1. No category

Manuscript under review. Do not quote without permission. Comments welcome.
How to Attract Voter Attention? The Emergence of the Political
Agenda and the Issue Management Model
Daria W. Dylla
University of Cologne
Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy
daria.dylla[@]uni-koeln.de
http://www.jaeger.uni-koeln.de/index.php?id=dylla
November 10, 2009
Abstract
The large theoretical and empirical body of research on different rational
choice concepts has provided a wide array of material for both critics and
adherents of this approach. However, the ability rational choice theories offer
to incorporate assumptions developed in different research areas in unitary
logical concepts has been seldom highlighted. In order to demonstrate this
ability, I have developed a model of the emergence of the political agenda,
called the Issue Management Model, which tries to extend the Economic
Theory of Democracy to the requirements of the modern media-democracy,
and to connect its main assumptions with some concepts of shaping the
political agenda from political psychology and media communication. The
paper pursues three objectives: first, it demonstrates the ability of the rational
choice theories to link their key assumptions to empirical results of studies in
different academic disciplines. Second, it discusses the extent to which the
Economic Theory of Democracy can be aligned with the requirements of
modern democracy. Lastly, it attempts to bring together several concepts of
the emergence of the political agenda. The intention of this article is to
contribute to a better understanding of the formation of political agenda or,
strictly speaking, of the construction of party strategies aimed at surviving in
office.
Key words: rational choice, political agenda, Issue Ownership Theory, heresthetic, voter maximizing,
Economic Theory of Democracy
„This is the art of politics: to find some alternative that beats the current winner. (...)
If the alternative appears unattractive, then it is dropped, probably never to be heard
of again. But if it should attract some response, it is started on a life of its own. (...)
The array of alternatives exchanges elements, thus presenting the society with an
infinity of new alternatives. None of this happens by magic, of course. Each step of
the proliferation is carried forward by a politician with an interest. This is why a new
issue is raised by one person, why it is stolen by another, why still others jump on
the band wagon, why still other combine the alternatives in novel ways. In this way,
the market for alternatives is very much like the market for products in which
proliferation is motivated by the desire of producers to make money“ (Riker 1982:
209).
1. Introduction
It might be stated that the rational choice approach has been perceived as one of the most controversial
approaches in modern political science. No other theoretical family appears to be as popular, or indeed
controversial, as the family of rational choice theories (Cohn 1999: 2, Hedström/Stern 2006). A high
degree of emotionality in the discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of this theoretical
framework (Monroe 2001: 156) is, therefore, hardly surprising. On the one hand, the rational choice
approach continues to arouse strong criticism regarding especially the rationality assumption, the
primacy of theoretical modeling over empirical tests, and the use of more sophisticated mathematics as
well as „the tendency for many formal theorists to present their ideas in an overly complex and
impenetrable manner“ (Walt 1999: 20; Pedriana 2005: 354).i On the other hand, the rational choice
approach is sometimes regarded as „the second best thing that ever happened to social science“
(Lindenberg 1985: 99; see also Abell 1992: 203), becoming an engine of social scientific research
(Shepsle 2005). However, there is still one aspect of the rational choice approach which is seldom
mentioned, even by its adherents, e.g., its ease to absorb assumptions developed in diverse academic
disciplines in logically coherent analytical concepts. Showing this ability is the point of departure of
this article. For this reason, a model of the emergence of the political agenda shall be presented, which
demonstrates how the key assumptions of one of the most prominent rational choice theories – the
Economical Theory of Democracy – could be connected with the recent studies from the research
areas of political science, political psychology and media and communication studies. The model,
called the Issue Management Model, does not, however, only illustrate how recent research in many
disciplines of science can enhance and improve the explanatory power of the rational choice theories.
It’s consideration and development has two additional functions: First, its integration in pre-existing
assumptions of the Economic Theory of Democracy helps it to adapt to the requirements and
expectations of modern democracy. One of the central elements of the Economic Theory of
Democracy is the question of how political leaders form their strategies in order to maintain their
position in office. It is obvious, however, that nowadays this question cannot be answered without
referring to the endeavours politicians make in order to determine their political agenda. Should the
Economic Theory of Democracy maintain its status of being a cornerstone of the modern rational
choice theories (Monroe 1991: ix) with „perhaps the greatest influence on political scientists“ (Mueller
2
2003: 4), its central assumptions must inevitably be enhanced by a model of the emergence of the
political agenda. I assume, therefore, that the question of how candidates compete for voters is in fact
a question of how they compete to define and control the political agenda to their advantage. Second,
the Issue Management Model represents an attempt to contribute to the theoretical research on the
emergence of the political agenda. There is evidently a great need for more theoretical research on this
point, which would also require studies on political communication and rhetorical strategies of
parties.ii Although in recent years, a substantial body of detailed, empirical research on political
communication has been undertaken, the studies focus primarily on voter behavior once exposed to
political information, whereas the politicians’ behavior has received much less attention (see Sides
2006; Damore 2004; Simon 2002; Shaw 1999). Even if, as some argue (see Jerit 2005: 23), our
understanding of rhetorical strategies of political actors, as a key means of determining the political
agenda, is not in its infancy any more, contributions referring to the supplying side of the political
communication are in fact in the minority. Unlike most studies on the emergence of the political
agenda, this paper does not refer, however, to the campaign politics and electoral rhetoric in a narrow
sense. Rather, it concentrates on the agenda-formation process in legislative settings, namely on policy
debates. Legislative agendas are not considered to be a fixed set of proposals that are voted on
sequentially (for a contrasting viewpoint see Damore 2004). Rather, the question is, how that set of
proposals emerges, or more specifically, why do particular parties tend to put certain issues on the
agenda? Furthermore, the theoretical body of work on rhetorical strategies is characterized through the
emergence of many narrow concepts that are analyzed and tested separately, such as the Issue
Ownership Theory, the Riker’s Dominance Principle and the concept of heresthetic, as well as agenda
setting, framing and priming. In developing the Issue Management Model, the current contribution
attempts to bring some of these concepts together.
