Why do diplomatic partners have similar Freedom
House ratings?
Homophily and selection in the diplomatic exchange network
Steffen Mohrenberg
(University of Hamburg)
International Sunbelt Social Network Conference XXXII
Redondo Beach, March 2012
States with similar FH–values are diplomatically connected
Positive Network
Autocorrelation
Moran’s I = 0.2
Selection?
Influence?
Figure: Diplomatic relations and FH–ratings, 2005
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Selection of diplomatic partners according to FH–values
Unfree states do not want diplomatic relations with free states
Pressure for political liberalization resulting in loss of political
power
Free states prefer other free states as their partners
Relations between free states work more smoothly
Free states are more reliable and politically predictable
diplomatic partners
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Influence: ego’s FH–score depends on diplomatic partners
Diplomatic relations increase interaction between states
Interaction leads to diffusion of political ideas and institutions
“Free” diplomatic alters induce trend towards high FH–values
“Unfree” diplomatic alters pull ego’s FH–values down
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Co–evolution model (RSiena)
Co–evolution of
Global diplomatic network (binary, undirected)
FH–ratings of individual countries (1–7)
Continuous–time, actor–based, stochastic model
Creation of ties if two states agree; one state can end tie
Observations: 1995, 2000, and 2005
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Network Dynamics: objective function
β
s.e.
FH–Selection
1.
2.
3.
FH (alter)
FH (alter) 2
FH (ego * alter)
0.07
-0.02
0.02
(
(
(
0.02
0.01
0.01
)
)
)
Trend
4.
Degree (ego)
-0.27
(
0.36
)
5.
6.
Transitive Ties
p
Degree(alter )
-1.00
-0.15
(
(
0.2
0.07
)
)
7.
8.
9.
GDP (alter)
GDP (alter) 2
GDP (ego * alter)
0.17
-0.01
0.02
(
(
(
0.03
0.01
0.01
)
)
)
Distance
10 .
11 .
12 .
Distance (capitals)
Contiguity
Closure (dipex–contig.)
0.00
1.10
0.16
(
(
(
0.00
0.13
0.01
)
)
)
Alliances
13 .
14 .
15 .
Alliance
Closure (alliance–alliance)
Closure (a.–a.) * alliance
1.51
-0.20
0.17
(
(
(
0.26
0.05
0.06
)
)
)
16 .
17 .
Similar interests
Closure (simint.–dipex)
0.44
0.05
(
(
0.15
0.01
)
)
Structure
GDP
State interest
Modeling changes in countries’ FH–scores
Behavior Dynamics: objective function
Influence
1.
FH (average alter)
Trend
2.
3.
FH (ego)
FH (ego)
4.
GDPpc (ego)
Control
2
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
β
s.e.
0.51
(
0.27
)
0.33
-0.01
(
(
0.09
0.04
)
)
0.09
(
0.08
)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Selection of diplomatic partners based on FH–values
FH (alter)
1
2
3
FH (ego) 4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-0.26
-0.31
-0.36
-0.41
-0.46
-0.52
-0.57
-0.13
-0.17
-0.20
-0.24
-0.27
-0.31
-0.35
-0.04
-0.07
-0.09
-0.11
-0.13
-0.15
-0.17
-0.00
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
-0.06
-0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.09
-0.15
-0.11
-0.07
-0.03
0.01
0.05
0.08
Based on the effects FH (alter), FH (alter)2 , and FH (ego * alter)
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Influence of alters’ FH–values on ego’s FH–score
FH (ego)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2
3
FH
4
(av. alter) 5
6
3.15
1.37
-0.41
-2.19
-3.96
2.27
1.00
-0.27
-1.53
-2.80
1.37
0.61
-0.14
-0.90
-1.66
0.45
0.20
-0.04
-0.29
-0.54
-0.49
-0.22
0.04
0.30
0.57
-1.44
-0.67
0.10
0.87
1.65
-2.42
-1.14
0.14
1.43
2.71
Based on the effects FH (ego), FH (ego)2 , and FH (average alter)
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
What explains FH–similarity of diplomatic partners?
Trend
Control variables
Influence effect (FH)
Selection effect (FH)
1995–2000
2000–2005
67%
16%
11%
9%
62%
16%
12%
12%
Based on comparisons of Moran’s I averages over 1000 simulations
for each nested model
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Main results
Diplomatic partners have similar FH–values because of
independent effects of influence and selection (expected)
Selection effect
Free countries strive for diplomatic relations with other free
countries (expected)
Unfree countries do not prefer diplomatic ties with either
unfree or free alters (partially expected)
Influence effect
Countries with free neighbors tend to increase, countries with
unfree neighbors tend to decrease their FH–score over time
(expected)
Thanks for listening!
8
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations
Major sources of inspiration
Steglich, C.; Snijders, T. A. B.; Pearson, M. (2010): Dynamic Networks
and Behavior. Separating Selection from Influence. In:
Sociological Methodology 40 (1), S. 329–393.
Fordham, B. O. (2011): Who wants to be a major power? Explaining
the expansion of foreign policy ambition. In: Journal of
Peace Research 48 (5), S. 587–603.
Neumayer, E. (2008): Distance, power and ideology. diplomatic
representation in a world of nation-states. In: Area 40 (2),
S. 228–236.
Warren, T. C. (2010): The geometry of security. Modeling interstate
alliances as evolving networks. In: Journal of Peace
Research 47 (6), S. 697–709.
Steffen Mohrenberg (University of Hamburg)
Regime homophily and selection in diplomatic relations