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EU-cHINA
tHE NEXT TEN YEARS
Eu-china
the next ten years
The opinions and analysis presented in this book do not
necessarily reflect the official views of the organisations that
participants represent, nor of the Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the European Union and Friends of
Europe, its Board of Trustees, members or partners.
Editors: Shada Islam and Patricia Diaz
Publisher: Geert Cami
Project Director: Nathalie Furrer
Design: Cristina Frauca
Cover Image: Roberto Saltori, Bernard Goldbach, Deondre Martin NG,
Boccaccio1
Copyright © 2014 Friends of Europe and the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the
European Union.
Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted, providing that full credit is given to Friends of Europe
and the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, and provided that any
such reproduction, wether in whole or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works
Acknowledgements
Friends of Europe gratefully acknowledges the continuous support and assistance provided by the
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union (EU). A special note of thanks to
the China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA), Huawei, Boao Review and China Daily for their
support to make the Third Europe-China Forum a big success
This book is printed on responsibly produced paper.
Table of contents
Shared visions and aspirations
8
Looking ahead at the next ten years
9
I. Europe-China Forum
10
Congratulatory message by Li Keqiang11
Keynote Address by Herman Van Rompuy13
Keynote Address by Wang Xiaochu21
Keynote Address by Pascal Lamy25
Executive Summary
31
EU-China relations: The next ten years
35
EU is China's "partner in development"
36
The Chinese Dream
39
Rebalancing of priorities
40
An active foreign policy 42
Greater market opportunities for Europe
43
Boosting investments
45
Not just about protection
47
European Parliament wants EU-China investment treaty
48
China and the CEE states
49
No worries
52
Evolving relations
52
Sustainable urbanisation
54
Energy cooperation
56
Public diplomacy
56
Transparency creates trust
58
Get to know China better
59
II. EU-China policy and practice partnership
60
Building a more resilient EU-China relationship61
Trade relations: Too big to fail62
Building trust63
Global challenges64
Divergences in strategic priorities66
New diplomacy66
Less complementarity, more competition68
Investment: The untapped potential69
China's small service sector72
China's special relationships73
Non-state actors74
Solar energy76
Schools and students76
Public diplomacy77
Conclusion77
iii. Policy Briefing
78
Ten years on: Rebooting EU-China relations79
iv. Guest Contributions
100
Think Small: How to improve China-EU Security Cooperation101
Europe and the Chinese Dream104
China and the EU in Africa: Time for a trilateral dialogue107
EU-China: Strategic Partnership in the making109
Can China and Europe reshape relations?111
EU-CHINA Partnership:
Less Strategic, But Stronger113
The reality of EU-China relations116
Does Central Europe’s cooperation with
China undermine EU policy?118
ANNEX I - List of participants123
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Friends of Europe | Global Europe
SHARED VISIONs AND ASPIRATIONs
By Yang Yanyi, Ambassador and Head of the Chinese Mission to the EU
2013 was an eventful and important year in the history of China-EU relations.
Together, China and the EU celebrated the 10th anniversary of their Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership. The 16th China-EU Summit was successfully convened and set
in place a blueprint for consolidation and expansion of China-EU relations in the coming
decade—China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.
Prior to the Summit, the Europe-China Forum, a joint venture between the Chinese
Mission to the EU and Friends of Europe, launched its third round seminar on China-EU
relations. The event was graced with a congratulatory message from Chinese Premier
Li Keqiang and a key-note address by President Herman Van Rompuy of the European
Council, and attracted eager participation by a wide range of scholars, experts,
academics and official from both China and the EU. The Forum’s dynamic and in-depth
debate produced enlightening thoughts and insights on the evolution and future course
of China-EU relations and, most importantly, came up with valuable recommendations
on advancing China-EU Strategic Partnership.
As underlined by President Xi Jinping during his meeting with European Council President
Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso last
November, China and the EU are “two major forces for safeguarding global peace”,
“two major markets for promoting common development” and “two major civilisations
for pushing for progress of mankind”. Both China and the EU share a dream of realising
global peace and prosperity, and both are committed to promoting sound and stable
development of their Strategic Partnership.
With a view to turn our shared vision and aspiration into tangible and meaningful benefits
for our peoples and to involve more and more people to the worthy endeavor of ChinaEU Strategic Partnership, it is worthwhile to share with the general public the interesting
and thought-provoking debate and message transpired from the third round of the
Forum. As a Chinese saying goes: Great things may be done by mass efforts.
I also wish to take this opportunity to say a big thank you to all the participants who
contributed greatly to the substantive and constructive discussion at the Forum. Your
dedication and generous contribution to China-EU friendship and cooperation is highly
appreciated by the Chinese people.
Yang Yanyi
EU-China: The next ten years
Looking ahead at the next ten years
By Shada Islam, Director of Policy at Friends of Europe
The 2020 Strategic Agenda adopted at the EU-China Summit in Beijing in November
2013 lays the foundations for stronger and more practical cooperation between
Europe and China in the coming years. Certainly, China-EU trade flows are thriving and
negotiations on a first-ever investment agreement between the two sides should also
boost two-ways investments. Significantly, China’s ambitious reform programme outlined
by decisions at the Third Plenum pave the way for even greater China-EU cooperation
in a range of areas while also opening up increased opportunities for synergies between
European and Chinese businesses.
Decisions taken by leaders are crucial in establishing a road map for future China-EU
relations. Building trust between China and Europe, however, also requires a constant
conversation between people and therefore a more active people-to-people dialogue.
And this is exactly why Friends of Europe and the Chinese Mission to the EU have
joined forces to bring together Chinese and European academics, representatives of
think tanks, media organisations, business and policymakers for a unique “policy and
practice” discussion on the future of the complex and multi-faceted China-EU dialogue.
The “policy and practice” roundtable is in addition to the Europe-China Forum which
Friends of Europe and the Chinese Mission to the EU established in 2011 as a high-level
public platform for debates on the expanding China-EU relationship.
Our roundtable discussion with about 35 people around the table - held on November
25 under the Chatham House rule – provided deep insight into how scholars from both
sides view the key political, security, economic and cultural aspects of the China-EU
relationship.
The roundtable was followed by a lively dinner debate with Pascal Lamy, the former
Director General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) who as the EU’s Trade
Commissioner, played a pivotal role in encouraging, pushing and prodding China into
the WTO in November 2001.
The public Europe-China Forum held on November 26 and attended by about 300
received an inspiring message from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang while EU Council
President Herman Van Rompuy made the keynote speech, followed by Wang Xiaochu,
Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 12th National People's Congress
of China.
This volume brings together the key messages made by Premier Li and President
Rompuy at the Forum as well as a full account of the wide-ranging public discussions.
A report of the roundtable discussion is also included as is Friends of Europe’s policy
briefing on China-EU relations and various articles on the subject written by members of
our roundtable network. Taken together these documents provide valuable information
on the state of China-EU ties today – and our hopes for their future expansion.
We wish you happy reading!
Shada Islam
9
I.
europe-china forum
The Europe-China Forum is a joint initiative of Friends of
Europe and the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to
the EU aimed at promoting greater EU-China engagement
and cooperation. This annual high-level meeting brings
together policymakers, business representatives and
leading academics from across Europe and China to
discuss issues of shared interest and address pressing
common challenges. In its third year, the Forum shed light
on the challenges and opportunities facing China and the
EU as they embark on the second decade of their strategic
partnership. The high-level event was live streamed in
English and Chinese and the videos are available on the
Friends of Europe website*.
This chapter includes the speeches delivered at the Forum
as well as a comprehensive account of the discussions
held.
* www.friendsofeurope.org
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Congratulatory message
By Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of The People's Republic of China
On the occasion of the Third Europe-China Forum, I would like to extend, on
behalf of the Chinese government and in my own name, hearty congratulations
on the opening of the Forum and warm greetings and best wishes to the Chinese
and foreign guests attending the Forum, as well as those who have followed with
interest and supported the development of China-European Union (EU) relations
over the years.
Since its establishment 10 years ago, the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership has made great strides and cooperation in various fields has yielded
fruitful results. Both China and the EU are at an important stage of their respective
development. For China, its economy, which has withstood the downward
pressure since the start of this year, is on course to meet the growth targets set
for the whole year and will continue to move in the direction of sustainable and
sound growth. The Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China has made the arrangement for comprehensively deepening reform
in China, which means China will continue to deepen its reform and openingup. The EU, for its part, has completed a new round of enlargement. And the
European economy is showing a momentum of steadily turning for the better. It
is all the more necessary and urgent for us to deepen China-EU relations.
Last week, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, European
Commission President José Manuel Barroso and I held the 16th China-EU
Summit successfully in Beijing. We reached the important agreement on further
deepening the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and jointly issued
the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. In the coming decade,
China and the EU will strengthen strategic mutual trust, vigorously promote trade
facilitation, trade in high technologies in particular, promote two-way investment
through signing the investment agreement, and expand win-win cooperation in
such key areas as new type of urbanisation, finance, scientific and technological
innovation and connectivity in a bid to boost development in both China and
the EU. I am confident that with the two sides working in concert, the China-EU
relationship will embrace another decade of even more impressive growth.
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Mutual trust makes the foundation for cooperation. Since its inception, the EuropeChina Forum has played an important role in increasing mutual understanding,
enhancing dialogue and exchange at various levels and promoting practical
cooperation between the two sides. President Van Rompuy’s attendance at this
round of the Forum is a fine embodiment of the high attention the EU places
on the Forum. I also hope that the experts and scholars attending the Forum
will continue to actively give their recommendations and policy advice so as to
contribute even more to the growth of the China-EU relationship.
I wish the Third Europe-China Forum a complete success.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
keynote address by Herman
Van Rompuy
By Herman Van Rompuy, European Council President
It is a pleasure to be here with you today for this Third Europe-China Forum. This
is indeed a good moment to discuss European Union (EU)-China relations for
the 10 years to come: we are celebrating the 10th anniversary of our strategic
relationship; we have just agreed on a Strategic Agenda that should drive our
relations up to 2020; and I have just returned from a Summit encounter in Beijing
with Premier Li Keqiang and meetings also with President Xi Jinping.
The new Chinese leadership finds itself at a crossroads. After many years of
rapid development at record-high yearly growth rates, millions of people have
been lifted from poverty. At the same time the existing economic model needs
to be re-examined and revised, if China is to continue on an equivalent path of
growth and development over the coming decade.
Reforms are an ongoing process in a changing society and changing world – in
China and everywhere else, also in Europe.
Speaking more specifically about China. Rebalancing between consumption
and investment, internal and external demand, private and collective goods
(such as social security, education, environment), the ecology and the economy,
countryside and cities – all of this is high on the Chinese agenda. It will reshape
China in the coming decades.
The present model is not environmentally sustainable to an extent that, if left
unchecked, it may endanger the quality of life and even the health of the Chinese
population, as well as its productive capacity.
This economic model has also shown its limitations in terms of efficiency in the
assignation of resources. The rapid growth and the deep involvement of the
Administration in the economic life of the country has led to disfunctionings and
to corruption-related problems. The State sector will remain important but there
is clear awareness that the market has to be given a greater role - the Third
Plenum foresaw "a decisive role" - in guiding economic decisions. Rule of law
will need to be strengthened, while limiting government/administration direct
involvement in the economic life of the nation.
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But the rapid growth has affected the aspirations of the population and is
introducing important social changes. Today, the Chinese population is more
empowered and educated than it has ever been in the past. The number of
internet users is the highest per single country in the world: 538 million at the end
of 2012, projected numbers of up to 718 million at the end of 2013, over 50%
of its total population.
The Chinese have greater ambitions regarding their personal future. They are
leaving the countryside and moving into cities in unprecedented numbers. This
can no longer be managed through administrative restrictions. It requires a
governmental policy capable of handling the new demands of its society and
channeling them in ways that will contribute to harmonious development and
avoid misery traps in the exodus from rural to city life: a phenomenon well known
in contemporary history of our world.
As a final introductory point, let me add that the domestic challenges are
tightly linked to China's foreign policy. During the initial phases of its economic
development, one of China's main interests has been finding enough resources,
raw materials, to fuel its economic development. In parallel China has developed a
commercially oriented foreign policy aimed at opening markets for its production.
It is now confronted with a double challenge: on the one hand, internally, it has
to find a better balance between attention to its own internal market and an
export oriented production; on the other hand, its economic expansion and
the wide network of connections it has established abroad have increased
China's capacity to influence world events. At the same time, China has also
become more interdependent with the rest of the world: external events have
internal consequences. The question is therefore, how does China wish to
use its international clout and what does it need to do to promote its interests
internationally; how to reconcile its profile as a developing nation with the power
and needs it also has as a highly developed industrial country.
This quick summary of some of the main questions that China is facing, constitutes
the backdrop against which EU relations with this key partner are being built.
These issues lie at the heart of the decisions taken by the Third Plenum two
weeks ago. These issues are at the basis of our relations with China and at the
centre of our discussions with the Chinese leaders. And before moving further, let
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
me express my confidence in the fact that the Chinese people and their leaders
are rising to the occasion in addressing these challenges.
I have been meeting the Chinese leaders regularly for the last four years. I
developed a very cordial relationship with former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
Last week's Summit also allowed me to start building a personal rapport with
President Xi and Premier Li, based on earlier encounters we had had in their
previous capacities. These personal contacts help in developing further trust.
They also assist in overcoming administrative hurdles of which the leaders are
quite often not even informed.
I have always been impressed by the clarity with which the Chinese leaders see the
problems they need to address in order to ensure the prosperous development
of their nation and to advance towards their long term vision. This is very much
behind the importance they attach to relations with the EU. President Xi was
clear in this regard when he said that "China and the EU are natural partners", a
partnership based on "mutual dependence, support and inclusiveness".
Indeed, today we are a partner in development for China in a deeper sense than
just a trade partner. We are a partner that will bring experience and knowledge.
We are a partner whose economy contributes to world growth. A partner on
which it is worthwhile investing. We are also increasingly seen as a partner for
peace and stability.
But, as China needs the EU, the EU also needs China. China is a major destination
for EU exports. It has contributed to sustain the euro during the recent financial
crisis. It is a source of investment and its rapidly growing economy offers, and
will continue to offer during the coming years, irreplaceable opportunities for
economic expansion.
China also lies at the centre of a very prosperous group of fast developing
nations, notably the ASEAN countries. Its relations with the Republic of Korea
and with Japan, (strategic partners of the EU and major world economies) are
key in ensuring peace and security in East Asia. Chinese decisions and actions
impact on regional and world stability.
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I will address now some of these questions, particularly in the light of the
discussions we had during our Summit last week. The EU has been China's
biggest economic partner for the past nine years. Our bilateral trade was over
€430 billion in 2012, a four-fold increase compared to ten years ago, creating
jobs and business opportunities on both sides. The EU is also one of the top five
investors in China, but the numbers are still much smaller than our true potential.
Undoubtedly, as in any partnership, there are trade disputes. In the China-EU 2020
Strategic Agenda for cooperation agreed last week, we committed to respect
WTO rules and administer anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations in
a fair, objective and transparent manner. We also agreed to handle major bilateral
trade frictions through dialogue and consultation, as a preferred option and, if
needed, through negotiations.
Together with the Chinese leaders in Beijing last week, we agreed on the need to
enhance the figures on trade as well as on investments. I specifically encouraged
more investment from China into the EU. The launch of negotiations on an
investment agreement, a major outcome of the Summit, was warmly welcomed
by both. This should lead to further liberalisation – and a level playing field.
In the context of our overall economic cooperation, while in Beijing, I underlined
that the existential threat over the euro has been lifted and that Europe's economy
is back on the path towards recovery. This message was very well received by
the Chinese leadership who stressed the importance they attach to the euro
as one of the pillars of today's international monetary architecture. Premier Li
referred to his country's readiness to buy bonds and participate in structural
funds in support of the euro. He also expressed readiness to join the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
But growth today needs to be "sustainable" growth. It has to be based on low
carbon emissions and strong measures to protect our environment. This will
improve longer term perspectives, while opening new business opportunities.