In short, this article presents a comprehensive model of the emergence of the political agenda,
called the Issue Management Model, which combine assumptions of the Economic Theory of
Democracy with some recent models of shaping the political agenda. In doing so, three tasks shall be
undertaken: first, the ability of the rational choice theories to link their key assumptions to empirical
results of studies in different academic disciplines shall be demonstrated. Second, the extent to which
the Economic Theory of Democracy can be aligned with the requirements of modern democracy shall
be discussed. Lastly, an attempt shall be made to bring together several concepts of the emergence of
the political agenda. Hopefully, it is the intention of this article to contribute to a better understanding
of the formation of political agenda or, strictly speaking, of the construction of party strategies aimed
at surviving in office.
3
2. The Economic Theory of Democracy and the tactical role of the political agenda
As is the case with all rational choice theories, the Economic Theory of Democracy rests upon two
assumptions: on the premise of the methodological individualism, and on the rationality assumption.
Accordingly, each decision is seen as arising from the individual goal-oriented behavior (Ordeshook
1968: 1; Lupia/McCubbins/Popkin 2000: 8). One of the main presumptions of the Economic Theory
of Democracy states that decision-makers aim primarily at voter maximization in order to keep their
position of power (see Downs 1957). The main objective of political actors results, thus, form the
structure of the electoral competition, which emerges, in turn, from the institution of the democratic
election. Consequently, regardless of their motives to win office, politicians have to follow the logic of
the political competition in order to survive. This is not to say that political decisions are produced
solely for that reason. However, since the quest for political survival shapes the behavior of political
actors, it appears to be an fruitful starting point for an analysis of political decision-making. The
following part of this paper puts forward and supports the notion that the shaping of political agenda
should be considered one of the most crucial elements of the effective, strategic maximization of
voters. But first and foremost, a definition of the political agenda is necessary. According to
Baumgarten, Schattschneider (1960) is considered to be the first scholar to regard the arrangement of
the political agenda as a fundamental part of a political process. Two years later, Bachrach and Baratz
(1962) published the contribution entitled „The Two Faces of Power“, in which they stated that the
first face of power is the power of an authoritative choice between alternatives, the second one is, in
turn, the control over which political alternative becomes prominent in political discussions
(Baumgartner 2001). Relying on Baumgartner, the political agenda is here defined as “the set of issues
that are the subject of decision making and debate within a given political system at any one time”
(Baumgartner 2001: 288). In this regard, I argue that this set of issues results from an intended
politisation of particular issues by political elites. By politisation of issues, I mean a relatively
frequent discussion about, and highlighting of, selected issues with the aim of turning the attention of
the mass media – and, therefore, the public –, to these considerations. For political elites, the
politisation of issues constitutes, thus, an instrument of affecting public attitudes and preferences. The
growing interest in defining certain political issues can be, thus, explained by the fact, that the
politisation of issues becomes an essential element of winning office in a modern democracy. The
reason for that is the increasing phenomenon of so called issue voting. In fact, with regard to Europe,
scholars identify a decreasing number of voters using a party affiliation as a voting cue (see
Dalton/Wattenberg 2000: 26; Kayser/Wlezien 2005). Short-term voter coalitions, holding a particular
interest in selected policy issues, appear to take over the stable body of electors. Moreover, as
empirical studies point out, independent voters are more likely to be affected by policy issues than
partisan voters are (Abbe et al. 2003). It means that a raising number of independent voters increase
the number of voters who are prone to base their candidate evaluation on considerations raised in
policy debates. Furthermore, the recent research in political psychology and studies on media effects
4
show that the voting behavior of nonpartisans is primarily based on issues that can easily be recalled at
the moment of the electoral choice. Cognitively available are, in turn, such issues that are able to gain
one’s attention, and that are frequently enough addressed in the mass media (Zaller 1992;
Krosnik/Kinder 1990; Aldrich et al. 2006: 485). They also confirm that varying amounts of attention
placed on an issue affect the basis for candidate evaluations. Consequently, parties are associated
primarily with those issues and judged on the basis of those considerations that dominate the public
agenda (for priming, see below). Furthermore, there are convincing results of the research on the
agenda setting effects concerning the transfer of the importance of issues to the public via mass media.
