1. No category

Human Security in Practice: East Asian Experiences
Human Security and Development in Myanmar :
Issues and Implications
Moe Thuzar
No. 96
March 2015
This paper was prepared as part of a research project on “Human Security in Practice:
East Asian Experiences,” organized by the Japan International Cooperation Agency
Research Institute (JICA-RI).
Use and dissemination of this working paper is encouraged; however, the JICA
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which this working paper has provided input. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official positions of either
the JICA Research Institute or JICA.
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Copyright ©2015 Moe Thuzar All rights reserved.
Human Security and Development in Myanmar1: Issues and Implications
Moe Thuzar2
Abstract
The nexus between human security and development as a workable approach towards inclusive
development is gaining prominence. In present-day Myanmar, which is currently undergoing
transition and reform, human security needs and challenges are acute, particularly in striving for
inclusive and equitable social and economic development in tandem with political stability and
national reconciliation. Trust among the different interest groups is a crucial element for moving
forward with human security issues. There is a role for inclusive and participatory practices to be
instituted in Myanmar’s pursuit of human security in the national development plans. The human
security and development approach to assistance programs in Myanmar is thus worth consideration.
ASEAN and development partners can leverage on ASEAN’s constructive engagement mechanisms
in pursuing this approach in Myanmar.
1
This paper uses “Myanmar” as the country’s name, which is consistent with the UN-recognized usage.
However, the former name “Burma” is used in narrating developments before the name change was effected in
1989.
2
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
1
1. The Context for Human Security and Development
The nexus between human security and development was highlighted prominently in the seminal
Human Development Report 1994 released by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
which shifted the focus from state security to more concrete deliverables for the security of
individuals within a nation-state. The Human Development Report thus brought forward the vision of
Dr. Mahbub Ul-Haq and his human development paradigm of enlarging people’s choices by
proposing “a new concept of human security” that acknowledges “people’s security,” encompassing
job security, income security, environmental security, and security from crime, conflict, repression,
and social disintegration.3 The report also made the argument for human security as an “upstream”
intervention that requires long-term development support.4
Human Security Now, the 2003 report of the independent Commission on Human Security,
further elaborated the concept of people-centred human security. The report states from the outset that
“Human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires
both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives.
Needed are integrated policies that focus on people’s survival, livelihood, and dignity during
downturns as well as in prosperity.”5 This new paradigm of security brought together the “human
elements of security, of rights, of development.”6 Building on this, UN General Assembly Resolution
66/290 on September 10, 2012, established a common understanding of human security, essentially
ensuring freedom from fear, freedom from want, and a life with dignity for individuals.
The
successful pursuit of human security will thus result in an absence of threats to individuals and
communities for their survival (personal security), their livelihoods (access to food, education, health,
and income opportunities), and their dignity (political, civil, social, and cultural rights).
3
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 3.
4
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, 3.
5
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003).
The excerpt is from the Foreword of the report presented jointly by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen.
6
Ibid., 4
2
Following this comprehensive enunciation of human security, Howe and Jang have examined
the relationship between human security and development, and their mutually reinforcing nature.
They posit that conflict retards development and underdevelopment can lead to conflict. 7 This
description certainly seems to resonate with the experience of Southeast Asian countries. Human
security policy and practices in many developing countries in Southeast Asia lean more towards
developmental aspects, whether on the part of the government responsible for ensuring the human
security of its populace or on the part of the development partner or donor which prioritises human
security as an overseas development tool. The underlying notes of conflict and instability from which
human security concerns arise, or to which lack of human security could lead, also lend a sense of
urgency for governments to consider human security priorities in their development agendas. This has
proved true for Myanmar, even as the transition from state security to human security continues to be
in a state of flux in the country.
Using the broad conceptual approach of human security from a continuum that began with the
Human Development Report 1994, was explained further by the 2003 report of the Commission on
Human Security, and culminated in an agreed understanding in the 2012 UN General Assembly
resolution 66/290, this paper assesses the current attitudes towards, and practices (where relevant) of,
human security in the present day reform-oriented Myanmar, bearing in mind the emphasis placed on
state security by the past military regimes. It looks at perceptions and practices on six issues: a)
environment and climate change; b) migration; c) urbanization; d) peacebuilding; e) poverty
reduction; and f) health and education. The assessment seeks to ascertain whether the development
approach to human security will find greater traction in Myanmar, as the current situation – though far
from ideal – now provides more opportunities than in the past for pursuing a policy-coherent approach
to human security issues. By examining these issues, the paper also argues that the Japanese
“maximalist” approach to human security, which emphasises a comprehensive view of all threats to
7
Brendan M. Howe and Suyoun Jang, “Human Security and Development: Divergent Approaches to
Burma/Myanmar,” Pacific Focus 28, no. 1 (April 2013): 120-143.
3
human survival, life, and dignity,8 will work better in Myanmar through development cooperation
activities that help to build a culture of trust among the different interest groups. The main assertion of
this paper is that while an emerging rationale for pursuing human security in the context of
development can be seen in the pronouncements made by Myanmar’s leadership, it still remains to be
seen whether current human security – and the more immediate humanitarian needs – following the
clashes in Rakhine State and the ethnic armed conflict issues will be addressed in the same spirit, and
whether regional cooperation mechanisms (under ASEAN) can play a role in addressing human
security priorities in the country.