The EU is a world leader in green technologies and industries. Its research and
innovation programmes, the EU Horizon 2020, with more than €70 billion to be
invested over seven years, will offer new possibilities for our partnership with
China.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
China's urbanisation policy has also become an important pole for our relations.
President Xi indicated that this would be a major goal for the coming 20 years,
and described the magnitude of the challenge (at present 53% of the population
lives in cities; with expected growth rate of 1%, the ratio will reach 60% in 2020
and peak at 70% in 2030; the intention is to favour the development of "smaller"
cities; prevent slums). Here again, the possibilities for cooperation and business
are immense, as shown by a Forum on Urbanisation which gathered 2000
people, mayors and municipal representatives from Chinese and European cities,
on the same dates as the Summit. A "Partnership for Sustainable Urbanisation"
established between the EU and China should help nurture this cooperation.
In his discussions with us, Premier Li stressed the "essential role of the market"
in assigning resources. This was also at the center of decisions taken by the
Third Plenum. Premier Li indicated that the Government's task was to assure
macro-economic stability and a level playing field, also between foreign and
Chinese investors. Premier Li underlined this would open new opportunities for
investments in the non-public sector. He also referred to the "bold step" taken to
put the lending rate on a market basis.
We would like to increase cooperation with China in the field of rule of law to work
for overall beneficial effects, including for EU businesses.
I have just commented on some of the elements that will fuel our economic
relations with China during the coming years. As we have seen, these questions
refer to key challenges that affect China's economic and social development
and the form and depth of European actual involvement can only be judged over
time. Suffice it to note today that our cooperation is placed at the core of China's
reform efforts.
Allow me now a few words on our cooperation in the field of human rights.
Our dialogue in this field is, as with other strategic partners, an integral part
of our relationship. Throughout the years this dialogue has developed and I
welcome the good exchanges during the recent visit to China of our Special
Representative, Stavros Lambrinidis.
The decisions adopted by Third Plenum a few days ago, contain potential for
positive movements in this field, including, the reduction in the number of crimes
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punished by the death penalty, the abolition of the "Re-education Through
Labour System", and reforms aimed at reinforcing the rule of law, including
greater professionalisation of the judiciary.
Some social reforms, such as the relaxation of the one - child policy, seem to go
in the right direction. There is no doubt that lifting millions and millions of people
from poverty in the last years is also a major contribution.
Nevertheless, concerns regarding respect for fundamental freedoms (including
human rights defenders and freedom of expression), and regarding the protection
of minorities remain. I raised these issues with the Chinese leadership, in the spirit
of frankness, but also friendship and respect, that characterises our relations.
Let me conclude today with a reference to EU cooperation with China on
international and security matters. Despite its proclaimed policy of "noninterference", through its economic policy China has become a very influential
international player. It has considerable security and defence capabilities and
as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) it is
constantly confronted with the challenges of the international peace and security
agenda.
It has also become a more assertive actor in its neighbourhood.
The defence and promotion of interests in a globalised world requires all actors,
China and the EU alike, to face challenges often in distant places. The EU and
China have a structured dialogue, the "Strategic Dialogue", to address such
questions at High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy/State Councillor level. These are also subjects that we address in all our
Summits.
Our cooperation in this field has undoubtedly made progress in the last years.
President Xi was clear last week when he referred to the benefits our relationship
will bring to the "World order". This is illustrated by examples like the Iranian
nuclear negotiations, where China's strong support to High Representative
Catherine Ashton's efforts has contributed significantly to the successful adoption
of an interim agreement in the E3+3 negotiations with Iran last Saturday. It is also
the case in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, where the Chinese
Navy is working together with EU operation ATALANTA.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Nevertheless, further progress can still be made. More dialogue is necessary
to continue communicating EU positions on Syria, on the Arab Spring process
or even on actions in the Sahel. Joint cooperation in addressing African crises,
in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), is
undoubtedly an area where I hope we will be able to advance. Our interests also
coincide when dealing with Afghanistan and stability in Central Asia.
One area of particular concern to the EU refers to the mounting tensions around
maritime disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
I have addressed all these questions with the Chinese leaders, most recently last
week in Beijing, reiterating the EU's position of principle that territorial disputes
should be resolved in accordance with the UN Charter and international rules,
through cooperative solutions.
Premier Li underlined the importance of solving these issues through dialogue
and avoiding what he referred to as "their internationalisation".
I think it is important to use today's discussion to call again for restraint and
dialogue. The three major East Asian nations have a lot to gain through their
cooperation and their interests are intertwined even more closely than those of
others.
Over the 10 years of our strategic partnership, China, the EU and the World have
changed substantially. Today, even more than in the past, we appreciate that the
only way to overcome the challenges we face is through greater understanding
and cooperation.
I have worked to achieve this with the Chinese leadership over the last four years
- one of the great advantages of the "permanent" Presidency of the European
Council. I am grateful for the friendship they have extended to the Union and to
me. I respect the long term vision with which they consider our relations.
Last week's Summit concluded with the adoption of the "China-EU 2020 Agenda
for Cooperation". Its four chapters - Peace and Security, Prosperity, Sustainable
Development and People to People exchanges - cover most of the questions I
have addressed today.
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I trust that we will be able to continue building on the sound basis that we have
laid. The world stands to benefit from our relationship, both in terms of the
prosperity it generates and the greater stability and peace it can foster.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Keynote address by Wang
Xiaochu
By Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 12th
National People's Congress of China
It is my great pleasure to attend this Europe-China Forum. The organiser asked
me to talk about Chinese Dream, and I am delighted to share with you my
understanding.
First of all, what is the Chinese Dream? President Xi Jinping of China pointed
out, “the greatest aspiration of the Chinese people since modern age has
been to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This is what we
call Chinese Dream.” Anyone familiar with the modern history of China knows
that after the Opium Wars in China in 1840, the Chinese nation was subject
to bullying and oppression by the big powers. But the Chinese people never
gave away. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Sun Yat-sen, the forerunner of
democratic revolution in China, first came out with the slogan “to revive China”,
and the Chinese people, generation after generation, had fought hard and
fearlessly, leading to the founding of the People’s Republic, achieving national
independence. And then, after ceaseless efforts, China embarked on the road
of reform and opening-up, starting the course of modernisation. Therefore, we
believe the Chinese Dream is a historical process, which is deeply rooted in the
Chinese history.
Then what is the connotation of today’s Chinese Dream? It includes the prosperity
of the country, the rejuvenation of the nation and the happiness of the people.
According to this, China has set two goals. First, from 2010 to 2020, to double
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and average per capita income, establishing,
as Chinese say, a well-off society in all aspects. China’s GDP in 2010 is about
US$6 trillion and it is expected to reach US$13 trillion by 2020. Second, by
2050, to build China into a modernised socialist country which is prosperous,
strong, democratic, and harmonious and China would catch up with moderately
developed countries.
The Chinese Dream is a dream of the nation and, at the same time, a dream
of each and every Chinese. The starting point and ultimate goal is to offer all
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Chinese access to better education, more stable jobs, better income, more
reliable social protection, better medical care, better living conditions and more
beautiful environment. It provides opportunities for Chinese people to grow up
with the country and realise their individual dreams for a better life.
That is why when the idea of the Chinese Dream was put forward by the new
Chinese leadership, it was immediately embraced by the general public, and
has become a grand goal that unites all forces in China. This Chinese Dream is
deeply rooted in Chinese history crossing 200 years, it takes great scale involving
1.3 billion people, and it covers extensively all aspects of people’s lives. Thus, it
is not an empty slogan, but a vision of the nation, an aspiration of the people, a
goal for hard work, and a guidance for the government.
Secondly, how to realise the Chinese Dream? President Xi Jinping pointed out,
“to make the Chinese Dream come true, we must follow the Chinese path, we
must foster the Chinese spirit, and we must pool the country’s strength.”
With 35 years of reform and opening to the outside world, China has sustained
high-speed development. The GDP increased from US$268.3 billion in 1978 to
US$8,355 billion in 2012, and China turns into the second largest economy in the
world. The country has resolved the long-standing problem of food and clothing
supply, lifted over 200 million people out of poverty, universalised nine-year
compulsory education, built up a social security system with 1.3 billion people
in basic medical insurance and 800 million people in basic old-age insurance,
which is the largest social security system in the world. The 35 years of reform
and opening-up has found China a development approach compatible to its
national conditions, an approach we call socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Only through this way could the Chinese Dream come true.
Of course, as the largest developing country, China is faced with many grave
challenges in its course of development. While its economy is the second in the
world, its per capita GDP is still positioned behind the 80th. Although it maintained
fast economic development, emerging problems become more prominent,
including resources bottleneck, environmental pollution, traffic congestion, and
food safety. While its society is full of vitality, it also faces challenges such as
urbanisation of 600 million rural population, employment for 25 million new entrants
each year in the urban labor market, and more conflict of interest in different
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
social groups. The Chinese leadership clearly recognised these challenges,
and therefore put forward a scientific outlook on development featuring putting
people first. They stress the importance of economic development, and call for
a comprehensive and coordinated development in economic, political, cultural,
social and ecological fields, transforming the development pattern. Efforts will be
made to stabilise growth, adjust structure, expand domestic demand, secure
employment, improve people’s well-being and safeguard social justice, as well
as to promote industrialisation, informatisation, urbanisation and agricultural
modernisation.
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party concluded a few weeks ago has made the decision to deepen
reforms in all fields. It calls for further reform of economic system, focusing on
ensuring market to play the decisive role and further opening of the economy. It
also outlines the road maps for reforms of political, cultural, social and ecological
systems. The decision has opened a new chapter for China’s reform and will
strongly promote development in the country to make Chinese Dream come
true.
Thirdly, what does the Chinese Dream mean to Sino-Europe relationship? I think
it means opportunities for development and cooperation.
As President Xi Jinping stated, “China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful
development, and unswervingly follow the win-win strategy of opening-up”. In
today’s world, the development of China could not be separated from that of the
world, and vice versa. The realisation of Chinese Dream can only be a process
of peaceful development, a road of opening-up and cooperation, and through
the strategy for mutually beneficial and win-win result. China is determined to
cooperate with other countries to find a new approach to the peaceful rising of
a big country.
I believe the process to achieve the Chinese Dream will bring opportunities for
Sino-Europe relationship in at least three ways.
First, a more prosperous China will greatly broaden economic cooperation and
trade between China and Europe. In 2003 the bilateral trade was only US$125.2
billion and in 2012 it grew to US$546 billion. In 1985 China purchased its first Airbus
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plane, while in 2012 853 Airbus plans were flying in the mainland, and another
60 were ordered by China in 2013. The further expansion and development of
Chinese economy, especially with its focus on expanding domestic demand, will
provide greater market opportunities for European companies and give stronger
impetus to our relationship in economy and trade.
Second, a more open China will provide broader platforms for China-EU
comprehensive strategic partnership. In recent years, China-EU cooperation
features higher level, wider coverage and closer contact. The establishment
of over 60 consultation and dialogue mechanisms stands as proof. The 16th
China-EU Summit was just concluded with fruitful results. In realising the Chinese
Dream, we are required to learn from all human civilisations and to pursue dreams
together with Europe and the rest of the world to achieve win-win outcomes. The
further expansion of China’s opening-up will continue to broaden and deepen the
cooperation between China and Europe.
Third, a more harmonious and stable China will better support China-EU
cooperation in responding to global challenges and safeguarding regional and
world peace. The China-EU relationship is among the most important bilateral
relationships in the world. To strengthen China-EU cooperation is beneficial not
only for the two parties, but also for world peace, stability and prosperity. A more
harmonious and stable China will give stronger support to China-EU coordination
to meet challenges, to work closely in international economic governance, and
to promote the establishment of a more fair and rational international economic
and political order.
In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Chinese Dream is not only a dream
of rejuvenation and development, but also a dream of harmony and peace. It is
our sincere wish that with mutual respect, China and the EU could join hands in
building a peaceful and prosperous 21st Century where everyone’s dream could
come true.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
keynote address by PASCAL
LAMY
By Pascal Lamy, Former Director General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
and Friends of Europe Praesidium Member
What I think I have learned about China in fifteen years of interaction - and which
I think will remain true for a decade to come.
First, China will keep growing fast, faster than most other economies, certainly
faster than the European Union (EU). The engine of growth will be rising
consumption by China’s growing middle class. Whether the economy will
grow by 6, 7 or 8%, I do not know. This will depend on the savings of Chinese
population which is resiliently high, higher than the Chinese leadership would
wish. Whatever the differences maybe, 90% of demand will come from outside
Europe, not from inside Europe, and the lion’s share of this demand will come
from China. In the future of course, this will change. Notably demographic shifts
will by 2025-2030 start depressing China's growth.
These comments set the prism for viewing EU-China relations.
Secondly, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows will rapidly accelerate
and we can expect political turbulence. It is going to happen, the Chinese
establishment expects it to happen, which is why they have entered, in a
strategic move, into bilateral investment treaties with the EU and importantly the
United States (US). Washington is the leading relationship for Beijing, not the EU
whether we like it or not.
China will keep going up the value added ladder even as this ladder itself develops
new stages. Labour competitive advantages will decrease more and more. This
is already happening: we have seen transitions from southern to northern China
and from eastern China to the western interior. Furthermore we have seen labour
transition towards Bangladesh, Cambodia other South East Asian states.
China has a young, new leadership; it is certainly more assertive than in the
past, in terms of body language, on both the intentional and domestic level.
The collective character of Chinese leadership will not change, however. Having
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attended all but one G20 meetings, I can say that the new leaders are the ‘no
speaking notes generation’ and that distinguishes them from their predecessors.
They do not need their notes anymore, they speak off the cuff - and that is a
good thing.
There has been, there is and there will keep being, intense internal debates on
policy, much more than what appears in public. From below the table information
(that does not appear in the China Daily), the relationship with State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) saw big fights and the leadership is trying to get the necessary
leverage to reform the SOEs, to get them to pay taxes and dividends.
As regards the relationship between local state authorities and central government;
the traditional game of barons between Beijing and Shanghai still occurs, as
does the debate between the protectionist side and the more trade-prone part
of the economy. This, itself does not fit into the traditional conservative-reformist
paradigm we are accustomed to hearing – but represent important tensions
within the system.
What I think will remain true for the next ten years: China like Europe faces many
challenges.
First, stability is what binds together the growing middle class and the party. The
party provides growth and an increase in living standards, which benefits the
middle class and, in return, but not for political reasons, the middle class provides
stability. They are people with mobile phones and wealth who are starting to think
more about their children's future and pensions. Thus, as an indirect result, the
middle class shows a lack of political assertiveness that would threaten stability
within China.
Second, discrimination is a very important point in terms of the trade and
investment relationship. The unequal treaties, as a result of the Opium War have
left a very deep scar on China’s perception of the West; this still dominates the
Chinese political perspective. During discussions between Jacques Delors and
the Chinese in 1986, Delors as president of the European Commission spoke of
a ‘united Europe’; the Chinese replied that Europe was united when it invaded
China.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
This is an important perspective to keep in mind as the international system
begins to be rebalanced, in terms of trade and the environment. China insists and
will keep on insisting, that it is a developing country; they will not tolerate being
discriminated against and being viewed any differently from other developing
economies. During WTO accession, China had to take on commitments that
were different from India, Brazil and other emerging countries. This process has
led to deep resentment within the Chinese system
Third challenge, is the fear that Taiwan, or Chinese Taipei as we call it at the
WTO, might one day escape China’s reach. This is an important topic within
China's domestic opinion and for the political establishment in Beijing. Also,
Japan- which is the real emotional issue that drives the Chinese population, the
burden of the past remains deeply entrenched in Chinese opinion; the pain is still
there long after the Second World War, in contrast to Europe. Most outsiders and
especially Westerners do not understand this problem.
