Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper The Construction of Emergent Order or How to Resist the Temptation of Hylozoism by Jeffrey Goldstein Adelphi University, Garden City, NY 11530 THE APPEAL OF HYLOZOISM Although it’s become quite popular to decry the legacy of Newton’s scientific achievements for bequeathing a mechanical and thereby lifeless view of nature, Newton himself was actually committed to an opposite sentiment, “We cannot say that all nature is not alive” (Rae, ). For Newton, nature was infused with qualities of dynamism usually associated with living creatures. The belief that nature is infused with life all the down, even in the apparently inert, is known as hylozoism, an antediluvian doctrine originating in early animism but finding sophisticated expression in ancient Greek Philosophy and the later traditions following it. Hylozoism is typically found along side the closely related notion of panpsychism, the doctrine that mental qualities also pervade nature all the way down. Both doctrines have been held, in one form or another, by no less a set of philosophical luminaries than Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, William James, and Alfred North Whitehead, to name just a few. Hylozoism has shown itself not only in outright declarations on a fundamental organicity pervading nature, but also in other, related doctrines resting on the belief in the pre-existence of certain temporally and ontologically primordial organic properties. For example, the early modern biological ideas of preformation or preexistence of the germ cell reveal a kind of hylozoist orientation, although here, rather than simply mere organicity, what pre-exists are miniature homunculi which grow into the mature adult during embryonic development (Richards, 1992; Rousseau, 1992). Similarly, the idea of penspermia holds that germ cells or other kernels of life force, pre-exist, even came from other planets, an idea embraced by no less a scientific exemplar than Francis Crick. Indeed, in an important sense the current notion of genetic predeterminism can be understood as a vestige of earlier hylozoism. A hylozoist core also can be detected in the dictum of Rudolf Virchow, a pioneer in cell biology, who argued that a cell could not emerge from a non-cell, his motto “omnis cellula e cellula“ being a kind of cellular hylozocism (Farley, 1977). Among those factors rendering hylozoism philosophically attractive has been its seeming capacity for “resolving” that age old philosophical quandary which, in Kant’s phraseology, derived from the fact that it would be “contradictory to 1 Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper reason” to believe “that life should have sprung from the nature of what is lifeless, that matter should have been able to dispose itself into the form of a self-maintaining purposiveness” (Kant quoted in Lenoir,1982, p. 29)) Hylozoism is able to side-step this enigmatic discrepancy for, if nature in its heart is endowed with properties of organicity, then the emergence of life from the non-living need not be any more mysterious than the unfolding of what’s already innate in it. That is, if there is no non-animated matter to begin with, life doesn’t need to emerge from what it’s not. So, puff B no discontinuity, no paradox, no conundrum, no problem! As the renowned 18th Century French biologist Georeges Cuvier put it, “...life has always arisen from life. We see it being transmitted and none being produced.” (Quoted in Farley, 1977, p. 39). Thus, no matter whatever other philosophical merits it may possess, hylozoism does offer the promise of demystifying the origin of life by way of denying there could be anything utterly destitute of life. Although later on we will be examining in greater detail the problematic nature of hylozoism, we need to note here the two critical, interrelated drawbacks which are the conceptual prices paid for the ability of hylozoism to “resolve” the issue of the origin of life. The first has to with the fact that hylozoism, by its very nature, must deny the existence of radical difference. That is, if even the most non-life like aspect of nature nevertheless is imbued with life, then consequently the radical discrepancy between life and non-life disappears. The second price paid, indeed, stemming from the first, has to do with how hylozoism succeeds in “resolving” the enigma of the origin of life only by replacing this enigma with another equally troubling one, namely, the conundrum of why the non-living, although supposedly endowed with life, do not exhibit what they are endowed with. For example, why does a rock appear inert and not life-like? Indeed, it seems that no matter how hard hylozoism has tried to rid the origin of life from the troubling nature of the origin of a radical discontinuity, it winds up with simply another discontinuity, that between appearance and reality. A further consequence is that hylozoism 2 can also avoid having to come up with a cogent understanding of the processes involved with the coming into being of the radically novel. This also means that hylozoism therefore is a completely opposite doctrine than that of emergence for the latter is challenged by precisely what hylozoism denies, that is, the coming into being of the radically novel. VESTIGES OF HYLOZOISM IN COMPLEXITY THEORY From the above remarks it might seem hylozoism has become merely a quaint relic of our philosophical and scientific past, yet vestiges of its allure can be detected in certain complexity related theses, most notably in three related currently influential complexity notions: first, in Maturana’s and Varela’s