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M PRA
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Rethinking the Twin Deficits
Collin Constantine
University of London: SOAS
2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61229/
MPRA Paper No. 61229, posted 12. January 2015 05:03 UTC
Forthcoming in the Journal of Australian Political Economy
(JAPE)
RETHINKING THE TWIN DEFICITS
Collin Constantine
2014
ABSTRACT
This article reexamines the thesis that fiscal deficits cause trade deficits and challenges
this explanation of the twin deficits with the following propositions. Differences in
competitiveness among nations do not lead to balanced trade. Using a Eurozone case
study, the article discusses the nexus between competitiveness and the trade balance.
Secondly, the author proposes that causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits
when the free trade-balanced trade theory is overthrown, and finally, the article
overturns the argument that austerity works.
Keywords: twin deficits, competitiveness, free trade, Eurozone, austerity
Jel Classification: E62, F15, F32, F34, F41
Introduction
The twin deficits debate that emerged in the late 1970s has regained traction in recent
times since the Eurozone crisis and the debt ceiling debates in the USA. The
neoclassical economic contention is that imprudent government spending causes trade
deficits: thus, public deficits and debt are the offenders responsible for the Eurozone
trade imbalances, the USA’s trade deficits and global imbalances generally.
Empirical tests are inconclusive. Some (Abell 1990:81-96; and Volcker 1984:4-9) show
that fiscal deficits cause trade deficits, while others (Summers 1988:349-375; and
Reisen 1998) indicate the reverse causality. Yet, austerity policies are advanced as if
they rest on an uncontested theoretical and empirical foundation. This article challenges
the orthodoxy and uses a simple model and a Eurozone case study to show that
international differences in competitiveness (based on real unit labor costs and the
complexity of exports) lead to unbalanced trade.
This crucial insight overturns the
neoclassical reasoning, since the latter explanation of a twin-deficit relationship rests
firmly on the free trade-balanced trade theory. The popular story is that, because trade
balances naturally, any imbalances can only be explained by fiscal imprudence. But
when imbalances are the natural outcome of trade among differently abled countries,
fiscal deficits cannot adequately explain these imbalances. Therefore, this article
contradicts the neoclassical view. It contends that public deficits and household debt
are unfortunate consequences of trade deficits because government outlays tend to
increase, stabilizing income and employment, as trade deficits increase.
This debate around these issues is important because of the impact its policy
implications could have on the global economy and how it is managed in the future.
Overturning the free trade theory and the mainstream economists’ explanation of the
twin deficits contradicts the claim that austerity is necessary. Using a simple model, this
article demonstrates how austerity measures can reduce cyclical trade deficits but at the
cost of higher unemployment and indebtedness. Knowing the difference between
cyclical and structural trade balances is crucial in understanding why austerity gives a
false sense of adjustment. Structural balances are underpinned by competitiveness,
1 while the cyclical trade balances adjust with income. But suppressing income to shrink
trade deficits is neither the solution when trade deficits are structural, nor is it humane.
Austerity is not the appropriate policy to adjust structural trade deficits.
Some previous studies, such as Nikiforos et al (2013:17), support the line of causation
proposed here, but there are important differences. For instance, Nikiforos et al (2013:2)
explain that the source of imbalances in Greece is the Euro, unlike the contention in this
article that differences in competitiveness are the key problem. Similarly, Krugman
(2013) claims that imbalances in Europe could be eliminated if the Eurozone countries
had independent currencies: but this article explains that this adjustment mechanism is
dependent on the assumptions of Say’s Law and high price and income elasticities of
demand for exports and imports respectively. When these latter assumptions are
relaxed, the adjustment mechanism fails to operate and trade imbalances persist.
So how can global imbalances be prevented? Keynes suggested an International
Clearing Union but this would not prevent imbalances when the source of the
imbalances is differences in competitiveness. Rather, industrial policies are necessary
to acquire the tacit knowledge and technology needed to improve competitiveness.
Nations with highly ubiquitous export portfolios and/or relatively high real unit labor cost
need space to elevate their productivity and the technology content of their exports.
Trade arrangements that fail to compensate for competitive differences create future
crises of debt, trade imbalances and high unemployment.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first section discusses free
trade theory and its assumptions, along with the neoclassical explanation of the twin
deficits and a brief review of empirical studies. The second section explains how
competitiveness determines the trade balance, using a simple model and a Eurozone
case study, and ends by reformulating the twin deficits relationship. The third section
explains why fiscal austerity is ineffective in solving structural trade deficits. A
concluding section summarizes the argument.