They show that the more frequently issues occur, the more relevant they are perceived as being by the
audience (see Kiousis/McCombs 2003).
Taken together, the results of recent research on when policy issues are perceived as essential, and
how the electoral choice is related to candidate competence show that the election outcomes depend
heavily on a party’s ability to control the political agenda with issues that are both salient, and within
the subject area for which the party is reputed to be competent. Consequently, an efficient strategy of
voter maximization must rely first and foremost on the creating and highlighting of issues, and their
dissemination to the public. The structuring of the political agenda for a party’s (or individual’s) own
advantage is referred to by Riker as heresthetik – „the art of political manipulation“ (Riker 1986: 1).
Admittedly, he noted that heresthetik cannot be determined ex ante, as it always depends on the
specific environment in which politicians act (see Riker 1983: 56). It refers, however, to specific
themes, rather than the theoretical concept as a whole. In the next section a theoretical model called
the Issue Management Model is presented, a model which could also be seen as an analytical basis for
making heresthetik. In differentiating three steps in which politicians try to determine the political
agenda, this model attempts to link existing approaches dealing with the formation of the political
agenda, and the political rhetoric strategies in one logical concept. Below, several models integrated in
the Issue Management Model confirm that politicians behave in the way assumed theoretically.
However, whether political actors really construct their strategies of agenda determination in the threestep method, as the Issue Management Model assumes, has not been empirically tested to date. Rather,
as all other theoretical frameworks, the Issue Management Model attempts first and foremost to lay
out a valuable platform for analyzing and understanding political behavior. Further research is needed
to assess whether this framework also mirrors reality.
The Issue Management Model is undoubtedly only one part of the required control over the
political agenda for a well-structured strategy of voter maximization. The second part is the
dissemination of selected issues to the public through the mass media (see figure 1). For the brevity
required by this article, I refer, however, only to the first part of the control management: the Issue
Management Model, it is, to the strategy of voter maximization through forming the political agenda.
5
The Issue Management Model:
•
Selection of issues in consideration of
the competence area of a party
•
Selection of issues in consideration of
their potential to gain public attention
•
A definition (frame) of the selected
issues
Transport of the selected issue
through mass media to the voter
market
Figure 1: Two parts of a voter maximization strategy
1.
The emergence of the political agenda: The three steps of the Issue Management
Model
1.1. Competency
The first step of the Issue Management Model is based on determining the area of competency of a
particular party. This idea refers to the concept of heresthetic by Riker, which is, in turn, based on the
so-called Dominance Principle: „When one side dominates in the volume of rhetorical appeals on a
particular theme, the other side abandons appeals on that theme“ (Riker 1996: 6). According to Riker,
candidates should focus their attention on considerations which either play to their strengths or to their
opponents’ weaknesses while avoiding issues that either accent the opposition’s strengths or highlight
their own weaknesses. This theoretical assumption of linking the formation of the political agenda
with party competence has become a subject of empirical research, primarily within the priming
studies and the Issue Ownership Theory.iii
In fact, many empirical results appear to confirm the fact that the behavior of political leaders
corresponds closely with the priming assumption (Egan 2006; Jacobs/Shapiro 1994; Johnston et al.
1998; Krosnick/Brannon 1993; Krosnik/Kinder 1990; Macdonald/Rabinowitz 1993: 76). Accordingly,
political leaders choose those considerations, for which society are assumed to perceive them as
competent, to appear on the political agenda. They emphasize, therefore, particular issues by giving
those issues more space in their statements in a bid to persuade voters to put more weight on those
issues when choosing among parties or candidates (Druckman/Jacobs/Ostermeier 2004: 1206). In this
regard, we speak about priming effects (see Iyengar/Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1992; Quiring 2003;
Graber/Smith 2005).
The second body of empirical research on the emergence of the political agenda has been
undertaken in the area of the Issue Ownership Theory. It presents the so-called “issue specialization”,
6
it is “a reputation for policy and program interests, produced by a history of attention, initiative and
innovation toward these problems, which leads voters to believe that one of the parties (and its
candidates) is more sincere and committed to doing something about them“ (Petrocik 1996: 826;
Petrocik/Benoit/Hansen 2003). The Issue Ownership Theory is based, therefore, on the assumption
that the reputation a party holds provides it with credibility over issues owned by this party (Damore
2004: 392; Norpoth/Buchanan 1992).iv The very point of departure is the assumption that voters
support those political actors whose party is perceived as competent in handling issues that dominate
public debate. In consequence, politicians highlight dimensions within which they have the advantage,
that are consistent with their party reputation (Simon 2002; Abbe et al. 2003). In contrast, politicians
avoid emphasizing (to emphasize) issues that do play to their individual or their party strength or that
favor the opposing party. Indeed, the empirical work on the emergence of the political agenda by
political elites indicates that focusing on party-owned issues is an effective strategy for setting the
political agenda (for confirmation of the real advantage parties gain from focusing on „their“ issues,
see Brasher 2003; Abbe et al. 2003). The reason for that is that when focusing on issues that are
traditionally associated with their party, decision makers encourage voters to concentrate on those
issues, and, accordingly, to base their electoral choice on them. Furthermore, such emphasis on mostly
party-owned issues also helps political actors win the support of independent voters, whose electoral
choices, particularly in close races, are of great importance. The success in dominating the issue
agenda is, therefore, closely related to the advantages at the polls.
