Pitfalls in Collection Letters Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act1 Elizabeth M. Shaffer Elizabeth M. Shaffer is an Associate with Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, 255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202. Ms. Shaffer may be contacted at (513) 977-8128 or by e-mail at [email protected]. ______________________________________________________________________________ I. OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT A. What Is the FDCPA? The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. “The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ... provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.” Nicholas v. CMRE Financial Services, Inc., No. 08-4857, 2009 WL 1652275, at *2 (D. N.J. June 11, 2009) (quoting Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 400 (3d Cir. 2000)). B. What Is the Purpose of the FDCPA? The FDCPA is “a statute designed to curb aggressive debt-collection practices.” Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, LLC, 365 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, it has been held that “[t]he FDCPA is designed to protect against abusive debt collection practices which would likely disrupt a debtor’s life.” Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (stating that the purpose of the FDCPA is to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses"). 1 The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of issues often raised in litigation so that a debt collector may attempt to avoid litigation. Nothing within this article should be read to suggest that an actual violation of the FDCPA or OCSPA has occurred based on any particular conduct. The purpose of the FDCPA is not only to protect consumers from unfair debt collection practices, but also to avoid "imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors." Peter v. GC Servs, L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 351-352 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 1-2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1695, 1696). Thus, the FDCPA is designed to protect against disruption in a debtor's life, while still allowing a creditor to ethically collect a debt which it is owed. C. What Are the Elements of an FDCPA Claim? To establish a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, plaintiffs must prove four essential elements: 1. the plaintiff is a natural person who is harmed by violations of the FDCPA, or is a “consumer” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692a(3), 1692(d) for purposes of a cause of action, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c or 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(11)[;] 2. the “debt” arises out of a transaction entered primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(5)[;] 3. the defendant collecting the debt is a “debt collector” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6); and 4. the defendant has violated, by act or omission, a provision of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.A § 1692a-1692o; 15 U.S.C.A § 1692a; 15 U.S.C.A § 1692k. Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F. Supp.2d 914, 938 -939 (N.D. Ohio 2009). The absence of any one of the four essential elements is fatal to a FDCPA lawsuit. Id. D. Key Sections Governing Liability Under the FDCPA 1. Key Definitions • "Consumer": Any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). • "Creditor": Any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 2 • “Debt”: Any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). • “Debt collector”: Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include-(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor; (B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts; (C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties; (D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt; (E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and 3 (F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6). 2. Communications After Notice of Representation by an Attorney - 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney: "Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). Even if a debt collector knows a debtor is represented by an attorney, the debt collector may still send a dunning letter to the consumer with respect to a different debt. Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F.Supp. 1456, 1464 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding dunning notices sent by debt collector after it had received notice from debtor's attorney to communicate only with attorney did not violate the FDCPA where they referred to debts other than those which had been assigned to the debt collector at the time of the communication from the attorney; the debt collector would not be charged with knowledge that the attorney represented the debtor with respect to debts assigned to the debt collector after the date of the attorney's letter, even though those debts were assigned by the same creditor which assigned the earlier debts.) 4 3. Communications with Third Parties - 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), a debt collector generally may not communicate with third parties regarding a consumer's debt: "Except as provided in section 1692b of this title [governing acquisition of location information], without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (emphasis added). 4. Harassment or Abuse- 15 U.S.C. § 1692d 15 U.S.C. § 1692d renders a debt collector liable for engaging in conduct that has the natural consequence of harassing, oppressing, or abusing a debtor in connection with the collection of a debt. Section 1692d lists several nonexclusive examples of such conduct, including, inter alia, threats of violence, use of obscene or profane language, causing a telephone to repeatedly ring with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass a person, and so forth. The district court of Minnesota found that the natural consequence of language used in debt collector's dunning letter, stating that “in case of an emergency, will you be refused credit because of this unpaid account we have for collection?” was not abusive to an unsophisticated reader under the FDCPA. Although it was arguably abusive to the subjective eyes of an abnormally sensitive reader, the question was not “offensive” in a way that was akin to profanity or obscenity. Bryant v. Bonded Account Service/Check Recovery, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 251 (D. Minn. 2000). 5. False or Misleading Representations - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Most consumers who bring suit against debt collectors under the FDCPA do so under one of the following sections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Cases interpreting these provisions in the context of collection letters are discussed more fully below. • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e: "A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 5 • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A): A debt collector may not falsely represent "the character, amount, or legal status of any debt" • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B): A debt collector may not falsely represent "any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt." • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3): A debt collector may not falsely represent or imply "that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney." • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5): A debt collector may not threaten "to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken." • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10): A debt collector may not use "any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer." 6. Unfair or Unconscionable Acts - 15 U.S.C. § 1692f 15 U.S.C. § 1692f specifically provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt, including, without limitation, collecting "any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Along with filing suit under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, consumers often allege a violation of the relatively broad Section 1692f, which generally prohibits unfair or unconscionable acts. See Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp.2d 795, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (quoting Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) ("While § 1692d prohibits 'harassment or abuse,' and § 1692e forbids 'false or misleading representations,' § 1692f serves a backstop function, catching those 'unfair practices' which somehow manage to slip by §§ 1692d & 1692e. That is, '§ 1692f allows the court to sanction improper conduct that the FDCPA fails to address specifically.'" E. The Bona Fide Error Defense The FDCPA contains a bona fide error defense that can shelter a debt collector from liability arising out of actions which would otherwise violate the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) states: 6 A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Thus, under the bona fide error defense, "a debt collector cannot be held liable under the FDCPA if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence the following three elements: (1) the violation was not intentional; (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide (or good faith) error; and (3) the violator maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." E.g. Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F. Supp.2d 783, 794-795 (S.D. Ohio 2006). The Sixth Circuit recently held that the bona fide error defense applies to mistakes of law, not just to procedural or clerical errors. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 476-477 (6th Cir. 2008). In Jerman, an initial validation letter incorrectly stated that a dispute must be in writing. The parties agreed that the defendant-law firm's mistake as to the written dispute requirement was a question of law, as opposed to a clerical error. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the bona fide error defense applies to questions of law, and that the law firm was entitled to the bona fide error defense under the facts of the case. Id. at 476. As evidence of good faith, the court noted that the defendant law firm designated its senior principal as the individual responsible for compliance with the FDCPA; he regularly attended conferences and seminars that focus on FDCPA issues; the firm subscribed to “Fair Debt Collection,” a part of “The Consumer Credit and Legal Practice Series,” together with the supplements thereto; the senior principal routinely distributed copies of cases relevant to the firm's practices and procedures to all attorneys at the firm; all new employees, attorneys and non-attorneys, were advised of the firm's obligations under the FDCPA and provided with the firm's FDCPA Procedures Manual, and encouraged to seek the senior principal's advice with questions regarding the FDCPA; and the senior principal conducted a mandatory meeting at least twice a year for all available employees wherein FDCPA issues and developments were discussed. Id. at 477. Federal circuit courts are split on whether the bona fide error defense applies to mistakes of law and, on June 29, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the issue. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 129 S.Ct. 2863 (2009). F. Standard for Evaluation of Collection Letters 1. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone , 561 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, a consumer may recover statutory damages if the debt collector violates the FDCPA even if the consumer suffered no actual damages. Id. 7 2. The Sixth Circuit, like Most Circuits, Applies the Least Sophisticated Consumer Standard. To determine whether a statement qualifies as misleading under the FDCPA, the Sixth Circuit employs an objective, “least-sophisticated-consumer” test. Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone , 561 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2009); Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2008). This standard “protects naive consumers [while] prevent[ing] liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care.” Miller, 561 F.3d at 592. Stated differently, courts “will not ‘countenance lawsuits based on frivolous misinterpretations or nonsensical interpretations of being led astray.’” Id. (quoting Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2007)); See also Belile v. Allied Med. Accounts Control Associated Bureaus (In re Belile), 209 B.R. 658, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (Violations of the FDCPA are assessed from the perspective of the "least sophisticated consumer.") 3. A Minority of Courts Apply the Unsophisticated Consumer Standard. The Seventh Circuit has long been a proponent of the "unsophisticated consumer standard." The Seventh Circuit adopted the unsophisticated consumer standard rather than the least sophisticated consumer standard because it held that standard better “admits an objective element of reasonableness” into the determination of whether a “reasonable” consumer would perceive the collection message to be “deceptive or misleading.” Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'Ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit held that the unsophisticated consumer standard serves a dual purpose: it “protects the consumer who is uninformed, naïve, or trusting, yet [also] . . . shields complying debt collectors from liability for unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection [communications].” Id.; see also Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the standard assumes the “uneducated debtor possesses rudimentary knowledge about the financial world, is wise enough to read collection notices with added care, possesses ‘reasonable intelligence,’ and is capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences . . . [and that] a statement will not be confusing or misleading unless a significant fraction of the population would be similarly misled”). 8 The Fifth Circuit has not ruled whether it will apply the "least sophisticated consumer standard" or the "unsophisticated consumer standard" in its evaluation of collection letters under the FDCPA. E.g. Gonzalez v. Kay, No. 08-205442009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17194 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2009) (citation omitted) ("When deciding whether a debt collection letter violates the FDCPA, this court 'must evaluate any potential deception in the letter under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer standard.'"); Goswami v. American Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2004); Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1997); McKenzie v. E.A. Uffman & Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit and the Western District of Texas have recognized that the unsophisticated consumer standard "is designed to protect consumers of below average sophistication or intelligence without having the standard tied to 'the very last rung on the sophistication ladder.'" Taylor, 103 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994)); Goswami, 377 F.3d at 495; Youngblood v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'Ship, 186 F. Supp.2d 695, 697 (W.D. Tex. 2002). The Western District of Texas commented that the purported least sophisticated consumer standard "cannot really mean to protect the least sophisticated consumer" because such a consumer "is a dull bulb indeed." Youngblood, 186 F. Supp.2d at 695. A true least sophisticated consumer analysis would lead to an unworkable rule of law: "Even if never before that time had anyone ever been so ignorant as to be misled by the letter in question, we would have a new leader in the never-ending race to the bottom, a new least sophisticated consumer, and a new and unforeseeable burden on the legitimate and important, if unpopular, business of debt collection" Id. at 698. The Western District of Texas concluded that the unsophisticated consumer standard was "more practical" than the least sophisticated consumer standard. Id. The unsophisticated consumer standard "protects the consumer who is uninformed, naïve, or trusting, yet it admits an objective element of reasonableness. The reasonableness element in turn shields complying debt collectors from liability for unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection letters." Id. (quoting Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257). 9 4. Courts Avoid Peculiar Interpretations of Collection Letters. Although the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, courts nevertheless seek to avoid idiosyncratic and peculiar interpretations of collection letters. See Youngblood, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (quoting Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257) (stating that debt collectors must be shielded "from liability for unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection letters"); Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., 406 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that courts must “disregard unrealistic, peculiar, bizarre, and idiosyncratic interpretations” of collection communications). Besides refusing to adopt peculiar interpretations of collection letters, courts reject literal interpretations "where using the plain meaning . . . creates an 'absurd result.'" See Peter v. GC Servs, L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, “even if the plaintiffs have a decent technical argument for their preferred interpretation,” that particular interpretation should not be followed if “its unreasonable consequences weigh heavily against it, even as a matter of interpretation[.]” Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2005). G. Damages Any debt collector who violates the FDCPA with respect to any person is liable to such person for: (1) any actual damages sustained as a result of the violation; (2) statutory damages; and (3) costs and reasonable attorney fees. Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F. Supp.2d 783, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). Section 1692k states: [A]ny debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure; (2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or (B) in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and 10 (3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). In assessing the amount of damages, the court must consider, among other factors, "the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). Statutory damages are limited to $1,000 "per proceeding" rather than "per violation." Wright v. Finance Service of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 1994). Consumers often allege that actual damages encompass not only out of pocket losses, but also damages for anxiety, emotional suffering, embarrassment, and distress. Generally, a court will only award actual damages for emotional distress where it finds that "the illegal debt collection practice was extreme and outrageous." See e.g., Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency 463 F. Supp.2d 783, 806 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding a genuine issue of material fact existed whether a debt collector's FDCPA violations rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct to justify an award of actual damages for mental distress for all of the class members); Boyce v. Attorney's Dispatch Serv., Case No. C-3-94-347, 1999 WL 33495605, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (awarding actual damages for emotional distress; “Of the more than 100 cases under the FDCPA and the OCSPA that have been filed with this Court, this particular lawsuit involves the most egregious conduct by any defendant”). Punitive damages are not available for violation of the FDCPA. Boyce v. Attorney's Dispatch Serv., Case No. C-3-94-347, 1999 WL 33495605, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 1999) ("The Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages under the FDCPA. That statute expressly sets forth the types of relief that a plaintiff can recover, to wit: compensatory damages, statutory damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. [citation omitted]. However, neither the FDCPA nor its legislative history (see Senate Report 95-382, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695) remotely suggests that a prevailing plaintiff can recover punitive damages for a violation of that statute. Indeed, courts have indicated that statutory damages are punitive in nature."); Aronson v. Creditrust Corp., 7 F. Supp.2d 589 (W.D. Pa.1998); Thomas v. Pierce, Hamilton and Stern, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ga.1997). 11 II. OVERVIEW OF THE OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT A. What Is the OCSPA and What Does it Cover? The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("OCSPA") is found in Ohio Revised Code § 1345.01 et seq. Generally speaking, under the OCSPA a debt collector may not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with a consumer transaction. R.C. § 1345.02. Ohio consumers who bring actions under the FDCPA generally also allege violation of the OCSPA. The Ohio courts have held that the OCSPA applies to debt collectors. See Broadnax v. Greene Credit Service (2d Dist. 1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 881, 893, 694 N.E.2d 167, app. den., 79 Ohio St.3d 1483, 683 N.E.2d 787 (1997); Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc. (9th Dist. 1984), 19 Ohio App.3d 49, 50, 482 N.E.2d 1260; see also Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., 467 F. Supp.2d 769, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2004). So, too, has the Sixth Circuit. See Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1999); Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., 467 F.Supp.2d 769, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2004). B. Key Sections Governing Liability Under the OCSPA In relevant part, the OCSPA states the following: No supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or deceptive act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction. R.C. § 1345.02(A). The OCSPA then provides a non-exhaustive list of acts or practices of a supplier that are considered "deceptive." R.C. § 1345.02(B). None of the enumerated acts specifically lend themselves to disputes regarding the contents of collection letters. The OCSPA also prohibits unconscionable acts by suppliers: "No supplier shall commit an unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unconscionable act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction." R.C. § 1345.03(A). The OCSPA defines a “consumer transaction,” in relevant part, as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to supply any of these things. R.C. § 1345.01(A). 12 The OCSPA defines “supplier,” in relevant part, as "a seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions, whether or not the person deals directly with the consumer." R.C. § 1345.01(C). The OCSPA defines a “consumer” as "a person who engages in a consumer transaction with a supplier." R.C. § 1345.01(D). When determining whether a consumer states a claim under the OCSPA, the debt collector should consider whether it falls within the definition of a "supplier" who is governed by the statute. Generally speaking, however, "Ohio courts have read these provisions to hold that the collection of debts associated with consumer transactions . . . falls within the purview of the OCSPA because such debt collection covers acts that occur before, during, or after the transaction." Schroyer v. Frankel , 197 F.3d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1999). "While the definition of 'supplier' under the OCSPA is substantially broader than the definition of 'debt collector' under the FDCPA, the requirements of the statutes are similar in that to prove that an attorney was 'engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions' under the OCSPA, a plaintiff must show 'more than one isolated occurrence, especially when the occurrence is not within the usual course of business. The phrase has generally been held to mean continuous or regular activity, not a single isolated occurrence.'" Id. (quoting Renner v. Derin Acquisition Corp., 111 Ohio App.3d 326, 676 N.E.2d 151, 159 (1996)) In the context of attorneys who may collect a debt, to determine "whether an attorney is a 'supplier' under the OCSPA, a court must consider specifically the regularity with which the attorney engages in the type of transaction attacked by the plaintiff, and not the entire gamut of transactions in which the attorney participates." Id.; Renner, 676 N.E.2d at 159 (finding that attorney who sent a letter demanding payment on behalf of her client was not a “supplier” given lack of proof that she sent such letters in the regular course of business); see also Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 412 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that attorney was not a “supplier” due to absence of proof that he regularly and deliberately filed collection suits in improper jurisdiction). Thus, to determine whether attorneys are “suppliers” under the OCSPA, courts must ask essentially the same question that is asked to determine whether an attorney is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA: Did debt collection activities fall within the attorney's regular and usual course of business so that he or she was “engaged in the business of” debt collection? Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1999). C. The Bona Fide Error Defense Like the FDCPA, the OCSPA provides a supplier with a bona fide error defense: "In any case arising under Chapter 1345 of the Revised Code, if a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid the error, no civil penalties shall be imposed against the supplier under division (D) of section 1345.07 of the Revised Code, no party shall be awarded attorney's fees, and monetary recovery shall not exceed the amount of actual damages resulting from the violation." R.C. § 1345.11(A). 13 Under the plain language of R.C. § 1345.11(A), if the supplier establishes a bona fide error, the consumer's damages are limited to actual damages. Courts will analyze the bona fide error defense under the OCSPA in the same manner as they analyze the bona fide error defense under the FDCPA. See Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency , 463 F.Supp.2d 783, 810 (S.D. Ohio 2006). D. Damages With respect to damages, the OCSPA states the following: (B) Where . . . an act or practice determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02, 1345.03, or 1345.031 of the Revised Code and committed after the decision containing the determination has been made available for public inspection under division (A)(3) of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code, the consumer may rescind the transaction or recover, but not in a class action, three times the amount of the consumer's actual economic damages or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater, plus an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars in noneconomic damages or recover damages or other appropriate relief in a class action under Civil Rule 23, as amended. R.C. § 1345.09 (B). Generally speaking, therefore, a consumer may recover statutory damages of $200 or three times his actual damages, whichever is greater, plus an amount not exceeding $5,000 for non-economic damages. R.C. § 1345.09(B). Attorneys' fees are also available to a prevailing party under the OCSPA: The court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed, if either of the following apply: (1) The consumer complaining of the act or practice that violated this chapter has brought or maintained an action that is groundless, and the consumer filed or maintained the action in bad faith; (2) The supplier has knowingly committed an act or practice that violates this chapter. 