2 Free Trade and its Assumptions
Consider two countries, A and B, with absolute advantage and disadvantage in all
commodities traded, respectively. When trade is undertaken, country A experiences an
inflow of foreign currency (or gold in David Ricardo’s original analysis) while country B
experiences an outflow. Employing the crude quantity theory of money, as Ricardo did,
country A and B experience inflation and deflation respectively, until country A loses its
absolute advantage in some commodities and country B gains in others. The real
exchange rate adjusts to reflect the price changes in both countries until trade balances.
These price changes supposedly mirror differences in comparative costs or result in
absolute advantage reversals. Essentially, price changes are used as the adjustment
mechanism that ensures balanced trade.
The above analysis was undertaken with the assumption that capital flows only affect
inflation. But when we account for how interest rates are determined these money flows
alter relative interest rates and generate an income adjustment mechanism. Using
Keynes’ theory of the rate of interest, these money flows cause a decrease in the rate of
interest for country A and an increase for country B. Relatively lower interest rates in
country A increase aggregate income through higher investment expenditure, which in
turn increases imports or reduces the trade surplus. The reverse is true for country B
that has higher interest rates, lower aggregate income and imports, and thus, an
improved trade balance. This income adjustment mechanism delineates how the
cyclical trade balance adjusts over the phases of the business cycle, which is different
from structural trade balance that cannot adjust through the income or price adjustment
mechanisms.
Mundell (1961:657-665) explained that currency unions or countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes would lose the price adjustment mechanism that balances trade
when wages and prices are rigid. Factor mobility was said to be the essential
adjustment mechanism that balances trade. Singh (2008:12), for example, argues that,
since Guyana implemented its Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1988, labor
migration served as the adjustment mechanism that improved its trade balance. Indeed,
3 Guyana’s exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar; and migration and remittance
flows intensified following the implementation of the (ERP). Singh (2008:12) explains
that remittances have two principal effects:
•
they serve as a source of deficit financing; and
•
they reduce the demand for imports when much of the remittances are in kind.
On this reasoning the adjustment mechanisms that balance trade ensure that free trade
is beneficial for all. The essential benefit is that losers (countries with trade deficits)
become winners as trade surplus countries become losers, through any of the
adjustment mechanisms that balance trade. An equilibrium is thereby established. But
this story is built on the assumptions of Say’s Law and no money flow reversals, both of
which are relaxed below. Finally, high price elasticity of demand for exports/imports and
high-income elasticity of demand for exports/imports are necessary conditions for the
price and income adjustment mechanisms to balance trade. When these do not hold,
trade imbalances are entrenched and the argument for free trade is severely weakened.
The price adjustment mechanism implicitly assumes full employment: otherwise, an
income adjustment mechanism would balance trade. This is why Say’s Law is an
important foundation of free trade theory, explaining that any excess supply of goods
will automatically readjust with price changes. Popularly known as ‘supply creates its
own demand’, Say’s Law ensures that aggregate demand (AD) equals aggregate
supply (AS) at a unique equilibrium of full employment (Keynes 1936:26). The latter is a
necessary condition that ensures the price adjustment mechanism is feasible. When
Say’s Law is relaxed, however, this paves the way for an income adjustment
mechanism to balance trade.
As stated earlier, the efficacy of the price adjustment mechanism also requires relatively
high price elasticity of demand for exports/imports: otherwise, price changes would be
insufficient to adjust trade imbalances. For instance, trade deficit countries that export
primary commodities with relatively low price elasticity of demand can hardly improve
their trade balances with lower export prices. This elasticity perspective is the source of
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis that explains why commodity-producing countries
experience declining terms of trade (Prebisch 1950:1-12; and Singer 1950:473-485). As
4 such, we expect persistent trade imbalances when commodity-exporting countries
undertake free trade with industrialized countries.
Since a clear interest rate differential exists between countries A and B (where the latter
has a relatively higher interest rate), money flow reverses and move from country A to B
in pursuit of higher returns. This reverse in money flow prevents any trade imbalance
from adjusting. Instead of a deflation in country B, the reverse money flow entrenches
its absolute disadvantages through the price adjustment mechanism. But imbalances
can still persist through the income adjustment mechanism. Instead of country A (with
its relatively lower interest rate) boosting aggregate income and imports, capital outflow
to country B would increase its interest rate and impede the income adjustment
mechanism from offsetting trade imbalances. Although currency unions lose the price
adjustment mechanism, the income adjustment mechanism is available to balance
trade, but this is subject to the critique above.
Relaxing the assumptions of Say’s Law and no money flow reversals explain why free
trade will not lead to balanced trade, contrary to the mainstream economists’ contention.
Imbalances between Northern and Southern Europe, China and the USA - and global
imbalances generally - should not be regarded as anomalies or the inevitable
consequence of fiscal mismanagement. Rather, as Harvey (1996:567-83) says: ‘Trade
imbalances have not been automatically eliminated, not in the developing world, not
even in the developed world, not in the past, not in the present, not under fixed
exchange rates, not under flexible exchange rates’.