1.2. Attention Gaining
However, the Issue Management Model states that considerations over issues, for which a party has
demonstrated its competence, is a necessary but not sufficient step toward shaping an effective
rhetoric strategy aiming at determining the political agenda and, thus, keeping itself in office. The
point here is that not all issues from the issue ownership area qualify as objects of politisation. Rather,
from the set of issues which favor a particular party, those issues are selected which have a particular
ability to gain the public attention. The assumption is that those parties have electoral advantages,
whose reputation is the strongest on issues, which people are most concerned about, or in other words,
which are salient to the voter at the time of the election choice. The second step of the Issue
Management Model is, therefore, that from the set of issues a party “owns”, those issues that are able
to exceed the threshold of the voter perception are chosen and politisated. The reason for that is that
voters are more likely to cast their ballots for a candidate who campaigns for his or her party-owned
issues that are also important to them. Empirical evidence for this assumption is offered for instance
by Abbe et al. (2003). Bélanger and Meguid go even further and state that party ownership has an
effect on the individual vote choice only when the issue in question is perceived as important to a
given person (Bélanger/Meguid 2008).
7
1.3. Framing
The greatest challenge, and at the same time the third step of, the Issue Management Model, is the
question of how those issues that were selected first, through the lens of the ownership principle (the
first step), and second, through the lens of the attention-gaining principle (the second step), should
finally be interpreted? This question is notably important, since each policy issue can be interpreted in
many different ways. Certainly, a given interpretation does not alter the issue itself. It does, however,
have a dramatic impact on its meaning in the public’ mind. As Berinski and Kinder note, “The same
story covered in subtly different ways by different media outlets can lead to very different
understandings of important political events” (Berinsky/Krosnik 2006: 654). The third element of the
Issue Management Model is constituted, therefore, by framing. Framing assumes that issues are not
context-free labels but (. Rather, they) can be linked to different aspects, and approached from varying
perspectives (see Berinsky/Krosnik 2006: 641). Therefore, the attributes of given issues shape frames
in which they are or could be discussed. So, framing means the ability to define the way in which an
issue will be presented to the public, or, a suggestion of how events could or should be understood
(understand). Many researchers see framing not only as „a central aspect of the ‚conversation‘
between elites and citizens in a democracy“ (Nelson/Kinder 1996: 1074), but also as a key means of
influencing voter preferences or just as an „essence of public opinion formation“ (Chong 1993: 870).
This is because public opinion frequently depends on the frame of an issue established in the mass
media. Put differently, frames determine how people understand a certain problem.v
In conclusion, it can be stated that the competition for voters is based not only on issue
selection, but primarily on the interpretation of these issues. As Thomas E. Nelson und Donald R.
Kinder noted: „[E]lites wage a war of frames because they know that if their frame becomes the
dominant way of thinking about a particular problem, then the battle for public opinion has been won“
(Nelson/Kinder 1996: 1058). Consequently, not only the selection of issues is made in a strategic way,
but also their interpretation, since even slight differences in the framing of an issue might imply a
different understanding of a problem and, thus, influence voter behavior.vi
To sum up, the ability of the politisation of issues largely depends on two aspects: First, on the
alignment of the issue in question to the issue area of a party, and second, on the potential this issue
has to gain public attention. After the two previously mentioned first selection steps, the final selected
issue is framed and subsequently transferred via mass media to the electorate. In this context, one of
the prominent scholars of the Salience Theory, Ian Bude, presumed that the empirical evidence of an
excessive highlighting of issues with the potential for voter accumulation changes the picture of
political competition „from the classical ‚great debate‘, or direct argument over a common range of
problems, to one where parties talk past each other, glossing over areas which might favour their rivals
while emphasizing those on which they feel they have an advantage“ (Budge et al. 1987: 24).vii
Whether politicians were more prone to „great debates“ earlier on than they are these days, appears to
be a point for discussion. The fact is, however, that due to the increasing number of issue-voters,
8
successful shaping of the political agenda has become the most effective tactic of voter maximization
in a modern democracy.
2.