The paper is based mainly on documentary research, with additional insights gained from
focused conversations and interactions with Myanmar experts, practitioners, and resource persons in
the six issue areas mentioned above.
2. Perceptions and Practice of Human Security in Myanmar
Dr. Maung Zarni has pithily noted that Burmese modern history has been conflict-soaked from 1947
to the present.9 These conflicts are along multiple lines: class and ideology; civil society and the
military; and the ethnic groups. Conflicts from pre-colonial and colonial eras gave rise to a new set of
conflicts upon Burma’s independence in 1948. This unbroken line of conflicts in the country, leading
to broken trust across the different interest/stakeholder groups, has coloured perceptions of human
security and responses to human security needs, especially by the ruling elites at any given point in
time in the country. Tin Maung Maung Than contextualizes this in analysing the human security
dimension in “Myanmar’s overwhelmingly state-centred national security perspective”.10
8
Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia,” (policy speech at the Lecture Program
hosted by the Institute for International Relations Lecture Program, Hanoi, December 16, 1998), accessed
December 30, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-pacific/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html.
9
Dr. Maung Zarni, “Burma/Myanmar: Its Conflicts, Western Advocacy, and Country Impact,” Reinventing
Peace (a blog of the World Peace Foundation, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University),
March 25, 2013, accessed January 1, 2015, http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/03/25/burmamyanmarits-conflicts-western-advocacy-and-country-impact/
10
Tin Maung Maung Than, “Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and
Ethnicity, ed. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 176.
4
The historical roots of human security perceptions in colonial Burma seem to illustrate this
point. The earliest expression of an organised movement to ensure human security in preindependence Burma (even before the concept was coined) was the motivation of Western-educated
young men, using Western organizational and institutional forms to protect the people from what they
saw as “encroachment” of Christian missions and other “Westernising” influences, and also against
the economic exploitation of Burma’s natural resources. The early social movements in Burma in the
1900s aimed at bettering the lives of the Burmese and were mainly rooted in Buddhist civic action.
The humanitarian or social actions undertaken by these organised movements and civil society
associations to protect “national interests” and the security of the local (Burmese) communities
politicised issues of concern and promote nationalism, whether intentionally or not. These nationalistoriented movements had political motivations as well as an aspiration to counter the situation of the
(Burmese) people negatively affected by government policies of the time.
On the other hand, Burma/Myanmar’s history of the authorities’ response to human security
concerns have had mainly political underpinnings, and spontaneous action was strictly regulated by
the colonial, and later the military, regimes. The focus has been more on civic and humanitarian
action, mobilising state-organised youth and social welfare organizations, rather than on proactive
policies that address human security and developmental needs.
In post-independent Burma in the 1950s, the social and business associations, which
addressed human security situations as a continuation of the pre-independence movements, were
encouraged to come under the umbrella of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). Many
social organizations were thus affiliated to, and operated through, the AFPFL machinery. Although
political societies existed, their roles and aspirations were rather ambiguous. Civil and political rights
advocacy took a backseat to the growing concerns over the emerging insurgencies that took place
almost immediately after independence. The insurgency situation led to the overwhelming emphasis,
through the decades up to the present day, on national (state) security and protecting the state from
any enemy or threat. This later became conflated with regime security, particularly after 1962.
After Ne Win took over powers of the head of state in 1962, the Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP) created institutions for social movement and action while restricting political and
5
economic organizations. The over-arching attitude was to strive for self-protection and sufficiency.
Local people’s militia-type structures were organised to “prepare” the populace against the threat of
insurgencies. Social organizations, such as the Lanzin Youth and the Peasants’ and Workers’ Unions,
were formed under the aegis of the BSPP ideology and their actions were heavily influenced by it. Yet,
local social welfare and religious organizations continued to function quite freely, creating favourable
conditions for the norms that encourage and promote social collective action,11 and thus keeping alive
the communal spirit of protecting human security needs collectively.
When the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took control in 1988 after a
bloody repression of pro-democracy movements, it initially held hostile attitudes towards civil society
organizations and, naturally, spontaneous collective action or movements of any sort. Regardless of
these restrictions, many civil society organizations continued to exist, including native place and
ethnic organizations, religious organizations, alumni associations, and local business associations in
both formal and informal structures. They continued to provide social networks through which
humanitarian needs were communicated and addressed, mainly for localized events and needs. This
was in part due to the heavy restrictions placed by the military government on assembly and
gatherings. Throughout the mid- to late-1990s, however, the current military government became
gradually more tolerant of civil society organizations that focused mainly on social, health, and later,
environmental issues (notwithstanding the political nature of the problems the organizations
addressed). This helps to explain why many civil society organizations in Myanmar today have a
focus on these topics. The civil society organizations thus provide a ready base for human security
responses in inclusive social development and in areas or sectors where public or government
capacity to respond is low and/or slow.
The importance of human security in several of its dimensions was driven home to the
military regime when the 2008 Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar’s delta area - the country’s rice-bowl.
The government in Naypyitaw, particularly the then Prime Minister Thein Sein, realized the
importance of constructive partnerships in opening up the country and in bridging development and
11
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Myanmar: State, Society, and Ethnicity,” in Associational Life in Myanmar, ed. N.
Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007).
6
information gaps. Since 2008, Myanmar’s political landscape has undergone an important change.
The military-led State Peace and Development Council ceded power to a “civilianized” government
elected into power in November 2010. The 2010 elections were largely decried as a “sham,” as the
main opposition party - the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not participate in the election. Aung San Suu Kyi herself was still under house arrest. This was
lifted on November 13, 2010, five days after the elections. The reformist government led by Thein
Sein, now the President of Myanmar, has initiated wide-ranging political and economic reforms since
taking office on March 30, 2011. The reform process has paved the way for the opposition to rejoin
the political process. Myanmar is now gearing up for the next round of general elections in 2015,
which are widely anticipated as the litmus test for the country’s democratization process.
Starting from a low base, one can argue that the only direction for Myanmar to go is upwards.
Successfully securing a progressive and prosperous future for the people requires an ability to
formulate and implement an integrated development policy that is appropriate for the specific
circumstances of the country, including progressing reforms at a pace that the Myanmar people can
absorb and adapt to. Human security considerations need to form the core of such a policy.
7
3. Key Human Security Concerns in Myanmar
Myanmar’s policy planners seem to have recognized this imperative. The Ministry for National
Development and Economic Planning launched a Framework on Economic and Social Reforms
(FESR) in January 2013 at a development cooperation forum attended by donors and development
partners. The framework outlines Myanmar’s policy priorities for 2012-15, stating its intent to be a
“reform bridge” that links ongoing reform programs to the country’s 20-year National Comprehensive
Development Plan. In the context of the FESR and ongoing reforms, ensuring human security for the
population should no longer be a matter of debate or choice for Myanmar’s policy makers.
The following six areas provide a useful framework for analysis of human security issues and
implications in Myanmar, as the country continues its quest to be an active player in regional efforts
for people-centred development. Indeed, it is now an opportune time for the Myanmar government to
engender people-centred programes and projects in its reform measures. During Myanmar’s ASEAN
chairmanship tenure in 2014, President Thein Sein was the first among ASEAN heads of
state/government to use the term “people participation” with reference to regional integration
priorities.12 This provides a good basis for policy coherence in implementing current national priority
plans such as the FESR. It should also take into consideration the global objectives for the post-2015
Development Agenda, which calls for a “truly integrated people-centred approach” in pursuing
inclusive social development; inclusive economic development; environmental sustainability; and
peace and security.13
At present, policies or programs in each of the six areas do not yet take an integrated
approach to human security needs and are largely pursued along separate tracks. The exception seems
to be in the emerging approach taken towards environment and climate change.
12
In his keynote speech to the 2014 ASEAN Business and Investment Summit at Naypyitaw, Myanmar on
November 11, 2014, President Thein Sein stressed that “ASEAN, a people-centred and people-oriented
organization, must highlight the importance of people’s participation in the business environment, along with
inclusiveness and transparency.” Full text of the President’s speech at the website of the President’s Office:
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2014/11/12/id-4395.
13
United Nations, Human Security Unit Strategic Plan 2014-2017 (New York: United Nations, 2014), 17.
8
Environment and climate change14
Environmental concerns are emerging as an area where there is a nascent intersectoral approach
linking environmental and human rights. Central (or Union) level senior officials in government have
openly recognized the nexus of human rights, environment and climate change, and the need for
policy cohesion among the different sectoral ministries. The commitment of Myanmar - in this new
era of opening up - to address green growth and sustainable development, is a noteworthy experience
to build upon. The lead taken by Myanmar during its tenure of the ASEAN chairmanship in adopting
an East Asia Summit Declaration on Climate Change (as an input to the international climate change
discussions led by the United Nations [UN]), and the announcement that Myanmar would host the
ASEAN
Institute
on
Green
Economy
bodes
well
for
Myanmar’s
emergence
as
a
future “champion” for this topic in ASEAN. However, the current state of ASEAN's work related to
environment and climate change shows that cross-sectoral coordination is still weak, whether at
regional or national level. This implies that national efforts (and national interest) are still the main
drivers for regional or global action. Yet, in this area, human security concerns are coming to the fore,
with increasing calls for environmental governance in different ASEAN countries to discuss the
legislative and judicial frameworks for access rights and public participation in environmental
decision-making. There is also a nascent environmental justice movement in ASEAN countries, with
transboundary relevance, which bears monitoring. With major infrastructure projects now taking place
for closer connectivity among the ASEAN countries, especially in the Mekong region and the Greater
Mekong Sub-region (GMS), issues of how to address/ensure procedural rights across borders, for
displaced or relocated local communities, are related to environmental and community security. This
is being played out at the local level in Myanmar by way of the community protests against the Dawei
deep sea port project in southern Myanmar.
Human security concerns are also embedded in compliance requirements for the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),15 to which Myanmar became a candidate country in July
14
The discussions under this heading are based on the author’s participation at a workshop on “Human Rights,
Environment, Climate Change” organized in Yangon on September 13-15, 2014, by the government of
Myanmar in its capacity as the 2014 chair of the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights.