Twin Deficits
Some simple modelling can help to explain the key variables and relationships.
Equation 1 below is a basic national accounting identity where national savings ( NS )
less investment ( I ) or net capital outflow is equal to the trade balance or exports ( X )
less imports ( M ) . A positive net capital outflow ( NS > I ) indicates that the nation is a
net lender in world financial markets; and basic accounting necessitates that the trade
balance ( X – M ) adjusts to maintain the identity, as equation (2) illustrates. Equation
5 (3) depicts the popular twin deficits relationship when the nation is a net borrower
( NS
< I ) in world markets. These identities have no causal implications but
nonetheless point to a correlation between net capital outflow ( NS – I ) and the trade
balance ( X – M ) .
NS – I = X – M (1)
NS > I = X > M ( 2 )
NS < I = X < M ( 3) The mainstream economists’ contention is that causation runs from left to right. On the
reasoning, fiscal deficits result in a shortfall in domestic savings ( NS < I ) , which ignites
foreign borrowing and, consequently, causes a trade deficit ( X < M ) . However, this
reasoning is subject to two qualifications:
•
if the reduction in government savings due to fiscal expansion is fully offset by a
rise in private savings, then the trade balance remains unchanged (which is
known as the Ricardo-Barro Equivalence theorem).
•
if a reduction in national saving ( NS ) is fully offset by a fall in private investment,
then the trade balance is unaffected (known as the Feldstein-Horioka theorem).
Given these two qualifications, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(S
( ) ( ) ( )
where S p , I p , Sg
and
p
) (
– I p + Sg – I g
(I )
g
)
=
(X
– M ) (4)
are private savings and investment and government
savings and investment, respectively. The validity of the Ricardo-Barro Equivalence
theorem is questioned because individuals have a limited lifetime and may choose to
increase consumption (or reduce savings), though government undertakes deficit
spending. As regards the validity of the Feldstein-Horioka theorem, households either
face strict capital controls and/or simply lack a preference for foreign capital, both of
which are doubtful in a world of highly mobile capital.
6 The Mundell-Fleming model explains the twin deficits relationship by arguing that fiscal
deficits cause trade deficits. The essential argument is that a budget deficit in one
country increases its interest rates relative to the rest of the world, which encourages
capital inflow that appreciates its exchange rate (in a floating exchange rate regime).
The higher exchange rate reduces net exports and deteriorates the country’s net trade
balance
(X
– M ) . Alternatively, when the exchange rate regime is fixed, the fiscal
expansion is accommodated by monetary expansion, which offsets the initial increase in
interest rates. The result is an increase in aggregate income (through deficit spending)
and imports, which erodes the trade balance ( X – M ) through the income adjustment
mechanism.
The Mundell-Fleming model uses the trade-balanced theory (or a world where price,
income or factor inputs adjust to balance trade) as its underlying theoretical foundation.
Logical deduction then dictates that any trade imbalance could only be explained by
fiscal imbalances. But trade accompanies money flow across countries that inevitably
alter relative interest rates. It is these relatively higher interest rates in trade deficit
countries, as compared to trade surplus countries, that ignite capital flows (to trade
deficit countries) and consequently cement trade imbalances independent of fiscal
balances.
Notwithstanding its flawed free trade theoretical basis, the Mundell-Fleming explanation
of the twin deficits relationship was given empirical support by Volcker (1984:4-9) and
Abell (1990:81-96) for the USA in the late 1980s. Hutchinson and Pigott (1984:5-25),
Zietz and Pemberton (1990:23-34), Bacham (1992:232-240), Erceg et al (2005:232240) and Bartolini and Larhiri (2006) also established the same line of causation for
OECD countries. Chinn and Prasad (2003:232-240) argue that the Mundell-Fleming
explanation holds for both developed and developing countries. However empirical
support for the reverse causality was generated by Summers (1988:349-375). Reisen
(1998) and Khalid and Teo (1999:389-402) also argued that there is empirical evidence
that supports the reverse causality of the twin deficits in developing countries in the 80s
and 90s, while Alkswani (2000:26-29) suggested that the reverse causality holds for
commodity exporting countries, since the trade balance directly affects fiscal revenues.
7 A number of other studies have posited bi-directional causality, implying that both fiscal
and trade balances affect each other. Darrat (1988:879-886) and Hatemi and Shukur
(2002:817-824) showed bi-directional causality for the USA. Islam (1998:121-128) and
Normandin (1999:171-193) confirmed the same for Brazil and Canada respectively;
while Baharumshah et al (2006:331-354) established similar findings for Malaysia and
the Philippines, though Anoruo and Ramchander (1998:487-501) indicated unidirectional causality from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. Other studies, such as Miller
and Russek (1989:91-115) and Rahman and Mishra (1992:119-127), confirm the
Ricardo-Barro Equivalence theorem, but these studies are difficult to reconcile with
recent evidence of both fiscal and private deficits leading to the global financial crisis.