notion of autopoeisis, particularly as this idea has been formulated by Varela with his self-referential abstract algebra; second, in how certain modern ideas of emergence in complex systems rely on a holistic perspective; third. , the application of autocatalytic structures observed in Artificial Life to the issue of the origin of life. Indeed, a hylozoistic cast can even be seen, paradoxically enough, in the very appellation “Artificial Life” for these simulations, that is, life-life dynamics have been attributed all the way down in the artificial world of Artificial Life in a manner not dissimilar to what hylozoists have done with the natural world of nature. Here we will only focus on the first two of these vestiges of hylozoism in complexity theory. PAN-REFERENTIAL CLOSURISM In previous publications, I have separated the history of the idea of emergence into three periods (Goldstein, 1999; 2000): the proto-period of Emergent Evolutionism, from about 1905 to 1935, when the idea got off the ground; the midphase stage when the early conceptualization was applied mainly to theoretical biology and neuro-science; and the neo-emergentist period corresponding to the advent of complexity theory in its various guises. It was during mid-phase emergentism that organic wholeness of Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper emergent phenomena was conceived in terms of a self-referential structure. Actually this was a modern restatement of the circular kind of causality that Kant had originally called for to distinguish life from non-life: “its parts should combine to form the unity of a whole by being reciprocally causes and effects of each others form” (quoted in McFarland, 1970). During the mid-phase period, a similar self-referential understanding of organic integrity reached perhaps its apotheosis in the concept of autopoeisis developed by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Maturana and Varela, 1980). Autopoeisis holds that organic wholes are those entities which seek to maintain the organization of which they are the embodiment. Living wholes are selfreferential in their very essence, a network of production processes of components which through their interactions regenerate and realize the network which produces them. This selfreferential circular causality operates to create an invariant self-contained identity, a boundary circumscribing a state of closure, the term favored by Varela in his later work, to distinguish his approach consisting of a logic of abstract relations from the standard information theoretic input/output model for self-organizing systems (Varela, 1979; Varela, 1984 ). In an important respect, autopoeitic “referential closure” can be seen as a counter to the “open systems”, information theoretic approach which, according to Varela and Maturana, could not get to the kernel of what maintained the integrity of on organism over time. Varela, concluding that his emphasis on the self-referentiality defining organicity was lacking a foundation in contemporary went on to erect a mathematical formalism of self-reference, which amounts to a sort of “pan-selfreferentialism” since it posited self-reference as a basic logical element along with the two conventional elements of true and false (Varela, 1979). The very possibility that autopoietic wholes could be mathematically formalized at all was a consequence of the fact, as pointed out later by two Spanish Artificial Life researchers, Julio Fernández Ostolaza and Álvaro Moreno Bergareche, that there is a crucial difference between organization and structure in the theory of autopoiesis ( ): the organization is that whose objective is the very preservation of itself; whereas the structure is the material substrate contingent upon the organization which the organization utilizes for its purpose of survival. Organization then refers to the wholeness of the whole, the identity of this wholeness, its integrity besides which the living organism is not intact. Since autopoeisis is a matter primarily of the organization and since this organization refers to itself, it is amenable to a purely formal account as the structure can be disregarded. This point is similar to the idea, of which many computer scientists are quite fond, concerning the radical disjunction between software and hardware, in which the purely formal construction of the software can be implemented in an infinity of different hardwares as long as the latter are capably of performing digital operations.1 However the idea of autopoeisis might be assessed, Varela, by believing he had to shoreit up through his algebra of self-reference, effectively rendered it according to the hylozoist model of positing an organic property, in this case autopoeitic self-reference, all the way down. Accordingly, like the above mentioned benefit of hylozoism, Varela was also able to pretty much duck the entire issue of how autopoeitic selfreferential invariance arose to begin. As in hylozoism, there simply isn’t any baffling disparity left between some stipulated pre-self-referential, non-referential condition and later self-referential wholeness. That’s why Varela was basically been silent about morphogenetic transformation, indeed, about the whole issue of “structure” as such in contrast to “organization.” What Varela left out however, and which remains a deep perplexity in emergentist thought is how exactly such referential closure could be brought about. Of course, if self-referentiality exists all the way down, then how it comes to be present in referential closure is not longer so mysterious. This is probably why Varela does not seemed to have had much use