9
2014, the first ASEAN member to do so. The EITI is a voluntary initiative that ensures greater
accountability and transparency in reporting revenues from extractive industries. Myanmar’s
preparations to be part of the EITI can provide a window to address corruption issues in the country,
as well as to see whether local communities and the public in general benefit from the funds gained
from extractive industries. A sad lesson in the midst of Myanmar’s EITI compliance preparations can
be found in the harsh security-related responses to community protests over the Letpadaungtaung
Copper Mine project, a joint venture between Myanmar and Chinese companies.16 The protests started
in 2012 over land compensation and relocation disagreements, escalating into a crackdown by
security forces that severely injured several protesters, including monks. The tensions continued to
simmer even after an investigation commission headed by Aung San Suu Kyi reported its findings and
recommended greater compensation, environmentally sustainable practices and greater corporate
social responsibility amongst other things. The recommendations did not include the halting of mine
operations.17 Protests returned with the resumption of the mine’s operations in 2014.18 The protests in
December 2014 resulted in the death of a villager.19
Urbanization
Myanmar’s urban population is roughly one-third of the country’s total population.20 United Nations
statistical data estimates urban population growth at 2.5 percent, and rural population growth is -0.1
15
To be EITI compliant, candidate countries are required to have in place a functioning multi-stakeholder group
that includes civil society participation, among other key requirements. See Human Rights Watch, “Decisive
Moment for Global Transparency Effort,” March 9, 2010.
16
The joint venture partners are the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEHL), a state-owned enterprise
with military backing, and Wan Bao Mining, a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned arms firm. Charlstons, a
boutique corporate finance law firm, provides the project background on its website at:
http://www.charltonslaw.com/newsletters/myanmar-law/en/2013/3/Letpadaung-Investigation-CommissionIssues-Final-Report.html
17
Ibid.
18
Protestors state their concerns over environmental damage and lack of full compensation. In 2014, three
workers were kidnapped by opponents of the mine. “Kidnapped: A Chinese Miner Tries to Be Nice,” The
Economist, May 24, 2014, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21602719chinese-miner-tries-be-nice-kidnapped.
19
Aye Aye Mar, “Violent Standoff Continues at Myanmar Mine Protest,” VOA News Online, December 23,
2014, accessed January 5, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/violent-standoff-continues-at-myanmarmine-protest/2570915.html.
20
In 2013, the percentage of urban population was 33.8, according to United Nations estimates.
10
percent. 21 Rural-urban migration has become one of the contributing factors to Myanmar’s
urbanization challenges. Migrants have the intention to return to their place of origin, but in reality
only few actually return. If they support relatives in their place of origin or intend to spend their
savings there, their disposable urban income is often very low, forcing many to share a rental room or
live in an informal settlement. Over the years, they become part of the urban population but their lack
of income and of access to basic infrastructure services, such as clean water and sanitation, and to
power and decision-making processes, render them vulnerable to the changes and renewals taking
place in urban areas such as in Yangon and other parts of the country. The country’s commercial hub,
Yangon, is confronted with the challenge of upgrading its infrastructure and facilities to meet the
requirements of ASEAN connectivity, while at the same time dealing with the lack of space, land, and
basic social services to accommodate all urban residents adequately. The continued existence of slums
or squatter settlements is a result of inadequate housing. Thus, there is no security of tenure for a large
portion of the urban population. In many cases they face the continuing threat of eviction as the
government, which technically owns all land in the country, seeks new venues for major development
projects, such as the special and/or industrial zones around major urban agglomerations.
Daw Mae Ohn Nyunt We, a candidate who stood for the West Yangon seat in the municipal
elections in Yangon, held on December 27, 2014 (the first municipal elections held since
independence),22 publicly shared her frustration with the lack of attention paid to the plight of such
urban insecurity in Yangon’s Kyimyindine township. She recounts that the residents in parts of the
township are literally living in the garbage as there is no regular garbage collection service. The
residents also have serious water shortage problems in the dry season. Currently, the Yangon City
Development Council (YCDC) provides one sampan-load23 of drinking water during the very dry
season to these residents. The water is meant to be shared among some 2000 residents in three wards
in the township. This is an insufficient supply for such numbers. Self-help efforts at digging ponds are
21
Data available at the United Nations Statistics Division UNData website, accessed October 15, 2014,
https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MYANMAR.
22
However, Daw Mae Ohn did not get elected.
23
A sampan is a small wooden boat used by coastal communities in Asia.
11
to no avail as the area is vulnerable to salt water seepage. There are no public funds allocated to
facilitate digging, fencing, and desalination of the pond-water.24
Migration
Myanmar has become the country with the highest numbers of migration in the GMS or Greater
Mekong Sub-region.25 This is mainly a result of people fleeing conflict in the border areas between
the armed forces and insurgent groups, as well as semi- and unskilled workers seeking what they
perceive as an attractive income in the labour-scarce higher-income ASEAN economies.
Inter-communal tensions between Rakhines and Rohingyas in 2012 led to some 140,000
people displaced in Rakhine State - most of them without citizenship and living in fragile protection
environments. The government has started a phased project to grant citizenship to the Rohingyas
(starting with 209 in September 2014) but there is current controversy over the “verification process”
to reflect the Bangladeshi origin of the Rohingyas. Hostilities in Kachin State caused some 100,000
people to be displaced. Ceasefire negotiations between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)
and the Myanmar government are still ongoing. International and local humanitarian organizations
have direct access to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the government-controlled areas.