We cannot reasonably infer that the verdict is out on the direction of causation.
However, the recent push for austerity measures in Europe implies otherwise. So does
the recommendation in the IMF (1999) Balance of Payments (BOP) Manual that
contractionary fiscal policies (among others) could solve balance of payments crises.
Even Rodrik (2013) argues that the real heroes of the global economy are countries like
Austria, Canada, the Philippines, Lesotho and Uruguay, since they do not over-borrow
or sustain a mercantilist economic model. Similarly, Krugman (2013) argues that
Germany’s trade surplus is responsible for a substantial part of global demand
slowdown, because the source of its trade surplus is its excess of savings relative to its
investment. Additional blame is also attributed to the fact that Germany does not have
an independent currency: otherwise, its exchange rate would simply appreciate to
ensure that its trade balance adjusts. But this argument is subject to the same critique
of the price adjustment mechanism. Furthermore, Krugman (2013) recommends
boosting aggregate demand in Germany to reduce its trade surplus, but this suggestion
falls victim to the same criticisms against the income adjustment mechanism. Even if
the latter were effective, it would only adjust Germany’s cyclical trade balance. If much
of Germany’s trade surplus is structural, Krugman’s advice is palliative at best and
completely ineffective in a worst-case scenario.
8 Competitiveness and the Trade Balance
Contrary to the mainstream economists’ contention, my argument is that the fiscal
balance does not regulate the trade balance. On the contrary, it is competitiveness that
determines the balance of trade. But what is competitiveness? The Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum defines it as the
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. But
Lall (2001:1501-1525) argues that this definition is too broad and that the methodology
in calculating the indices is flawed, such that these weak theoretical and empirical
foundations reduce the value of the indices for any analytical purposes and
policymaking.
Competitiveness is defined here, rather more specifically, as the ability of a nation to
seize opportunities and subdue costs in an increasingly integrated global environment,
through the use of institutions that improve productivity in sophisticated goods/services.
From this view, two pillars of competitiveness emerge:
•
productivity, particularly labor productivity; and
•
technological content or the degree of sophistication of goods/services.
Real unit labor costs could be defined as: wages per hour/labor productivity. Therefore,
as productivity rises relative to wages, real unit labor costs fall, and vice versa. But the
competitive gains from reducing real unit labor costs are limited, especially if the product
mix of a country’s exports is ubiquitous and built with simple technology. This
challenges Krugman (2010), who argues that internal devaluation or reductions in unit
labor costs is the only sensible way to eliminate the effects of asymmetric shocks within
the Euro. But the sophistication of a country’s exports is equally important for
competitiveness. Besides, Krugman’s suggestion could make matters worse: if
aggregate demand in Southern Eurozone countries is wage led, internal devaluation
would reduce consumption and aggregate income while increasing unemployment and
debt to GDP ratios.
The PRODY index developed by Hausmann et al (2007:1-25) approximates the
revealed technology content of a product by a weighted average of GDP per capita of
9 the exporting countries. The PRODY index describes the income level associated with a
product and gives more weight to countries with a revealed comparative advantage in
that product. Thus, high-income countries can be expected to export goods with
relatively higher technology content. At the country level, the Economic Complexity
index (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009:10570-10575) measures diversification and
ubiquity, while EXPY (Hausmann et al 2007:1-25) scores indicate the income level
associated with a particular export basket. These measures are highly correlated with
per capita income and growth. Countries that are relatively more competitive possess
greater technological capabilities and knowledge (formal and tacit), which increase the
degree of complexity and the range of goods/services that can be produced. This has
been the justification for industrial policies or selective state intervention to accelerate
technological accumulation and development.
A Simple Model
Consider two countries, Alpha and Beta, which export goods X and Y respectively.
Country Alpha possesses greater technological capabilities: therefore, good X is a
sophisticated commodity with high complexity. The reverse is true for country Beta and
good Y . The level of wages (Wa ) and productivity in country Alpha determine the real
(
)
unit labor costs W *a . We assume that country Beta has a lower wage rate (Wb < Wa )
(
)
but even lower productivity, giving a relatively higher real unit labor cost of W *b > W *a .
Let Px denote the price of good X in terms of Y or the terms of trade of country Alpha.
Conversely, the price Py of good Y is 1 / Px . These differences in terms of trade are
attributed to differences in the technology content of commodities and real unit labor
costs. In this simple model, the basis for trade is differences in technology or
competitiveness, which cause export prices and export baskets to differ.
