Pikettys formueanalyse passer
ikke på Danmark
Simon Halphen Boserup
cand.polit, ph.d.
Økonomisk Institut
Københavns Universitet
Akademiet for Unge Talenter
September 2015
1 / 29
Passer Pikettys formueanalyse
på Danmark?
Simon Halphen Boserup
cand.polit, ph.d.
Økonomisk Institut
Københavns Universitet
Akademiet for Unge Talenter
September 2015
2 / 29
Program
1. Introduktion til Thomas Piketty
2. Hvordan måler man ulighed?
3. Indkomst- og formueulighed i Danmark
4. Ulige muligheder
5. Konklusion
3 / 29
1. Introduktion: Piketty
Kort om Thomas Piketty
◦ ph.d. i Europa
◦ ansat i et par år på MIT i USA
◦ flytter hjem til Frankrig og væk fra forskning i “ligegyldige”
spørgsmål
◦ lidt stille i en periode
◦ begynder at sætte en dagsorden med sin forskning i ulighed
Piketty’s opdagelser
◦ Undersøger (sammen med Emmanuel Saez) udviklingen i
amerikansk indkomstulighed siden 1913
◦ Finder eksplosiv udvikling i de senere år: 86% af al
reallønsfremgang i perioden 1980–2007 gik til de top 10% rigeste
◦ Igangsætter “The World Top Incomes Database”
◦ Påbegynder senere undersøgelser af formueulighed i Frankrig –
senere endnu globalt
4 / 29
1. Introduktion: Ulighed i historisk perspektiv
Piketty vs. Kuznets(’ kurve)
◦ 1950erne: Kuznets’ hypotese om udviklingen i indkomstulighed i
langt perspektiv
◦ Omvendt U-form:
↑: stigende ulighed når nye højproduktive sektorer dukker op
(eks. fremstillingsindustrien under den industrielle revolution)
↓: faldende ulighed når flere arbejdere tilslutter sig de bedre
betalende sektorer af økonomien (eks. urbanisering)
◦ Marx og Kuznets enige om stigende ulighed, men Marx
forudsiger kapitalismens kollaps som reaktion
◦ Piketty: Det kommer an på...
5 / 29
1. Introduktion: Pikettys forudsigelser
Økonomisk analyse
◦ Afgørende skel: ejerne af arbejdskraft vs. kapitalejerne
◦ Hvem er disse grupper egentlig?
◦ Styrkeforholdet mellem de to afgøres af hvordan deres
økonomiske forhold udvikler sig
◦ Arbejderne: bliver rigere, når der er generel økonomisk vækst (g)
i samfundet (arbejdskraften bliver mere produktiv, “alle” bliver
rigere)
◦ Kapitalisterne: bliver rigere, når afkastet af deres
kapital/investeringer (r) er højt (“få” bliver rigere)
◦ Hvis eks. r > g får kapitalisterne det relativt bedre
◦ Styrkeforholdet kan aflæses i forholdet mellem den samlede
private formue og årets samlede nationale indkomst
6 / 29
has been shrinking lately
the record levels observed in Europe before
the order of 30 to 50% of
Atlantic.
World War I. The U.S. top decile wealth share
y developed country. Prop1. Piketty vs. Kuznets
Given th
ransfers, and
lower in th
income decthan in 191
measurement
income ineq
ularly regard- Wealth inequality in Europe and the United States,
(or even sli
uch as health, 1870–2010
in 1913 Euro
good spendShare of top wealth decile in total net wealth
modern U.
we therefore
more on a
evolution of
100 percent
labor incom
mary income
Top 10% wealth
share: Europe
treme levels
that charact
the top dec90
(wealth-base
0 was lower
In 1913 Eur
rose in the
Top 10% wealth
80
predominan
s–1940s, and
share: U.S.
(rent, intere
o 35% in the
ing from t
above Euro70
tration of c
It then rose
U.S. income
ace since the
60
about equa
ow close to
capital inco
measure, priproximately
ation is cur50
income ineq
as ever been
1890
1910
1930
1950
1970
1990
2010
1870
same form
also slightly
WI Europe.
Kilde: Piketty og Saez (2014, Science)
Note: Europa = UK, FRA, GER, SWE
Wealth-to
Fig. 2. Wealth inequality in Europe and the United States, 1870 to 2010.
Before7 /furth
29
armony among
ught in the
o we know
and wealth
e 18th cencan we deedge for the
y? For a long
arch on the
and wealth
vely limited
ed facts toiety of pureons. In this
k of recent
en made in
t a number
ng the longe and wealth
d countries.
sible interns for the
the classes,
ploited by a growing number of scholars in
constantly being extende
available on
parisschoo
a research
Income inequality in Europe and the United States,
analysis.