Local organizations have helped in providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs in other areas. The
Governments of Myanmar and Thailand are discussing the situation of displaced persons along the
Thai-Myanmar border, most of whom are in refugee camps or undocumented workers in Thailand. On
June 30, 2014, the Ministries of Labour of both countries launched a process to issue temporary
registration cards for Myanmar workers in Thailand. This in turn had the effect of thousands more
entering Thailand in the hope of qualifying for registration and potentially legal work permits in the
future.
24
This information is from an email interview with Daw Mae Ohn Nyunt We.
According to the International Organization on Migration (IOM). See overview for Myanmar at the country
page on the IOM website, accessed January 6, 2015, http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-wework/asia-and-the-pacific/myanmar.html.
25
12
Government responses to migration thus far lack policy coherence. For example, the migrant
worker issue is dealt with mainly by the Ministry of Labour, which has no jurisdiction over IDPs, and
which provides peripheral inputs to the negotiations on liberalization of skilled professionals. The
resettlement of IDPs comes under the mandate of the Ministry for Social Welfare, Relief and
Resettlement, yet the political nature of the situation has occasioned multi-faceted interventions by
different government-related organizations, such as the Myanmar Peace Centre and the Myanmar
National Human Rights Commission. International humanitarian organizations and related UN
agencies seem to be taking on most of the work in assisting the Myanmar government. There is much
potential for building local civil society capacity to take on the bridge-building role in post-conflict
peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, and to strengthen nascent capacities among civil society
groups that are participating in national, bilateral, and regional discussions on cross-border migrant
labor issues.
Peacebuilding26
The decades-long national reconciliation process in Myanmar had a “breakthrough” in August 2011
when President Thein Sein and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi publicly shared their joint commitment to
work together in bringing about positive change for Myanmar. Landmark by-elections on April 1,
2012, saw the NLD win a majority of the seats being contested. The inclusion of all political forces is
cited by analysts as one of the main accomplishments of Myanmar’s political reforms, as are the
agreements reached with ethnic armed insurgent groups towards a nation-wide ceasefire agreement.
Challenges remain, however, in building trust among the different (minority) interest groups. There
are sixteen armed groups negotiating their different interests with the government, each with different
sets of concerns over their security and survival beyond the ceasefire settlements. Resettlement,
rehabilitation and reintegration for citizens affected by the ethnic conflict, and disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for armed groups to re-join the political process all require
substantial capacity-building and assistance from partners.
26
Insights on peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar are gained from several conversations with Dr. Kyaw Yin
Hlaing of the Myanmar Peace Centre.
13
At present, the government remains committed to the peace process towards a speedy
conclusion of the projected ceasefire accord by February 12, 2015, Myanmar’s Union Day.27 Civil
society organizations (CSOs) and international non-governmental organizations (I-NGOs) have taken
part in facilitating meetings and discussions with the ethnic groups. Their assistance will also be
important in the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs. The Myanmar Peace Centre, established
under the aegis of the International Peace Donor Support Group in June 2012, continues to coordinate
the process and serve as a one-stop center for development needs and poverty reduction in the ethnic
areas. Myanmar has placed poverty reduction prominently on the national agenda for the first time in
decades (poverty was hitherto hidden under the rubric of “border area development”), as part of the
reform efforts.
Poverty reduction28
The First Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment (IHLCA-I), conducted nation-wide in
Myanmar in 2004-05, defined poverty incidence as the “proportion of population of households with
insufficient consumption expenditure to cover their food and non-food needs.” IHLCA-II followed in
2009-10. The IHLCA-I showed poverty incidence to be at 32.1 percent at the Union or national level.
Then IHLCA-II found poverty incidence to have fallen to 25.6 percent, showing an improvement of
6.5 percentage points. However, there are disparities between rural and urban areas. IHLCA-I showed
a rural poverty rate of 35.8 percent compared to 21.5 in urban areas. IHLCA-II showed an
improvement, but with rural poverty incidence (29.2 percent) almost doubling the urban rate (15.7
percent). Nevertheless, the overall reduction in national poverty incidence encouraged the Thein Sein
administration to set an ambitious target of further reducing the poverty incidence to 16 percent by
2015, to meet Millennium Development Goal 1A of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by
halving “between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day.” But in
27
Nyein Nyein, “President Meets with Ethnic Armed Groups, Hopes for Quick Ceasefire Accord,” The
Irrawaddy, January 5, 2015. The previous dates set for the nationwide ceasefire accord were by end-September
2014 and then later November 2014.
28
The priorities for poverty reduction are from insights shared by Dr. U Myint, chief economic advisor to the
Myanmar President. In November 2014, Dr. Myint was put in charge of overhauling Myanmar’s archaic
statistics system to ensure accurate forecasting and planning.
14
Myanmar’s surveys through the years, there has been no estimate of the proportion of people living on
less than US$1.25 (or US$2) per day.
The preliminary results from the 2014 census carried out in Myanmar placed the country’s
total population at about 52 million. This implies that many people in Myanmar, especially in the
rural areas, are existing just above the poverty line. Any disturbance, natural or man-made disaster, a
rise in inflation, or the sickness of a family member can send households over the edge. Additionally,
there are the attendant issues of a lack of proper social protection, social safety net, and social
insurance. Low public spending on healthcare also means that when a family member falls sick, the
family has to either sell off assets or borrow money at an exorbitant interest rate, thus incurring a
vicious debt cycle from which it is very difficult to exit.