When free trade is undertaken between these countries a clear trade imbalance
emerges ( Px Xa > (1 / Px ) Yb ) , where Xa and Yb are the quantities of goods X and Y
respectively and are non-zero. If we assume that countries Alpha and Beta have their
10 own currencies, the price adjustment mechanism is available to balance trade. But this
is impeded by price differentials that are underpinned by differences in competitiveness.
Since the price adjustment mechanism assumes Say’s Law (contrary to our earlier
criticisms) and the factor mobility adjustment is only viable in currency unions, then the
income adjustment mechanism is the only way to balance trade. However, as the first
main section of this article explains, capital moves from surplus countries to trade deficit
countries: thus, trade imbalances persist. Consequently, we can posit the following:
PROPOSITON 1: Free trade among countries with differences in competitiveness does
not lead to balanced trade.
Accordingly, we can expect trade imbalances between North and Southern Europe to
persist, since nations within the Eurozone have experienced a divergence in
competitiveness. Similarly, extensive trade liberalization of the world economy can be
expected to create chronic global imbalances, as is evident today.
If we assume factor price equalization, then wages would tend to be the same in all
countries, but real unit labor costs can still vary because of differences in technology
and productivity. Technology transfer in trade is a fact, but only formal and codified
knowledge is disseminated from the center to the periphery. Inevitably, gaps in tacit
knowledge not only exist but also tend to persist; since many Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) outlaw industrial policies that government might otherwise implement to acquire
that tacit knowledge for local industries.
A Eurozone Case Study
Figure 1 tells a striking story about the Eurozone crisis and highlights the divergence
between the North (surplus nations) and the South (deficit nations). Evidently, trade
imbalances have long been a part of the Eurozone story, but they became chronic after
2002. Figure 2 showing unit labor costs for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and
Portugal takes us closer to an explanation. After 2002, unit labor costs escalated in
Southern Europe, with the largest increase observed in Greece. By contrast, Germany’s
labor cost increases have been modest when compared to its Southern counterparts.
Thus, a clear divergence in competitiveness between Germany and Southern Europe is
11 observed, mirroring the worsening trade imbalances from 2002 to 2008 shown in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Intra-Eurozone trade balances
400
300
Surplus
200
mil. euros
100
0
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
-100
Deficit
-200
-300
Source: Kosteletou (2011:11).
Note: The trade deficit countries are Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxemburg, Cyprus, Malta and
Slovenia with other Eurozone countries. The trade surplus countries with other Eurozone countries are Germany,
Belgium, Ireland, Holland and Slovakia.
Figure 2: Unit Labor costs for selected Eurozone countries
Source: www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/image/mickey_fig1.gif - data source: Eurostat.
12 Figure 3 strengthens the argument that a competitive divergence exists, as productivity
improvements were slower in Southern Europe, especially Italy, when compared to
Germany. Although the rate of productivity growth increase has evidently been below
the rate of increase in labor costs in Germany in recent years, the two have moved
more-or-less in tandem over the whole time period shown. By contrast, in France,
Spain, Italy and Portugal, the costs of labor have steadily outstripped the slow
productivity growth. In spite of Greece’s substantial productivity growth until 2008, its
competitiveness has been eroded due to escalating labor costs. The divergence
between the cost of labor and productivity shown in Figure 3 has also mirrored the
increasing divide between surplus and deficit countries shown in Figure 1.
Figure 3: Productivity and Labor costs for selected Eurozone countries
Source: www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/image/mickey_fig3.gif - data source: Eurostat.
It is often argued that a common currency regime prevents the price adjustment
mechanism from working: hence, the Euro has been blamed for entrenched trade
imbalances. To assess this hypothesis, Figure 4 highlights the year in which selected
Eurozone countries joined the Euro, as indicated by the vertical line in each graph.
Interestingly, each of the countries had current account imbalances prior to their
adoption of the Euro, in spite of the fact that they all had independent currencies. Figure
4 also depicts the correlation between these current account imbalances and the public
deficits for the selected economies. The correlation looks weak. Both Italy and France
13 had current account surpluses in many years even though their public accounts were in
deficit. Generally, however, the selected countries experience both current account
deficits and fiscal deficits over the time period studied here, although there is no clear
evidence of any consistent year-by-year association between the two.
Figure 4: Twin Deficits for selected Eurozone countries
GREECE
PORTUGAL
0
SPAIN
-2
4
-4
-4
0
-6
-8
-4
-8
-12
-8
-10
-16
-12
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
-12
92
94
96
98
ITALY
00
02
04
06
08
10
92
94
96
98
FRANCE
8
00
02
04
06
08
10
04
06
08
10
CYPRUS
4
4
2
4
0
0
0
-2
-4
-4
-4
-8
-8
-6
-12
-8
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
04
06
08
10
-12
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
92
94
96
98
00
02
SLOVENIA
10
5
0
-5
-10
92
94
96
98
00
02
Current Account (% of GDP)
Public Deficit (% of GDP)
Source: Kosteletou (2011:9). Note: the solid vertical line indicates the year that the Euro was adopted.