14 R.C. § 1345.09(F). Therefore, attorneys' fees are available to a prevailing consumer if a supplier knowingly violates the OCSPA. Under Ohio law, "to establish a knowing violation of [the OCSPA], for an award of attorney fees, a plaintiff need prove only that the defendant acted in a manner that violated the CSPA and need not prove that the defendant knew that the conduct violated the law." Charvat v. Ryan (Ohio 2007), 116 Ohio St.3d 394, 401, 879 N.E.2d 765, 772. Because there may be a relatively small recovery of actual or statutory damages on OCSPA claims, attorneys' fees may comprise much of any award of damages. For example, in Luft v. Perry County Lumber & Supply Co. (10th Dist.) 2003-Ohio-305, a consumer sued a paint manufacturer, lumber yard, and others claiming fraud, negligence, breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and violation of OCSPA, and product liability for paint failure on pre-coated lumber used in the consumer's buildings. The consumer prevailed and received compensatory damages in the amount of $8,000 and attorneys' fees of $86,000. In affirming the award, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not required to consider a proportionality determination of reasonable attorney fees. The trial court properly considered time spent on case, hourly rate, and complexity of issues in arriving at the fee award. The court noted that the legislative purpose of the OCSPA attorney fee provision was to permit meritorious consumer protection claims to be brought in spite of a relatively small potential damages. Similar to the FDCPA, a prevailing supplier may also recover attorneys' fees if it establishes that the consumer brought a groundless action and filed or maintained the action in bad faith. R.C. 1345.09(F)(1). As one might expect, a court will rarely award a prevailing supplier its attorneys' fees. See Davis v. Axelrod Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (8th Dist.), 2003-Ohio438, ¶ 34 (reversing trial court's award of attorneys' fess to a car dealership on consumer's OCSPA claim and holding that prevailing care dealership was not entitled to its attorney fees, absent any evidence that the buyer brought her action for any purpose other than pursuing her perceived rights under the CSPA.) A prevailing consumer may also recover punitive damages in connection with a violation of the OCSPA. Boyce v. Attorney's Dispatch Serv., Case No. C-3-94-347, 1999 WL 33495605, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174 (1987) (syllabus)) (awarding punitive damages to a prevailing consumer and noting "[p]unitive damages may be awarded under the law of Ohio, when, inter alia, the defendant has acted with “a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”). III. What Are the Requirements for a Collection Letter? A. Governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) sets forth the required contents of a typical collection, or dunning, letter: 15 (a) Notice of debt; contents Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing-- B. (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. Typical Notice of Validation of Debt. A typical notice of validation of a debt that would appear in a collection letter is as follows: "Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor." It is important to note that a consumer need not dispute the debt in writing. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 464 F. Supp.2d 720, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 16 C. The "Mini-Miranda" A communication to a consumer must state the following information, typically referred to as the "mini-Miranda": "This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information will be used for that purpose. This communication is from a debt collector." Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), a debt collector may not fail "to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action." IV. PITFALLS IN COLLECTION LETTERS A. Overshadowing - 15.U.S.C. § 1692g(b) In its initial correspondence with a debtor, a debt collector may not "overshadow" the time period in which the debtor has to seek verification of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) states, "Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor." Generally speaking, a "[d]ebt collection notice is 'overshadowing' or 'contradictory' if it makes an unsophisticated consumer uncertain as to his or her rights under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act." Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., 942 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Wis. 1996). Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, the collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. Meselsohn v. Lerman, 485 F.Supp.2d 215 (E.D. N.Y. 2007). 1. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). The court held an attorney violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by demanding payment of a debt within 10 days, which is inconsistent with the 30 day time frame to dispute a debt contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The court reasoned that a notice of rights, when presented in conjunction with such a contradictory demand, is not effectively communicated to the debtor. 17 2. Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008). The court held that the debt collector's letter to consumer stating, “If your payment or notice of dispute is not received in this office within 30 days, we shall recommend further action be taken against you to collect this outstanding balance,” did not overshadow or contradict collector's notice that consumer had right to require verification of debt, on ground that consumer would be uncertain whether she had any right to dispute debt at all before payment, in violation of FDCPA. The court reasoned that the least sophisticated consumer would understand that consumer had option to submit notice of dispute within 30 days, rather than pay claimed sum within 30 days, and right to seek validation of debt was further explained in clear terms on face of demand letter. 3. Olson v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc., 366 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2004). The court held that a form collection letter twice stating that amount was “Now Due” did not contradict or overshadow meaning of 30day validation notice, in violation of FDCPA; phrase “Now Due,” even to an unsophisticated consumer, simply meant that debt collector was willing to accept less than the total balance of the debt to bring the account to current status. 4. Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, on remand 989 F. Supp. 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The court held that language in a debt collector's initial letter to a debtor, besides statutorily required notice of the debtor's 30-day right to dispute debt, whereby the debt collector warned the debtor of the need to “immediately” contact the debt collector in order to avoid possible legal action, did not contradict or overshadow the validation notice itself, in violation of the FDCPA, where the debt collector nowhere required immediate payment but only an immediate call to his office, and where the letter was typed in uniform, same-size type, which did not emphasize any particular statement in letter. 5. Durham v. Continental Cent. Credit, Inc., 600 F. Supp.2d 1124 (S.D. Cal. 2008). The court held that a debtor's allegation that a second demand notice sent by a collection agency obscured her right to dispute her was sufficient to state claim against agency under FDCPA, where the first notice informed debtor of her right to dispute debt's validity within 30 days, but second notice, sent within that 30-day period, demanded immediate payment. 18 6. Owens v. Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, 550 F. Supp.2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2008). The court held that a letter seeking to collect overdue homeowners' association dues contained language that overshadowed or contradicted its validation notice, in violation of the FDCPA. The court reasoned that even if threatened consequences of failing to pay were not inexorable, where the letter advised consumers of their right to contest debt within 30 days of their receipt of letter, but later stated that their entire annual assessment might be accelerated if they did not pay within 30 days of date of letter, and letter did not explain that its demand for payment did not override the consumers' right under FDCPA to seek validation of debt. 7. Register v. Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, PC, 488 F. Supp.2d 143 (D. Conn. 2007). The court held that language in a debt collector's letter to a consumer regarding time to cure default overshadowed and contradicted language informing the consumer about time in which he could dispute his debt, in violation of the FDCPA, where the letter stated that consumer only had thirty days to cure default before suit would be brought, and nothing in letter indicated that the debt collector would halt its debt collection activity if the consumer made a written request for validation. 8. Spira v. Ashwood Financial, Inc., 358 F. Supp.2d 150 (E.D. N.Y. 2005). The court held that notice in a debt collection letter stating it was the debt collector's policy to report all unpaid accounts to a major credit bureau after 30 days of the notice and urging the consumer to protect her credit by paying her debt did not overshadow the letter's validation notice, in violation of the FDCPA. The court reasoned that the notice did not state that the policy of reporting unpaid accounts depended on how the consumer responded or that the consumer's failure to pay her debt and forego her right to contest it would hinder her ability to obtain credit in the future, and the validation notice was presented in same font, size and typeface. 9. Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Associates, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-919, 2008 WL 1775251, *8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2008). Where a collection letter stated that the consumer must make a payment within 10 days and also stated that the consumer had 30 days to dispute the debt, the court found a genuine issue of material fact whether the thirty-day validation notice was overshadowed by the debt collector's implicit threat that the consumer would be criminally prosecuted for failing to pay the debt within 10 days of receipt of the letter. 