In the ten years to come, China will remain rational with no big mistakes, in
contrast to other major players on this globalised planet. Excluding the One Child
Policy and environmental issues such as the Three Gorges Dam, China has made
no major mistakes in the last thirty years; few countries can claim that, even one
of these mistakes, the One Child Policy, was a pre-Deng Xiaoping policy.
Another thing we have to keep in mind in coming decade is that domestic issues
will consume 85% of the focus, attention and energy of the Chinese leadership.
With the speed, development and the sheer size of the economic growth in
China, there will be inevitable economic inequalities and regional imbalances in
China. There is already pollution, food safety concerns and social unrest in some
parts of the economy. This I believe has been reasonably well handed so far.
There is however a lot bad debt in the system. Although economists disagree
on how much debt is in the Chinese banking system, estimations vary between
30% and 60%, just take the average between these two figures and that is a lot
of bad debt that needs to be absorbed.
With the amount of reserves, China has enough capital to save a big national
bank if recapitalisation was ever need, this is not a treasury problem. This debt
however, will probably weigh on heavily on the economic changes to come.
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What remains to be seen in the next ten years, in the cycle we entered with this
new leadership, is just how much of the blueprint for reform which was recently
published, will be implemented. The rhetoric is impressive. The Chinese are
extremely attentive to the choice of words and the word reform appears fifty-six
times, in this new report. This is totally unprecedented and there are important
semantic shifts, which in terms of driving politics in China, are essential.
One example, the market now has a “decisive role”, where previously for a long
time, the market had a “basic role”. This is important.
Over the last year, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang have built
up a strong power base in the party and in the establishment. They have clearly
spent a lot of time doing this. Whether this new power base can be used to put
forward this programme of reform remains to be seen. We should watch carefully
the relationship with the SOE sector. As a result of the economic crisis, China –
like many others - had to spend a lot of money to fight fires. This has led to an
extension of the part of the economy now under public control - probably more
than 50% and there is a lot at stake there.
If we look at the blueprint as regards SOEs, it clearly says there will be a need
to rebalance the system, between the public and private sectors. Whether this
happens or not remains to be seen. Given the strong connections between the
leadership of SOEs and the party, this is where the jury is still out, in my opinion.
To conclude, what does this mean for EU-China relations in the future? I think
China will remain very pragmatic and very rational and that is what we have seen
in the investment relationship. The bilateral treaty being negotiated with the US
and the one to be negotiated with the EU illustrate a very pragmatic approach.
This approach is not geopolitical or ideological: we need safe investments.
What will remain true, the Chinese population and the leadership in general don't
understand the way the EU works; we should understand the difficulties they
have. I think this difficulty is on par with average European citizens: Who does
what? Should we put our eggs in the Council or the European Commission?
Should we look more at Germany or the United Kingdom (UK) or France? These
questions are haunting diplomats in Beijing and rightfully so in my view. I am not
sure I have answers to these questions; Europeans will have to live with the fact
that the European system is extraordinarily unfriendly to non-European users.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Finally in the years to come, what will matter and what will give an indication
of the direction of this relationship, is the body language of both partners in a
number of concrete, pragmatic and down-to-earth trade negotiations. There are
important tests ahead for the EU-China relationship.
The first is the trade and services negotiations, where the EU has been trying to
keep negotiations open and I think China very cleverly, has given strong signals it
wants to join that agreement. How this will play on US reluctance and European
goodwill remains to be seen; in order to join however China will have to put its
services sector on the table which it so far has signalled it may be willing to do.
The same can be said for the information technology agreement that has been
under negotiation for some time. Obviously, on this we have a more reluctant
China; the state-owned technology sector has more political clout than the
services sector and this is understandable.
Finally of course Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is
seen very much in the same league and maybe potentially viewed as a European
version of Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). What will be the outcome of TTIP
remains to be seen: Will the process be open? Will the EU and the US converge
on regulations? Will the rest of the world accept our standards or will the TTIP
move to become an open platform allowing the Chinese and others to participate
in the creation of this framework? The outcome in my opinion will decide whether
the Chinese view the EU as a separate entity in its own right, or whether Europe
is viewed as a wealthy, successful annex of the US.
The future of a specific, standalone EU-China relationship will be decided on the
basis of decisions to be made in the next ten years.
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Executive summary
The global China and the European Union (EU) must build on the growth of
their relationship over the past decade by promoting greater two-way investment
as well as cooperation in areas such as finance, technology and urbanisation,
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said in a special message sent to the Third EuropeChina Forum.
“Since its establishment 10 years ago, the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership has made great strides and cooperation in various fields and has
yielded fruitful results,” Li said.
China’s recent decision to deepen reform would lead the country to open up
further, and that trade facilitation – in particular for high-tech products – would
contribute to the relationship, he underlined. “In the coming decade, China and
the EU will strengthen strategic mutual trust and embrace another decade of
even more impressive growth,” the Chinese leader added.
The Forum, a joint initiative of Friends of Europe and the Mission of the People’s
Republic of China to the European Union (EU), was held on 26 November, shortly
after a Summit in Beijing between Li and EU leaders, where they adopted a 2020
Strategic Agenda calling for greater cooperation. The EU and China are scheduled
to start negotiations on an investment agreement, which Forum participants said
could help deepen a relationship that is currently heavily focussed on trade.
In his keynote address to the Forum, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the
European Council, called for more joint work in international security. “Our
cooperation in this field has undoubtedly made progress in the last years,”
he told the Forum, mentioning the recent Iran nuclear negotiations, where
China's support contributed to an interim agreement, as well as Chinese Navy
cooperation in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia.
However, he said progress should be made in other areas. “More dialogue is
necessary to continue communicating EU positions on Syria, on the Arab Spring
process or even on actions in the Sahel,” he said. “Joint cooperation in addressing
African crises, in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations
(UN), is undoubtedly an area where I hope we will be able to advance.”
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Booming trade contrasts with meagre investment between the EU and China.
From just €125 billion in 2002, EU-China trade reached €434 billion in 2012.
“On the contrary our investment relations are poor,” said João Aguiar Machado,
the European Commission Deputy Director General for Trade. “EU investment in
China represents 2% of EU investment in the world. Chinese investment in the
EU is 2 or 2.5% of the total investment the EU receives.”
Greater investment would actually further boost trade, said Vital Moreira, Chair of
the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade. “Most of trade is in
companies, so modern trade should be based on investment,” he said.
The EU-China relationship is evolving amid huge changes in China, which will
also impact its external relations. Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, said that the
“Chinese Dream” is an ongoing historical process, whose current focus is on
prosperity and happiness. “China has set two goals,” he said: to double its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and per capital income between 2010 and 2020; and
“to build China into a modernised socialist country which is prosperous, strong,
democratic and harmonious.”
Achieving these goals requires some careful rebalancing, said Van Rompuy –
between consumption and investment; internal and external demand; the ecology
and the economy. “The present model is not environmentally sustainable,” he
said. “If left unchecked, it may endanger the quality of life and even the health of
the Chinese population.”
Concrete activities – where Europe and China might be able to contribute to
each other's well-being – were seen as crucial by Forum participants. Europe's
experience of urbanisation could be useful for China, where hundreds of millions
of people will likely move from to cities in coming years, raising challenges in
transport, sanitation and water supply.
“Europe is seen as a good example – three-quarters of the population live in cities
and there is harmony,” said Paula Abreu-Marques Head of Unit Responsible
for EU-China Cooperation in the European Commission Directorate General for
Energy.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
At the same time, China presents new opportunities for Europe. “China needs
to create new jobs, so we need European small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) to contribute,” said Li Tie , Director General of the China Centre for Urban
Development of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).
“A lot of European SMEs would like to invest in China but do not understand
Chinese policies. So we should create some demonstration sites to show SMEs
how to do this.”
Though trade friction will inevitably crop up from time to time, participants said,
this is the result of a strong trading relationship. “We do not see eye to eye on all
issues, but we can manage these,” said David O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer
of the European External Action Service (EEAS). “Agenda 2020 was not easy to
negotiate, but it's a good basis for future cooperation.”
In conclusion, China and Europe could be moving away from a “them-and-us”
relationship towards something much more useful, said Forum co-moderator
Giles Merritt, Secretary General of Friends of Europe.
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Welcoming remarks by Zhang Lirong, Chargé d'Affaires
of the Chinese Mission to the EU
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
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EU-China relations: The next ten years
“Since its establishment 10 years ago, the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership has made great strides and cooperation in various fields has yielded
fruitful results,” Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said in a special message sent to
the Third Europe-China Forum on November 26. “In the coming decade, China
and the EU will strengthen strategic mutual trust and embrace another decade
of even more impressive growth,” Li said.
China’s recent decision to deepen reform would lead the country to open up
further, and trade facilitation – in particular for high-tech products – would
contribute to the relationship, the Chinese Premier underlined. “The Third
Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has
made the arrangement for comprehensively deepening reform in China, which
means China will continue to deepen its reform and opening-up,” the Chinese
leader added.
Li's message was delivered to the Forum – co-organised by Friends of Europe
and the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union (EU) –
several days after he had met EU leaders in Beijing.
“In the coming decade, China and the EU will strengthen strategic
mutual trust and embrace another decade of even more
impressive growth.”
Li Keqiang, Premier of the People's Republic of China
In his keynote address to the Forum, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the
European Council, said China’s new leadership finds itself at a crossroads. “After
many years of rapid development at record-high yearly growth rates, millions of
people have been lifted from poverty. At the same time the existing economic
model needs to be re-examined and revised, if China is to continue on an
equivalent path of growth and development over the coming decade,” he said.
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EU is China's "partner in
development"
The EU is a “partner in development for China in a deeper sense than just a trade
partner. We are a partner that will bring experience and knowledge. We are a
partner whose economy contributes to world growth. A partner on which it is
worthwhile investing. We are also increasingly seen as a partner for peace and
stability,” said Van Rompuy.
“But, as China needs the EU, the EU also needs China. China is a major destination
for EU exports. It has contributed to sustain the euro during the recent financial
crisis. It is a source of investment and it’s rapidly growing economy offers, and
will continue to offer during the coming years, irreplaceable opportunities for
economic expansion,” he underlined.
China also has to decide how best to use its increased capacity to influence world
events, said Van Rompuy. “Our cooperation in this field has undoubtedly made
progress in the last years,” he told the Forum, mentioning the recent Iran nuclear
negotiations, where China's support contributed to an interim agreement, as well
as Chinese naval cooperation in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia.
“The EU is a partner in development for China in a deeper
sense than just a trade partner. It is a partner that will bring
experience and knowledge. A partner whose economy
contributes to world growth and on which it is worthwhile
investing.”
Herman Van Rompuy, European Council President
However, he said progress should be made in other areas. “More dialogue is
necessary to continue communicating EU positions on Syria, on the Arab Spring
process or even on actions in the Sahel,” he said. “Joint cooperation in addressing
African crises, in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations
(UN), is undoubtedly an area where I hope we will be able to advance.”
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
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Giles Merritt, Secretary General at Friends of Europe and
Wang Xiaochu, 12th National People's Congress of China
Friends of Europe | Global Europe
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
The Chinese Dream
In a special address to the Forum Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the 12th National People's Congress of China, talked of the
Chinese Dream and its impact on the EU-China relationship.
“It includes the prosperity of the country, the rejuvenation of the nation and the
happiness of the people,” he underlined, adding that the ambition was to double
China’s GDP and per capita income from 2010 to 2020 in order to establish
a “well-off society in all aspects”. The ambition was also to build China “into
a modernised socialist country which is prosperous, strong, democratic and
harmonious and to catch up with moderately developed countries” by 2050.
Concretely that means better education, more stable jobs, better income, more
reliable social protection, better medical care, better living conditions and a
cleaner beautiful environment. “It provides opportunities for Chinese people to
realise their individual dreams for a better life,” Wang said.
The Chinese Dream means “opportunities for development and cooperation”
in the EU-China relationship, he said. A more prosperous China would have
strong economic and trade links with the EU. A more open China would provide
broader platforms for the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and a
more harmonious and stable China would be able to better respond to global
challenges and safeguard regional and world peace.
“The Chinese Dream means opportunities for
development and cooperation in the
EU-China relationship.”
Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the 12th National People's Congress of China
The “Chinese Dream” is an on-going historical process, which Wang Xiaochu
traced back to the “bullying and oppression by the big powers” after the Opium
Wars in 1840. Since the start of reforms under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has
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achieved great material progress, he said: “The country has resolved the longstanding problem of food and clothing supply, lifted over 200 million people out
of poverty, universalised nine-year compulsory education and built up a social
security system with 1.3 billion people in basic medical insurance and 800 million
people in basic old-age insurance, which is the largest social security system in
the world.”
Rebalancing of priorities
Herman Van Rompuy told the Forum that achieving these goals required some
careful rebalancing of priorities in China. “After many years of rapid development
at record-high yearly growth rates, millions of people have been lifted from
poverty,” he said. “At the same time, the existing economic model needs to be
re-examined and revised, if China is to continue on an equivalent path of growth
and development over the coming decade.” Rebalancing is necessary between
consumption and investment; internal and external demand; ecology and the
economy. “The present model is not environmentally sustainable,” he said. “If left
unchecked, it may endanger the quality of life and even the health of the Chinese
population.”
In addition, the Chinese system of government needs to be adjusted, said Van
Rompuy. “The rapid growth and the deep involvement of the administration in
the economic life of the country has led to dysfunctional and corruption-related
problems,” he said. “The state sector will remain important, but there is clear
awareness that the market has to be given a greater role – the Third Plenum
foresaw 'a decisive role' – in guiding economic decisions. Rule of law will need to
be strengthened, while limiting government and administration direct involvement
in the economic life of the nation.”
Ma Zhengang, Vice Chairman of the China Public Diplomacy Association
(CPDA), stressed that China was committed to peace, and is not trying to revive
an old empire or establish a new hegemony. Talking about the “Chinese Dream”
he said: “Even some people say that’s a dream of a vicious dragon. I think that’s
a total misunderstanding. A very important precondition of the Chinese Dream is
a peaceful environment.”
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
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The EU-China Summit adopted a 2020 Strategic Agenda calling for greater
cooperation in areas such as growth, security and the environment. The Agenda
aims to deepen links beyond the thriving trade relationship, which has developed
to the point where the EU is China's biggest trading partner and China is the EU's
second, after the United States. It opens an array of opportunities for greater
EU-China synergies including in areas such as green growth and urbanisation.
Two-way investment levels are still small, but negotiations towards an investment
agreement are scheduled to start early in 2014, potentially laying the ground for
more businesses to set up operations away from home.
“A very important precondition of the Chinese Dream
is a peaceful environment.”
Ma Zhengang, Vice Chairman of the China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA)
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An active foreign policy
President Xi Jinping is working to develop and reinforce old and new friendships
and has already visited the US but also Russia, India, Southeast Asia and
countries in Africa and Latin America. “This new leadership has a new style,”
said Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS). “The leaders have a new vision for China’s foreign policy and it seems they
have a global vision.”
“This new leadership has a new style.”
Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS)
China is also increasingly aware of the importance of trade routes, said Ruan.
These include the “silk road” economic belt in Central Asia, as well as a maritime
version with Southeast Asia. “The fundamental point here is that China wants to
share its opportunities with the neighbouring area. China has land borders with
14 countries, so it has no choice: We have to cultivate better relationships in our
immediate neighbourhood.”
Ruan said it was necessary to remember the lessons of Europe a century ago.
Then, after several decades of technological and economic progress with few
military conflicts, the First World War broke out, killing millions of people and
destabilising the continent for decades afterwards. “Of course there are a lot of
differences, but there are similarities to that time,” he said. “We should not take
peace, stability and prosperity for granted.”
Trade is the bedrock of the EU-China relationship, as both sides need growth
– whether this is the 7% or 8% annual increases that China needs to create
sufficient new jobs, or the more modest goals of the euro zone. In 2003 bilateral
trade was only $125.2 billion, but by 2012 it had grown to $546 billion, according
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
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to Chinese government figures. In 1985 China purchased its first Airbus plane,
but in 2012 this had increased, with over 800 Airbus planes flying over mainland
China. China ordered another 60 in 2013.