The production of attention: salience and emotionality
„New alternatives, new issues, are like new products. Each one is sponsored as a test of the voting
market, in the hope that the new alternative will render new issues salient, old issues irrelevant, and
above all, will be referred by a majority to what went before“ (Riker 1982: 209). Despite the large
uncertainty regarding voter behavior, politicians remain not only hopeful, but they also have the
knowledge, provided by political psychology and media studies, of how to conceptualize issues that
might be capable of attracting societal attention. Accordingly, the most effective instruments to grab
people’s attention are highly salient and emotional issues (Damore 2004: 392).
Salience refers to the importance, significance and urgency that an actor ascribes to a certain issue
within the political agenda (see Oppermann/Höse 2005: 149). Salience can be operationalized by
simply asking the interview question of what is the most important problem. This question can refer
either to things that are considered by an individual to be personally essential or to the state’s tasks
being seen as the most relevant (an overview for different operationalisation methods this question is
offered by Wlezien 2005: 556). David Butler and Donald Stokes wrote on this point already in 1972:
„If an issue is to sway the election it must not only have crossed the threshold of his awareness; he
must also have formed some genuine attitude towards it. The more an issue is salient to him and the
subject of strong attitudes, the more powerful will be its influence on his party choice. Indeed, given
the multiplicity of influences upon the individual elector, only issues that excite strong feelings are
likely to have much impact“ (Butler/Stokes 1972: 288).
On this point, however, it is worth noting that in speaking about salience not only the
relevance of a problem is important in forming the political strategic communication, but also the need
for a solution to this problem, i.e., the extent to which this problem is deemed to be problematic (see
Wlezien 2005). Consequently, organized crime is generally regarded by the majority as a problem.
However, for political leaders it will be of secondary importance, as long as the majority of voters do
not see it as a problem requiring urgent or immediate solving. Of course, each problem perceived as
relevant is also seen as emotional. Conversely, however, not every emotional issue is interpreted as a
salient one. Sensational or controversial issues are perceived as emotional, but they need not be
thought of as problematic. When, for example a politician from an opposition party or journalist
uncovers a serious corruption scandal involving some high-level members of the government, this
issue might be expected to be viewed emotionally in society. However, as long as corruption scandals
do not belong to “the most important problems”, which should be resolved at once, this issue cannot
be considered salient. In spite of this, the emphasis media put on emotional but not actually salient
issues, can also dictate the election outcome. For instance, it might damage the image of the
government party but it can also become the very ground for party judgment at election time and, thus,
quite relevant for the prospects of being (re-)elected. At this point, it should be stressed the research
9
results of political psychology about the relevance of emotions for the judgment of parties (see Jerit
2002: 8). For instance, in her empirical studies Jennifer Jerit confirms the dominance of emotional
slogans in the political rhetoric (see also Brady/Sniderman 1985; Kinder 1994; Schwarz 1990;
Marcus/MacKuen/Neuman 2000; Clore/Isbell 2001). This corresponds with the assumption of the
Economic Theory of Democracy that elections are seen by voters as low-cost situations, in which
information costs are to be reduced to the minimum (see Kirchgässner/Pommerehne 1993). It is,
therefore, plausible to assume that salient and emotional issues might have a critical impact on the
election outcome (see Jerit 2002: 8).
3.
Sources of information about salient issues
However, how do politicians establish what kind of considerations might attract public attention, and
what sort of frames might they accept?
Both (auto-)stereotypes and the dominant patterns of problem perception, which are anchored in a
historical and societal context, could be regarded as the first source of information about the issues
which are particularly attractive in a given society. Undoubtedly, some messages have an advantage,
since they are tied to the myths and symbols of cultural heritage, whereas others have no chance of
being accepted as they are contrary to existing believes. Three aspects are, therefore, of great
importance to political leaders: First, the knowledge regarding national-specific sensitivities,
particularly resulting from historical experiences, second, information about the varying intensity with
which problems are perceived, and third, the knowledge of what kind of questions is most likely to
attract collective emotions. The key for gaining the voter support lies, therefore, in the information,
and subsequent awareness, of what sort of messages might get a better reception in a given society,
i.e., what kind of political issues the majority are sensitized for, what sort of problem resolution is
mostly accepted by the majority, and finally which stereotypes and prejudices are able to compensate
for the lack of knowledge or reduce peoples’ uncertainty in the most effective way. Whether the
collective national-specific sensibilities could, in fact, be tactically relevant depends, however, on the
extent to which the historical experiences or stereotypes are common in a given society. The more
multinational or multicultural is a society, the less relevant historical or cultural backgrounds are in
creating issues that can gain voter support, and the more relevant are the poll results.