Historica
1900–2010
ries
have als
Share of top income decile in total pretax income
similar meth
number of c
Top 10% income
a longer tim
Top 10% income
50 percent
share: U.S.
share: Europe
ing on previ
historical n
(22), long-ru
45
tion of agg
ratios in th
40
oped econo
some of th
18th centur
35
This Rev
on this bod
on income
30
on a recent
tive synthe
25
presenting
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
emerge fro
on the disgram (Figs.
egins in the
to interpret
Kilde: Piketty og Saez (2014, Science)
Note: Europa = UK, FRA, GER, SWE
1. Indkomstuligheden historisk
8 / 29
wealth-income ratios take so much time? The
people in such a soci
the land of booming top
stop savin
e is the land
1. Styrkeforholdet: kapital vs. arbejde
tal units be
lbeit with a
With posit
ration than
Wealth-to-income ratios in Europe and the
the proces
. These are
The rise of
ena, involv- United States, 1900–2010
level. But t
mechanisms
Market value of net private wealth (% national income)
very high.
f the develOne can
700 percent
logic can a
for why the
Europe
lates structu
600
to its annu
iscussion of
and Japan.
ns and lesU.S.
500
rates excee
stress at the
to large imm
ve to offer is
U.S. growth
formed dis400
ductivity g
have at our
1.5%—are a
xtensive his300
year, if not
e data than
population
ous researchJapan is no
s still far too
200
total growt
ect for a rig1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
tivity growt
sessment of
per year. Th
play. Several
Kilde: Fig.
Piketty
og Saez (2014, Science)
Europa
= UK,
FRA,
GER,
by the fact
have clear3. Wealth-to-income
ratios in Europe Note:
and the
United
States,
1900
to SWE
t role in the 2010. Total net private wealth was worth about 6 to 7 years of national income tend to be
9 / 29
aries in the
1 – a in the
, rich counb and a rise
what larger
assume that
process, as
s for capital
capital for
s by drones
keep rising
tion. It deand on the
bor and the
he capitalomic modets is likely
standpoint,
cially if the
h slowdown
io b toward
parameters (some individuals like to save, some
prefer to consume their wealth); shocks to productivity parameters (capital income is sometimes
help to explain some of the important historical
variations that we observe in wealth concentration series.
1. Styrkeforholdet: årsag og prognose
Rate of return vs. growth rate at the world level, Antiquity–2100
Annual rate of return or rate of growth
Pure rate of return
to capital r (after
tax and capital
losses)
6 percent
5
4–5
4
3
2
Growth rate of
world output g
1.5
1
icated—and
0
ong-run dy0-1000 1000-1500 1500-1700 1700-1820 1820-1913 1913-1950 1950-2012 2012-2050 2050-2100
High capital
a, is not bad
to have anKilde: Piketty og Saez (2014, Science)
most of the
Fig. 4. Rate of return versus growth rate at the global level, from Antiquity until 2100. The
me to leisure
average rate of return to capital (after tax and capital losses) fell below the growth rate in the 20th
n we all find
century. It may again surpass it in the 21st century, as it did throughout human history except in the
10 / 29
1. Pikettys konklusion
◦ Fairness: Rentier samfund vs. meritokrati
◦ På vej mod lavvækst (lavt g) og stigende ulighed?
◦ Bekymring: Eliten køber sig politisk magt for at fastholde sin
position – demokratisk problem
◦ Anbefaler progressiv beskatning af formue (sænker r)
1) lighedshensyn
2) dataindsamlingshensyn
11 / 29
2. Hvordan måler man ulighed?
Typer af ulighed
Ulighed i
Indkomst
Et års indkomst
vs.
vs.
Formue
“Permanent” indkomst
Outcomes
Intra-generationelt
vs.
vs.
Muligheder
Inter-generationelt
Mål for økonomisk ulighed
◦ Gini-koefficienten
◦ Top X%’s andel af samlet indkomst/formue
◦ Variationskoefficienten
◦ Opadmobilitet
◦ m.fl...
◦ Formue/indkomst forholdet?
12 / 29
2. Hvordan måler man ulighed?
Typer af ulighed
Ulighed i
Indkomst
Et års indkomst
vs.
vs.
Formue
“Permanent” indkomst
Outcomes
Intra-generationelt
vs.
vs.
Muligheder
Inter-generationelt
Mål for økonomisk ulighed
◦ Gini-koefficienten (intra)
◦ Top X%’s andel af samlet indkomst/formue (intra)
◦ Variationskoefficienten (intra)
◦ Opadmobilitet (inter)
◦ m.fl...
◦ Formue/indkomst forholdet?
