Building capacity - amalgamation or what, Graham Sansom

Graham Sansom
UTS Centre for Local Government
Councils exist in systems of government
 Local government is government:
 Not an ‘industry’ or ‘business’ or lobby group or local club
 Not just service delivery
 Complexity and changing functions are inevitable
 ‘Core business’ is very difficult to define
 Inter-government relations are fundamental
 Local leaders must understand state and federal systems
and learn how to manage relationships
 Local government itself is a system
 Elements must be in sync to get good outcomes and build
capacity
Australia’s federation at a crossroads?
 A federation in name only?
 Commonwealth financial dominance (80% 0f tax)
 States lack meaningful autonomy (even GST not guaranteed)
 Commonwealth decisions are critical to regional development,
infrastructure, metro planning etc
 Significant capacity differentials between states
 Questionable future of SA and Tasmania
 Implications for State-local relations?
 Forthcoming White Paper
 Will the Abbott government turn back the clock?
 Budget and COA messages for local government
 Not just medium-term cuts in FAGs?
 End of a 40 year relationship with Canberra?
Constitution vs reality?
Commonwealth
Commonwealth
Local
State
State
Local
But will ‘Local’ stay there?
NSW Review Panel 2012-13
 Options for governance models, structural arrangements
boundary changes:
 To improve the strength and effectiveness of local
government
 To drive key strategic directions in ‘Destination 2036’
and the NSW 2021 State Plan
 Goal:
 A more sustainable system of democratic local
government that has added capacity to address the
needs of local and regional communities, and to be a
valued partner of State and Federal Governments.
Context
 152 councils, about half <10,000 population
 Climate of fiscal restraint
 Financial difficulties facing State and LG, especially
infrastructure backlogs, revenue shortfalls
 Static or declining federal support
 Declining populations across most of inland NSW, but
growing ‘regional capitals’
 Increasing imbalance/inequity between LGAs
 Importance of Sydney as a ‘global city’
 Vital importance of the regional dimension:
 Capacity building in non-metro areas
 State-local cooperation (agencies cannot/will not deal
with 152 councils effectively)
Relative levels of rates
Local Government
Area
Woollahra
Ku-ring-gai
North Sydney
Waverley
Kogarah
Palerang
Penrith
Blacktown
Clarence Valley
Campbelltown
Bathurst
Albury
Warrumbungle
Broken Hill
Average Residential
Average Residential
Land Value
Rates 2011/12 ($)
2011/12 ($)
1,036,898
1,006
529,412
591
366,043
484
563,832
796
446,270
887
237,770
770
229,634
957
183,763
808
152,449
784
154,348
817
100,403
810
115,128
1,045
30,648
452
28,802
674
Rates as % of Land
Value 2011/12
0.10
0.11
0.13
0.14
0.20
0.32
0.42
0.44
0.51
0.53
0.81
0.91
1.47
2.40
Strategic capacity
 Fundamental goal was to enhance ‘strategic capacity’
 Securing LG’s future in troubled times
 Coping with complexity and unpredictable change
 More robust revenue base (static/declining grants:
stronger councils must be more self-sufficient)
 Scope to undertake new functions/major projects
 Ability to employ wider range of skilled staff
 Knowledge, creativity and innovation
 Credible and ‘real’ partner for State and federal agencies
 Panel was NOT focused on economies of scale/cost savings
 LG as government, not just service delivery
‘Strategic Capacity’
Relevance
 Role in system
of government
 Wider agendas
 Places and
communities
Resources
 Finance/asset
management
 Rates
 Skills (inc
strategy, policy,
IGR)
Credibility
 Political
renewal
 Mayors
 Benchmarking
 Leadership by
larger councils
A package of proposals
 Structural reform necessary, but just one element
 Need to balance increased capacity with ‘keeping the local’
 Three components: some amalgamations (esp metro Sydney),
strong regional organisations, new forms of local governance
 Other complementary proposals including:
 ‘Fiscal responsibility’ agenda (including audit)
 Improvements to the rating system (equity issues)
 Re-distribution of grant funding
 State-wide finance agency
 Better governance (eg role of mayors)
 Consistent data and benchmarking
 Changes in State-local relationships
‘Joint Organisations’
 Voluntary ROCs, alliances patchy, vulnerable, limited in scope
 Proposed mandatory organisations/shared services:
 But flexible arrangements (individual proclamations)
 Proposed core functions:
 Strategic regional and sub-regional planning
 Regional advocacy and inter-governmental relations
 Collaboration on key infrastructure (water utilities, road
network planning, major projects)
 Regional economic development
 Library services
 ‘High level’ corporate services
 Integration with State regional coordination system
Member
Councils
Subsidiaries:
Existing County
Councils;
Regional Water
Alliance;
Shared Services;
Others
Shared
Services
Centres of
Excellence
Governing Body
(Mayors plus others
as agreed)
Statements of
Intent
Partnership
Agreements
Other Key
Stakeholders
Regional
Partnerships:
Roads and
Transport Group;
Strategic Planning;
Others
RGM and
Secretariat
InterGovernment
Relations
Regional
Strategic
Planning
Other
Activities
Reviewing the evidence
 No single ‘right’ approach to structural reform:
 Amalgamations and shared services/regional
collaboration both have role to play
 Both may ‘succeed’ or ‘fail’
 Fundamental questions concern:
 Role of local government (‘maximalist’ government or
‘back to basics’ service deliverer?)