for the term or concept of emergence per se. In fact, a similar reticence concerning transformation and how it can come 3 Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper about is also apparent among those who have appropriated autopoeisis in various contexts (see Ulrich and Probst, 1984). The point being made here is not to say that autopoeisis doesn’t have some important insights to add, but that as an explanation it suffers from the same serious lack as hylozoism. And those who do get some important mileage out of the concept, for example Lemke (2000) do so by, in my estimation, so changing the notion of Varela’s closure that it no longer even carries anymore the sense of being closed! As a matter of fact, the referential closure stance on emergent wholes pushes the focus of inquiry away from how the parts can function in making up wholes and instead overemphasizes the autonomy of emergent wholes in relation to the parts. One result is that we are left with the impression that such wholes are disconnected from that from which they emerge, a sense that having a life of their own is separate from and lifted out of causal processes — we are back then with even greater mystery. HOLISM IN EMERGENTIST THOUGHT There is another way that hylozoist tendencies are showing themselves in the study of complex systems, namely, the turn to a certain conception of holism. A salient example of such holism is the oft repeated refrain among complexity enthusiasts of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts. To be sure, in an important respect this holistic move is to be commended. Herbert Simon, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, and noted trailblazer in the study of complex systems, once put forward a methodological principle that has since become something of a working guideline among complexity theorists, “... in the face of complexity, an in-principle reductionist may be at the same time a pragmatic holist. (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). Notice Simon’s careful phrasing: he can simultaneously affirm the reductionist underpinning of scientific research and acknowledge a heuristic value accrued from paying attention to the whole as such. Although Simon could thereby be seen as opening a door 4 for taking emergence scientifically seriously, ardent advocates of emergence have tended to adhere to an in principle holism and strident antireductionism. Holism, in coming down on the side of the inviolability of the whole, tends to subordinate the importance of parts even to the point of gainsaying their explanatory significance at all. Such an attitude to parts through considering the whole as ontologically pre-eminent falls-out from the holist conceptualization of wholes as pregiven, foundational structures of reality, a conceptualization found at least as far back as Aristotle, but emerging in a pronounced form in the scientific work of Goethe and other Naturphilosophes, which form the backdrop of much of contemporary holism (Harrington, 1996). Indeed, there is a connection between the Naturphilosophisch conception of wholes as pregiven and their self-referential structure, the most telling example perhaps being found in the work of Kant (see Lenoir, 1982; and McFarland, 1970). As soon as wholes, however, are considered ontological pre-given, they partake of the same fate as hylozoism’s animation of nature, i.e., they are pushed all the way down into the primordial substance of nature. As a result, the coming into being of wholes loses any bewildering character just as the origin of life does for hylozoism. If wholes pre-exist, then their coming into existence is no longer an issue. Although, as in hylozoism, there is then the equally obscure issues of both why these preexisting wholes are not always apparent and when they are apparent what is it that has enable this to come to pass. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH HYLOZOIST PERSPECTIVES As briefly mentioned above, two the conceptual problems plaguing hylozoism are its denial of radical difference and its replacement of the enigma of the origin of the radically different quality of life with the equally enigmatic quandary of why what’s supposed to be imbued with life does not show this innate organicity. In the Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper modern garb of complexity theory, hylozoist tendencies likewise prematurely take the sting out of a particularly thorny question: how is the emergence of radically novel entities with radically novel properties possible. In particular, the hylozoism of today presents several deep conceptual problems which in my opinion obviate the usefulness of such an orientation in the study of complex systems. In effect, hylozoist sentiments in the study of complex systems possess, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell, all the benefits of parthogenesis over genuine sexual reproduction.. That is, they want to have us believe that radical otherness somehow spontaneously emerges out of nature because it is pre-given in nature. The outcome though is as fruitful as a stillbirth. Not the least problem with holism, whether of ancient or modern expression, is the same one that Aristotle had with Platonic Forms: How is a non-material whole supposed to affect the material world? Holists find themselves in the unenviable position of claiming their non-material wholes have material efficacy without quite showing how. This is not to deny that there may be such a thing as the so-called “downward causation” of wholes onto parts. But if this downward influence is thought of in terms of something mysteriously nonmaterial