
has a responsibility to make sure that
all units are fully fit to fight, no matter
when and where, perhaps in the most
unexpected circumstances. This will
put a premium on developing mission
command and all three components
of fighting power to give the force
the necessary qualitative edge and
resilience.
Finally,
Operation
Enquiry
requires example from the army’s
senior leaders. The force is facing
exceptional, generational challenges.
The transformation of the army
demands strong, positive leadership,
not just ‘change management’. Neither
the establishment of a new integrated
headquarters in Andover nor the
publication of Army 2020 means that
future success is guaranteed. The army
should commit itself to a programme
of
education,
experimentation,
engagement, exchange and example
if Army 2020 is to be translated into
a properly funded, balanced, fighting
force worthy of the name, underpinned
by an intellectual renaissance that the
army so urgently requires.
Let us hope that the 2013 Land
Warfare Conference at RUSI provides
a suitable stimulus and starting point.
Given the lead, the led will jump at the
chance to forge a New Model Army:
one that rests on real fighting power
and enlightened mission command, all
coupled with a winning combination of
expertise, enterprise and élan. Operation
Enquiry should be launched as soon as
possible.
Major General (Rtd) Mungo Melvin
CB OBE
Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI.
7