W

WEI WU
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: (919) 308-2010
Email: [email protected]
http://home.uchicago.edu/~wwu0/
EDUCATION
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
PhD in Finance, MBA (Expected 2015)
2010–present
Duke University
MA in Financial Economics
PhD in Neuroscience
2003–2009
Peking University
BS in Biological Sciences
1999–2003
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Empirical Asset Pricing, Information Economics, Investment Management, Corporate Finance
WORKING PAPERS
Information Asymmetry and Insider Trading (Job Market Paper, 2014)
I investigate the impact of information asymmetry on insider trading by exploiting a quasiexperimental design: the brokerage closure-related terminations of analyst coverage, which
exogenously increase the information asymmetry of the affected firms. Using a difference-indifferences approach, I find that after the terminations of analyst coverage, corporate insiders obtain
significantly higher abnormal returns and enjoy larger abnormal profits. The magnitudes of the
increase are large economically. For firms with five or fewer analysts, losing one analyst increases
insiders’ six-month abnormal returns by 16.0% for purchases, and by 10.7% for sales (both in absolute
terms). My paper highlights the role of information asymmetry as a critical determinant of insiders’
abnormal profits, and calls for regulatory attention to corporate insiders’ transactions associated with
high levels of information asymmetry.
Insider Purchases Amid Short Interest Spikes: A Semi-pooling Equilibrium (with Chattrin
Laksanabunsong, 2014) Fama-Miller Working Paper No. 14-04
We study corporate insiders’ purchase behavior amid short interest spikes. The cumulative abnormal
returns associated with insider purchases amid short interest spikes increase in the short run but
decrease significantly in the long run, which is in sharp contrast to those associated with typical insider
purchases. Moreover, insider purchases amid short interest spikes are on average followed by negative
rather than positive earnings surprises. Our results suggest corporate insiders, provided with the right
incentive, can strategically use purchases to shape firm information environments, steer stock prices,
and thus disrupt market efficiency.
WORK in PROGRESS
Investor Inattention and Sluggish Price-Discovery Process: Evidence from Corporate Insider
Trading (2014)
Lead-Lag Relationships Augmented by Insider-Trading Information (2014)
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HONORS and AWARDS
Katherine Dusak Miller PhD Fellowship
Deutsche Bank Doctoral Fellowship
Eugene F. Fama PhD Fellowship
AFA Student Travel Grant
John and Serena Liew PhD Fellowship
CRSP Summer Paper Award
University of Chicago Booth Student Fellowship
Duke University Graduate Student Fellowship
American Heart Association Pre-doctoral Fellowship Award
Peking University MingDe Fellowship
2014–2015
2014
2013–2014
2014
2012–2013
2011
2010–2015
2003–2009
2006
1999–2003
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
MBA Course TA: Corporate Finance (Prof. Jacopo Ponticelli)
PhD Course TA: Theory of Financial Decision I (Prof. Eugene Fama)
2014
2013
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant for Prof. Bryan Kelly
Research Assistant for Prof. Steven Kaplan
Research Assistant for Prof. Michael Brandt
Research Assistant for Prof. Alon Brav
2012–2013
2011–2012
2009–2010
2009–2010
OTHER EXPERIENCE
Participant of the Yale Summer Program in Behavioral Finance
Organizer of the Chicago Booth Finance Brownbag
Referee for Journal of Financial Services Research
2013
2012–2013
2012
PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS
Wei Wu, Paul Tiesinga, Thomas Tucker, Stephen Mitroff, and David Fitzpatrick (2011). Dynamics of
population response to changes of motion direction in primary visual cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience,
31(36): 12767–12777.
Wei Wu, Long-Chuan Yu (2004). Roles of oxytocin in spatial learning and memory in the nucleus
basalis of Meynert in rats. Regulatory Peptides, 120(1-3):119–125.
REFERENCES
Eugene Fama (Co-chair)
Tobias Moskowitz (Co-chair)
Bryan Kelly
Amit Seru
(773) 702-7282
(773) 834-2757
(773) 702-8359
(773) 834-2767
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[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]