Greater market opportunities for
Europe
“The further expansion and development of the Chinese economy, especially
with its focus on expanding domestic demand, will provide greater market
opportunities for European companies and give stronger impetus to our
relationship in economy and trade,” said Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the 12th National People's Congress of China.
“The further expansion and development of the Chinese economy,
especially with its focus on expanding domestic demand, will
provide greater market opportunities for European companies and
give stronger impetus to our relationship in economy and trade.”
Wang Xiaochu, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the 12th National People's Congress of China
New possibilities abound for increasing business relations, said Christopher
Dent, Professor in East Asia's International Political Economy at Leeds
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University. In September a Chinese container ship travelled for the first time from
Northeast China to Rotterdam via the Arctic Ocean, a much shorter route that
the conventional one through the Suez Canal. “It's a very, very small volume of
trade at the moment,” he said. “But that could be interesting in the longer term.”
More trade could also mean more trade friction, but there are signs that China and
the EU are finding ways to deal with this without jeopardising their relationship.
“Problems arise from different perceptions of the realities in the world, from
different historical and cultural backgrounds and from different priorities in our
respective agendas,” said Zhang Yuanyuan, Senior Communication Advisor
and Member of the Public Diplomatic Advisory Committee of China's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. “But it is problems that force us to redouble our efforts to move
“Problems arise from different perceptions of the realities in the
world. But it is problems that force us to redouble our efforts to
move our relations forward.”
Zhang Yuanyuan, Senior Communication Advisor and Member of the Public Diplomatic
Advisory Committee of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
our relations forward. Nothing should be allowed to stand in a way of stronger
and closer partnership between China and the EU.”
David O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer of the European External Action
Service (EEAS), was optimistic too. “We do not see eye to eye on all issues, but
we can manage these,” he said. “Agenda 2020 was not easy to negotiate, but
it's a good basis for future cooperation.”
“There are many potential synergies between
Agenda 2020 and elements
of the Chinese Dream”
Shada Islam, Director of Policy at Friends of Europe
and co-moderator of the debate.
“There are many potential synergies between Agenda 2020 and elements of the
Chinese Dream” said Shada Islam, Director of Policy at Friends of Europe and
co-moderator of the debate.
Boosting investments
Booming two-way trade contrasts with low levels of investment. From just
€125 billion in 2002, EU-China trade reached €434 billion in 2012. “On the
contrary our investment relations are poor,” said João Aguiar Machado, Deputy
Director General at the European Commission Directorate General for Trade.
“EU investment in China represents 2% of EU investment in world. Chinese
investment in the EU is 2% or 2.5% of the total investment the EU receives.”
The low level of investment is not well understood, especially by Europeans, who
can have an inflated view of China's overseas purchases, said André LoesekrugPietri, CEO and Founding Managing Partner of A CAPITAL. He recalled a cover
of The Economist newspaper two years ago that featured an image of Chairman
Mao holding a fist full of dollars to illustrate that China was buying up the world.
“This is totally wrong in numbers, but that’s the perception and I think this is the
challenge that a lot of Chinese firms face,” said Loesekrug-Pietri.
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However, many of the overseas mergers and acquisitions done by Chinese firms
have been in Europe. “What China needs today is transportation technology,
air quality and water treatment,” he said. “These are areas where the leading,
globally competitive clusters are mainly in Europe.”
“What China needs today is transportation technology, air quality
and water treatment. These are areas where the leading, globally
competitive clusters are mainly in Europe.”
André Loesekrug-Pietri, CEO and Founding Managing Partner of A CAPITAL
European companies could benefit if a future EU-China investment agreement
gives them more access to the Chinese consumer market. Though many of
them have produced goods in China for a long time, the share of their revenues
from China is still mostly single digit – with German car-maker Audi a notable
exception. “Very few European companies have tapped into this huge domestic
consumption market which is opening up,” said Loesekrug-Pietri. These factors
create a strategic opportunity, he said: “I think there is a historic chance because
there is an interest on both sides.”
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Not just about protection
A stronger investment relationship could do more than just boost the economic
numbers. It could also consolidate the wider relationship. “When you trade,
you export and you import from a distance,” said Machado. “When you invest
you take a direct stake in the other country and its society, so it becomes a
much closer relation. So if we reinforce our investment relations, it will have a
tremendous impact in bringing our overall relations with China closer.”
“If we reinforce our investment relations, it
will have a tremendous impact in bringing
our overall relations with China closer.”
João Aguiar Machado, European Commission
Deputy Director General for Trade
The investment treaty would not, however, be just about investment protection,
said Machado. Only one of the 28 EU member states – Ireland – still does not
have a bilateral investment treaty with China, so there would be little point in
simply replacing the 27 existing investment protection treaties with a single EU
version. “What is missing is greater access to Chinese markets and opportunities
to invest across the board there,” he said. “There are some sectors that have
been protected. And on the Chinese side, there are certainly opportunities to
increase investments in Europe.”
Greater investment would also further boost trade, said Vital Moreira, Chair of
the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade. Currently, the EU's
trade relations with its two biggest partners are completely different, he said.
Most trade between the EU and the US is inter-corporate, based on outward
investments made by US and European companies. US companies export
components from America to their European units, and then export their final
products to the US – or the other way round.
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“None of this happens with China because the investment flows are so low,” said
Moreira. “So our trade flow with China is very traditional. We need to modernise
it, and that’s why investment should be at the basis of our trade relations with
China. Modern trade should be based on investment.”
"Our trade flow with China is very traditional. We need to
modernise it, and that’s why investment should be at the basis of
our trade relations with China."
Vital Moreira, Chair of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade
European Parliament wants EU-China
investment treaty
This is one reason that the European Parliament – often very critical of China over
trade relations – has been enthusiastic about a potential investment deal. Since
the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, trade agreements and legislation
must pass through the European Parliament and it has tended to be critical
of China over trade, often citing unfair trading practices, poor enforcement of
intellectual property rights and environmental standards and weaknesses in the
rule of law and human rights. “However, when we learned that the Commission.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
had decided to launch negotiations for an investment agreement with China, the
Parliament came out strongly in support,” said Moreira.
That said, the EU-China relationship will not be able to match those of the US
with EU and with China for geographic reasons, Moreira said. “The Pacific is also
an American ocean,” he said. “We have only the Atlantic Ocean.” However, he
said, Europe was still engaging with Asia, completing a free-trade agreement
with South Korea and negotiating with Japan and India
After spending years trying to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and then,
after entry, bringing itself in line with WTO rules, China now finds itself uninvolved
in the world's two biggest trade-boosting projects: the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated by the EU and the US and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in which a large number of Asia-Pacific countries
are either involved in or have expressed interest in – including the US, Canada,
Chile, Japan and much of Southeast Asia.
The EU, for its part, is trying to seal an array of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) around
the world. “At the beginning I think China preferred multilateral mechanisms such
as the WTO,” said Cheng Weidong, Professor at the European Studies Institute
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). “If FTAs or regionalism are
the future trend, I think Europe will play a more important role in that process.”
China and the CEE states
China, meanwhile, has caused unease in some European capitals by pursuing a
separated cooperation agenda - through Economic and Trade Forum meetingswith 16 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the so-called “16 plus
1”. In a visit to Poland last April, then-Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced $10
billion credit line to support Chinese investment in the region. At the most recent
meeting, in November 2013 in Bucharest, current Prime Minister Li proposed
to double the trade volume between China and CEE countries within five years,
plan a group of big joint infrastructure projects and boost corporate investment.
The meetings have raised suspicions that the eastern European states are trying
to get round the EU framework or that China is playing groups of member states
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off against the EU. However, this is not a formal arrangement and should not clash
with the EU's policies towards China or the framework for EU-China relations,
said Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, Analyst at the International Economic Relations
and Global Issues Programme of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. The
main thing the countries have in common is that they have longer diplomatic
relations with China than western European countries, as they recognised the
People's Republic in 1949. In addition, their time spent in the Soviet bloc slowed
their economic progress, so they now tend to have lower wages than Western
Europe.
Herman Van Rompuy, European Council, Zhang Yuanyuan, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cheng
Weidong, Chinese Academy for Social Sciences (CASS) and Ma Zhengang, China Public Diplomacy
Association (CPDA)
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But the 16 countries are very different from each other, said Szczudlik-Tatar.
“They range geographically from the Baltic through Central Europe to the
Balkans and are at different stages of economic development. They do not have
a common policy towards China but are focused on pursuing their individual
bilateral relations, making them to some extent competitors.” She also said
China's economic pledges, such as the credit line, were not that significant.
“It's more a political declaration than a real economic offer,” she said. “The
Summit is kind of a place when 16 bilateral dialogues are held. So practically, it's
a venue for annual meetings between prime ministers from those countries and
the Chinese Prime Minister. For us this is very convenient.”
"The 16 CEE countries do not have a common policy towards
China but are focused on pursuing their individual bilateral
relations, making them to some extent competitors.”
Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, Analyst at the International Economic Relations and
Global Issues Programme of the Polish Institute of International Affairs
One reason for the initiative might be the EU's Lisbon Treaty framework, which
gave the Union a single president – Van Rompuy at present – and did away with
the old system, where the EU President was the head of government of the
country holding EU's six-month rotating presidency.
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No worries
O'Sullivan said he was “fairly relaxed” about the 16 plus 1. “The EU is what it is.
We are not a state. We are in an intermediate stage of development between
an international organisation and some new form of supra-national,” he said.
“We have difficulty ourselves defining it to our own citizens sometimes. I am not
surprised that our strategic partners want to hedge their bets by not only having
good relations with Brussels but also having good relations with our member
states. This is nothing new. It was said that China is not trying to divide and
rule. Well, it would be the first strategic partner that didn’t try to do that because
most of our strategic partners have been doing this as a strategy for many, many
years, hedging their bets.
For its part, China is undergoing changes in the responsibilities assigned to
different layers and divisions of government, something that could also affect the
way Europe and China interact. “In the beginning in China, the system was that
everything was paid for by the central government leaving the local governments
doing nothing,” said Zhang. “Later on, the local government was asked by the
central government to do an increasing number of jobs on behalf of the central
government, but the taxation system remained pretty much unchanged. This
meant local governments had great difficulty in meeting their financial burdens.
So in the latest reform package includes reforms in the area of taxation powers
and areas of competence.”
Evolving relations
The EU-China relationship is evolving amid massive changes inside China, which
will also impact its external relations. “I think what absolutely struck most of us
from the EU delegation to Beijing was the style of the new leadership, which is
much more spontaneous and much more self-confident,” said O'Sullivan. The
full implications of the Third Plenum have yet to sink in for outsiders, he said, “but
it’s clearly taken some very, very important decisions.”
Concrete activities – where Europe and China might be able to contribute to each
other's well-being – were seen as crucial by Forum participants.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
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Policies to smooth the progress of urbanisation are a key priority, said Wang
Xiaochu, as Chinese cities would in coming years need to absorb 600 million
people migrating from the countryside. At present, 53% of the Chinese population
lives in cities, but this is expected to reach 60% in 2020 and peak at 70% in
2030. That makes it necessary to generate 25 million new urban jobs each year
and to provide adequate transport, sanitation and water supply. “While Chinese
society is full of vitality, it also faces challenges and more conflicts of interest
between different social groups,” he said.
“I think what absolutely struck most of us from the EU delegation
to Beijing was the style of the new leadership, which is much
more spontaneous and much more self-confident.”
David O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer of the
European External Action Service (EEAS)
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Sustainable urbanisation
Europe's experience of urbanisation could be useful for China, several participants
said. This could cover mobility, water and the efficient use of resources, as well
as a range of concerns from environmental protection to cultural heritage. In
2012, leaders established the China-EU Partnership on Urbanisation and then
held the first China-EU Mayors' Forum.
“Europe is seen as a good example – three-quarters of the population live in cities
and there is harmony,” said Paula Abreu-Marques, Head of Unit Responsible
for EU-China Cooperation in the European Commission Directorate General
for Energy. “Of course, not everything has been positive but it is also possible
to learn from our mistakes. So this is an area where Europe and China have
decided to make a big effort together.”
“Europe is seen as a good example – three-quarters of the
population live in cities and there is harmony.”
Paula Abreu-Marques, Head of Unit Responsible for EU-China Cooperation in the
European Commission Directorate General for Energy
City-to-city cooperation is also being encouraged. Twelve cities from Europe
and 12 from China have signed up to pairing agreements that will lead to pilot
projects, said Abreu-Marques. “This is another vehicle for European companies
to enter the Chinese market,” she said.
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Indeed, said Cheng Weidong, joint cooperation on cities could be an opportunity
for European companies to profit from their technology, as they are widely
considered to be leaders in renewable energy, low-energy buildings and the
treatment of water and waste. “We all know that Europe has a lot of experience,
skills and technology in the area of urbanisation,” he said. “So there is a large
potential area of cooperation.”
“We all know that Europe has a lot of
experience, skills and technology in the
area of urbanisation. So there is a
large potential for cooperation.”
Cheng Weidong, Professor at the European Studies Instirtute of
the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences (CASS)
Some European companies – and not just in the urbanisation field – might need
help to navigate the Chinese business scene, said Li Tie, Director General of the
China Centre for Urban Development of the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC). “China needs to create new jobs, so we need European
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to contribute,” he said. “A lot of
European SMEs would like to invest in China but do not understand Chinese
policies. So we should create some demonstration sites to show SMEs how to
do this.”
“China needs to create new jobs, so we
need European small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) to contribute.”
Li Tie, Director General of the China Centre for Urban
Development of the National (NDRC)
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Energy cooperation
Energy is another big challenge for China, in particular given its current heavy
reliance on carbon-based fuels. Because China needs to import all its gas and
oil, it relies a lot on coal, which it has in abundance for the time being, said
Ma Zhengang. “We know that’s not the best choice,” he said. “The Chinese
government has taken a lot of measures to reduce pollution but it takes time.”
Currently China generates just 2% of its electricity from nuclear power, compared
to 75% for France and 19% for the US but, according to Christopher Dent,
China – along with South Korea – has the world's most ambitious nuclear energy
programme.
Most remarkable is China's expansion of wind power, which is unparalleled in the
world. Helped by its large surface area and long coastline, China in 2010 became
the largest wind energy provider worldwide, and it now has more capacity to
generate electricity by wind than it does nuclear capacity. China is also investing
heavily in solar power, hydropower and biomass – plant-based products used
to produce energy.
“The challenges are enormous but I think we are going in the right direction,” said
Dent. “If you look at investment levels in green and renewable energy, the two
leaders are China and Europe.”
Public diplomacy
China has become increasingly aware of its image around the world, and has
been working hard at public diplomacy.
Mainly it has invested in the past years in building the “hardware” of public
diplomacy, said Ingrid d'Hooghe, Senior Research Associate at Clingendael
in the Netherlands. It has expanded its media presence around the world,
established many Confucius Institutes and set up people-to-people dialogues
and student exchanges. “I think now China is ready to take the next step and
improve on the software of public diplomacy,” she said – “improve the quality of
its messages; improve the quality of the programs.”
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Public diplomacy is important because China is different from many of the
countries and regions that it deals with in its historical background, cultural identity
and political system. “Chinese leaders often complain they are misunderstood,
and I think they are right,” said d'Hooghe. The best way to produce messages
that appeal to a foreign or European public is to formulate them jointly. Often,
dialogues consist of a European participant talking, a Chinese participant talking
“If you look at investment levels in green and renewable energy,
the two leaders are China and Europe.”
Christopher Dent, Professor in East Asia's International
Political Economy at Leeds University
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and then each goes their own way. “Instead of a Chinese participant writing an
op-ed and a European participant writing an op-ed, maybe they could write
an op-ed together,” she said. “I think there are many creative ideas to really
collaborate and improve the impact of people-to-people dialogues.”