The government’s poverty reduction efforts seem to have stalled. In several public statements,
including his monthly radio messages, the President has reiterated the importance of economic
development in the border areas to assist poverty alleviation. There are, however, few concrete
projects, although there is a significant push by Japan to ramp up assistance to Myanmar through
several channels, including rural poverty reduction and improving HIV/AIDS care. The Asian
Development Bank (ADB) recently announced that its Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction would fund
a US$12 million program for rural poverty reduction in the Ayeyawaddy Delta, Tanintharyi Division
and Shan State where poverty rates are double that of urban poverty rates; another US$10 million will
go to financing programs for better access and quality to health and HIV/AIDS services.29
A progressive measure that has been implemented without much fanfare is the establishment
of a poverty reduction fund as part of the decentralization process undertaken under the rubric of the
government’s Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR), which was launched in 2013.
An assessment of state and regional governments in Myanmar, carried out by the Myanmar
Development Resource Institute (MDRI) Centre for Economic and Social Development (CESD) in
partnership with the Asia Foundation hailed this development as a major innovation in the subnational fiscal system. First introduced in 2011 as a lump sum development grant called the Poverty
29
Kyaw Hsu Mon, “$22 Mln in ADB Programs to Reduce Poverty, Improve HIV/AIDS Care,” The Irrawaddy,
February 14, 2014, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/22mln-adb-programs-reducepoverty-improve-hivaids-care.html.
15
Reduction Fund, the initiative stands out as “the only fully devolved resource transfer from the union
to state and region level,” allocating (in FY2012-13) about one billion kyat (roughly US$1 million) to
each state or region, with Chin State – due to its extreme remoteness and lack of facilities – receiving
triple.30
Health and education31
In June 2014, the Myanmar President appointed advisors for health and education.32 These are two
important areas which facilitate the empowerment and development of people and their capacity to
participate in, and contribute to, development processes in the country. Even with the wide-ranging
reforms that the Thein Sein administration has instituted, Myanmar’s public spending on health and
education ranks lower than other ASEAN countries, according to a study carried out in early 2014 by
Action Aid Myanmar.33 For the 2014-15 budget year, the defense spending (at 12 percent of total
allocation) was more than the combined allocations for education (6 percent) and health (3 percent).34
Health and nutrition security is paramount for young children (especially those under five
years of age) and their mothers in Myanmar. Myanmar’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates are
still high. There are twin challenges of lowering the infant and maternal mortality rates, as well as
reducing malnutrition in children, particularly those living in rural and remote border/ethnic
populations. One in three children under five years of age face stunted growth and development in
Myanmar. Stunted growth and development is associated with poor educational performance,
30
Hamish Nixon et al., State and Region Governments in Myanmar (Yangon: MDRI-CESD and The Asia
Foundation, 2013).
31
The priority needs listed for health and education security in Myanmar are insights gained from Dr. Yin Yin
Nwe, former UNICEF Country Director for China, and currently advisor to the Myanmar President on education.
32
President Thein Sein appointed Dr. Yin Yin Nwe as one of two education advisors on June 17, 2014.
Advisory groups on health and on religion were also established, adding to the existing National Economic and
Social Advisory Commission. See: Kyaw Hsu Mon, “Burmese President Appoints New Advisors,” The
Irrawaddy, June 29, 2014, accessed January 6, 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burmese-presidentappoints-new-advisors.html.
33
For the 2013-14 fiscal year, 11.8 percent of the budget was allocated for education and 6.5 percent for
healthcare. See “Myanmar Spends the Least for Education among ASEAN Countries: AAM,” Eleven Daily,
March 23, 2014, accessed Month Day, Year,
http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5505:myanmar-spends-theleast-for-education-among-asean-countries-aam&catid=44:national&Itemid=384.
34
Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Military Spending Still Dwarfs Education and Health,” Myanmar Times, March 30, 2014,
accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10000-military-spending-stilldwarfs-education-and-health.html.
16
heightened risk of non-communicable diseases as adults, and negative consequences for the country’s
human capital and economic productivity. Strategies for promotive and preventive public health are
thus important in ensuring health security, as many of the causes of death amongst women and
children are either preventable or treatable. Increasing the number of auxiliary health workers and
midwives in villages, and free health care for children under five are proven public health solutions
that have shown results and need to continue. It will also be important to improve/raise the health
facility-to-population ratio according to WHO standards.
As regards education, there are access, quality, and governance issues affecting primary,
secondary, and tertiary education. To address these challenges, a new education law was enacted on
September 30, 2014, outlining a decentralized structure and a wider space for private or alternative
education. Education reforms at the primary and secondary levels will need to break the current
vicious cycle of (overloaded) curriculum, predominance of private tuition, and poor quality of the
teaching-learning process. The ongoing ceasefire negotiations are expected to have a positive impact
on the teaching of local languages and culture in ethnic areas. With regard to tertiary education reform,
the major challenge for all levels of education will be to ensure that education outcomes are able to
fulfil job market requirements as Myanmar opens up. Even as the new education law was
promulgated, young people took to the streets to voice their anger at the job-skills mismatch and the
low quality of tertiary education.35
35
Paul Mooney, “Myanmar Students Protest against Education Law for Third Day,” Reuters, November 16,
2014, accessed December 30, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/16/us-myanmar-protest-idUSKCN0J00MD20141116.