then we are in a cognitive swamp of great conceptual unwalkability. Holists then The other two interrelated muddles have already been mentioned, that is, how the ontologically pre-given wholes remain hidden; and what process enables them to appear when they come out of hiding. The hylozoist perspective can be seen if the answer to the these two questions includes something like the conceptual strategy of an actualization of a potential. Indeed, this sort of perspective can be detected in several places in complexity theory, e.g., Gregoire Nicolis’ explanation of selforganization in physical systems as the activation of a hidden nonlinearity (Nicolis, 1989) and even in Mitchell Feigenbaum’s explication of his constant in the logistic map in terms of the potential of so-called one-humped maps (Feigenbaum, 1983). Now there may be ways in in specific cases where the actualizing of potentials is an appropriate conceptual strategy. But when it is used to dodge the really difficult issue of how the radical novel can emerge then it becomes just some fancy footwork, maybe pretty to look at but lacking in real scientific or philosophical perspicuity. A version of the actualization of potentials but even more drastic in its refusal to deal with the hard issue of the arising of the radically different is that of self-generation, an idea promulgated by the mathematician and computer scientist Ben Goertzel ( ). Relying on the mathematician Paul Aczel’s theory of hypersets which are sets with the property of being allowed to contain themselves, a property going against conventional standards of logic and set theory, a self-generating system would consist of a collection of components which act on each other with a certain probability, thereby yielding new components with different probabilities. The result is a new collection of components which can then be fed back into the previous system like functional iteration or computational emergent updating, thereby used as “fodder” for further ongoing modifications. Now there is nothing inherently problematic about self-generating systems themselves just as their isn’t for self-referential structures or constructions as such. Indeed, as Goertzel has shown, self-generating can provide clever insights for computational data mining and analysis. However, they operate in a manner that parallels hylozoism, a fact derived from the basis of self-generation in hyperset theory. If a set can contain itself as a member, then this amounts to the positing of a primordial self-referentiality. If there is a primordial self-referentiality, however, then we are back with the hylozoist stance of Varela’s algebra of self-reference. It is like the problematic nature of Escher’s famous drawing of two hands drawing each: once the two hands have emerged then this drawing graphically illustrates how they maintain each other by their cross referential relation. But the drawing suggests, at the same time, that unless the 5 Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper macroscopic image is just the macromanifestation of an infinitely small micro-seed of their self-cross referential structure, that is, a version of some kind of hylozoist selfreferentialism all the way down, there’s no way the hands could have emerged in the first place! Hence, self-generation may be plausible to talk about the initiative of the components of a system in reinforcing each other, but it is not a viable way for talking about the initiative of emergence in the first place since it amounts to emergents emerging by their own bootstraps. Hylozoism, in whatever version, has the unfortunate feature of replacing one mystery by another, of supposedly explaining one obscuring by something equally or even more obscure. THE EMERGENT CONSTRUCTION OF EMERGENT WHOLES Since hylozoist perspectives in effect dodge the really tough questions about how emergent wholes can come about, what’s needed instead is an approach which squarely looks at this difficult and instead of shirking it, grapples with it. Previously, I’ve offered an approach to emergence which characterizes the processes of emergence in terms of construction, more specifically, self-transcending constructions (Goldstein, 2001). The basic idea there was to offer a fresh approach to the study of emergence given the fact that even in spite of the great amount of research devoted to emergence in such areas of complexity theory as far-fromequilibrium thermodynamics, dynamical systems, and Artificial Life, it cannot be denied that emergence has remained an elusive concept primarily due to the lack of suitable constructs for investigating structure and patterns (see, e.g., Cructhfield, 1993; Hartman, 200; Holland, 1998). I sketched-out a constructional approach that took quite seriously the claims made for emergent phenomena, and then backing-in, so to speak, from the characteristics of such phenomena to how they might come about, that is, what kinds of constructional processes might be capable of bringing them about. It must be noted that “construction” is not being in its customary sense where it carries the connotation 6 of an “external constructor”. Rather, those processes at the heart of evolution, namely variations and natural selection, as well as the genetic operators of Artificial Life can be included under the rubric of “construction” in this sense. A self-transcending construction is one precisely leading to an outcome that is radically transcendent with respect to that from which it emerges. To the degree that emergents are not pregiven as a hylozoist perspective would have it, but, instead, are dynamical, that is, arise over time, then