“China is ready to take the next step and improve on the
software of public diplomacy, improve the quality of its
messages; improve the quality of the programs.”
Ingrid d'Hooghe, Senior Research Associate at Clingendael in the Netherlands
There are some relatively simple things that China could do better. For example,
the Chinese government's report on the Third Plenum had not been posted on
its website in an official English language translation, something that would have
helped non-Chinese better understand Beijing's thinking.
Transparency creates trust
Chinese business leaders could improve their image by being more open to
foreign media, said Loesekrug-Pietri. “We co-invest with Chinese groups, I am
permanently harassed by journalists who tell me they would like to interview the
chairman of our partner in Shanghai or Beijing,” he said. “I keep having the same
answer that these Chinese groups are not available for interviews.”
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
This would also help China buy foreign companies. Volvo – which was bought in
2009 by Zhejiang Geely – was available for purchase fairly easily, he said. “But
when you are looking at companies that have a lot of value and technology and
that are profitable, there is a lot of competition in Europe from local investors,” he
said. “The story is the same everywhere – that between a foreign investor and a
local investor, there is a human tendency to privilege the local one. You feel more
comfortable, you speak the same language.”
He said the heads of big Chinese enterprises should go to the media more and
talk – about their strategies, financing, and also what kind of a person they are.
“They will create huge trust because transparency creates trust,” he said. “I think
this is a very big message that probably the central government or entrepreneurs'
associations can really push, and say, 'It's not just about a cheque book.' If you
want to invest in Europe, you will need to disclose much more who you are, what
you want to do and what is your strategy. This will make Chinese firms much
more acceptable, I think.”
Get to know China better
Europeans too should make more effort to get to know China, said O'Sullivan.
“We have a much deeper and richer common cultural heritage with the United
States,” he said. “There are deep family personal ties there which go back a
long way even if we have to recognise that the changing demographics of the
US mean that cannot be taken for granted. We have nothing comparable in our
relations with China and I do think there that the obligation is rather on Europe
frankly to understand better our place in a changing world.”
Often, the rest of the world has been damaged in some way by Europeans, so
they know quite a lot about Europe, he said. To redress the balance, changes
should be made to language and history education, he said. “I think we need a
little bit of humility on our side to recognise that we actually have to be the ones
to reach out and understand better the culture, history, and perspective of the
countries with whom we are going to share this planet.”
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II.
EU-China Policy and
Practice Partnership
The EU-China Policy and Practice Partnership is an exciting
new Friends of Europe initiative aimed at promoting stronger
understanding of EU-China relations. Through roundtable
discussions and publications, this project seeks to bridge the
existing gap between the academic and scholarly work being
done on EU-China relations, the policy initiatives undertaken
by officials and the priorities identified by business leaders.
It is only through such synergies that EU-China cooperation
can be made strong, sustainable and able to deliver concrete
results.
The inaugural roundtable brought together a unique mix of
participants for an insightful outcome driven dialogue on how
to reboot the EU-China Strategic Partnership. This chapter
provides a full account of the wide-ranging discussions and
a list of recommendations to strengthen the relationship.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
Building a more resilient EU-China relationship
China and the EU must establish a fresh and forward-looking agenda for the
next decade of their Strategic Partnership, according to Chinese and European
academics, think tank representatives, business leaders and journalists who
attended the EU-China “Policy and practice roundtable” organised on November
25 by Friends of Europe and the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the
EU. The focus should be on making the EU-China relationship wider and more
multi-dimensional, as well as more resilient than it is at the moment.
Participants agreed on the need for a stronger vision for the future and called
for more EU-China discussions on global governance issues as well as practical
and pragmatic cooperation in areas such as green growth and urbanisation. The
meeting, organised under the Chatham House Rule, allowed for a wide-ranging
and no-holds-barred discussion on the state of current EU-China relations and
highlighted the need for stronger social, educational and business contacts
between the two sides in order to deepen relations.
Relations with China are a test for the EU’s readiness to adapt to a very rapidly
changing global order, where emerging economies are increasingly assertive and
the nature of power is changing. For China, it means adapting and adjusting to
a very complicated world and to the functioning of complex entities such as the
EU.
The roundtable – and the Europe-China Forum that followed it – was held only
days after the EU-China Summit in Beijing on November 21 and the adoption of
a 2020 “strategic vision” on greater cooperation on green growth, security and
prosperity by leaders. The Summit brought together Chinese Premier Li Keqiang,
European Council President Herman van Rompuy and European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso, the first formal meeting between the three men
since the leadership transition in China in early 2013.
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Trade relations: Too big to fail
China and the EU have a buoyant trade relationship worth some €1 billion a
day or €434 billion in 2012. The EU is now China's biggest export market and
China is the EU's second biggest export destination after the US. But other
aspects of the relationship, including two-way investment flows are still modest
in scale. Joint work in international security has been limited. In broader areas
– such as culture and society – there is a willingness to expand ties, but these
are still thin. Trade disputes such as the recent one on Chinese exports of solar
panels often cast a pall over relations. As such, wider-ranging links might lessen
misunderstandings and facilitate their resolution. Overall, deepening relations
and making them less volatile will require that Chinese and Europeans take a
fresh, more pragmatic and less emotional view of each other.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
building trust
It is important to further expand the relationship, said roundtable participants,
adding that Europeans and Chinese could benefit from an increase in contact
at different levels – in schools, local government and infrastructure projects to
improve the quality of life. Several participants identified a lack of trust between
the EU and China as an over-arching challenge, noting that the relationship is
still beset by fears, misperceptions and misunderstandings.
Europeans think that China is focussed on a new kind of great power
relationship with the US, leaving the EU marginalised. They are also worried
about trade disputes, such as the recent high-profile case over low-cost solar
panel exports, and are wary of Chinese efforts to forge relations with individual
member states – or groups of them – rather than with the EU as a whole.
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Europeans also believe that China sees the EU mainly as a trading power and
does not appreciate Europe's role in world security.
The Chinese, for their part, do not like to be viewed as an increasingly assertive
power, a perception that has grown in recent years due to China’s disputes
with neighbouring countries. Chinese are also unhappy at not being able to
play an active role in international agenda setting and rule writing, leading to a
feeling of being marginalised.
Global challenges
Some Europeans are sceptical about China's willingness to work with the EU
on global challenges – perhaps because of China's cool reaction to an EU offer
for trilateral cooperation in Africa. Both sides, however, share goals such as
maintaining peace and stability in Africa and promoting its social and economic
development. “China is increasingly open to possible cooperation with EU in
Africa” said a Chinese academic. There are indeed some signs of progress: last
year a working group was set up by the three sides to combat the spread and
use of small arms and lighter weapons in Africa.
One problem in foreign policy cooperation is a simple lack of experience of working
together, although some recent experiences have shown that cooperation can
be fruitful. China's role in the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, which
led to the recent interim agreement, was seen as positive. Likewise China is also
helping the EU fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
Still, there are mixed feelings in Europe about a growing Chinese role in
international affairs. “We want China to contribute, but are not keen if that would
change the way the world is run,” said a European academic. “Is China ready
to take on more global responsibilities? Of course, they are, but I think that the
question is what we expect in return.” Unfortunately the record of EU-China
international security cooperation is rather poor and there are not many reasons
for optimism regarding a possible intensification over the short term.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
Anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are the only example of joint EUChina military cooperation, although European and Chinese troops and experts
are currently deployed alongside each other in a number of UN peacekeeping
missions. But there is no record of the EU or EU member states jointly taking
the lead with China to advance a particular agenda in international security.
Sometimes differences have been impossible to reconcile, such as over the
conflict in Syria.
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Divergences in strategic priorities
One factor is a divergence in strategic priorities. Europeans tend to have a broad
international security agenda, but China is focussed on a limited number of goals
related to regional priorities, relations with the US and international contributions
through the UN framework. In addition, the EU has limited capacity to act on
security issues, especially when this requires military operations. The EU arms
embargo against China also puts a damper on security-related initiatives. In any
case both sides need to be realistic about what they can achieve and could start
small and focus on limited but feasible and mutually beneficial goals.
Such cooperation could start for instance with the protection of citizens abroad,
particularly evacuations of nationals from warzones, as was necessary in
Libya. To this could be added arms control and disarmament – such as joint
development of best practices to limit the destabilising flow of arms to fragile
states in conflict zones, and the prevention of unauthorised re-exports of small
arms and light weapons.
China's large annual increases in its defence budget have attracted attention,
particularly in other parts of East Asia but the issue is not just military spending
but lack of information on China’s military capabilities and plans. China is making
an effort to be less opaque by releasing a defence white paper every year and
the defence ministry is more open. However, there is still persistent unease about
China’s intentions.
New diplomacy
EU-China relations operate on many different levels and touch on many areas so
that often traditional foreign policy mechanisms may not always be appropriate.
For example, China has become a big source of carbon emissions and any
obstruction by Beijing of a deal at the 2015 Climate Conference in Paris could
lead to calls for barriers or tariffs on Chinese goods.
“Diplomatic machinery is very bad at understanding these modern, linked-issue
problems,” said a European expert. “It tries to deal with them in old-fashioned
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
ways and it doesn’t work very well. We need to change the way we do diplomacy
around some of these creative issues. We need to dig down a bit deeper I think
into the practice of diplomacy and not just talk about the objectives.”
Well-functioning markets could be a good common strategic objective for China
and the EU, as both face questions such how to organise financial markets
and to what extent industries can be subsidised. Another idea for focused
cooperation is infrastructure. President Xi Jinping, during a visit to Southeast Asia
in October raised the idea of establishing a mechanism to finance cross-border
infrastructure projects for Southeast Asia. The EU and China could work together
to implement some of Southeast Asia’s connectivity plans.
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Less complementarity, more
competition
The backdrop to evolving EU-China relations are shifts in the way that international
business is conducted. The EU and Chinese economies used to be clearly
complementary: China could compete on low-cost labour and Europe had a
big lead in technology. But that is no longer the case. The skills and knowledge
gap is closing fast, which means less complementarity and more competition,
leading to more trade disputes.
Still, trade and investment between China and the EU remain lopsided. Trade
has also become increasingly complex, with much of it taking place within large
companies. In particular, high-tech European companies often go to China to
produce things at competitive prices for sale back in Europe. This has helped
keep global inflation low, making the EU-China relationship more of a functional
one. Both are increasingly part of the same economic systems, energy systems,
development systems, trade, investment and business systems. As a result, to
segregate European and Chinese interest will become increasingly difficult.
This kind of trade puts into perspective the trade surplus China has enjoyed with
the EU for many years. About 60% or 70% of the surplus is the result of exports
from EU companies which have invested in China and export from there. So
Chinese companies do not make profits from this trade, though China benefits
from the jobs it creates.
Participants suggested that when trade disputes crop up – as with the recent
dispute over Chinese solar panel exports – it is important to have mechanisms to
settle them. For the EU, it would be beneficial to settle in the consultation phase
and avoid going to the WTO unless absolutely necessary. One reason: if there
is a dispute between a higher income country and a lower income country, the
higher income country always wins at the consultation phase, said a European
academic.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
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Investment: The untapped potential
The strong links between trade and investment mean that negotiations on an
investment treaty will include market access, a key European demand. The EU
wants assurances on the dismantling of non-tariff barriers to the Chinese market
– what happens “behind the border”. As such, the talks will be difficult.
Chinese investment in Europe is still meagre. The EU stock of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in China is about US$76 billion, far greater than that of China
in the EU, which is about US$20 billion, according to the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM). Finnish companies, for example, have invested more
than US$10 billion in China, while Chinese companies have invested something
on the order of US$50 million to US$100 million. Finland was a high tech exporting
country for a while, thanks in large part to Nokia. Then, Nokia invested heavily in
China, but its Finland-based operations declined. Now, Finland’s fastest growing
export product is fur – something it traded a thousand years ago.
Investment is growing rapidly, however. Chinese FDI to the EU surpassed that
of EU to China in 2010, and in 2012 China became the EU’s third largest source
From left to right: Zhang Yuanyuan, China's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Shada Islam, Friends of Europe and Ma Zhengang, China
Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA)
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Francis Snyder, Centre for Research on Transnational Law, Peking University School of Transnational
Law (Shenzhen Graduate School) and Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, International Economic Relations
and Global Issues Programme of the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Tamas Matura, Centre for European Integration ESSCA School of Management, Cheng Weidong,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Ingrid d'Hooghe, Clingendael
Oliver Bräuner, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and
Jolita Pons, European External Action Service (EEAS)
Sanja Vasic, Center for International Economic Relations, Belgrade Chamber of Commerce,
and Mario Esteban Rodriguez, Real Instituto Elcano and Autonomus University of Madrid
Mikael Mattlin, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Finland, Jin Ling, China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS) and Ruan Zongze, Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
Niall Duggan, Modern Chinese Society and Economy of the Centre for Modern
East Asian Studies at Göttingen University and Jing Men, College of Europe
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of FDI in terms of investment flows. Partly as a result, a total of 7,148 Chinese
enterprises were active in 35 countries in Europe at the beginning of 2013 as
compared to 4,525 firms in 28 European countries in 2011. In 2011, companies
with Chinese shareholders employed 27,381 people in the EU, but this increased
to 123,780 by 2013.
However, Europeans are often nervous about Chinese investment – just as they
were nervous about investment from US companies in the 1960s and 1970s
and Japanese investment in the 1980s. They assume that Chinese investors
are primarily seeking profit from Europe and worry that they might not conform
to European norms on business. Europeans' attitude is quite divided: on the
one hand, some regions compete for investment. On the other, there are fears
expressed by politicians – mostly those from opposition parties.
Allaying such fears requires the development of deep, multi-layered relations.
For China to become a successful and mature investor in the continent requires
more time, since the success of outward FDI does not depend only on financial
strength. It is really an activity that combines economic, social and cultural factors.
For that reason, European and Chinese leaders should work out a complete
strategy to promote economic cooperation, including investment.
China’s small service sector
One problem is that China has a relatively small service sector. This will not
be changed by trade agreements but is something that China will have to do
unilaterally. In terms of services and modernisation, China is still a developing
country, and in order to produce jobs and more value-added, this next step of
reform will be crucial. “We have to bear in mind that China hasn’t done much in
terms of trade liberalisation since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).
I am not saying that it is lacking in ambition, but it is lacking in experience,” said
a European expert.
The future looks uncertain with expected slow growth in the euro zone expected
to prompt fast-growing East Asian countries to focus on each other for business
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
relationships and possibly lose interest in Europe. Moreover, the cost of energy
and pressure to reduce carbon emissions might also make it more difficult
to organise a long-distance global supply chain between China and Europe.
Countries in the periphery of Europe like Turkey or Morocco could play this role
for Europe instead.
China’s special relationships
The nature of the EU complicates its economic relations with China. The Union
is responsible for areas such as trade policy, but individual member states –
and regions within those states – promote investment and business. That has
led to suspicions of China playing a divide-and-conquer tactic, such as when
Premier Li and Chinese executives recently met the leaders of 16 Central and
East European (CEE) countries in Bucharest.
There are several misunderstandings over such meetings, participants said. First,
the 16 CEE countries are not a united bloc and are in fact in competition to
attract Chinese investment. The group of 16 has no institutionalised format, so its
main function is to provide a venue for meetings between the Chinese leadership
and government leaders from Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU maintains, however, that such encounters are “psychologically awkward”
as they give the impression of a “double date”. The danger is not that China
works together with a group of EU member states as long as this is a transparent
process and as long as the agenda is clear. “Maybe it’s all perfectly fine we all
just need to know what it is about? What is exactly the agenda and where it is
going?” said an EU policymaker. EU member states are free to see whoever
they wish but areas such as trade and investment where the EU has exclusive
competence should be avoided.
