W
WEI WU The University of Chicago Booth School of Business 5807 S. Woodlawn Ave. Chicago, IL 60637 Phone: (919) 308-2010 Email: [email protected] http://home.uchicago.edu/~wwu0/ EDUCATION University of Chicago, Booth School of Business PhD in Finance, MBA (Expected 2015) 2010–present Duke University MA in Financial Economics PhD in Neuroscience 2003–2009 Peking University BS in Biological Sciences 1999–2003 RESEARCH INTERESTS Empirical Asset Pricing, Information Economics, Investment Management, Corporate Finance WORKING PAPERS Information Asymmetry and Insider Trading (Job Market Paper, 2014) I investigate the impact of information asymmetry on insider trading by exploiting a quasiexperimental design: the brokerage closure-related terminations of analyst coverage, which exogenously increase the information asymmetry of the affected firms. Using a difference-indifferences approach, I find that after the terminations of analyst coverage, corporate insiders obtain significantly higher abnormal returns and enjoy larger abnormal profits. The magnitudes of the increase are large economically. For firms with five or fewer analysts, losing one analyst increases insiders’ six-month abnormal returns by 16.0% for purchases, and by 10.7% for sales (both in absolute terms). My paper highlights the role of information asymmetry as a critical determinant of insiders’ abnormal profits, and calls for regulatory attention to corporate insiders’ transactions associated with high levels of information asymmetry. Insider Purchases Amid Short Interest Spikes: A Semi-pooling Equilibrium (with Chattrin Laksanabunsong, 2014) Fama-Miller Working Paper No. 14-04 We study corporate insiders’ purchase behavior amid short interest spikes. The cumulative abnormal returns associated with insider purchases amid short interest spikes increase in the short run but decrease significantly in the long run, which is in sharp contrast to those associated with typical insider purchases. Moreover, insider purchases amid short interest spikes are on average followed by negative rather than positive earnings surprises. Our results suggest corporate insiders, provided with the right incentive, can strategically use purchases to shape firm information environments, steer stock prices, and thus disrupt market efficiency. WORK in PROGRESS Investor Inattention and Sluggish Price-Discovery Process: Evidence from Corporate Insider Trading (2014) Lead-Lag Relationships Augmented by Insider-Trading Information (2014) 1 HONORS and AWARDS Katherine Dusak Miller PhD Fellowship Deutsche Bank Doctoral Fellowship Eugene F. Fama PhD Fellowship AFA Student Travel Grant John and Serena Liew PhD Fellowship CRSP Summer Paper Award University of Chicago Booth Student Fellowship Duke University Graduate Student Fellowship American Heart Association Pre-doctoral Fellowship Award Peking University MingDe Fellowship 2014–2015 2014 2013–2014 2014 2012–2013 2011 2010–2015 2003–2009 2006 1999–2003 TEACHING EXPERIENCE MBA Course TA: Corporate Finance (Prof. Jacopo Ponticelli) PhD Course TA: Theory of Financial Decision I (Prof. Eugene Fama) 2014 2013 RESEARCH EXPERIENCE Research Assistant for Prof. Bryan Kelly Research Assistant for Prof. Steven Kaplan Research Assistant for Prof. Michael Brandt Research Assistant for Prof. Alon Brav 2012–2013 2011–2012 2009–2010 2009–2010 OTHER EXPERIENCE Participant of the Yale Summer Program in Behavioral Finance Organizer of the Chicago Booth Finance Brownbag Referee for Journal of Financial Services Research 2013 2012–2013 2012 PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS Wei Wu, Paul Tiesinga, Thomas Tucker, Stephen Mitroff, and David Fitzpatrick (2011). Dynamics of population response to changes of motion direction in primary visual cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(36): 12767–12777. Wei Wu, Long-Chuan Yu (2004). Roles of oxytocin in spatial learning and memory in the nucleus basalis of Meynert in rats. Regulatory Peptides, 120(1-3):119–125. REFERENCES Eugene Fama (Co-chair) Tobias Moskowitz (Co-chair) Bryan Kelly Amit Seru (773) 702-7282 (773) 834-2757 (773) 702-8359 (773) 834-2767 2 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
© Copyright 2024