The second source of knowledge regarding the peoples’ perception of given themes are results
of empirical research on particular short-term issues in focus groups, and primarily in representative
surveys. Nowadays, the survey research undoubtedly constitutes an important component of the
information management of political leaders. The larger the amount of voters interested in short-term
issues, the larger is the demand for regular asking people, what they think, want or disfavor. Given the
validity and reliability of survey results, they provide politicians with comprehensive knowledge about
which policy areas or particular issues are perceived in a society as relevant, what kind of issues
people feel affected by, whether an alternative is perceived positively or negatively, and how
particular formulations/phrases and slogans are perceived semantically. For instance, in Germany
10
1998, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) tested ca. 90 campaign slogans (for example,
terms such: “reform”, “innovation”, “progress”) in a representative survey. The purpose was to gather
knowledge about which words successfully attract the attention of the German people. The result
showed that the term “reform” was perceived negatively, since reforms of the government coalition
SPD/die Grüne were generally regarded as “unsocial”. For this reason, the SPD replaced the word
“reform” by the term “innovation”, which, according to the survey, evoked the interest and curiosity
of the respondents, and included it in its communication strategy (Machnig 1999). In short, on the one
hand, surveys are an appropriate instrument for political leaders to fit their issue offer to the voter
needs, therefore, to correct their image. In this regard, the orientation on poll results might be seen as a
restriction of the room for maneuver of political parties. On the other hand, survey results are a facility
for political leaders, since „elites can ‚use‘ public opinion as a weapon of political struggle, instead of
merely responding to it“ (Manza/Cook 2002: 657).
4.
Embedding of issues in ideological positions of parties
Another precondition for a desired impact of an issue or its interpretation on the voter behavior is the
compatibility of a problem-solution proposal, presented by parties, with their ideological positioning.
The point is that the embedding of short-term issues in a long-term ideological line facilitates not only
the election choice of voters, but also the decision-making of political leaders. For voters, the
ideological embedding of issues can be helpful when parties do not sufficiently differentiate
themselves from one another in their problem-solving competence. In this case, ideological
differences can point to the appropriateness of a party to solve given problems, which creates, in turn,
advantageous shortcuts of the landscape of political parties. „[I]f I know what you think on defense
policy, abortion rights, and environmental policy, I can guess (with some error) what you think of
school lunch subsidies“ (Hinich/Munger 1997: 6). For voters, this ideological abbreviation of (the) a
party’s landscape opens, therefore, a possibility of a cost-efficient orientation in the political spectrum.
The complexity of political decisions can, thus, be reduced quickly and with minimal cost. And since
ideological signals of the political course of a party can be decoded without detailed knowledge, nonpartisans also benefit from ideological shortcuts (Ferejohn 1990; Popkin 1991; Lupia/McCubbins
1998; Kuklinski/Quirck 2000; MacKuen et al 2003; Pappi/Shikano 2004: 1). Using shortcuts is
valuable primarily in multiple party systems, in which parties want to keep a distance from one
another. The reason is that the stronger the ideological polarization, the easier it is to recognize
differences between parties through ideological lines. When no issue is perceived as particularly
relevant, then it is profitable for voters in multiple party systems to decide solely on the basis of an
ideological sympathy. According to Downs, voters in multiple party systems are more prone to be
influenced by ideological considerations than they are in two party systems, in which parties converge
ideologically to the center and become similar (see Downs 1957). However, the ideological shortcuts
are of value not only for voters but also for parties, as they do not have to state their detailed position
on all political issues. Somewhat provocatively, it could be stated that political leaders are, in fact,
11
compelled to a parsimonious argumentation due to the reduced demand for elaborate political
statement in society. The ideological positioning, which anchors each party in the political space, and
also constraints party possibilities to define and contextualize issues, leads finally to the result that
parties cannot arbitrarily change their standpoints (see Hinich/Munger 1994: 73). Due to the anchoring
of political issues in long-term ideological positions, political elites are more predictable for voters as
if there were no ideological platforms, and the competition would take place only with regard to shortterm issues.
5.
Restrictions by defining the issue management
In the previous sections I assumed that the prerequisite for an efficient issue management is a
successful link between those issues which are of advantage for a party, and those which are capable
of gaining increased amounts of public attention. The ideological embedding of these issues
contributes additionally to achieving the goal of holding office through determining the political
agenda. However, conceptualization and setting of themes for the purpose of voter maximizing is by
no means an easy task, and, as empirical studies show, we can observe parties’ trespassing on issues
associated with the opposition party, or put simply, parties also campaigning in their opponent’s issue
territories (see Sigelman/Buell 2004; Holian 2004). There are, however, well-founded reasons for this
practice, some of each I detail below.
First, parties develop their strategies in a highly uncertain environment. The uncertainty lies with
both voter behavior as well as the behavior of opposition parties. The growing voter mobilization
increases the uncertainty about which voter groups should be addressed first by a given message,
which issue has the biggest potential of gaining attention, and on the basis of which attributes
candidates will finally be chosen. As mentioned above, voter majorities are often formed shortly
before the election day from distinctive small groups. These groups are, therefore, anything but stable.
In addition, there is also a great lack of transparency concerning issues and their frames, which might
be chosen by the opposing party.