12 / 29
3. Ulighed i Danmark: Indkomstulighed
Kilde: Atkinson og Søgaard (2013)
13 / 29
3. Hvad er formue?
Aktiver: huse, aktier, obligationer, penge i banken, biler, koen på
marken, patenter, værdi af egen virksomhed, familiefonden osv.
Passiver: gæld til banker, realkreditinstitutter, familiemedlemmer, osv.
Nettoformue = “Alt hvad man ejer” = aktiver – passiver
14 / 29
3. Hvad er formue? – Mulige datakilder
Formueregisteret
Nationalregnskabet
◦ Info. på individniveau
◦ Ikke på individniveau
◦ Mangler* varige
◦ Mangler varige
forbrugsgoder (biler,
kunst,...)
◦ Problematisk
værdisætning af visse
formuegoder (aktiver der
ikke handles, huse, ...)
forbrugsgoder (biler,
kunst,...)
◦ Problematisk
værdisætning af visse
formuegoder (aktiver der
ikke handles, huse, ...)
◦ Mgl. formuer skjult i
◦ Mgl. formuer skjult i
Cayman Islands
Cayman Islands
◦ Mangler**
pensionsformuen
◦ Negativ formue?
15 / 29
3. Formuen i nationalregnskabet
◦ Danmarks Statistik laver ikke en opgørelse af nationalformuen
eller husholdningernes samlede formue
◦ Flow vs. beholdning
◦ Kender i vid udstrækning niveauet for investering i fysisk kapital
(bygninger, maskiner, mv.)
◦ Mindre viden om nedslidning af fysisk kapital (gør antagelser)
◦ Fra flow til beholdning: “Perpetual inventory method”
– kender tilgang (investering), afgang (nedslidning) og et
udgangspunkt for beholdningen (ligegyldigt på lang sigt)
◦ Undtagelser: Decideret opgørelse til markedspris, eks. aktier
handlet på børsen (boligformue en undtagelse)
16 / 29
3. Formueulighed: Registerdata
40
35
Share of total wealth
30
25
20
15
Old wealth def.
New wealth def.
10
Gini-koefficienten i 2011: 1,33 (!)
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1982
1980
0
1984
Top 1%
Top 5−1%
Top 10−5%
5
Betydning af negative formuer?
17 / 29
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
Aggregate wealth/income ratio (in %)
3. Formue/indkomst-forholdet: Registerdata
500
400
300
Old wealth def.
200
100
0
New wealth def.
18 / 29
3. Formue/indkomst-forholdet: Registerdata
400
Incl. (net of tax) pensions
300
Old wealth def.
200
100
Excl. pensions
New wealth def.
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
0
1980
Aggregate wealth/income ratio (in %)
500
19 / 29
3. Formue/indkomst-forholdet: Nationalregnskabet
Formueregisteret giver kun mulighed for en “kort” tidshorisont (ca. 30
år)
Abildgren (2015) samler data over meget lang tidshorisont:
1845-2011.
En kompilering af mange datakilder: Dækker over skiftende metoder,
databrud.
20 / 29
3. Den
samlede danske nationalformue, 1845–2013
Chart 1: Total stock of national wealth and consumer durables in Denmark 1845-2013
Per cent of NNI
800
Total national wealth
Consumer durables
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Note:
Source:
2015
2005
1995
1985
1975
1965
1955
1945
1935
1925
1915
1905
1895
1885
1875
1865
1855
1845
0
Current prices.
For national wealth figures: See the main text. For NNI: Statistics Denmark and the author's calculations based on
Bjerke and Ussing (1958), Hansen (1983), Hansen and Henriksen (1984a, 1984b) and Abildgren (2008).
Denmark's
net foreign asset position (international
investment for
position)
relativei DK.
to NNI
Noter: NNI
= Nettonationalindkomsten
≈ Samlet indkomst
folk bosat
1845 is (2015).
shown in Chart 2. During most of the period, Denmark has been a debtor nation
Kilde: since
Abildgren
on a net basis. However, Denmark had large net credit positions vis-à-vis foreign residents
during the period 1857-1890 and during World War I, and has again become a net creditor
21 / 29
3. Chart
Dansk
landbrugs andel af formueudviklingen
4: Summary composition of Denmark's domestic national wealth 1845-2013
Per cent of NNI
Total domestic national wealth excluding agricultural land and farmhouses
800
Agricultural land and farmhouses
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Note:
Source:
2005
1995
1985
1975
1965
1955
1945
1935
1925
1915
1905
1895
1885
1875
1865
1855
1845
0
Current prices.
See Chart 1.
5: Arable
agricultural area in Denmark 1845-2013
Kilde: Chart
Abildgren
(2015).