To what extent has the varying sophistication of exports contributed to the divergence in
competitiveness and the worsening of trade imbalances? Table 1 illustrates the
Economic Complexity and EXPY indices for Eurozone countries, China, Japan and the
USA. It is evident that Germany and the remainder of the surplus countries have higher
ECI and EXPY scores, as compared to Greece, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus. Although
France, Italy and Austria have recently been trade deficit countries, they have similar
ECI and EXPY scores to the trade surplus countries. We may infer that differences in
real unit labor costs could explain the competitiveness gaps between the nations.
Indeed it is no surprise that Greece, Portugal and Spain are burdened with substantial
trade imbalances (as shown in Figure 4), since they export few complex goods and are
relatively less diversified. These countries score poorly on the two pillars of
competitiveness and, as proposition 1 suggests, they endure chronic trade imbalances.
Improving labor productivity within these countries would enhance their international
14 competitiveness, but this cannot be sustained unless they diversify and upgrade the
technological content of their exports. Greece’s top five exports are: refined petroleum,
packaged medicaments, aluminum plating, non-fillet fish and copper pipes. Germany’s
main exports are: cars, vehicle parts, packaged medicaments, planes, helicopters and
spacecraft. 11% of Greece’s imports come from Germany, making up the largest part of
its import bill.
Table 1: Measures of Diversification (ECI) and Incomes for a Particular Export
Basket (EXPY) for Selected Countries
COUNTRY
ECI 2010
EXPY 2010
GERMANY
1.76
1.62
20518.92
20545.04
1.54
18723.02
1.52
20920.42
1.51
19542.34
1.49
19992.51
1.39
19111.67
1.39
1.35
20104.39
18914.48
1.30
18032.51
1.28
1.28
1.23
1.23
1.17
1.12
1.02
0.99
0.86
0.83
0.80
0.78
0.73
0.68
0.65
0.51
0.98
18447.67
18584.14
18701.91
24734.78
19762.23
17429.08
18249.39
17950.39
16430.41
17371.78
15654.90
15888.44
15608.11
16292.15
13699.65
15540.75
17058.99
SWEDEN
CZECH
REPUBLIC
FINLAND
UNITED
KINGDOM
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM –
LUXEMBOURG
FRANCE
SLOVENIA
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
NETHERLANDS
HUNGRARY
ITALY
IRELAND
DENMARK
POLAND
SPAIN
MALTA
ESTONIA
CYPRUS
ROMANIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
PORTUGAL
BULGARIA
GREECE
CHINA
15 JAPAN
USA
1.99
1.55
21313.27
20030.19
Source: Reinstaller et al (2012:28).
To digress briefly, Papadimitriou et al (2013:1-20) and Shaikh et al (2003:1-16) explain
that the decline in the USA’s current account coincides with a downturn in
manufacturing as a share of value added in the economy. This de-industrialization is
indicative of the loss in competitiveness in industry. Papadimitriou et al (2013:1-20)
argue that, unless the stagnation in US manufacturing is reversed, the erosion of its
competitiveness will continue. They propose an increase in R&D investment in export
sectors to reduce unit costs for producers, arguing that this could return the USA to its
competitive position in the high technology sector.
It is a line of reasoning that is
consistent with the arguments made in the Eurozone case study.
Shaikh et al (2003a:1-16) demonstrate that Japan, Germany and China are the three
main contributors to the USA’s current account deficit. As Table 1 illustrates, both
Germany and Japan have higher ECI and EXPY scores than the USA, indicative of their
superior competitiveness. Although China scores poorly on these measures as
compared to the USA, Shaikh et al (2003a) explain that China accounts for the greater
part of the USA’s current account deficit, revealing its advantage in the real unit cost of
labor.
Similarly, Montoute (2013:110-126) explains that Caricom1 countries have endured an
increasing trade deficit with China since 2001. China’s top ten products are finished
manufactures, while Caricom’s top ten exports are raw materials – indicating a striking
competitive gap. But Caricom’s trade misery does not end with China, as the customs
union has also experienced trade deficits with the USA and EU since 2001. There were
exceptional years like 2006 when Caricom benefited from a trade surplus with the USA,
but the region is generally at a competitive disadvantage, similar to the Southern
Eurozone countries.
ECLAC (2012:114) explains that trade between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
and the USA, EU, Asia and the Pacific reflects reprimarization (the tendency to export
1
A customs union of mostly Small Island Caribbean states. 16 primarily agricultural commodities) on the part of LAC. The same publication illustrates
that productivity growth has been completely absent in LAC for the period of 1980-2010,
while productivity tripled in Asia. LAC has been fortunate since the mid-2000s because
the commodity price boom favorably influenced their terms of trade, but it is likely to be
in a precarious position when commodity prices stabilize.