In fact these meetings might not be that significant, said one participant, adding
that the importance of China’s relations with Central Europe were “highly
exaggerated and overestimated” and had produced little in terms of tangible
results. From China’s point of view, the complex interactions of the EU and
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member states can be tricky. Beijing has cooperative relationships of various
kinds with Germany, France, Britain, Italy and others, covering areas including
technology, environmental protection, culture and education.
“I don’t agree that China’s bilateral relations with member States would damage
EU-China relations,” said a Chinese academic. In fact developing bilateral relations
with member States is an integral part of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership. It is not China that is trying to divide Europe or take advantage of
Europe’s debt crisis, but it is the European structure which determines the dual
structure of China-European relations. The EU and member states play different
roles with different powers.
Non-state actors
If the divisions of competences in the EU can be confusing, contacts beyond
the central government level could be an effective way to exchange useful
information and to deepen ties between the EU and China, a number of
roundtable participants said.
Relationships between cities in Europe and China are going to grow stronger, not
least because the global economy is based on global cities. In Europe as well you
have quite well-defined city or governing authorities. “These are really important
actors and these are going to become increasingly important in international
and public diplomacy. So, I believe that relationships between Europe and Asia
involving multiple layers of actors are going to become thicker,” said a European
participant.
For example, if Shanghai wants to get tips of port management, it will find the
best advice directly from Rotterdam. Rotterdam port looks after itself, not the
government of the Netherlands. So it would be good for the mayor of Shanghai
to talk directly to the mayor of Rotterdam. As such, the EU should accept that
member states and even sub-national actors are given an increasingly important
role in the Sino-European relationship.
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Participants came up with a number of other concrete measures for cooperation,
including food safety, urbanisation, city management, social security and
environmental protection. Europe is considered to be a world leader in most of
these areas, but China is also making rapid progress, so the information flow
could go both ways. China also needs the EU as a partner in areas such as food
and water security, employment and social security.
Overall for China, engagement with Europe could help drive forward reforms
announced by the Third Plenum. “China used to be on the margins of the world
stage. Now it's moving little by little to the centre, but China is still a latecomer.
Especially when it comes to international rules, law or practices, we are still in
the learning process,” underlined a Chinese participant, adding that it was the
danger of being kicked out of the international community that was forcing China
to reform.
Zhang Yuanyuan, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Solar energy
China and Europe are leading in many aspects of green energy development.
Since China has more wind capacity than anywhere else, and is making solar
power more affordable, there is certain inevitability that energy and climate will
reshape the EU-China relationship. Also, while both America and Europe have
production lobbies opposed to the import of Chinese solar panels, there is a
growing counter-lobby which wants to install solar power using affordable Chinese
panels. The structure is therefore very complex and becoming increasingly linked
to trade disputes. “I would bet a large amount of money that energy and climate
change are going to become increasingly important agenda issues and global
challenges, which we both face,” said a European participant.
Schools and students
Better understanding between Europe and China could be promoted by
increased exchanges between schools and universities in different regions. A
European school or university could set up its own group for students interested
in China, so that they could learn about Chinese history and follow Chinese news
from a young age. Chinese educational institutions could do the same. “After 10
or 15 years the students will grow up,” said a Chinese participant, adding: “I think
we need concrete measures to implement a big idea or plan. I think people-topeople contact is very important. It's much more even much more important to
the economic cooperation.”
Such moves might encourage the Chinese to invest more in Europe as they are
sometimes put off by their lack of knowledge of how the continent works. “Some
Chinese investors are not familiar with the language, culture, customs, laws,
policies and regulations of their target markets,” said another Chinese academic.
More Europeans should also study Chinese, said participants because, as one
European academic pointed out: “European citizens are largely ignorant about
China. Compared to the US, Europeans' knowledge of China is behind.” Chinese
language study could be made mandatory in all EU primary schools by 2020,
starting at age eight – something that at least one Portuguese school has already
put into action. The EU could also work to have Chinese recognised as an official
language of the WTO by 2025.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
Public diplomacy
China is investing a great deal in public diplomacy including efforts to improve
its image, create understanding and build trust. This is a contrast to many
European countries which have cut their budgets in this area. “China takes a
long term perspective, which is one of the strengths of its public diplomacy,” said
a European scholar. “Another key strength is the strategic nature of its public
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is an integral part of its overall foreign policy and
diplomacy.”
However, Chinese public diplomacy is still state-centred without enough of a
role for civil society. Efforts have been focussed on the “hardware” of public
diplomacy, increasing China’s media presence abroad, building Confucius
Institutes all over the world, teaching Chinese and promoting student exchanges
in people-to-people dialogues. Now is time to improve the quality of public
diplomacy. Improvements in communication could also help raise Europe's
profile in Chinese eyes after the sovereign debt crisis and the damaged it caused
to the EU’s reputation.
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CONCLUSION
The last ten years have allowed China and the EU to move their relationship
beyond trade into areas such as international security, climate change,
urbanisation and people-to-people discussions. Ties are, however, still hampered
by misunderstandings and misperceptions, domestic concerns and global
developments.
Despite their many differences, in an interdependent and inter-connected world,
China and the EU have no option but to accept the compromises and inevitable
give-and-take needed to build a 21st Century partnership.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy and Practice Partnership
10 MUST DOs
These ten policy recommendations on how to strengthen EU-China
relations are the result of the frank, lively and insightful discussions
held at the first Policy and Practice Partnership roundtable, which
brought together experienced experts and practitioners from all over
Europe and China.
1. Build a relationship based on trust and confidence
2. Cooperate on areas important to China's future growth and
development
3. Energy and climate change are key areas for future synergies
4. More dialogue on global governance challenges
5. Encourage multiple contacts between EU and Chinese cities,
ports, universities and students
6. Promote European study of Chinese
7. Keep China's growing relations with EU member states open
and transparent
8. Do not allow trade disputes to colour overall relations
9. Further enhance people-to-people contacts
10. Actively pursue the negotiation of a mutually beneficial
agreement on investments
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III.POLICY BRIEFING
Friends of Europe publishes regularly concise and timely
analyses on key European and international issues. Our
Policy Briefings provide insightful analysis and concrete
policy recommendations. EU-China relations have been an
essential element of Friends of Europe’s publications.
This chapter includes the most recent Policy Briefing
on this subject written by Shada Islam, Director of Policy,
and Patricia Diaz, Programme Manager. Over the coming
decade, the authors argue, China and the EU should delve
deeper into expanding their practical cooperation with
green growth at its core, but also wider the outlook for more
interaction in multilateral fora and on crucial questions of
global governance.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
TEN YEARS ON: REBOOTING EU-CHINA RELATIONS
It’s time for a relationship reboot. As they embark on the second decade of their
partnership, the European Union (EU) and China need to rethink their interests,
ambitions and priorities over the coming years.
Shada Islam
Director of Policy at Friends of Europe
Patricia Diaz
Programme Manager at Friends of Europe
The EU-China Summit held in Beijing in November – the first official EU meeting with
China’s new leaders - offered a much-needed moment of reflection and respite after
a fraught year marked by tense exchanges over trade and reciprocal accusations of
arrogance, indifference and neglect.
Celebrating 10 years of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, China and the EU
have drafted a strategic plan for cooperation until 2020, with a focus on green growth,
security and prosperity. Negotiations will start on an EU-China bilateral investment
agreement. China's newly-announced reform strategies are conducive to a more
constructive EU-China economic relationship while aspects of the “Chinese Dream”
invoked by President Xi Jinping also open new avenues for cooperation.
More is needed, however. Drawing up new blueprints for the future is important and
these strategies must be implemented fully. But the new agenda can only work if it
encourages Brussels and Beijing to take a fresh, more realistic and less emotional view
of each other. Too-high expectations need to be toned down and new realities taken
into account. China still needs to learn from others, but three decades of economic
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growth have bolstered China’s confidence, making it even more unwilling to kowtow
to foreign counsel, however well-intentioned. The EU, meanwhile, has to get used to
living and inter-acting in a world of increasingly assertive emerging powers which do not
necessarily share Europe’s values and norms.
A test for EU foreign policy
Relations with China are an important test of the EU’s ability to adjust to an
emerging multi-polar world marked by fundamental shifts in the global distribution
of power as well changes in the nature of power.
There is no doubt: With trade worth €1 billion day, the relationship between
China and the EU is too big to fail. China should and will remain at the centre of
the EU’s conversation with Asia and of wider European efforts to fashion a new
foreign and security policy. Stronger and more sustained engagement with China
is important for the EU’s growth and jobs agenda as well as for its credentials as
a global actor. Similarly, China has an obvious economic interest in keeping its
EU connections in good shape. Even as President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister
Li Keqiang step up the search for a new “great power” relationship with the
United States (US) and court other emerging powers and their Asian neighbours,
Europe remains an important market for Chinese goods, an increasingly
significant source of investments and a partner which can help Beijing to meet
the higher quality-of-life aspirations of its people.
This policy briefing will look at the EU-China relationship in the light of China’s
new transformative economic agenda and changing foreign policy priorities. It
will explore some common challenges facing Europe and China and look at the
opportunities for cooperation opened up by the “Chinese Dream” and the new
economic reform programme. Over the coming decade, this briefing argues that
China and the EU should delve deeper into expanding their practical cooperation
with green growth at its core but also wider outlook for more interaction in
multilateral fora and on crucial questions of global governance. The emphasis
must be on understanding each other better and not allowing friction over trade
and other questions to blur the bigger picture.
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Multi-dimensional conversation
A revamp of EU-China relations requires a shift away from fragmented policy
responses to a more coherent and multi-dimensional method of dealing with
each other, tackling global challenges – and delivering global public goods. EUChina relations are subject to sudden swings in mood, ranging from anger and
recrimination over trade or human rights to euphoric “honeymoon” periods such
as in 2004 when the EU became China’s largest trading partner. This should
change, with ties being put on a more resilient, less volatile and more sustained
footing.
“A revamp of EU-China relations requires a shift away from
fragmented policy responses to a more coherent and
multi-dimensional method of dealing with each other, tackling
global challenges – and delivering global public goods.”
In addition to a scrutiny of bilateral EU-China ties, careful attention must also
be paid to the broader, rapidly-changing international and regional context.
The recent downturn in ties between Brussels and Beijing was certainly due
a trade dispute over solar panels, the role of Chinese state-owned enterprises
and EU businesses’ repeated claims that Beijing is discriminating against foreign
investors. The EU is part of the international chorus demanding that China
rebalance its economy away from an investment-led model towards one driven
by domestic demand. But other factors are also in play. Europeans fret over
China’s “special relationship” with Germany and Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries and accuse Beijing of trying to “divide and rule” Europe. The EU
is also worried about the deterioration in China’s relations with Japan. China’s
unease about aspects of Europe also runs deep. Beijing is suspicious of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), viewing it as an US-EU
attempt to “encircle” and contain China. Many in Beijing also believe that the EU
does not respect or trust China.
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Time for explanations
These and other concerns – including the EU’s continuing embargo on weapons
sales and reluctance to grant China market-economy status - will certainly
remain on the table. But they should be explained and clarified. China’s new
leaders need to provide more insight into their vision of a “Chinese Dream”
and also articulate their policy on Europe. Having set a new economic reform
agenda at the Third Plenum, it is important that both sides identify areas where
they can work better together. The EU, meanwhile, has to readjust its views
and expectations of a country which is more assertive and self-confident and
reluctant to listen to prescriptive foreign judgments on its future course.
Not surprisingly, this is not easy. China has many facets: It seeks respect as a
major power and believes it no longer needs to acquiesce to outsiders’ demands,
says Linda Jakobson of the Lowy Institute in Sydney. But at the same time, it
craves recognition for contributions to global stability and prosperity. According
to Jing Men of the College of Europe, China has a dual identity comprising of a
strange combination of “self-superiority and self-inferiority”.
The Chinese Dream
First invoked by President Xi in late November 2012, the Chinese Dream has
captured global and domestic attention – and raised many questions and
demands for clarification. With no detailed explanation given so far, for some, Xi’s
references to the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as the “greatest Chinese
dream” (made at an exhibition entitled “The Road to Revival” at the National
Museum in Beijing), have prompted unease about perceived nationalistic and
even military elements of the concept. In meeting with US President Barack
Obama in California in June 2013, the Chinese President insisted that the
Chinese Dream is about “cooperation, development, peace and win-win.” It is
also clearly about easing inequalities in a country which is increasingly plagued
by gaping disparities in wealth. As such, the Chinese Dream stands as an
important precursor to the raft of reforms agreed by the Third Plenum with the
aim of increasing living standards of the middle class and rural poor, avoiding
the “middle income trap” of economic stagnation and allowing a greater role for
market forces.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
Economic transformation ahead
Unveiled amid high expectations of a long-awaited change in China’s policies
and institutions, assessments of President Xi’s economic reform agenda,
adopted at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congres on November 12, were
initially muted, with analysts undecided on the scope and potential impact of
the new measures. Details published a few days later, however, appeared to
convince sceptics - and markets - that the new leadership had sidestepped
opposition from conservatives and vested interest and agreed on an impressive
transformative agenda which sets China on the path of a fundamental economic
overhaul similar to the groundbreaking pro-market agenda espoused by Deng
Xiaoping at the 1978 plenum. There is consensus, however, that the journey has
just begun and that implementation of the vast package – expected to be largely
dependent on local officials - will take time and patience.
The 60-point reform agenda includes plans to relax China's one-child policy,
loosen up control on markets, make reforms to existing land and residence
systems, open up some sectors monopolised by state-owned enterprises,
and abolish labour camps. Competitive market-based pricing in sectors
including water, energy, transport and telecommunications will be allowed.
Beijing will also consider establishing a special court to deal exclusively with
complaints over intellectual property violations. Interestingly, the plenum has
approved the establishment of two new bodies: a “leading group” in charge
of the “overall deepening of reforms, responsible for the comprehensive design
of reforms”, the control of their application and implementation, and another
in charge of national security which will help coordinate foreign and security
policy across the ministries and help alleviate inconsistent signals and bickering
between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the military police, intelligence
agencies, government ministries and the central bank.
• One-Child Policy reform:
The controversial policy introduced in 1979 is to be eased to allow urban
couples to have two children if one of the parents is an only child. The
regulation, originally designed to ease demographic pressures, has led to
gender ratio disparity and a dwindling work force. Aside from putting a stop
to forced abortions, the change should also help the country’s transition to
a consumption-driven economy.
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• Welfare-system reform:
The household registration, known as the hukou system, is to be relaxed,
a move which should help liberalise the labour market, allow the free
movement of workers and encourage urbanisation. The largest cities such
as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen will still have strict rules
applied but registration restrictions will be lifted completely in third-tier
towns and small cities. Being able to obtain hukou will allow rural residents
moving to most cities to benefit from basic social services.
• Greater rights for farmers:
Farmers will be granted rights to “possess, use, benefit from and transfer
their contracted land, as well as the right to use their land ownership as
collateral or a guarantee.” The restriction on transferring usage rights of rural
land that is classified as “for construction” has been lifted, which will benefit
both poor rural households and make the process of urbanization smoother.
Previously, land sales had to be carried out through local governments
which were able to acquire land at a low price from farmers.
• Stepping up financial reforms:
The “decisive” role markets will be allowed to play in resource allocation
will mean that prices of water, oil, natural gas, electricity, transport
and telecommunications will become more market-determined and
policymakers will retreat from micro-level intervention, allowing for freer
markets. In addition, interest rate and capital account liberalisation will be
accelerated and private banks will be authorised for the first time.
• State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs):
SOEs will be required to pay larger dividends to the government, with 30
% of earnings from "state capital" to be paid back to the state and used
for social security by 2020. Private firms, meanwhile, will be encouraged
to play a greater role in the economy. At the moment, China's large SOEs
under direct government control typically pay five to 20 % of their profits to
the government in dividends. However, SOEs’ dominance in key sectors will
be protected and there appears to be no plan for large-scale privatisation.
• Labour Camps Abolished:
In a bid to adapt to international human rights standards, China will finally
abolish the controversial labour camp system first put in place in 1957.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
Looking outwards: Great power or
developing nation?