17
4. Opportunities and Challenges of Constructive Engagement
The SLORC’s assumption of state power in 1988, brutally suppressing the popular uprisings that
swept across the country’s urban centers, was widely condemned. This, and the SLORC’s targeted
antagonism against Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD (which symbolized the forces for democracy) led
to the imposition of sanctions and other punitive measures against the military junta. However, Asian
governments, particularly the ASEAN governments, did not join the sanctions regime and instead
advocated constructive engagement as the approach to bringing about change in Myanmar. Only
Japan applied limited sanctions while continuing to be a major source of foreign aid to the country.36
This illustrates the dissimilarities in the Canadian and Japanese approaches to human security.
Howe and Jang explain that Canada’s human security perspective is associated with conflict- and
violence-related threats to individuals, and allows for “vigorous action” including coercive measures
such as sanctions and military force in pursuing the human security agenda. Japan’s human security
perspective, on the other hand, is rooted in the “heart to heart” Fukuda doctrine, which is essentially
anti-military and pro-economic in practice. Learning from the bitter experience of World War II,
Japan’s human security concept embraces both freedom from fear and freedom from want. This was
later expanded to include freedom to live in dignity, building on the “comprehensive security” policy
of the 1980s that was inclusive and emphasized multilateralism. This became a key foreign policy
perspective for Japan in the 1990s under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and a main objective of
Japanese overseas development assistance (ODA), highlighting the notion of a strategic link between
development, human security, and Japan’s foreign policy. 37 Japan’s ODA policy, and subsequent
refinements to it, also reinforces this notion by emphasising that human security is one of the “basic
policies” of ODA and the first “priority issue.” ODA implementation thus requires assistance
programs that put people “at the center of concerns.” The revision of Japan’s ODA Charter in 2003
36
Dr. Maung Zarni, “An Integrated Approach to National and Human Security Issues in Myanmar or
Burma,” (paper presented at the International Conference on Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance,
Canberra, September 2005), accessed January 1, 2015,
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/integratedsecurityapproach.htm.
37
Howe and Jang, “Human Security and Development: Divergent Approaches to Burma/Myanmar.”
18
saw an increased focus on programs that address basic human needs, including basic social services
and emergency aid.38
Japan’s human security approach finds greater traction among the policy elite in Myanmar39
who subscribe to the seven components of human security in the Human Development Report 1994.40
These considerations have influenced various plans and programs of the current Myanmar
administration, including the President’s aspirations for poverty reduction as a means towards
development, peace, and (comprehensive) security, especially in conflict-prone or tension-ridden
areas.
The response to human security and the humanitarian need arising in the wake of the
devastating 2008 Cyclone Nargis provides a good example of the constructive approach to tackling
human security concerns through development assistance.
Today Nargis is mostly remembered for the confusion over Myanmar’s stance on accepting
aid. Less remembered is the tripartite mechanism among the Government of Myanmar, the UN, and
ASEAN to coordinate relief and recovery assistance. The military governments’ initial ambivalence
towards offers of assistance grabbed worldwide attention. France’s suggestion to invoke the UN
responsibility to protect and deliver aid without waiting for approval prompted a statement from
Myanmar’s foreign ministry on May 8, 2008, making it clear that the country “was not yet ready” to
receive search and rescue, and media teams. Amidst the confusion, aid flights, including those from
the United States, continued to arrive in Yangon. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ special meeting
on May 19, 2008, Myanmar agreed to accept aid through ASEAN’s coordination at that meeting. The
ASEAN and UN Secretaries-General sought to prevail on the military leadership to allow foreign aid
workers into the country. On May 23, 2008, Myanmar’s reclusive Senior General agreed to allow all
aid and relief workers into the country “regardless of nationality.” Two days later, the ASEAN-UN
38
Ibid., 131.
Personal interviews with former foreign and deputy foreign ministers of Myanmar.
40
The seven components are: i) economic security which requires an assured basic income; ii) food security
which means all people have both physical and economic access to basic food; iii) health security which means
freedom from diseases and infection; iv) environmental security, such as freedom from dangers as
environmental pollution; v) personal security which is physical safety; vi) community security which ensures
survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups; and vii) political security which means protection of basic
human rights and freedoms. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994,
24–33.
39
19
International Pledging Conference was held in Yangon and ASEAN Foreign Ministers established the
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force. The Task Force’s mission to coordinate relief and recovery efforts
in Myanmar was carried out by a Tripartite Core Group (TCG), comprising representatives from
ASEAN, the Government of Myanmar, and the UN. This opened the opportunity for non-government
actors, both local and international, to assist in the recovery of Nargis-stricken areas. Humanitarian
aid workers were allowed to operate in the delta area. The circumstances surrounding the response to
Nargis thus led to unprecedented mechanisms of working together and also brought into focus
ASEAN’s efforts to address issues that require special engagement with its members, including
human security issues.