19 B. Misrepresenting the Character of the Debt - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) In the age of form collection letters, debt collectors are presented with significant challenges to avoid making misrepresentations as to the character of a debt. Collection letters should avoid referring to the debtor as a "customer" if the debtor is not a customer, avoid stating that the debt collector "issued" an account if it was actually issued by an original creditor, and avoid stating that the debt collector is "subrogated" to the original creditor's rights if the debt collector is not so subrogated. 1. Aronson v. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 96-2113, 1997 WL 1038818 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1997). A debt collector sent a collection letter to a debtor addressed as "Dear Customer," even though the debtor was not a "customer" of the debt collector because the debt collector was not the original creditor. The debtor sued under section 1692(e)(2) for misrepresentation of the character of the debt. The court granted the debt collector's motion for summary judgment because the letter would not deceive a least sophisticated consumer by addressing the recipient as a customer. The letter clearly identified itself as an attempt to collect a debt on behalf of a company that acquired the rights to the debtor's credit card accounts. Even though the debt collector was not the original creditor, it did not attempt to mislead the debtor. Moreover, the language tracked the language in section 1692g for notices to consumers. Therefore, the court held the debt collector did not misrepresent the nature of the debt. 2. King v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. 02-0867 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2003). A court granted a debt collector's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. There, a debt collector purchased an account from JC Penney, and in a collection letter to a debtor referred to the debtor as "our client." The debtor claimed that by referring to him as "our client," the debt collector violated section 1692e(2) by misrepresenting the nature of the debt since it actually purchased the account from JC Penney. The court held the debt collector did not misrepresent the nature of the debt and the effect of using the term "client" at most had a "di minimus" effect on the least sophisticated consumer. "Although the pro-consumer objectives of the FDCPA are broad, they do not encompass an incorrect statement that has no material affect on the collection of a debt." 3. Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2000). A debt collector brought suit against a debtor and, in the complaint, alleged that it was "subrogated" to the rights of a creditor when, in fact, it was not subrogated to the rights of the creditor. The court held that this representation violated sections 1692e(2) and 1692e(10) because it was a false representation to collect a debt, even though it was unintentional. 20 C. Misrepresenting the Amount of the Debt - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) A collection letter must not only accurately represent the character of a debt, it must also accurately represent the amount of the debt. In this context, a consumer might allege that a collection letter violates Section 1692e(2)(A) by failing to provide the exact amount due, by failing to explain that the amount of the debt was adjustable on a daily basis based on interest accrual, or by failing to break down the amount due into principal, interest, finance and other charges. 1. Fields v. Wilbur Law Firm, P.C., 383 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court's decision that a consumer failed to state an FDCPA claim where a collection letter listed an account balance that exceeded the principal obligation, but did not explain that the debt collector was seeking attorneys' fees. The Seventh Circuit stated, "Even if attorneys' fees are authorized by contract . . . and even if the fees are reasonable, debt collectors must still clearly and fairly communicate information about the amount of the debt to debtors. This includes how the total amount due was determined if the demand for payment includes addon expenses like attorneys' fees or collection costs." Id. at 565. 2. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, LLC, 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000). A collection letter stated that the "unpaid principal balance" of the mortgage loan was $178,844.65. The letter also stated that "this amount does not include accrued but unpaid interest, unpaid late charges, escrow advance, or other charges for preservation and protection of the lender's interest in the property as authorized by your loan agreement. The amount to reinstate or pay off your loan changes daily. You may call our office for complete reinstatement and payoff figures." Id. at 875. The court expressed concern that the letter only provided a principal balance, and the court found that the list of other charges that may or may not be owed violated the FDCPA because it implied that the amount in the letter was not actually the full amount of the debt owed. The court stated that the FDCPA required the debt collector to state "the total amount due - interest and other charges as well as principal on the date the dunning letter was sent." Id. 3. Bartlett v. Heibel, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit provided a "safe harbor" letter for debt collectors to use to avoid violation of the FDCPA, which stated the total amount of the debt owed as of a particular date: "I have been retained by Micard Services to collect from you the entire balance, which as of September 25, 1995, was $1,656.90, that you owe. . . ." 21 D. Misrepresenting the Legal Status of a Debt - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) Consumers often allege a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) when there is any inaccuracy whatsoever regarding the amount or other characteristics of the debt. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that a literally false statement in a collection letter violates the FDCPA as a matter of law. See, Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir.1996). The Sixth Circuit suggested in an unpublished opinion that an “incorrect” representation in a collection letter is sufficient under section 1692e(2) to withstand a motion to dismiss, without discussing its deceptive or misleading character. See, Savage v. Hatcher, 109 Fed.Appx. 759, 761, 2004 WL 2030310, *2 (6th Cir.2004); Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 443 F.Supp.2d 954, 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005). Few cases focus on the "legal status" language from Section 1692e(2)(A). However, in Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., 467 F.Supp.2d 769 (S.D. Ohio 2004), the court held that a debt collector's employee's affidavit attached to a state-court complaint seeking judgment against consumer for an unpaid credit card debt, allegedly falsely representing debt collector as “holder in due course,” was actionable under the FDCPA and OCSPA as a representation concerning the “legal status” of debt, if the representation was in fact false, and if the debt collector could not establish its entitlement to the FDCPA's bona fide error defense. E. Misrepresenting the Compensation that May be Received by the Debt Collector (i.e., attorneys' fees) - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B). Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B), a debt collector may not falsely represent "any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt." In Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 F. Supp.2d 783, 802 (S.D. Ohio, 2006), the district court held that a standard request for attorney fees in Ohio debt collection action complaints against consumer debtors was deceptive or misleading from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, in violation of FDCPA, where the statement constituted an absolute entitlement to attorney fees, but such fees were not recoverable under Ohio law. In that case, consumers asserted that a debt collector's state court complaints against class members unlawfully demanded a right to attorney's fees, in violation of § 1692e(2)(B). The district court noted that, under Ohio law, creditors are not permitted to recover attorneys fees incurred in connection with debt collection suits involving “personal, family, or household” debts. Id.; see R.C. § 1301.21. In this case, the debt collector sought relief for attorney fees in the underlying complaints. From the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer,” that statement in a prayer for relief constituted an absolute entitlement to attorney fees, even though such fees are not recoverable under Ohio law. Therefore, the court concluded that the debt collector's standard request for attorney fees in Ohio debt collection action complaints constituted a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B), and the court granted summary judgment to the consumer on that issue. 