Kassim (2013) has investigated the impact of trade liberalization on export and import
growth across 28 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1981 to 2010. The research,
based on panel data, concludes that, following liberalization, the trade balance
deteriorated for the sample countries. Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004:F50-F72)
drew the same conclusion for 22 developing countries from 1972 to 1998. An
investigation conducted by Santos-Paulino (2007:972-998) for 17 least developed
countries from 1970 to 2001 confirmed that this finding is robust. As proposition 1
explains, when competitiveness is asymmetrical, liberalization of the world economy
tends to create chronic trade imbalances.
Twin Deficits and Causality
Some further modelling can held to show the nature of the twin deficits relationship.
Equation (5) explains the normal situation where actual income (Y ') is less than full
employment income (Y *) , being made up of government outlays ( G ) , consumption
(C ) , investment ( I )
deficit
( NX
and net exports ( NX ) . Following proposition 1, we expect the trade
< 0 ) and the economy’s slack (Y ' < Y *) to intensify for country Beta,
while the reverse is true for country Alpha. We assume that the output elasticity of
unemployment is relatively low for country Alpha so that increases in Y ' due to an
increasing trade surplus ( NX > 0 ) do not incite wage increases. We also assume that
wages are sticky downwards, so that an increasing output gap (Y ' < Y *) does not
manifest itself in lower wages in country Beta.
Y ' < Y * = G + C + I + NX ( 5 )
17 As the output gap increases (due to an increasing trade deficit ( NX < 0 ) ) in country
Beta, national income falls along with ( C ) , ( NS ) and tax revenues (T ) . This leads to
the following position, where (Y '' < Y ') :
Y '' < Y * = ( G > T ) + C + ( NS < I ) – NX ( 6 )
Equation (6) illustrates the situation of a public deficit
(G
> T ) resulting from a
downward (automatic) adjustment of tax revenue (T ) and national saving ( NS ) . We can
expect the public deficit ( G > T ) to increase as the trade deficit ( NX < 0 ) worsens. It
is through the automatic and discretionary stabilization mechanisms that government
outlays become endogenous and respond to shocks in the trade balance. The reverse
argument could be made for country Alpha that experiences an increase in its trade
surplus
( NX
> 0 ) , tax revenue (T ) and national saving
stabilizers, Alpha’s fiscal position becomes a surplus
becomes a net lender
( NS
( NS ) .
(G
Through automatic
< T ) and the country
> I ) in world markets. This leads us to the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: Causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits.
This implies that fiscal balances endogenously adjust to trade balances, which
undermines the fiscal sovereignty of nation states. This should caution against the
embrace of many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and further integration of trading
blocs.
As highlighted earlier, there is empirical support for Proposition 2, but this hardly gets us
anywhere as the reverse causality also has some empirical support. To settle the issue,
one has to investigate the theoretical foundations of the various lines of causation.
Conventional trade theory argues that the value of each nation’s imports and exports
tends to balance irrespective of their initial competitiveness, but this reasoning is built
on implausible assumptions, as argued earlier. Since competitiveness is not evenly
distributed, trade imbalance is the general case and could not be caused by fiscal
deficits.
18 Rodrik (1998:997-1032) explains that governments play a risk-reducing role for
economies exposed to significant external risks, supporting the argument that causation
runs from openness to government spending. To reduce endogeneity problems and
extract the exogenous component of trade shares, Rodrik employs three different
approaches to establish causality. He uses a measure called natural openness (instead
of the standard measure of trade to GDP ratio), which captures the distance among
major trading partners. Secondly, he employs a measure developed by Frankel and
Romer (1996) that seeks to capture the geographical determinants of trade shares,
using only bilateral trade data. Finally, an instrumental variables approach, based on
population and distance, is used. Cross-country regressions on these three bases
confirm the earlier findings of causation running from openness to the size of
governments when the standard measure of openness (trade to GDP ratio) is
employed. This supports Proposition 2 and the determination of trade imbalances
independent of fiscal imbalances.
Kearney and Fallick (1987) contend that fiscal restraint will not improve the trade
balance unless accompanied by industrial initiatives aimed at improving the country’s
structural weaknesses. The authors underscore the point that private savings and
investment are not stable: ergo, fiscal consolidation is not the only adjustment
mechanism to balance trade, unlike the neoclassical claim. The authors highlight the
importance of the components of government spending (current and capital outlay) and
contend that these have asymmetrical influence on the trade balance, an argument that
is ignored in the neoclassical reasoning. Similar to Cuddington and Vinal (1986), the
authors claim that the influence fiscal deficits have on the trade balance is dependent
on how the deficit is financed, whether it be tax or loan financed.