Given the vast challenge of economic reform, domestic economic tasks and
ensuring national stability will undoubtedly dominate China’s policy priorities
over the coming decade. President Xi and Premier Li are engaged in efforts
to strengthen and widen China’s global networks in response to the country’s
expanding comercial interests and hunger for resources. Although no major
policy shifts have been announced, China’s new leaders have quickly put
their stamp on relations with key partners by indicating a stronger interest in
discussions on global governance and “soft power” initatives and backing efforts
for a dialogue with Iran. Attention is also increasingly paid to non-traditional
security issues such as energy security, climate change and cyber security. The
18th Party Congress strategy report refers to protecting China’s legitimate rights
and interests and not yielding to outside pressures.
Pursuit of stronger relations with the US highlights China’s determination to
be recognised at home and abroad as a potent global player while increased
contacts with other emerging nations prove that Beijing still sees itself as a
developing nation, albeit one with extraordinary influence and clout. As such,
China over the next decade will continue the search for a stronger regional and
global role. Certainly, since formally taking over as president in March, Xi has
made important overseas trips and participated in key international summits,
with a particular emphasis on relations with the US, China’s neighbours and
other emerging countries.
Foreign policy at a crossroads
China is at a crossroads when it comes to making some important strategic
decisions and foreign policy adjustments, says Zheng Wang, Global Fellow at
the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars in Washington. As an example, Zheng says that
while some foreign policy experts in Beijing believe that China should abandon
its support for North Korea, others argue that China should establish closer
relations and provide comprehensive security, protection, and even a nuclear
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umbrella. Similarly, while there are suggestions that China should reconcile and
find a peaceful solution to the South China Sea disputes, others are lobbying for
a more assertive stance on national interest including the use of force.
One of the major debates still raging in Beijing is over whether China should
continue Deng Xiaoping’s policy of taoguangyanghui, commonly translated
as “hiding your strength and waiting for your time” in order to concentrate on
economic development and domestic issues or whether the policy should be
abandoned, with China becoming less shy to use its power to pursue and
protect its national interests
Multiple pivots
China has a “multi-pivot diplomacy” which translates into networking on an array
of fronts, according to Ruan Zongze of the Chinese Institute of International
Studies (CIIS). Relations with Russia and India are high on the agenda, with
Beijing seeking to reconcile cooperation and competition with two of its largest
neighbours. China has launched a campaign to enhance its relationship with
ASEAN through a dramatic increase in trade and a message that current territorial
disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines are not issues between China and
ASEAN and should be settled peacefully.
Visits to Russia, Tanzania, the Congo and South Africa - where Xi attended the
BRICS Summit – have been followed by trips to Mexico, Costa Rica and Trinidad
and Tobago. An informal “shirt-sleeve” Summit with US President Obama
highlighted China’s quest for a “great power” relationship with Washington. Xi
has invoked plans to build a “new silk route” in Central Asia, while Premier Li
has articulated an ambitious vision of a “diamond decade” of flourishing trade
ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the absence of
President Obama at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in
Bali, the Chinese leaders dominated Summit proceedings.
It’s not all plain sailing, however. Territorial disputes in the East China and South
China Seas have soured relations with Japan and the Philippines. As illustrated
by its initial modest relief efforts following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philipppines,
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despite its growing international clout and increased spending on defence and
“soft power” charm initiatives, Beijing has yet to acquire the expertise and serious
tools and instincts to become an important global or even regional humanitarian
player.
“The hoped-for and much-needed deepening of relations and
better mutual understanding will require
more time and effort .”
ASEAN
Premier Li’s ambition of embarking on a “Diamond Decade” with ASEAN
highlights Beijing’s determination not to allow territorial disputes with Vietnam
and the Philippines to impact negatively on its overall relations with its Southeast
Asian neighbours. Although many in the region are wary of a too-close Chinese
embrace – Myanmar for instance is seeking to diversify its trade and aid networks
– China is ASEAN’s leading trade partner. In recent meetings, Chinese leaders
have proposed that two-way trade between China and ASEAN, which reached
$400 billion in 2012, be raised to $1 trillion by 2020, a substantial advance over
the previous target of $500 billion in 2015. In addition, the two sides have agreed
to work towards two-way investment of $150 billion in the next eight years. A
proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank “to give priority support to Asean
connectivity projects” has been mooted and both sides said that they “look for
early and substantive progress in the construction of the Pan-Asia Railway,”
which will link the continental countries in Southeast Asia with Yunnan province
and will clearly benefit both sides. China’s ties with Indonesia and Malaysia —
both visited by President Xi — are being raised to a comprehensive strategic
partnership.
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Working with “non-like minded” states
Adding to the policy confusion, China – like many other emerging countries
– is both a rising power with regional and global ambitions and a developing
country which still has to deal with poverty and social inequalities. These and
other paradoxes must be taken into account if China and the EU are to build a
relationship which is more resilient, mature and trusting and better adapted to
new challenges.
21st Century foreign policy imperatives in a changing world require that countries
work with each other despite their differences. Tackling nuclear proliferation,
climate change, pandemics and cyber security require cooperation among nonlike-minded countries, just as much as alliances with value-sharing nations.
Also, China and the EU share many common challenges: both have to speed up
economic growth and reform, manage domestic and international expectations,
inter-act with and respond to the aspirations of increasingly assertive citizens
while also dealing with difficult neighbours. They also have to tackle challenges
posed by an ageing population, ease regional economic disparities and adapt
to a new and more complex world order. Prosperity in both China and the EU
hinges on a peaceful and stable regional and global environment.
“The hoped-for and much-needed deepening of relations and
better mutual understanding will require
more time and effort .”
As indicated at the EU-China Summit, ties in future will likely be dominated by
common interests in green growth and innovation, negotiations on a bilateral
investment treaty and stronger cooperation on the delivery of global public
goods. European expertise will be useful as China seeks to speed up economic
reform, ease social inequalities, improve the quality of life of its citizens and
ensure sustainable urbanisation. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, EU
cooperation with China will be important in areas such as clean air, energy and
climate change. The EU meanwhile will continue to need China’s markets for its
economic recovery, while European investors expand their business interests in
the country.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
Building resilient relations
Relations will hinge on more than lists of interests and common challenges,
however. The relationship needs to be put on a more resilient and stable footing.
This requires greater trust and confidence in each other. As the Eurozone
continues to face challenges, China needs assurances on the future direction
of European economic policy. European policymakers, on the other hand, need
to be convinced that China’s new economic reform agenda, foreign policy goals
including relations with neighbours and implementation of the Chinese Dream
will go hand in hand with the country’s peaceful rise. Brussels is also looking
for assurances that China’s special relationship with Germany and increased
cooperation with Central and Eastern European states is not part of a “divide
and rule” policy and that discussions on key EU areas of competence, including
trade and agriculture, will be held with the EU, not member states.
Trade and investments
Negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty are expected to dominate the
EU-China agenda over the coming years. Once concluded, the deal will help
increase the bilateral flow of investments, lead to improved investment protection
and market access for both sides. Equally significantly it is likely to contribute to
a reinforcement of political ties.
The agreement is certainly needed. According to provisional Eurostat data, in
2012 Chinese investments into the EU(27) amounted to €3.5 billion, accounting
for 2.2% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into the EU. In the same
year, EU firms invested €9.9 billion in China, accounting for approximately 11.4%
of all China’s inward FDI. However, the EU’s outward FDI to China only accounted
for 2.4% of total outbound investment flowing from the EU to the rest of world.
By contrast, bilateral trade in goods and services is valued at more than €1 billion
per day, climbing up steadily from €4 billion in 1978 to €432 billion in 2012. Since
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has become one of Europe's
fastest growing export markets. In 2012 EU exports to China increased by 5.6 %
to reach a record €143.9 billion. The EU is also China’s main export destination,
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with €289.7 billion in goods imported in 2012. Europe´s €145 billion trade deficit
with China (down by almost 14% compared to the 2010 record of almost €170
billion) is mainly caused by sectors like office and telecommunication equipment,
shoes and textiles, iron and steel. “Through better market access, European
exporters should be well placed to increasingly sell their products on the rapidly
expanding Chinese consumer market,” according to the EU Commission. Trade
in services, however, is still about ten times lower at €49.8 billion and remains an
area full of potential.
Market access
Almost all EU countries have signed bilateral investment pacts with China which
are expected to be consolidated into a comprehensive EU-China investment
agreement. EU officials insist, however, that the new accord with go further and
will include provisions on market access, including access to services, and on
intellectual property. The successful negotiation of the treaty is widely seen as
paving the way for the possible conclusion of an EU-China free trade agreement.
“European companies are very interested in entering the telecommunications,
energy, construction, railway and financial service industries in China, if access
can be further eased through a bilateral investment treaty,” Davide Cucino,
President of the European Chamber of Commerce in China recently told China
Daily. According to a recent business confidence survey of 550 European
companies surveyed — all with a presence in the Chinese market for more than
five years — 86% are considering further investment to expand operations, while
41% are planning merger and acquisition deals this year.
EU-China Imports Exports
Year
Imports €
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
247,815m
214,238m
282,509m
293,692m
289,915m
Share of imports% Exports € Share of exports% Trade deficit
15.7
17.4
18.5
17.0
16.2
78,276m
82,391m
113,426m
136,372m
143,874m
5.9
7.5
8.3
8.7
8.5
-169,539
-131,847
-169,084
-157,320
-146,041
Trade
326,091m
296,630m
395,935m
430,064m
433,789m
Source: Directorate General for Trade
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
It’s not that easy for Chinese companies investing in Europe either, say Chinese
officials, pointing to technical barriers in many areas and the absence of a
unified foreign investment approval procedure. The enthusiasm and motivation
of Chinese investors have been seriously affected by the abuse of antitrust
investigations, harsh visa conditions and inflexible labor laws, according to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A blueprint for the future
Launched in 2003, the EU-China strategic dialogue has had a chequered ten
years, with relations rapidly switching from warm to cold in response to trade
disputes and EU reaction to domestic developments in China, including human
rights issues. Other “irritants” include the EU’s arms embargo on China and
the EU’s reluctance to grant China a much-coveted market-economy status.
Broader factors leading to mutual disenchantment have also come into play.
When the strategic partnership was launched, Beijing clearly believed that the
EU was emerging as a genuine “counterweight” to the US and would become
a partner in an emerging multipolar world. Europeans meanwhile have for long
hoped that economic transformation would lead to political openness and greater
respect for human rights. So far, however, China seems to be the exception
to the modernisation theory which holds that authoritarian systems tend to
democratise as incomes increase and an emerging middle class becomes more
assertive.
What kind of “strategic partnerhsip”?
Grievances between the EU and China are rooted in different interpretations of
the nature and purpose of strategic partnerships. China sees the partnership as
a dialogue between equals aimed at promoting closer understanding of China’s
political system, while the EU views it as a tool to support China’s transition
to an open society based on the rule of law. “Where China sees an enduring,
comprehensive, and stable relationship that extends beyond everyday issues,
Europe sees market access and better global governance, but lacks a clear
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long-term vision for the partnership,” adds Wang Yiwei, professor at Renmin
University. China appreciates Europe for its capacity to offset “Americanization”
and as a major source of technology. “But the EU lacks a coherent strategy for
engaging with China, and its ongoing identity crisis over whether it is a single
super-state or a bloc of individual states is impeding its ability to define a more
effective approach,” says Wang.
Central and Eastern Europe
China certainly is not helping to resolve the “one voice” dilemma that continues
to dog EU foreign policy. Beijing has long trumpeted its special relationship
with Germany and, much to the dismay of the EU, seems equally bent on
strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) despite EU concerns.
Attending a meeting with CEE leaders in Warsaw in 2012, former Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao put forward 12 proposals to promote China-CEE friendship
and cooperation. A similar meeting was held in Bucharest in November 2013,
with Premier Li in attendance. A China-CEE Cooperation Secretariat has been
set up in Beijing, while CEE countries have created counterpart departments or
designated a national coordinator for cooperation with the secretariat.
With Eurozone economies in turmoil, CEE states offers China a “window of
opportunity” to increase investments, according to Liu Zuokui, Associate
Professor at the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS). China has also created a $10 billion credit line to support
Chinese investments in Central European infrastructure, new technology, and
renewable energy. “CEE countries urgently need expanding investment to
promote economic growth, and China has advantages in capital and technology”,
says Ruan Zongze from the Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
What happened to the PCA?
The EU and China have been negotiating a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) since 2007, but negotiations have stalled over the EU’s
insistence on including a human rights clause in such deals. Beijing and Brussels
launched an annual High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED) in 2008, a
High-level Strategic Dialogue (HSD) in 2010 and a High-level People-to-People
Dialogue (HPPD) in 2012. The number of sectoral dialogues has expanded to
more than 50. The expanding number of topics discussed by the two sides
means that EU-China relations are becoming wider and broader. Premier Li has
said China is willing to map out relations with the EU from a “strategic and longterm perspective”. Given global economic uncertainties, Li has also underlined
that China and the EU should strengthen coordination in macro-economic
policy, jointly oppose trade protectionism and promote free trade and investment
facilitation.
Trade and economic cooperation may be the backbone of the relationship but
China and the EU are expanding their conversation to include consultations on
climate change and have worked together in the G20 and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) on global governance reforms. Discussions are underway on energy
and food security and Brussels and Beijing also consult regularly on the Middle
East and the Iranian nuclear issue. In Beijing, the EU and China held a first
dialogue on innovation, in addition to discussions on their year-ld urbanisation
partnership, agriculture, migration and mobility as well as people-to-people
exchanges. Leaders also discussed climate change, Asian regional security,
Syria and efforts to speed the global economic recovery through cooperation
in the G20.
Maritime security
EU and Chinese maritime vessels are successfully cooperating in fighting piracy.
Since 2011, Chinese vessels have escorted World Food Programme vessels
in the Gulf of Aden, thereby burden-sharing with the EU. China is stepping up
its support for peace keeping operations, such as in Mali, where China – as a
UN Security Council Permanent Member – has pledged military forces for the
operation.
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Tourism and culture
Tourism between the EU and China is booming. Air traffic between the EU and
China has grown to six million passengers per year, three times the 2003 figure.
Over five hundred officials and experts have received training through the EUChina Civil Aviation Project. EU-China academic exchanges have increased
significantly over the last two decades, with the Erasmus Mundus and Marie
Curie programmes providing scholarships to Chinese students and professors
to study and teach in the EU.
Green growth
China’s plans for transition to a low-carbon economy - China aims at reducing
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% from 2005 levels by 2020 - have
created new opportunities for cooperation. The new EU-China Urbanisation
Partnership will look at developing city pairings and other mechanisms to foster
exchange of experiences and joint projects in a broad scope of sectors, from lowenergy buildings to clean mobility, from integrated water and waste treatments to
social inclusion, from sound local infrastructure to efficient public services. The
EU and China are also working together on urban air quality and road safety.
Frustrating dialogue on human rights
Although it allows the EU to voice concerns on specific issues in both public
and private, the twice-a-year EU-China dialogue on human rights remains a
frustrating exercise for EU policymakers. However, EU officials say that a visit to
China by Stavros Lambrinidis, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights
in September 2013 has opened a new high-level channel of communication with
China and identified new areas for cooperation.
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
Practical and pragmatic
The vast and evolving agenda of EU-China cooperation is impressive, emphasising
as it does the many areas where the two sides can and should work together to
meet key aspects of the Chinese Dream and also help implement key reforms
identified by the Third Plenum. China and the EU will continue to have different
expectations of their strategic partnership. It is therefore salutary that the focus
has shifted to practical and pragmatic cooperation which zeroes in on common
interests and sidesteps chronic discord on diverging values.
In order to avoid a further proliferation of sectoral dialogues, however, Europe
and China need to improve the quality of their discussions by setting clearer
objectives and establishing a timetable for results. China and the EU must also
interact more actively and regularly in regional and global fora, including the UN,
WTO, G20 and ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) and seek to break out of current
“north-south”, “east-west” and other “boxes” to work with each other on global
challenges.
