Download Report

April 2015
Overview



Turkish Airlines Operation
Security
Safety
 CNS
 ATS
 AIS
 Meteorology
Turkish Airlines’ Operation
Europe
41 Countries
103 Destinations
North America
2 Countries
8 Destinations
HELSINKI
OSLO
YEKATERINBURG
MONTREAL
MANCHESTER
MOSCOW
UFA
ASTANA
ULAN BATUR
BOSTON
SAN FRANCISCO
CHOCAGO
LISBON
WASHINGTON
LOS ANGELES
BEIJING
ATLANTA
HAVANA
MEXICO CITY
South America
2 Countries
2 Destinations
NAUKCHETE
SEUL
MASHAD
ORAN
CASABLANCA
OSAKA
SHANGHAI
SEBHA
ASMARA
MUSCAT
DHAKA
MUMBAI
HONG KONG
DAKAR
HO CHI MINH CITY
ABIDJAN
BOGOTA
MALE
SINGAPORE
KIGALI
LUANDA
SAO PAULO
BUENOS AIRES
JAKARTA
DAR ES SALAAM
MAPUTO
JOHANNESBURG
CAPE TOWN
Africa
27 Countries
50 Destinations
Middle East
14 Countries
33 Destinations
Far East
21 Countries
31 Destinations
Africa
27 Countries
50 Destinations
Africa
27 Countries
50 Destinations
Fleet Development
Turkish Airlines Fleet Size
435
7
85
103
133
102 127
158
202
1
18
2
17
67
84
83
2005
2006
2007
4
20
29
6
68
55
43
36
349
35
105
109
124
138
159
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Narrow
Source: Ranking from IATA Wats 2014.
79
9
7
4
18
293
11
9
5
1
17
179
233
261
Wide
181
197
214
2013
2014
2015B
Cargo
2021
SECURITY
SYRIA
Serious risks to the safety of international civil flights and the
consequent airspace restrictions.
YEMEN
All flight operations in the Sanaa flight information region (OYSC
FIR) are potentially hazardous situation created by the risks to civil
aviation from ongoing military operations, political instability,
violence from competing armed groups, and the continuing
terrorism threat from extremist elements.
SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN
Within or over the territory and Sudan and South Sudan HSSS FIR
(KHARTOUM) at altitudes below FL260 due to the potentially
hazardous situation created by the ongoing armed conflict in south
Sudan between the government of south Sudan and rebel forces.
EGYPT
Egypt Sinai Peninsula Airspace. Risk to overfly area published in SIB
at or below FL260.
IRAQ
Overflight is avoided. Airspace and Airport Closures and
Restrictions. Safety risk on the territory and airspace of Iraq.
UKRAINE
Simferopol FIR (UKFV) and Dnipropetrovs'k FIR (UKDV) are
avoided and alternative routings are preffered.
Raising safety concerns in Simferopol FIR 'due to the unsafe
situation where more than one ATS provider may be
controlling flights within the same airspace.
LIBYA
Libyan airspace is avoided. Taking into consideration the
armed conflict situation in Libya, ICAO draws the attention to
possible existence of serious risks to the safety of
international civil flights operating within the Tripoli FIR.
Hazardous situation in Libyan airspace overfly
ISRAEL
Flight Operations to Tel Aviv Ben Gurion International Airport,
Israel. Risk to overfly area published in SIB at or below FL260.
AFGHANISTAN
Flight level equal to or above FL240 in the airspace of
Afghanistan OAKX FIR (KABUL).
SAFETY - CNS
•
Surveillance Coverage
•
VHF Coverage
•
Navaids
•
Landing Aids
•
Calibration and regular flight checks for the navigation and landing aids
SAFETY - CNS
VHF, HF, CPDLC, Aircraft or ATC Relay
In-Flight Broadcast Procedure “IFBP”
Call 2 Minutes Prior to Waypoint.
Single standard VHF frequency 126.900 MHZ
Some regions within AFI are still not covered by VHF
communication facilities, communication handled via
HF which may be very difficult because of poor quality
and sometimes can be performed via relay by other
aircraft or African HF-ground stations only that are
working on the same HF frequencies.
SAFETY - CNS
Especially in during Hadj season a lot of additional traffic crosses and frequency problem
becomes more difficult to handle.