Per cent of Denmark's total geographical area
76
22 / 29
strong increase in real property prices prior to the crisis followed by a subsequent fall.
3. Hvad har drevet stigningen siden 1950?
Chart 6: Detailed composition of Denmark's domestic national wealth 1950-2013
Per cent of NNI
900
Agricultural land and farmhouses
800
Oil and gas reserves
700
Inventories
600
Agricultural breeding stocks
500
Intellectual property products
400
Non-residential buildings and structures
300
Dwellings (excluding farmhouses)
200
Transport equipment
100
Machinery and equipment
Note:
Source:
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
0
Current prices.
See Chart 1.
Kilde: Abildgren (2015).
23 / 29
3. International sammenligning
Chart 9: National wealth in European countries 1845-2010
Per cent of NNI
800
Denmark
Germany
France
UK
700
600
500
400
300
200
Note:
Source:
2015
2005
1995
1985
1975
1965
1955
1945
1935
1925
1915
1905
1895
1885
1875
1865
1855
1845
100
Current prices. France: Prior to 1870 partly based on geometric interpolations. UK: Prior to 1855 partly based on
geometric interpolations.
For Denmark: See Chart 1. For other countries: Piketty and Zucman (2013).
One might (2015).
also notice that the wealth-to-income ratio in Denmark declined by more than
Kilde: Abildgren
225 per cent of NNI from 1870 to 1913. In contrast the wealth-to-income ratios in France and
24 / 29
3. Hvad kan man lære af det?
◦ Dansk udvikling: historisk fald pga. landbrugets faldende
betydning i samfundet. Nylig stigning skyldes hovedsageligt
stigende huspriser.
◦ USA: stigning også drevet af huspriser (Rognlie 2015)
◦ Kan vi aflæse en økonomisk koncentration (eller politisk
magtkoncentration) i disse figurer? Er formue/indkomst det
ideelle mål?
◦ Bemærk: formuebegrebet her er nationalformuen (privat sektors
formue + offentlig sektors formue)
25 / 29
4. Ulige muligheder? Intergenerationel formuemobilitet
◦ Hidtil har vi adresseret spørgsmål om intra-generationel fordeling
af formue. “Hvor ulige er formue fordelt i Danmark?”
◦ Nu skal vi i stedet se på: “I hvor høj grad ens formue er
determineret af tidligere generationers formue?”
— hidtil kun indirekte udforsket med formue/indkomst-forholdet
26 / 29
100
4. Ulige muligheder? Intergenerationel formuemobilitet
0
20
Child wealth rank
40
60
80
Slope = 0.22
0
20
40
60
Parental wealth rank
Mean child wealth rank
95% conf. interval
80
100
OLS fit
Hvordan afhænger børns formue i dag af deres forældres formue for
15 år siden?
27 / 29
100
4. Ulige muligheder? Intergenerationel formuemobilitet
0
20
Parental wealth rank
40
60
80
Slope = 0.20
0
20
40
60
Grandparental wealth rank
Mean parental wealth rank
95% conf. interval
80
100
OLS fit
Hvordan afhænger forældres formue for 15 år siden af deres forældres
formue for 30 år siden?
28 / 29
5. Konklusion
Er uligheden i Danmark på en eksplosiv retning?
◦ VIGTIGT: Husk alle forbeholdene. Har vi et pålideligt mål for
formue? ... for ulighed?
◦ Formueregistrene: NEJ til eksplosiv udvikling
(både F/I-forhold og intergenerationelt)
...men relativ kort tidshorisont, uperfekt mål for formue
◦ Abildgren 2015: JA
...men drevet af boligprisstigninger, så måske er det
middelklassen, der løber fra bunden?
◦ Begge formuemål uperfekte. Abildgrens nok mere dækkende,
men hvad nu hvis den største udvikling i uligheden stammer fra
ting, vi ikke måler? [unoterede aktier (LEGO!), formuer i skattely]
◦ Nationalbanken m.fl. arbejder på en forbedret udgave af
formueregisteret, som bl.a. inkluderer pensionsformue på
individniveau
...men det løser nok ikke alle måleproblemer
29 / 29
Referencer
Abildgren, Kim (2015). “Estimates of the national wealth of Denmark
1845–2013”. Danmarks Nationalbank Working Papers No. 92.
Atkinson, Anthony B. og Jakob E. Søgaard (2013). EPRU Working Paper
Series 2013–01, University of Copenhagen.
Piketty, Thomas (2014). “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”. Harvard
University Press.
Piketty, Thomas og Emmanuel Saez (2014). “Inequality in the long run”.
Science, vol. 344, no. 6186, p. 838–844.
Rognlie, Matthew (2015). “Deciphering the fall and rise in the net capital
share”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
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