Marine Safety Investigation Unit SIMPLIFIED SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT 201406/020 The Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011 prescribe that the sole objective of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with the regulations, including analysis, conclusions, and recommendations, which either result from them or are part of the process thereof, shall be the prevention of future marine accidents and incidents through the ascertainment of causes, contributing factors and circumstances. Moreover, it is not the purpose of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with these regulations to apportion blame or determine civil and criminal liabilities. NOTE This report is not written with litigation in mind and pursuant to Regulation 13(7) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame, unless, under prescribed conditions, a Court determines otherwise. The report may therefore be misleading if used for purposes other than the promulgation of safety lessons. © Copyright TM, 2015. This document/publication (excluding the logos) may be re-used free of charge in any format or medium for education purposes. It may be only reused accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as TM copyright. The document/publication shall be cited and properly referenced. Where the MSIU would have identified any third party copyright, permission must be obtained from the copyright holders concerned. MV Fantastic REPORT NO.: 14/2015 June 2015 MV FANTASTIC Serious injury to crew member in position 05° 37.8’N 097° 54.3’E 16 June 2014 Course of events Fantastic was enroute to Hazira, India from Tanjing, Indonesia with 55,000 metric tonnes of coal in bulk. On 16 June 2014, at approximately 0800 (LT), whilst navigating the Malacca Straits, the chief mate and an able seaman (AB) proceeded on deck to secure the freefall lifeboat. The vessel was heading to the Western coast of India and the master had requested additional lashing due to the monsoon season in the area. Just before the accident happened, the chief mate was positioned on the lifeboat embarkation platform, holding the lifeboat’s lifting block. The AB was tasked to operate the hydraulic control levers fitted to the lifeboat’s davits on the poop deck level. The chief mate and the AB were not in direct line of sight, although it was not impossible to see one another. The third mate was standing nearby, watching the two crew members. 1 The ‘hydraulic control station’ at the foot of the lifeboat’s davits is fitted with two levers, connected to hydraulic spool valves. The left hand (i.e. aft control lever in relation to the ship) operates the winch. The right hand lever (forward lever) operates the hydraulic control to swing in / out the lifeboat’s davits (for recovery purposes). After the chief mate and the AB positioned themselves in their respective points, the former instructed the AB to heave up the lifting block. The AB briefly operated the lever and heaved up the block, waiting for directions from the chief mate. During the process, the chief mate ordered the AB to lower the lifting block, instructing him to stop a while later. Eventually, the chief mate instructed the AB to lower it even further. Instead, the AB heaved up the block. Consequently, the chief mate’s fingers were caught between the 201406/020 the lifting block and the lifeboat’s davit (Figure 1), resulting in a severe injury. Fixed part of the lifeboat davits Area where chief mate’s finger was injured Lifting block Figure 1: Lifeboat davits’ lifting block Extent of reported injuries The injuries which the chief mate suffered to his fingers were serious and required immediate medical assistance ashore. However, they were not life threatening. The chief mate was eventually landed ashore in Indonesia and treated in a local hospital before he was repatriated. As a result of the injuries, the chief mate lost part of his third finger and a sustained a fracture in another. Condition of the equipment and familiarisation Documentary evidence from the ship suggested that the AB was familiar with the operation of life saving equipment. The ‘Ratings Familiarization Check List’ – SMS Form No. 303003, indicated that the AB had received his familiarisation training on 28 May 2014. The safety officer was the chief mate. It was also noticed that the responsibility of the AB in the muster list was to operate the lifeboat’s davits and the unlashing of the lifeboat. There was therefore no doubt that the AB was familiar with the equipment being used at the time of the accident. Moreover, as explained above, he had already followed the orders of the chief mate twice before the accident happened. Probable cause of the accident The AB claimed that just before the third operation of the hydraulic lever, he thought that he had heard the chief mate asking him to hoist the lifting block again. In the absence of contradictory evidence, it was concluded that the probable cause of the serious injury was one-way communication between the chief mate and the bosun. MV Fantastic 2 201406/020 The safety investigation did not come across any evidence which suggested that the equipment malfunctioned or was not well maintained. Thus, malfunction of the hydraulic control system was ruled out. mate and the AB was context and mutual understanding – a communication type where it is taken for granted that the receiving end of the instructions has understood the intentions. Closed-loop communication only happens when verbal instructions are repeated by the receiver to confirm to the originator that they have been well understood1. Closed-loop communication increases the likelihood to identify verbal instructions which would not have been understood. Effective communication It had been established that the two crew members, being of the same nationality, had no language barriers. Moreover, as indicated elsewhere, the lifeboat securing operation had already started and no problems had been experienced until the accident happened. There were no indications that the chief mate communicated simultaneous instructions in the direction of the AB. However, because the communication loop was not closed, the two crew members did not share a mental model – even more so, the AB had no situation awareness of the position of the block because he was standing on the poop deck where the controls were fitted. As indicated in Figure 2, it is very probable that the chief mate and the AB were not in a direct line of vision. Chief mate Third mate SAFETY ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE SAFETY INVESTIGATION2 AB Control levers Genel Denizcilik Nakliyati AS has issued a safety alert to its bulk fleet, bringing to the attention of the crew members serving on board the details and findings of the internal investigation carried out in terms of Section 9 of the ISM Code. Figure 2: The accident site Effective communication is essential in any domain for the reduction of erroneous actions. This is also applicable during situations which are not classified as emergency situations and hence are not necessarily time-critical. Whilst it is very probable that a pre-task briefing was not required for this task (because it was perceived to be a rather simple), it was evident, however, that communication was mono-modal, i.e. one channel of communication – verbal. Moreover, the communication procedure during lifeboat drills and recovery of the lifeboat has been revised and communicated to the fleet. The new procedure now provides clear instructions on the operation of the lifeboat davits winch and the communication methods between the responsible officer and the winch operator Evidence suggested that rather than closedloop, the communication between the chief MV Fantastic 3 1 For instance, closed-loop communication normally happens on the bridge when the vessel is in manual steering and therefore a helmsman is at the wheel. 2 Safety actions should not create a presumption of blame and / or liability. 201406/020 RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of the safety actions taken by the Company, no recommendations have been made. MV Fantastic 4 201406/020 SHIP PARTICULARS Vessel Name: Fantastic Flag: Malta Classification Society: DNV - GL IMO Number: 9456329 Type: Bulk carrier Registered Owner: Fantastic Shipping Ltd. Managers: Genel Denizcilik Nakliyati AS Construction: Steel Length Overall: 189.99 m Registered Length: 185.64 m Gross Tonnage: 33044 Minimum Safe Manning: 16 Authorised Cargo: Solid bulk VOYAGE PARTICULARS Port of Departure: Tanjing, Indonesia Port of Arrival: Hazira, India Type of Voyage: International Cargo Information: Coal in bulk Manning: 24 MARINE OCCURRENCE INFORMATION Date and Time: 16 June 2014 at 0800 Classification of Occurrence: Serious Marine Casualty Location of Occurrence: 05° 37.8’N 097° 54.3’E Place on Board Boat deck Injuries / Fatalities: One serious injury Damage / Environmental Impact: None Ship Operation: In passage Voyage Segment: Transit External & Internal Environment: Clear weather with good visibility and a fresh Westerly breeze. Air temperature was recorded at 28°C. Persons on board: 24 MV Fantastic 5 201406/020
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