An extension of the causality debate is the argument that excessive savers and
spenders are responsible for global imbalances. But let us reconsider equation (6),
where trade deficits ( NX < 0 ) reduce national income and national savings ( NS ) . The
fall of national savings ( NS ) in trade deficit countries is the consequence of an increase
in the output gap, as opposed to irresponsible governments or households. The reverse
is true in trade surplus countries ( NX > 0 ) , where national income and national savings
19 ( NS )
are rising steadily. Hence, the presence of ‘excessive savers and spenders’ is an
expected consequence of global imbalances (ceteris paribus). In trade deficit countries,
households attempt to maintain their current standards of living by incurring debt,
although employment and income are falling.
Trade Deficits and Fiscal Austerity
The popular argument that twin deficits are caused by fiscal mismanagement leads to
one conventional policy conclusion – impose fiscal austerity. Equation (6) illustrates the
budget deficit ( G < T ) that austerity measures are supposed to eradicate, as in the
cases of Greece and the IMF’s structural adjustment programs. Reductions in ( G ) that
are intended to balance the budget simultaneously reduce aggregate income, ( C ) and
( NS ) . That fall in national income would normally reduce imports and thus improve the
cyclical trade deficit, but at a cost of higher unemployment.
Surely this is not the
humane way to address global imbalances.
Proponents of austerity contend that the austerity measures are expansionary since the
cyclical trade balance improves. But any such expansionary effect must be weighed
against the contractionary impulses of lower ( C ) , ( G ) and ( I ) . Indeed, trade deficits
have declined in the aftermath of austerity policies in Southern Europe, but this does not
reflect improved competitiveness: it is the cyclical trade deficits that have improved at
the cost of unemployment. This leads us to proposition 3:
PROPOSITION 3: Fiscal austerity cannot solve structural trade deficits.
This claim rests on the foundation of Propositions 1 and 2. As such, unless fiscal
austerity improves competitiveness, structural trade deficits will persist. Moreover, it is
unlikely that budget cuts in education, health care, infrastructure and other social
spending will enhance competitiveness and reduce trade imbalances, especially in
times of high unemployment.
The idea of austerity is founded on a flawed theory that leaves only one explanation for
trade imbalances – irresponsible governments. Proponents of austerity argue that the
20 reduction of debt should be the first order of business. Of course, trade deficit countries
are net borrowers, so high indebtedness is expected, but the use of austerity measures
tends to increase the debt to GDP ratio and make the problem worse. The problem of
debt will continue, unless the structural imbalances are addressed by reducing the gaps
in competitiveness among nations. Meanwhile, austerity measures are deeply socially
unpopular, as shown by protests on the streets of Europe.
Conclusion
Overthrowing orthodox economic trade theory strikes the hardest blow against the
popular explanation of the twin deficits. This article proposes that free trade among
nations with differences in competitiveness does not lead to balanced trade, and that
causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. When we understand that trade
imbalances are not anomalies but the general outcome of trade among countries that
are differently abled, one cannot convincingly argue that fiscal imprudence causes
these imbalances. This article has sought to show the flaws in the mainstream
reasoning and explains why fiscal austerity cannot solve structural trade deficits. The
reasoning that excessive spending and savings are the root causes of global
imbalances has also been challenged and overturned through the use of a simple
model that delineates why these are inevitable outcomes from unbalanced trade.
In the European case, there is a clear divergence in competitiveness between North
and Southern countries that drives the imbalances. In the German case, its real unit
labor costs are lower than the Southern Eurozone countries and its exports are highly
complex and sophisticated. Southern European countries, particularly Greece, need to
diversify and upgrade the technology content of their exports. For countries like France
that export sophisticated goods like others in the North, reductions in real unit labor
costs can contribute to regaining competitiveness, but this cannot be done unless
industrial policies are accommodated.
These findings have far reaching implications for academics and policy makers alike,
especially at a time when countries are affected by chronic trade imbalances, debt and
high unemployment. The proposition that differences in competitiveness matter for trade
21 forces us to rethink the global trading architecture and helps us understand the role that
trade liberalization (or integration) plays in today’s global and regional imbalances. The
Eurozone crisis should be a lesson for trading blocs everywhere: its continuing
problems represent the epitome of the flawed theory that trade always balances. A
reconstruction of the global economy is needed to prevent, instead of create, trade
imbalances, thus averting high indebtedness and unemployment. How we organize the
global economy to close the gaps in competitiveness is the principal task of our
generation and a fertile area for future research.
Collin Constantine is a Graduate student at the University of London: SOAS.
[email protected]
The author wishes to thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments and Frank
Stilwell for support that greatly contributed to this article.
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