 Objectives of reform (enhance capacity or cost savings?)
 Process is critical:
 Sound information base? Consultative? Proper preplanning? Robust governance arrangements?
 Applies equally to amalgamations and shared services
 Hoffman’s paper to FOLG 2013
Amalgamation
Efficiency
and
Economies
of Scale
Strong link
Boundary
Shared
Change
Services
Potential strong
link: depends on
Strong link
re-shaping of
councils
Regional
Collaboration
Weak link
As above –
benefits for
larger ‘new’
council/s
Medium-strong
link subject to Weak link
governance
Service
Improvement
Strong link
and
Innovation
As above
Strong link for
services that are
effectively
shared
Potential
Diminution
of Local
Democracy
Risk where
Some risk – can decisionLittle or no risk
be managed
making ceded
to joint agency
Strategic
Capacity
Strong link
Distinct risk,
but can be
managed
Depends on
nature and
scope of
collaboration
Amalgamations
 Benefits are not ‘automatic:
 Amalgamations don’t always deliver efficiencies/savings, can
be disruptive and costly
 No ‘straight line’ link between size and efficiency (Dollery et
al studies)
 May be a difference between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’
mergers (Dollery et al), but most likely process is the key
 A wide range of studies (ACELG, Dollery et al, Hoffman
and Talbot) do point to significant benefits:
 Economies of scale
 Economies of scope and increased capacity
 Enhanced sustainability
…continued
 Tiley’s 2010 study of Clarence Valley (2004 forced merger)
 The larger organisation has been able to increase
outputs and projects that were beyond the capacity of
the former councils … CVC has developed the capacity to
deliver services over a wider footprint than its
LGA…there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the
financial strength and stability of CVC is now greater
than that of each of the former councils …
 …the weight of empirical evidence … proves that the
economic benefits have outweighed the fiscal
disadvantages of this amalgamation… at least from a
fiscal standpoint, bigger is indeed better, but not
obviously cheaper.(emphasis added)
QTC review of 2007-8 amalgamations
 Costs were indeed substantial: the 24 councils involved
claimed a total cost of $184.71m
 But QTC’s assessment reduced this figure to $47.21m,
largely by excluding ‘discretionary decisions’ to adopt the
wage and salary levels of the previously highest paying
council
 QTC argued that additional costs would be progressively
offset by savings – but savings were often ploughed back
into improved services rather than made explicit
 All the councils had the financial capacity to meet the costs
of amalgamation, which represented only 0.3-1.5% of
operating revenues (or perhaps 1.2-6%?)
Shared services
 Given that compulsory council consolidation seldom achieves its




intended aims, and given that scale and scope economies do exist in some
specific local government services… the best way to achieve larger scale
economies in these selected functional areas is for councils to enter into
collaborative shared services agreements… (Dollery et al 2012)
… it is important not to ‘oversell’ this message by way of exaggerated
claims for what shared services models can realistically achieve … shared
services models have their limitations which must be recognised. (ibid)
… the degree of success varied considerably from case to case … there are
often significant barriers to the implementation of shared service
arrangements, which are difficult to overcome, including the loss of ‘local
identity’, the complexity of the processes involved, conflicting objectives
between participating councils and uncertainty surrounding potential
benefits. (Dollery et al 2011)
Findings confirmed by ILGRP research into ROCs
Failure of NESAC in NSW
‘Joint Board’ model
 Dollery and Johnson 2007:
… the retention of autonomous existing councils and their
current spatial boundaries, but with a shared administration
and operations overseen by a joint board of elected councillors
from each of the member municipalities. In essence,
constituent councils would each retain their current political
independence, thus preserving extant local democracy, while
simultaneously merging their administrative staff and resources
into a single enlarged bureau, in an attempt to reap any scale
economies, scope economies, or other benefits that may derive
from a larger aggregated administration.
Conclusions
 Local government faces an uncertain future:
 Growing fiscal constraints
 Shifting inter-government arrangements
 It will need to enhance its capacity, its independence, and
its credibility as a valuable part of our federal system
 Further structural reform has an important role to play in
this endeavour
 Such reform will be multi-dimensional:
 Drawing ‘battle-lines’ between amalgamations, shared
services and other approaches is pointless and damaging
 We need a mature conversation about what type of reform to
apply in what circumstances, and sound processes to make
those decisions