However, attempts at brokering similar responses to human security and recovery needs in
Myanmar’s Rakhine State over the Rohingya issue have not met with similar breakthroughs. It is
difficult to recapture the spirit of impartial collaboration and partnership during the time of Nargis and
apply it to situations of human insecurity such as those that occurred in the wake of the June 2012
clashes between the Rohingya and Rakhine residents in Rakhine State leading to religion-based
violence in central parts of Myanmar, as well as to the situation of displaced persons in the aftermath
of clashes between the Myanmar armed forces and ethnic armed groups. In response to the concern
expressed by the international community over the situation in Rakhine State, and the ethnonationalist tensions today, Myanmar has reverted to sovereignty over intervention. Human security
issues in ASEAN member states are usually not part of the formal regional agenda for discussion,
although it is still possible to raise the topic(s) in the corridors or bilaterally among member states.
20
Conclusion: Future Human Security Approaches for Myanmar
The key requirement for the success of human security policies or projects in Myanmar is to have
greater inclusion and participation in their formulation and implementation. This is where civil society
organizations can help fill capacity gaps and complement government initiatives.
Myanmar today enjoys a more open atmosphere as the wide-ranging reforms that started in
March 2011 created more space for civil society to operate and function. Building on these gains, civil
society organizations present in all regions of the country have a wider scope for their work.
Throughout the country, civil society organizations are present in almost every township, including
the presence of smaller community-based organizations, especially faith-based organizations. The
largest concentration still remains the Ayeyawaddy and Yangon Divisions, where the post-Nargis
responses are being implemented. There are Christian organizations in Chin, Kachin, and Shan States
where peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements have enabled their existence and operations,
although armed conflict still continued in Kachin State until the recent breakthrough in the
government’s ceasefire talks with the armed groups. Only a few are in Kayah and Kayin States, and
Tanintharyi Division, as well as in Northern Rakhine State where Rohingya communities are still
facing difficulties following the violent communal clashes in June 2012.
Some suggestions have been put forward on applying the tripartite consultation model that
worked successfully during Nargis, to the Rakhine communal clashes. Although Myanmar’s reformist
government admits the humanitarian dimensions of the situation, it has maintained that the Rohingya
situation is Myanmar’s internal affair and has rejected several proposals to set up tripartite talks based
on the Nargis modus operandi to “prevent the violence having a broader regional impact.”41 Dr. Surin,
who is a Thai Muslim, took the lead in exhorting stakeholders and commentators alike not to put a
religious slant on the issue. Yet, the Rakhine situation is still interpreted by many as conflict between
Buddhists and Muslims. The complexities of the situation have been compounded by decades of
manipulation by dictator regimes. The Thein Sein administration thus faces one of its biggest
challenges with the Rakhine situation, which unfortunately will not see a constructive resolution
41
The proposal was made by then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan in 2012.
21
through democratic institutions. The many layers to this issue, i.e., national identity and citizenship;
corruption and the lack of proper rule of law; and, perhaps most importantly, poverty alleviation and
access to basic social services, all present formidable human security challenges that confront and, to
some extent, threaten Myanmar’s nascent transition to change. At the core of these issues are the
people.
In addressing the issue of broken trust (and continuing feelings of insecurity) among the
different communities, civil society has a potential role to help bridge the tensions. Civil society
(especially inter-faith groups) in Myanmar has taken some initial steps towards this difficult role. In
addition to government relief efforts, some civil society groups and individuals have offered relief
assistance to people displaced by the conflict in Rakhine. The role of political parties in Rakhine State
and legislators of these parties in the regional and central-level parliaments is also crucial in framing
the issue and perceptions of the human security needs arising from it. However, it will probably take
decades to undo negative perceptions42 and re-establish a modicum of trust.
Disasters and conflicts thus underscore an urgent need for “bridge-builders” for human
security and for building capacities of such individuals and organizations. The situation in Myanmar
illustrates that trust is essential for formulating integrated responses to human security needs. Further
research should continue to explore whether Myanmar’s fellow ASEAN members and ASEAN’s
Dialogue Partners who have bilateral country programs in Myanmar can leverage the regional
cooperation mechanisms and utilize the approach of development diplomacy to provide bridges to this
end.
42
Tin Maung Maung Than and Moe Thuzar, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Dilemma,” ISEAS Perspective (July 9,
2012): 1-7.
22
*******
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24
Abstract (in Japanese)
要約
包摂的な開発に向けた実際的アプローチとして、人間の安全保障と開発の結合（nexus）
が注目を集めつつある。移行・改革の真っ只中にある今日のミャンマーでは、政治的
安定および国民和解とならび、特に包摂的で公正な社会経済開発を達成しようとする
努力において、人間の安全保障のニーズおよび課題が重大なものとなっている。人間
の安全保障の問題を進めるためには、異なる利益集団間の信頼関係が極めて重要な要
素である。ミャンマーの国家開発計画において人間の安全保障を追求していくにあた
っては、包摂的で参加型の実践を組み込むことが必要である。このため、ミャンマー
で実施される援助プログラムにおいて、人間の安全保障と開発を結合させたアプロー
チを採用することは検討に値する。同アプローチの追求に際し、ASEAN および開発パ
ートナーは、ASEAN による建設的関与（constructive engagement）のメカニズムを活
用することが可能であろう。
25