they must be in one way or another constructed in this specific sense. It would be too much of a distraction to go into any more detail here as to the justification for taking such an approach except to reiterate that it was offered as a fresh look at emergence with the hope it would prompt some fresh insights into emergence. However, what I can offer here are some hints as to what might involved in processes of the self-transcending constructions of new emergent wholes. Specifically, I am offering several hints culled from areas of study devoted to the issue of the organization of wholes as such: Gestalt Psychology’s principles of the organization of perceptual wholes; principles from the design of aesthetic wholes; how selfreferentiality in grammatical structures are constructed. Obviously, these are not meant to be an exhaustive survey of what’s involved but rather, as stated above, merely as hints in that direction. If emergent wholes are somehow constructed out of the interaction of their parts, and in such a manner that it makes these wholes more than a mere amalgam of parts, then a good starting place would not be to jump to the transcendental source of such wholes as hylozoist oriented holism does, but instead, stay with the whole as it shows itself and carefully explore first what it is about it that summons the label of wholeness. What specifically is it about an emergent whole that makes it a whole? In other words, what is the wholeness of a whole? PRINCIPLES OF PERCEPTUAL WHOLES Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper Although Gestalt Psychology grew out of a long tradition of holism in Germany which, as described above, posited wholes as pre-given, ontological facts, nonetheless, Gestalt Psychology’s study of perception has been concerned with how parts are organized in such a way as to “construct” a perceptual whole.(Köhler, 1947). Since their focus, then, has been not just on any old organization of parts, but how the parts fit together to form a whole, gestaltism can be turned to as a source of insight into precisely what constitutes the wholeness of emergent wholes. Kurt Koffka, one of pioneers in Gestalt Psychologist stated, “It has been said: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It is more correct to say that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts., because summing up is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole part relationship is meaningful.” (Koffka, 1935, p. 176). Gestalt Psychology has typically conceived the perception of organized wholes through an adumbration of several principles of “organization” or “grouping” what Koffka talked about in terms of parts which “fit” each other, or a “good continuation” or “joining”: < Figure/Ground; < Closure: One of the features of a pattern which make it appear as a whole is it having some sense of closure so it can be distinguished from the background; < Proximity; < Similarity; < Symmetry; < Continuity: tend to prefer continuous figures, like a cross, we see two intersecting lines not four lines meeting at center; < Uniformity: a strongly unified part of a field will look as uniform as possible; < Internal vs External Forces of Organization or Forces Within vs Without: Here is not the place to assess the merits of any of the principles of this list, but merely to point out that principles such as these are what serves to make wholes wholes. Therefore, to the extent that emergent wholes are constructed this constructional process would need to take heed of such a list. This point will be reinforced by the similar way of thinking about wholes described in the next section. THE CONSTRUCTION OF AESTHETIC WHOLESTHE CONSTRUCTION OF AESTHETIC WHOLES The wholeness of artistic products has been a primary concern of artists. For example consider these three quotes from famous artists: Delacroix: “before knowing what the picture represents you are seized by its magical accord” (quoted in Dewey, 1934, p. 145). Paul Klee: “the aim of our theoretical work is always in one form or another, the organization of differences into unity, the combination of organs into an organism. ...” (quoted in Barratt, 1980, p. 282. Mattisse: “the relationships between tones [colors] must be instituted in such a way that they are built up instead of knocked down. A new combination of colors will succeed to the first one and will the give the wholeness of my conception” (quoted in Dewey, 1934, p. 136). This concern for aesthetic wholeness has perhaps had its most intense commitment and expression in Islamic design since the Quranic injunction against pictorial representations of the deity and the prophet led to a turn to abstract geometrical representations of divine unity (Burckhardt, 1976). These abstract geometrical forms to portray unity and wholeness can be a door into abstract principles of design about wholeness which parallels in certain ways the Gestaltist’s views on the organization of perceptions into unities. The principles of Islamic representations of wholeness can be summarized as follows (derived from Burckhardt, 1976; and, Critchlow, 1976): < the center, periphery, and in-between regions are all important with the design balanced in its focus on all three; 7 Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper < a heterogeneity of sizes and shapes linked by common “threads” as well as a mix of repetition and the unexpected; < regions concentrically layered from the center out are connected; < the use of symbols of the unity of oppositions, e.g., circles, squares, crosses, six pointed stars, octagons, and so on; < interlocking and interweaving, both locally, and across the