Second, parties are seldom in the comfortable situation to make reference only to those issues in
which they have the advantage. There are several reasons for that. (a) Each political actor not only has
the incentive to emphasize her or his own strengths over certain issues, but also to highlight the
opponents’ weaknesses. For this reason, decision makers aim to involve their opponents in a dialogue
over issues that accent their own competency. Consequently, during the struggle for conquest of the
political agenda, parties shape not only their own strategies, but also the strategy of opposing parties.
Even if political leaders tend to emphasize different considerations and pay attention to party-owned
issues, at the same time they are forced by the opposing side to engage in a policy debate. Engaging in
dialogue with the opponents does not mean, however, a contradiction of Riker’s Dominance Principle,
but quite the opposite in fact. A party avoids appeals on the theme on which the other side has
advantage, but it tends, in turn, to involve the other side in a policy debate, in which it can identify its
own advantage. If the opposing side attacks a proposal of the governmental party, the latter has to
12
respond, i.e., to defend its arguments from attack and, thus, to engage in the debate over an issue. It
cannot simply ignore an attack without losing its credibility. From this perspective, the engagement in
policy debates should be regarded as a rational, necessary element of a rhetorical strategy (Jerit 2005:
24). (b) Furthermore, shaping the political agenda is affected also by environmental factors such as the
breakout of war outcomes of international summit meetings, natural disasters etc., as well as other
actors aiming at structuring the debate over policy issues, such as interest groups, experts, academics
and numerous other elites (see Chong 1993). As a result, politicians could be compelled „from
outside“ to comment on issues that they do not “own”. (c) Moreover, it is not in the interest of parties
to be removed from a relevant public debate. In avoiding this, they have to comment on all issues that
are most highlighted in mass media, regardless of their issue ownership area, and try to establish their
competency to resolve problems linked with those issues. As previously mentioned, recent research on
this point provides evidence that issues perceived as salient to the electorate are more likely to be
discussed by candidates, despite the issues’ partisan ownership. Therefore, the salience of an issue
increases the likelihood of it’s coming under discussion by politicians, even if it is associated with the
opposition party (Aldrich/Griffin 2003; Damor 2004: 395).viii Some scholars (Aldrich/Griffin 2003)
see this result as problematic from the perspective of the Issue Ownership Theory, since it presupposes
that candidates’ selection of issues is made irrespective of their area of competence. However, this
practice could also be regarded as rational behavior of political actors. Given the preponderance of
evidence that party-owned issues dominate the candidate rhetoric (Petrocic 1996), trespassing on
issues is clearly a result of a pragmatic assessment of the environment in which a political competition
for voters takes place (Damor 2004: 392). The decisive point is that even if parties address the same
topic, they continue to use different frames. I argue that the real struggle for political survival is based
not only on issues, but first and foremost on frames of those issues. Speaking about a refutation of the
issue ownership assumption could only be plausible, therefore if parties use the same frame, not just
trespass on issues.
In short, for the range of reasons discussed above it is not surprising that parties or candidates
frequently talk about the same considerations (Sigelman/Buell 2004). This engagement in a dialogue
on the some topic does not, however, deny their tendency to shape and frame a debate relying on
issues for which they are credible. Even if parties speak about the same policy issues, they frame those
issues differently.
Third, intellectual predispositions, skillfulness in dealing with restrictions, and not least the
political adeptness of candidates and their advisors are of the utmost importance for the successful
setting of new considerations. Obviously, not each politician has strategic skills, and wise advisors.
Lastly, there are psychological boundaries of manipulation of voter preferences through agenda
setting, priming and framing. In this context, recent research points out the psychological mechanism
of selectivity. Accordingly, the selectivity of choice, retention and perception of information is a main
characteristic of the manner in which human beings deal with received information. Consequently,
they notice only this information, which confirms their preexisting attitudes, and trust only those
13
sources of information which correspond with their prior views.ix Therefore, the ease with which
political actors frame an issue to their advantage depends on the extent to which citizens have
preconceived opinions about it (Jerit 2008: 4). Even if the results of recent research, largely conducted
in the field of media science, show that the filter of perception could be broken by deploying factors
capable of gaining public attention (see McCombs 2004: 130), the adoption of the interpretation of
particular issues to the pre-existing voter preferences seems to be essential. The more consistent these
preferences are, the less likely their alteration through emphasizing and contextualizing of certain
issues is (see Nelson/Kinder 1996: 1058). This effect is confirmed, for instance, by Rune Slothuus. He
notes the reason for this is on the one hand that „a person with inconsistent and ambivalent
considerations are in more need of, and more susceptible to, a frame to make sense of how to tackle
the issue. On the other hand, a person with strong predispositions will have more consistent
considerations whose relative importance it will be difficult to change. (…) Thus, the stronger
predispositions, the better equipped a person will be to decide whether or not to reject or accept an
issue frame“ (Slothuus 2005: 12).