22 Although the Foster case addressed a request for attorneys' fees in an actual state court complaint, the analysis may be instructive in the context of collection letters. In particular, under Foster, a debt collector should avoid stating in an Ohio collection letter that it is entitled to attorneys' fees should it file a collection action against the consumer. F. Threatening to Take Legal Action that Is Not Intended to Be Taken - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) only if a debtor establishes both of the following: (1) a debtor would reasonably believe that the letter threatens imminent legal action; and (2) the debt collector does not intend to take legal action. See United States v. National Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 1996). Courts have rejected claims under Section 1692e(5) based upon allegedly illegal conduct that is not just threatened, but actually undertaken. See Delawder v. Platinum Financial Services Corp., 443 F.Supp.2d 942, 948 (S.D. Ohio, 2005); Wehrheim v. Secrest, No. IP 00-1328-C-T/K, 2002 WL 31242783, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug.16, 2002) (granting summary judgment to defendant debt collector on Section 1692e(5) claim where debt collector actually filed allegedly illegal suit to recover on debt); Clark v. Pollard, No. IP 991414-C H/G, 2000 WL 1902183, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 28, 2000) (plaintiff did not state a claim under Section 1692e(5) for allegedly illegal action actually undertaken); Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 334, 338 (D. S.D.1990) ("Plaintiff in this case has shown no facts which would support a conclusion that there was a lack of intent to follow through with the threat of litigation, and in the face of actual litigation, her allegation fails."). Generally speaking, a debt collector may state that if a debt is not paid, the debt collector will refer this matter to an attorney in the debtor's area for legal consideration. Further, the debt collector may inform the debtor that if judgment is rendered against the debtor, the debt collector will collect payment using all methods legally available. However, a debt collector cannot make these assertions in a collection letter if it has no intent on following through with litigation. For example, if a debt collector sends a dunning letter with this or similar language to a debtor in Alaska, but the debt collector has never sued a debtor in Alaska, the debtor may have a strong argument that the debt collector violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) by threatening to take legal action it did not intend to take. The key to determining whether language in the collection letter violates the FDCPA is whether the language threatens "imminent" legal action without the intent to take such action, or if the letter misleadingly states that legal proceedings have already begun. 23 1. Cases Finding No Threat of Legal Action a. General rule: "A debt collector may state that certain action is possible, if it is true that such action is legal and is frequently taken by the collector or creditor with respect to certain debts." Young v. Manley, No. 99 C 5569, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13035, at * 12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2000) (quoting FTC Official Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed.Reg. 50097 (Dec. 13, 1988)). b. Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120, 1137-1138 (N.D. Ill. 1998). An attorney sent a collection letter stating that the "economic feasibility of some type of litigation" had not been determined and "if legal action were to be undertaken, it would be costly and time-consuming." The court ruled that the letter did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because "the letter's reference to litigation lacked imminence." In finding no threat of imminent litigation, the court noted that the paragraphs discussing litigation were phrased in terms of hypotheticals such as "if legal action were taken" and "should such court action occur." The court held that "for a collection letter to threaten legal action under § 1692e(5), it must communicate that a lawsuit is not merely a possibility, but that a decision to pursue legal action is either imminent or has already been made." c. Brown v. Card Service Center, No. 05-0498, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12810, at * 10, *21 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2005). A collection agency sent a debt collection letter stating that the failure of the debtor to cooperate "could" result in legal action. The court ruled that the letter did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because it did "not threaten imminent legal action against plaintiff and in no way indicate[d] that action had already been taken." Rather, the letter was a "lawful reminder that litigation is a step available in the debt collection process." 24 d. Madonna v. Academy Collection Serv., Inc., No. 3:95CV00875, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13315, at *6-*7 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 1997). A debt collector sent three letters informing the debtor that "[o]ur client may choose to pursue legal action." The final letter stated "it is our intent to close our files and inform our client that you have refused to cooperate." The letter further described possible consequences of litigation and suggested the debtor obtain legal counsel. The court held that the letters' references to legal action were not threats to pursue litigation but, rather, merely communicated that litigation was one possible course of action. The court stated, "Far from threatening legal action, the statement . . . indicates that legal action is an option available to the creditor, who may indeed choose to take advantage of it." In finding that the statement in the collection letters did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), the court stated, "The fact that a creditor may sue on an unpaid debt is a possibility which would be understood even by the least sophisticated consumer." e. Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., No. C-3-96-166, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23775, at *10 (S.D. Ohio July 31, 1997). The court held that a collection letter containing the words "further collection procedures," "legally due," "protracted and unpleasant collection effort," "litigation," "legal action," "court costs," "attorneys' fees," "court action," "judgment," "garnishment," "execution," "voluntary settlement," and "no defense to this claim," did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). In so holding, the court reasoned "those words and phrases, read in the context in which they appear in collection letters, do not establish, as a matter of law, that the Defendants threatened imminent legal action against the Plaintiff." f. Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 178 (W.D. N.Y. 1988) (holding language in a collection letter that "legal action may be necessary in order to collect this bill" did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because "even an unsophisticated person would realize this statement to mean that because he has allowed his debt to remain unpaid, a suit may be brought to collect the amount owed.") . 25 2. g. Combs v. Direct Marketing Credit Serv., Inc., No. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32670, at * 5-*6 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998) (holding language in a collection letter stating "this is your opportunity to resolve this matter amicably" and "we advise you to consult with your attorney regarding your liability" did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because the words did not "imply that litigation has been, or will be, initiated"). h. Knowles v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, No. 91-CV-14S, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8349, at *3, *6 (W.D. N.Y. May 27, 1992) (holding language in a collection letter stating "failure to pay will leave our client no choice but to consider legal action" did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because "[a]t most, the language at issue here threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action[.]"). i. Courts have further noted that where the likelihood of legal action is unclear from the text of a collection letter, the letter's source can be determinative, "especially if it purports to be from an attorney." E.g. Jenkins, 999 F. Supp. at 1137; see also Brown, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12810, at * 9-*10 (quoting Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 *3d Cir. 1989) (finding that the fact that a collection letter was sent by a collection agency rather than an attorney was an important distinction because "abuses by attorney debt collectors are more egregious than those of lay collectors because a consumer reacts with far more duress to an attorney's improper threat of legal action than to a debt collection agency committing the same practice"). Thus, a collection letter from a debt collector is less likely to threaten imminent litigation in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) than one sent from an attorney. Cases Finding an Unlawful Threat To Take Legal Action a. United States v. National Financial, 98 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a collection letter sent by an attorney stating "only immediate payment will stop further legal action" violated section 1692e(5) because the letter "connote[d] that a real attorney, acting like an attorney, ha[d] considered the debtor's file and concluded in his professional judgment that the debtor [was] a candidate for legal action"). 26 b. Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a collection letter stating that a collection agency had authority to file suit when it did not, in fact, have such authority "implied that the commencement of legal proceedings was imminent" and violated section 1692e(5)). c. Keli v. Universal Fidelity Corp., No. Civ. 96-00366ACK, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23940, at *19 (D. Haw. Feb. 25, 1997) (holding that a collection letter violated section 1692e(5) because it "clearly indicate[d] the possibility of an impending legal action" despite the fact that the debt collector was not even authorized to take such action). Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a collection letter stating "this item has already been referred for collection action" violated section 1692e(5) because "[t]he clear import of the language, taken as a whole, is that some type of legal action [had] already been or [was] about to be initiated and [could] be averted from running its course only by payment"). d. 3. Cases Discussing the Debt Collector's "Intent." a. The debtor bears the burden of proof with respect to a debt collector's intent under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). Tsenes v. TransContinental Credit & Collection Corp., 892 F. Supp. 461, 465 (E.D. N.Y. 1995); Kapeluschnik v. LeSchack & Grodensky, P.C., No. 96-CV-2399, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at * 23-*24 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 25, 1999). b. A creditor's intent cannot be determined merely by examining the collection letter. See Moore v. Frazier, No. 00-60590, 2002 WL 753508, at * 2 n.2 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2002). 27 c. Where a collection letter threatens suit, but the debt collector never actually files suit, the mere fact that the debt collector did not bring suit is insufficient to establish it never "intended to" bring suit. E.g. Kapeluschnik, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at * 24 (granting summary judgment to a debt collector under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because a debtor could not meet his burden of establishing that the debt collector did not intend to bring suit by the mere fact that the debt collector never actually filed suit against the debtor); Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. Conn. 1990) (dismissing a debtor's 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) claim because the debtor "has offered no evidence, other than counsel's bald assertions, regarding defendant's intent as to any future actions"); Tsenes, 892 F. Supp. at 465 (stating that to meet its burden of proof and "affirmatively show the defendant did not intend to bring legal action," the debtor would have to show that a lawsuit would not even be an option because, for example, the creditor had a practice of not litigating claims against consumers). d. Madonna v. Academy Collection Serv., Inc., No. 3:95CV00875, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13315, at *20 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 1997). The court held that, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), a debtor failed to established that a debt collector never intended to bring suit because the debt collector had accounts for litigation in all fifty states, including the state where the debtor brought suit. e. United States v. National Financial Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996). An attorney sent "literally millions" of collection letters, only filed suit 15 times, and never filed suit against anyone within the two year term of that litigation. Thus, plaintiff established that debt collector never "intended" to file suit. f. Young v. Manley, No. 99 C 5569, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13035, at * 10-*11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2000). The court held a law firm did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) because, even though it threatened suit against the plaintiff and never filed suit, it did file suit in 20% of the cases for which it sent letters. g. Robinson v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 385, 392-393 (N.D. N.Y. 1995). The court held that a debt collector did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) by threatening suit, but not bringing suit, because it did actually refer files to an office that recommended legal action depending on the facts of each case. 28 h. G. H. Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805 (S.D. Ohio 2001). The court held that a collection letter threatening to foreclose on real property of a consumer violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5) and 1692e(10). Such foreclosure was prohibited by R.C. 2329.66(A)(1)(a), and the debt collector testified that that he never foreclosed upon the homes of consumer debtors, which was the only evidence before the court as to his intention, or lack thereof, to foreclose upon the consumer's residence. Threatening to Take Legal Action that Cannot Be Taken - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 1. Where a debt collector threatens to sue on a debt it knew was time-barred by the statute of limitations, a violation of the FDCPA will lie. See Gervais v. Riddle & Associates, P.C., 479 F.Supp.2d 270 (D. Conn. 2007); Stepney v. Outsourcing Solutions, No. 97 C 5288, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18264, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997); Kimber v. Federal Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1488-90 (M.D. Ala. 1987). However, since the running of the statute of limitations does not extinguish a debt, courts have permitted debt collectors to send collection letters for time-barred debt where the letters do not threaten collection action. Gervais, 479 F.Supp.2d at 273. Courts have also found that absent a threat of litigation or other remedy that the debt collector could not legally pursue, there is no FDCPA violation in attempting to collect on a time-barred debt. Id. 2. Gionis v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 405 F.Supp.2d 856 (S.D. Ohio 2005). The court held that a law firm, as a debt collector, threatened to take action that it could not legally take or that it did not intend to take, in violation of the FDCPA, by filing complaint in n Ohio lawsuit against consumer debtor that included an attached affidavit from a creditor which declared that the creditor was entitled to recover, to extent permitted by applicable law, its reasonable attorney's fees as stated in the contract, since R.C. 1301.21 precluded collection of attorneys' fees from consumer debtors. Falsely Representing that a Communication is From an Attorney - 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) A debt collector may not falsely represent or imply "that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney." To avoid an arguable violation of this provision, a general rule of thumb for a non-attorney debt collector is to avoid any reference to a legal division and avoid use of the suffix "Esq." 29 1. Tromba v. MRS Assocs., Inc., 323 F. Supp.2d 242, 248 (E.D. N.Y. 2004). A non-lawyer sent a debt collection letter from the debt collector's "legal department" referring to himself as a "senior legal associate." The plaintiff argued that this letter violates section 1692e(3) because reference to the sender as a "senior legal associate" was inaccurate because he was not licensed to practice law. The debt collector argued in a reply memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss that not even the least sophisticated consumer would interpret a "senior legal associate" as equivalent to an "attorney at law." This argument was not properly before the court because it was not raised in the initial motion to dismiss. However, the court stated "it harbors grave doubts as to whether any reasonable trier of fact, even under the least sophisticated consumer standard, could conclude that "senior legal associate" was equivalent to "attorney at law" or "lawyer." 2. Rumpler v. Philips & Cohen Assocs., 219 F. Supp.2d 251, 257 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) The court granted a debt collector's motion to dismiss (or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment). There, a non-lawyer sent a collection letter to a debtor, and signed his name with the term "Esq." The debtor asserted a claim under section 1692e(3) for falsely representing that the communication was from an attorney. The court held that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the term "Esq." was equivalent to a claim of being an attorney. 3. Grief v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 217 F. Supp.2d 336, 341-342 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) The district court granted a law firm's motion to dismiss a section 1692e(3) claim. There, a law firm sent a debt collection letter on law firm stationary directing the debtor to call "Mr.. DeGaetano," a non-lawyer employee of the law firm. The plaintiff alleged that the letter was in violation of section 1692e(3) because it falsely implied that Mr. DeGaetano was an attorney. The court held that the letter did not violate section 1692e(3) and that the letter did not imply to the least sophisticated consumer that Mr. DeGaetano was an attorney. The letter did not give his title, but did not affirmatively state he was an attorney. Further, the words "counsel" or "lawyer" did not appear in the letter, except in reference to attorneys' fees. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 30 I. 4. Belile v. Allied Med. Accounts Control Associated Bureaus (In re Belile), 209 B.R. 658, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court held that a debt collector's collection letter threatening to refer a claim to its "legal department" violated section 1692e(5), which prohibits threats of legal action that cannot legally be taken or that are not intended to be taken. Because the debt collector lacked a license to bring legal action, the court found the threat to be a false and misleading representation. The court further found that the letter violated section 1692e(10). 5. Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, No. 3:05CV7238, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1925 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2007). A debt collector sent a collection letter to a consumer printed on "Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC" letterhead, and containing the address and telephone number of the debt collection business. Id. at *2. The consumer brought suit against the debt collector alleging that the letter violated Section 1692e(3) because the name of the collection agency was "Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC," the notice was on "Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC" letterhead, and the law practice and the collection business operated out of the same office, among other reasons. Id. at *6. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector because, among other reasons, the notice clearly stated it was from a "debt collector" and the law firm letterhead was not determinative. Id. Harassing or Abusing the Debtor - 15 U.S.C. § 1692d 15 U.S.C. § 1692d renders a debt collector liable for engaging in conduct that has the natural consequence of harassing, oppressing, or abusing a debtor in connection with the collection of a debt. Section 1692d lists several nonexclusive examples of such conduct, including, inter alia, threats of violence, use of obscene or profane language, causing a telephone to repeatedly ring with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass a person, and so forth. 1. Bryant v. Bonded Account Service/Check Recovery, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 251 (D. Minn. 2000). The district court of Minnesota found that the natural consequence of language used in debt collector's dunning letter, stating that “in case of an emergency, will you be refused credit because of this unpaid account we have for collection?” was not abusive to unsophisticated reader under FDCPA. Although it was arguably abusive to subjective eyes of abnormally sensitive reader, the question was not “offensive” in a way that was akin to profanity or obscenity. 31 J. 2. Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Conn. 1990). The court held that reference in second collection notice from a debt collector giving debtor “THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THIS MATTER IN A FRIENDLY MANNER,” following the first notice in which the debt collector stated it would resort to all approved means to collect debt, did not imply that the debt collector would resort to unfriendly methods including violence if friendly methods did not succeed, in violation of provision of the FDCPA prohibiting harassing, oppressing, or abusive conduct in connection with collection of a debt. 3. Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1990). The court held that even if all of the alleged 48 letters sent to a debtor by a debt collector over a period of eight months referred to the same debt, the mailing of six letters per month would not be “harassing.” 4. Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Or. 1981). The court held that a letter which was sent by a debt collector to a consumer and which implied that the consumer removed her head when she received letters from the collector, that she ignored her mail and her bills, and that she lacked common sense to handle her financial matters properly, when in fact she had called collector in response to earlier letter and her call had not been returned, violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, which prohibited a debt collector from engaging in any conduct that harasses or abuses any person in connection with collection of debt. Threatening to Collect an Amount Not Authorized by Law - 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1): A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt, including, without limitation, collecting "any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 32 In Delawder v. Platinum Financial Services Corp., 443 F.Supp.2d 942, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2005), a consumer claimed that a debt collector violated Section 1692f(1), by attempting to collect an amount of debt when that amount was not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The district court noted that courts generally recognize claims under Section 1692f(1) where, as in this case, a debt collector filed a lawsuit seeking an amount allegedly greater than the amount owed under a debt agreement; thus the court concluded the consumer stated a claim under Section 1692f(1). Id.; See also Conner v. Howe, 344 F.Supp. 2d 1164, 1172-73 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (granting plaintiff summary judgment for Section 1692f(1) claim against debt collector-attorney for filing lawsuit seeking to collect amount greater than permitted by loan agreement, that additionally was invalid); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 321 F.3d 292, 308 (2nd Cir. 2003) (recognizing plaintiffs would state a claim against defendant law firm if law firm sued to collect an amount not permitted by debt agreement or by law, but affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim on other grounds). Although the Delawder decision involved statements in a collection complaint rather than a collection letter, the rationale nevertheless likely applies to collection letters. Thus, a debt collector should be cautious in stating the amount owed and ensure that it is consistent with the credit application or other agreement creating the debt. V. AVOIDING THE PITFALLS IN COLLECTION LETTERS A. Develop and maintain an effective system to document whether a consumer is represented by an attorney. Because a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, the simple act of mailing a collection letter may violate the FDCPA if a consumer can establish that he or she previously notified the debt collector of representation by counsel with respect to that debt. B. Develop and maintain an effective system to document the correct contact information of the consumer. Because a debt collector generally may not communicate with third parties regarding a consumer's debt, a debt collector may violate the FDCPA by sending a collection letter to the wrong person. A debt collector is particularly susceptible to allegations of FDCPA violations in "Jr." and "Sr." situations. C. Be nice. Do not use profane or obscene language that would harass or abuse a consumer. 33 D. When providing the notice of validation of debt, track the exact language of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). There is no reason to get creative. To do so will only expose you to the possibility of litigation, even if your additional language does not violate the statute. The amount you will spend to defend litigation will likely outweigh any additional amounts you might collect based upon your creative language. E. Provide the full mini-Miranda on any letter: "This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information will be used for that purpose. This communication is from a debt collector." An initial communication requires a statement that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Subsequent communication require a statement that the communication is from a debt collector. To be safe, include all three statements in all communications. F. In an initial validation notice, do not demand payment within a certain number of days (i.e., 10 days, 31 days). In doing so, you risk overshadowing the statutorily required 30 day validation notice. G. In an initial validation notice, or any subsequent correspondence sent within 30 days of that notice, do not demand "immediate payment" of the debt. Again, in doing so, you risk overshadowing the statutorily required 30 day validation notice. H. Be careful how you describe your relationship to the original creditor, to any subsequent account owner for whom you are collecting the debt, or to the consumer. You must be accurate in such descriptions, particularly since the FDCPA is a strict liability statute. For example, collection letters should avoid referring to the debtor as a "customer" if the debtor is not a customer, avoid stating that the debt collector "issued" an account if it was actually issued by an original creditor, and avoid stating that the debt collector is "subrogated" to the original creditor's rights if the debt collector is not so subrogated. I. State the total amount owed as of a particular date, including all interest, fees and costs. For example, in stating the amount of the debt, a collection letter could state, "I have been retained by [insert creditor] to collect from you the entire balance, which as of [insert date], was [insert amount], that you owe. . . . J. Determine whether a lawsuit to collect a debt is time-barred before sending a collection letter. Only discuss the possibility of legal action for debts that are not time-barred. 34 K. In Ohio, do not threaten to collect attorneys' fees in a subsequent action if the consumer fails to pay the debt. L. Do not threaten imminent legal action unless you have a history of actually filing suit in the subject jurisdiction. M. Do not indicate that litigation is imminent or that a decision regarding litigation has already been made. Less objectionable language may include that the "economic feasibility of some type of litigation" had not been determined; "if legal action were to be undertaken, it would be costly and time-consuming;" or "[o]ur client may choose to pursue legal action." N. A non-attorney debt collector should avoid any reference to a legal division and avoid use of the suffix "Esq." Although some case law is instructive that these references will not violate the FDCPA, in light of the fact that the issue is heavily litigated, you should avoid even the possibility of an action by refraining from the use of such language. 35
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