whole picture which serve to hold the whole together; < parts are demarcated as well as connected to the whole; < the use of modularity and scaling, including the golden proportion and its fractal scaling; < various symmetries; < a harmony of simplicity and complexity. Moreover, the overt design can, on analysis be found to rely on covert patterns acting as a sort of blueprint for wholeness (see Critchlow, 1976). It is crucial to emphasize that the organization of the design exhibited as wholeness is not something apart from the parts but is how the parts are made to fit with each other and the whole. This wholeness is a “unity in multiplicity” where each part has an indispensable function and in that sense at least is not downplayed in relation to the whole. Rather the whole is precisely that which is constituted by the parts in their interrelationships. CONSTRUCTING SELF-REFERENCE: DIAGONALIZATION As discussed above, organic wholeness has been thought of in terms of referential closure from Kant through Maturana and Varela into the neo-emergentist focus on autocatalytic networks. An access into how self-referential structures can be constructed is afforded by a look at how selfreference comes about through grammatical constructions of sentences. A self-referential sentence is by definition one that refers to itself, e.g, the following four sentences: (1) This sentence is written in English. (2) This sentence has five words. 8 (3) This sentence is grammatically correct. (4) This sentence is a sentence. In each case, it is the opening phrase “This sentence” which is the marker that indicates that what the sentence is referring to is itself. There’s nothing particularly significant in using the phrase “This sentence” to construct a self-referential sentence since it could be replaced by some other device to indicate self-reference, e.g., putting a box around the sentence: The sentence in the box is in English. Sentence 4 is a bit more complicated since it is not only referring to itself, it also referring to itself about what it is, i.e., a sentence, whereas what the previous sentences, 1, 2, and 3 are referring to themselves about is not the fact of being a sentence but, instead, about the language, the number of words, and its grammatical status. There is nothing particularly unusual about such grammatical constructions and accordingly, there shouldn’t be any controversy about whether such sentences are semantically meaningful. (By the way, cross-reference is an indirect form of selfreference in that it includes two or more things referring to each other in a circular fashion, so that ultimately the circle comes back to from where it started so it amounts to an indirect form of self-reference (see Grim, Mar, St. Denis, 1998; and , Hellerstein, 1997). In mathematical logic, the construction of self-reference is often understood in terms of diagonalization (Smullyan, 1994). First, for an expression (AexA for short) of the sentence, substitute for ex the literal quotation of the whole statement. This is actually much easier than it sounds, for example, start with sentence 10: (10). John is reading Moby Dick. (“Moby Dick”’’ ex) and substitute the whole sentence (10) for ex to yield: Complexity and Philosophy Workshop - DRAFT paper (11) John is reading “John is reading Moby Dick” Strictly speaking, sentence (11) is not yet selfreferential for it merely asserts John is reading sentence (10), not itself, sentence (11). a fixed point attractor in the logistic map at certain ranges of the parameter value. Indeed, fixed points show that a recursive function have become self-referential in regards to the variable). Conclusion Now consider the sentence: (12) John is reading the diagonalization of sentence (11). Since the diagonalization of (11) is {John is reading “John is reading >John is reading Moby Dick’”}, sentence (12) is {John is reading “John is reading >John is reading >John is reading Moby Dick=>”}, or: (12A). John is reading the diagonalization of John is reading >John is reading Moby Dick=.” The diagonalization of expression (12A) then would be: (13) John is reading the diagonalization of (12) or {“John is reading the diagonalization of >John is reading Moby Dick.=”}. Sentence (13) then asserts that John is reading the diagonalization of (12), but the diagonalization of (12) is (13) itself! Therefore, sentence (13) asserts that John is reading the very same sentence itself (13)! Accordingly, sentence (13) is purely self-referential. Whatever the construction process necessary for emergent wholes, is it would need to mimic in some sense diagonalization. Our brief review of diagonalization shows that achieving pure selfreference is difficult since the action of referring has to be completely bent back around to itself, a complete, not partial, fulfillment of circularity. That’s why neither self-reproduction nor recursion are purely self-referential, the former because what’s being reproduced is not itself but a facsimile thereof, the latter because the feeding back consists of a new value not just the same old value (unless, of course, the recursive function has become a fixed point, for example, Hylozoist strategies are certainly a temptation for the way they manage to avoid the really “hard problem” of emergence. It might seem that we are also falling into a hylozoist cast by presenting what could be taken as a form of “pan” selftranscending constructionalism. However, selftranscending constructions are by their very nature not pre-given, but refer, instead, to a dynamical process of the coming into being of the radically original. 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