SAFETY - ATS
•
Route Structure and Airspace Design
•
Air Traffic Service Provision Availability and Quality
•
Language barrier in ATS communication- ICAO Level 4
•
Clear Communication/Broadcast Procedures and application throughout region
•
Transponder Usage Procedures – TCAS equipage
•
UAS, Aerostats, Arial Reconnaissance/Operational Activities
ISTANBUL TO KINSHASA (LTBA-FZAA)
EGYPT- SUDAN- DRC
EGYPT-SUDAN-CHADCENTRAL AFR.REP-DRC
GREEK-EGYPT-SUDANCHAD-CENTRAL AFR. REP –DRC
KINSHASA TO ISTANBUL (FZAA-LTBA)
DRC-SUDAN-EGYPT
DRC -CHAD-CENTRAL AFR.REP-
SUDAN-EGYPT
DRC-GABON-EQUATORAL GUINEACAMEROON-NIGER-NIGERIA-ALGERIA-TUNISIAMALTA-GREECE
ISTANBUL- KHARTOUM- ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL -KHARTOUM
EGYPT- SUDAN
KHARTOUM- ISTANBUL
EGYPT-SUDAN
SAFETY - Airports
•
Structural regular checks of movement area for FOD Hazard (Runway,
Taxiways and Apron)
•
Airport Security
•
Services Provided (ATS, AIS, MET, Airport Management, Ground Services)
•
Aerodrome lighting , lights around the airport creating confusion
•
Markings
SAFETY - AIS
•
NOTAMs
– Notification procedures and capabilities
•
AIP
– Data availability
– Validity –Up to date
– Integrity
– Quality
SAFETY
AIS
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Aeronautical Information Publication AIP http://www.ais-asecna.org/en/gen/gen2.htm
Should be updated
Standardization is needed, some parts need to be translated into English.
SUDAN
Aeronautical Information Publication AIP http://www.scaa-ais.sd/en/
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
Data is needed
Notams as published below made airline operators consider the mentioned IAC unusable. As the calibration
or maintenance is completed they should be updated.
………U/S DUE TO CALIBRATION,
………WITHDRAWN FOR MAINTENANCE,
………OPR BUT GND CK ONLY, AWAITING FLTCK,
SAFETY - Meteorology
•
METARs
•
TAFs
•
SIGMETs
•
Data Quality and Validity
SAFETY - Meteorology
KHARTOUM/ HSSS-KRT
Khartoum KRT WX reports are received on time
For HSPN/PZU Port Sudan, alternate A/D for KRT, there are problems in
receiving actual weather (SA) reports.
KINSHASA /FZAA-FIH
Problems in receiving weather reports for FZAA.
SAFETY DATA EX1
SAFETY
Erroneous Warning Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) as
‘Caution on runway alert when on taxiway/ Caution on taxiway’ alert when on runway.
Pilots prepare hazard report if they receive "caution on taxiway" warning.
FZAA Chart Notam: Airport data based on unreliable state sources.
CNS
Receiving G/S warning on localizer approach.
PAPI may be U/S without notification. If PAPI lights are not received on short final, confirmation is requested from
ATC tower.
Navaids / added; but Localizer RWY 24 U/S; VOR/DME U/S
RNAV (GNSS) 24 descent angle is 3.05° while PAPI is 2.8° pilot should pay attention.
ATS
Runway lighting. Some part of runway edge lights and runway end lights may be missing.
Push Back can be done wrongly.
SAFETY DATA EX2
SAFETY
Sodium lights prior to RWY18 are not to be confused with HIRL.
Heavy bird activity around the airfield.
CNS
On VOR approach no bearing received
PAPI lights may be U/S without notification.
Below G/S warnings
ILS glideslope deviations have been reported around 1000 ft AAL.
RNAV GNSS 18 / RNAV GNSS 36 / IAC / Transition Altitude/Level taken from airport. Source value presumed
unreliable
OR KHARTOUM / AOI / VOR KTM unusable R230-355 and R100-130
ATS
For international flights only Taxiway B and C permitted to vacate runway. But taxiway B is reported as it not
permitted.
Pilots should not misunderstand line of red lights ( Parallel to RWY36, 3 NM West) for ILS RWY36.
Runway lighting,
Ground communication problem
Very congested apron. Taxiing incidents occured in KRT.
FOD hazard possibility. Holes in Apron.
Arrival traffic vacates runway with back-track and gets marshalling assistance.
AIS
Notams should be published without delay.
(GROUND SERVICES)
Refuelling of aircraft may be executed by delay due to trucks unavailability to reach to the airport.
The number of push back vehicles is reported to be not sufficient.
[email protected]
THANK YOU