The limits of the political manipulation through agenda setting, priming and framingx decide
furthermore, the salience and complexity level of given issues. Accordingly, if an issue is salient, but
at the same time not overcomplicated, people are able to make a judgment about it. Conversely, if an
issue is salient, but too complex, its understanding depends largely on its interpretation of a political
leader, which ultimately equates to (it means,) the public being exposed to political manipulation. In
consequence, the individuals most prone to be influenced by priming and framing are those who do
not have stable preferences with regard to issues that are relevant but too complex. In this situation,
individuals are not able to formulate any preferences by themselves. However, even if there are factors
that limit the effects of agenda setting, priming and framing on the electoral choice, relying on these
elements when developing the strategy of voter maximization is still considered to be inevitable for
creating an effective issue management.
6.
Conclusion
The large theoretical and empirical body of research on different rational choice concepts has provided
a wide array of material for both critics and adherents of this approach, and continues to contribute to
the vital exchange of arguments concerning this approach in the scientific community. However, the
ability rational choice theories offer to incorporate assumptions developed in different research areas
in unitary logical concepts has been seldom highlighted. In order to demonstrate this ability, I
developed a model of the emergence of the political agenda, called the Issue Management Model,
which tries to extend the Economic Theory of Democracy to the requirements of the modern mediademocracy, and to connect its main assumptions with some concepts of shaping the political agenda
from political psychology and media communication. The Issue Management Model is, therefore,
based first on the principle of political survival, and second on the tendency for issue-voting, and to
use mental short cuts when making electoral choices. In developing this model, I tried to show how
14
the emergence of the political agenda in democracies could be explained. As mentioned above, this
model does not claim to mirror reality. It offers, however, a useful analytical framework to approach
political practice. Not least, the model helps to explain why parties do not focus on those issues
particularly requiring a solution. Rather, they are mostly concerned with issues, which are firstly
sufficiently salient to arouse excitement in society, and which can secondly be tied to the particular
competence of parties to resolve problems. The strategy of voter maximizing is, therefore, based on
discussing those issues that belong to the competence area of a party, and that are capable of arousing
resonance in society. Consequently, policy issues are chosen according to the rules of attention
distribution. The analogy to the economy market is obvious: Particular considerations become the
subject of policy debates not because of their significance, rather because they are perceived by
politicians as a highly appropriate instrument for influencing voter preferences. In consequence, the
composition of the political agenda depends profoundly on public demand: Those issues that are
expected to raise the public attention are most likely to be discussed. As a result, many relevant issues
remain unconsidered, whereas issues with the potential to gain voters are transmitted to society
through all available communication channels. The quest for survival in office implies that the value
of a political issue is measured by its utility in terms of gaining or holding on power.
Finally, it should be strongly emphasized that the Economic Theory of Democracy does not
regard the competition for political office with negative or cynical touch, but it views it quite
neutrally. “In a democracy, the function of a politician is to find an issue on which he or she can win,
for thereby a politician expresses some part of the values of the electorate. Political opportunism is not
evil, therefore, but is instead the engine of democracy” (Riker 1982: 216). Political leaders need not
necessarily be selfish, but they must inevitably focus on keeping themselves in office.
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ii
For an overview of the most critical points that seem to be still current, see Shapiro/Page 1994. For arguing
that rational choice does not necessarily equal formalization, see Cox 2002: 4; Snidal 2002: 73 a. 77; Dylla 2007.
ii
The terms “parties” and “political leaders” or “politicians” are treated in this paper synonymously since a party
is understood as a conglomerate of individual politicians with the same objective: voter maximization.
iii
However, the political tactic of stressing topics, in which a party has demonstrated credibility, while avoiding
those, in which it is weak, is not only a key element of the heresthetic, the Issue Ownership Theory and a subject
of the study on priming effects, but it emerges also in the Salience Theory, I refer to below.
iv
For empirical validity of the Issue Ownership Theory, see Aldrich 1980: 174 ff.; Petrocik 1996; Narud/Valen
2001; Griffith 2005; Egan 2006. A formalisation of this theory is offered by Simon 2002. For a criticism, see
Kaplan/Park/Ridout 2006; Aldrich/Griffin 2003.
v
For empirical studies confirming this hypothesis, see Druckman 2001: 1041; Simon/Xenos 2000;
Sniderman/Theriault 2004; Slothuus 2005: 2; Berinsky/Krosnik 2006.
vi
For an argument that parties not always focus on framing but also engage in a policy debate, I discuss below,
s. Jerit 2005.
vii
For
research
on
Salience
Theory
regarding
the
political
competition
see
Stokes
1992;
Klingemann/Hofferbert/Budge 1994; Budge 2001; Van der Brug 2004; Clarke et al. 2005.
viii
An empirical evidence for a high degree of issue convergence, when issues in question are salient, is
provided by for instance Sides (2006), and Green/Hobolt (2008).
ix
Empirical evidence of the hypothesis that when exposed to contrary frames, the attentiveness of the public
focuses on those frames, which confirm its political believes, offer for instance Rousseau/Lux/Miodownik 2000;
Sniderman/Theriault 2004: 27; Goble/Werner 2006: 4.
x
For an overview of the limits of the political manipulation through framing, see Druckman/Nelson 2003.
19