The EU and China have also much to discuss on prospects for peace and
development in Afghanistan post-2014. China can benefit from a sharing of
expertise and best practices on development cooperation, on ways of protecting
citizens abroad and disaster management.
Conclusion
The last ten years illustrate just how far both sides - and EU-China relations have come. Although the talk in 2003 was of launching a strategic partnership,
the EU-China relationship was still largely based on trade, with the EU seeking
to turn China into a “responsible stakeholder” and “an open society based on
the rule of law”. Today, as China’s leaders stride confidently across the globe,
their every word making newspaper headlines, China’s rise is more visible, its
friendship and money much more sought after. China may still be willing to learn
from Europe’s vast experience in tackling economic and social challenges, but
there is no question of Europeans being able to mold and shape China’s future.
In fact, as it struggles to emerge from years of economic slowdown, austerity
and high unemployment, the EU needs to convince China – and many others in
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Asia – that it is still a potent, credible and significant global player. Interestingly,
despite recent turbulence in ties, China still holds the EU in good stead and sees
Europe as an important partner in realising many facets of the Chinese Dream
and the new reform programme.
The future development of ties will depend on domestic developments in China
and the EU, especially both sides’ ability to tackle crucial growth and development
challenges. The future course of China-US relations and the EU’s ties with the US,
especially the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), will undoubtedly influence how Brussels and Beijing deal with each other.
The EU will keep a close watch on China’s relations with its neighbours and
attitudes towards easing tensions with Japan and the Philippines while China will
remain wary of possible EU intervention in Syria and other possible humanitarian
adventures.
Despite their many differences, in an interdependent and inter-connected world,
China and the EU share many interests. For both, internal stability will hinge on an
ability to maintain growth, create jobs and ensure a better life for citizens. At the
same, global challenges in the shape of access to resources, climate change,
cyber security and maritime piracy, will draw China and the EU together. As such,
they have no option but to accept the compromises and the inevitable give-andtake needed in a 21st Century partnership.
Moving forward
China and the EU need to build trust and confidence by:
•
Stronger cooperation to ensure green growth and sustainable development
•
Fully implementing all facets of the partnership on urbanisation
•
Completing negotiations on a first-ever bilateral investment treaty as a test for a
future free trade agreement
•
Engaging in enhanced dialogue on global governance and the delivery of global
public goods
•
Working together to realise aspects of the “Chinese Dream” and economic reform
agenda of the Third Plenum
•
Ensuring that friction and disputes over trade do not affect broader ties
•
Keeping the eye on bigger common challenges of peace, stability and prosperity
despite diverging values
EU-China: The next ten years | Policy Briefing
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15th 2013] available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/12/chinas-foreign-policydebates/
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16th 2013] available at: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-11/02/content_30479134.
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16th 2013] available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/strengtheningthe-china-eu-strategic-partnership-by-yiwei-wang
Zongze, Ruan (2013) Winning the Next Decade: China's Multi-pivot Diplomacy
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english/2013-09/04/content_6272955_2.htm
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at: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-01/07/content_27611165_2.htm
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IV.
guest
contributions
Friends of Europe publishes guest contributions from
outside experts on key challenges in international affairs.
As part of the EU-China Policy and Practice Partnership,
the selected group of experts from Europe and China weigh
in to provide a variety of perspectives on the future of EUChina relations.
This chapter includes a selection of the guest contributions
published by the renowned academics and think tank
representatives that took part in the inaugural roundtable.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
THINK SMALL: HOW TO IMPROVE CHINA-EU
SECURITY COOPERATION
Moving the EU-China security relationship on requires a “think small” approach,
writes Oliver Bräuner, who argues that both sides need to be realistic about what
they can achieve and focus on rather specific and technical issues that are both
feasible and mutually beneficial.
Oliver Bräuner
Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), Sweden
From a European perspective, a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ should
also include cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security issues.
However, more than ten years after the establishment of the ‘comprehensive
strategic partnership’ between China and the European Union (EU), cooperation
on global security issues remains underdeveloped and both sides have a poor
record of joining their diplomatic forces to tackle for instance the on-going
conflict in Syria or the Iranian nuclear issue. Military cooperation remains even
more limited and so far does not go beyond some cautious exchanges within
the United Nations (UN) framework, such as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden or peacekeeping missions in Africa. This stands in stark contrast to the
economic relationship between the two sides, which continues to deepen even
in times of a global economic crisis.
Insurmountable obstacles?
Although both sides have repeatedly stated their willingness to deepen their
cooperation on global security issues and to intensify the ties between their
militaries, prospects appear rather bleak for the near- and medium-term.
There are a number of obstacles that have proven to be insurmountable in
the past ten years and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
The first is the very structure of the EU. Despite the establishment of the
European External Action Service (EEAS) and other reforms of the EU Common
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) introduced through the Lisbon Treaty in
2009, the EU remains a supranational entity. Its 28 member states often
have diverging interests and thus continue to struggle with the formulation
of joint positions on many global security issues. In addition, the EU still
does not have a joint military structure independent of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and defence spending in the region has stagnated or
been reduced as a result of austerity measures related to the Eurozone crisis.
As the EU also does not have any direct security interests or military assets
in the Asia-Pacific region, China does not take it seriously as an independent
global security actor.
The second obstacle is China security agenda. The EU and some of its (mostly
larger) member states have a broad international security agenda, with an
ambition to play an active role on almost all international issues, and a strong
emphasis on human security and non-traditional threats. Beijing, on the other
hand, pursues a much more narrow security agenda that focuses largely
on traditional threats in the Asia-Pacific region, mostly related to maritime
disputes with its neighbours. These interests are usually seen through the
lens of Beijing’s increasingly competitive relationship with Washington.
President Xi Jinping’s ‘new type of great power relations’ can be seen as
another sign of China’s fixation on the United States. China’s traditional policy
of ‘non-interference’ in the domestic affairs of other countries further limits
the potential for cooperation. Consequently, the security agendas of China
and the EU only overlap on a very limited number of issues.
The third obstacle is a continued and deep-seated lack of trust between the
two sides. China perceives the EU arms embargo as a sign of disrespect,
even though SIPRI research has documented a considerable amount of
militarily-relevant European technology transfers during the 25 years of its
existence. On the EU side, disappointment over the perceived lack of political
reforms and a deterioration of the human rights situation in China - especially
since the 2008 Beijing Olympics - is growing.
Moving beyond Pirates and Peacekeeping
While these obstacles will continue to limit China-EU security cooperation,
there are still a number of foreign and security policy goals shared by both
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
sides. However, after a decade of grand expectations and disappointments,
both sides need to be realistic about what they can achieve. Cooperation
should start on a small scale and be focused on rather specific or technical
issues that are both feasible and mutually beneficial. Exchanges between
militaries on both sides should be increased, especially through joint
education and training programmes for officers at military academies and
defence universities on both sides.
This would lead to more transparency and understanding of the other side’s
security concerns. China and the EU could deepen cooperation (or at least
coordination) on the protection of citizens abroad, and particularly on noncombatant evacuation operations from war zones. A number of EU member
states have already provided logistical support for the Chinese evacuation
operation from Libya in 2011. In this context, the EU should actively support
exchanges between Chinese and European energy companies on how to
best protect their employees and assets in conflict zones.
Practical cooperation in the area of arms control and disarmament should
also be intensified. These efforts could build on successful past cooperation,
for example through the EU Outreach programme, and include actors from
the state, military and industry on both sides and preferably also from third
countries. One option would be to jointly develop best practices to limit the
destabilising flow of arms to fragile conflict zones, for example in Africa and
the Middle East.
Such a ‘think small’ approach would probably go against the natural instincts
of both the Chinese and EU leaders, who usually seem to favour grandiose
and much publicised ‘strategies’ and large-scale events. It would also mean
that the EU would need to officially relinquish more tasks to its member
states. Nevertheless, it could help circumvent some seemingly immovable
obstacles and move the EU-China security relationship on after ten years of
disappointments and stagnation.
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EUROPE AND THE CHINESE DREAM
The Chinese Dream is a comprehensive and flexible concept that offers many
opportunities for strengthening cooperation between the EU and China says Cheng
Weidong.
Cheng Weidong
Deputy Director of the Institute of European Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Insurmountable obstacles?
There is no official or uniform interpretation of this concept. It provides large
space for discretionary interpretations.
Some Western scholars and journalists criticise the Chinese Dream as a concept
connoting increased nationalism and repackaged authoritarianism. I think this is
a huge misunderstanding. References to the “revival of the Chinese nation” focus
on building an independent, wealthy, civilised and respectful nation. The real
meaning of revival is to change the impression of backwardness, poverty and
other negative aspects about China, and to build a prosperous, civilised, stable,
democratic and modern China.
The Chinese Dream is a comprehensive and flexible concept. It not only refers
to the aspirations of China, but also the hopes of the Chinese people; it not only
reflects the aspirations and hopes themselves, but also the gaps between the
dreams and reality. It plays multiple roles.
Fundamentally, the Chinese Dream focuses on domestic concerns, however the
process of chasing the dream will inevitably be connected with the outside world.
China will need help from the outside world, and likewise also have some impact
on the outside world.
The European Union (EU) is one of China’s important strategic partners. The
Chinese dream can and will play an important role in future EU-China relations.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
What does the Chinese dream mean for China-EU
relations?
The Chinese Dream opens a window for Europeans to know and to understand
China and the Chinese people, which will contribute a great deal to reducing
misunderstandings between the two sides. It can and will offer many opportunities
for bilateral cooperation between China and the EU. To fulfill the Chinese Dream,
comprehensive reforms are necessary. Reform means opportunities, especially
in economic and social areas.
At the same time, the Chinese Dream can also provide an opportunity for the EU
and China to compare the dreams of both sides and offer a kind of possibility to
figure out a common dream.
As one of China’s major strategic partners which has many advantages in terms
of advanced technology, good governance, high quality products, excellent
experiences, innovations, etc, the EU can play an important role in the process
of Chinese people’s pursuing their dreams, especially in following aspects:
1.To further bilateral cooperation in economic area.
2.To cooperate in developing and transferring new technology
which is of great significance in coping with urgent and complex
problems, such as new energy, environment and climate change
issues, etc.
3.To share European experiences and skills in the field of
urbanisation.
4.To support China in respect of anti-terrorism and maintaining
China’s national security and stability.
How to compare EU-China relations and EU-US
relations?
From the perspective of political relations, there are no substantial conflicts
or disparities in terms of geopolitical interests within EU-China relations and
EU-US relations. Political cooperation is an important component both in
EU-China relations and EU-US relations. But EU-China political cooperation
is basically limited to low politics, such as non-traditional security issues and
global governance. In high political areas, the EU and the US have kept closer
cooperation.
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The EU shares more common values with the US than with China, although there
are also some disparities between the EU and the US.
From the perspective of sector cooperation, the EU-US bilateral cooperation
lays more emphasis on the formation of international market regulations and
technical standards, research and innovation cooperation in new emerging high
technological industries and harmonisation in trade and raw material supply
against the third country. EU-China cooperation emphasises the settlement
of disputes in the economic and trade sector, and governance cooperation in
traditional domains such as agriculture, environment and energy.
From the perspective of economic relations, the EU and China as well as the
EU and the US are all significant mutual trade partners. But compared with the
investment flows between the EU and the US, the investment flow between the
EU and China is very limited. Even in the trade field, despite the vast growth
in trade volume, there are more imbalances between EU-China trade, such as
imbalance in product structure, trade deficit, etc.
From the perspective of science and technology cooperation, the cooperation
between the EU and the US is much closer than the one between the EU and
China.
Generally speaking, the EU and the US have developed a comprehensive
and inter-dependent strategic cooperation, not only in the traditional security
area, but also in the fields of other politics, economy, culture, and science and
technology. It is a reality that the meaning and substance of “strategic partner”
between the EU and China and between the EU and US is a little different. But
this difference also means a great space for China and the EU to further develop
their relations in the future.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
CHINA AND THE EU IN AFRICA: TIME FOR A
TRILATERAL DIALOGUE
The EU and China can contribute to the stability of African countries and to
strengthening African crisis-management capabilities. More can be done to
strengthen trilateral cooperation writes Niall Duggan.
Niall Duggan
Acting-Chair in Modern Chinese Society and Economy,
Centre for Modern East Asian Studies, Göttingen University,
Seminar für Politikwissenschaft
Europe and China have strong strategic interests in Africa. However, the actions
of one can often be counterproductive as regards the actions of the other. This
often has negative repercussions for the continent. Both the EU and China have
issued respective policies on Africa, outlining how they intend to operate in Africa,
their political and economic interests, as well as the role they intend to play in
the development of the region. There are numerous differences in the policies
of each actor, most notably in terms of how to deal with states that have poor
human rights records or a history of misusing funds intended for development
projects. A number of similarities can be found between the two policies, such
as their commitment to combat terrorism and organised crime. In 2008, the
Council of Europe publicised a number of conclusions on the “The EU, Africa
and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation”. The Council highlighted
that it would be advantageous to coordinate the EU’s and China’s efforts more
closely around priorities that reflect Africa’s needs, adding that such a dialogue
would strengthen bilateral partnerships with both China and Africa. There were
suggestions that cooperation should be developed by initiatives in the sectors
of peace, security, and sustainable economic and social development in Africa.
The desirability of a common approach to improving the effectiveness of official
development assistance and preventing crises over indebtedness was also
underlined.
However, little progress has been made on the EU’s proposed trilateral dialogue
and cooperation. Some cooperation has taken place in the area of security – but
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more can be done. The EU and China can contribute to the stability of African
countries and to strengthening African crisis-management capabilities. The EU
has been a major player in the area of security in Africa since African nations
gained their independence. The EU brings the most experience and technological
know-how to peace and security projects. China’s growing role in United Nations
peacekeeping projects in Africa, as well as its increased influence on isolated
nations, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, means that it could contribute strongly
to any peace and security programme. It would seem that cooperation between
these two actors with the oversight of the African Union, the third actor in the
trilateral cooperation, would be the most effective form of collaboration. It would
also create a platform for other projects, which could be developed under the
EU-China Strategic Partnership.
However, the major barrier to this cooperation would be the EU arms embargo
on China. It is difficult to see how China would agree to cooperate with the EU
in the area of peace and security when the EU is unwilling to trust China as a
responsible partner in other areas of global peace and security. Any joint project
in the area of security will require leadership from the African Union. This may
challenge the current Africa policy of both China and the EU.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
EU-CHINA: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN THE
MAKING
The EU-China bilateral relationship is in need of a sober assessment writes Mario
Esteban, who argues that cooperation between Brussels and Beijing could benefit
greatly from a practical strategy focused on realistic and specific goals.
Mario Esteban Rodriguez
Senior Analyst (Asia-Pacific) at Real Instituto Elcano (RIE)
and Professor of Chinese Studies at the Autonomous
University of Madrid, Spain.
The European Union (EU) and China established a strategic partnership a decade
ago. Both entered the partnership with over-expectations of being able to align
their interests on many conflicting issues such as international intervention,
human rights, market access, and weapons transfers. Those misperceptions
fostered disappointment on both sides. One of the main lessons that can be
learned from this experience is the need for a sober assessment of this bilateral
relationship, which could be more accurately depicted as a strategic partnership
in the making.
Besides many difficulties, EU-China relations are still of great importance for both
sides. However, their relevance is decreasing for China, due to the relative decline
of Europe vis-à-vis other regions and its descending economic dependence
on Europe, whereas it is increasing for the EU, particularly since the Eurozone
crisis. Thanks to its growing economic muscle, Beijing has become a major
international actor with a key role in many of the most pressing international
issues that Europe faces. If Europe wants to reverse the weakening Chinese
interest in Europe, the EU needs to increase its international profile through the
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This might be
the only course for the member states to deal effectively with China.
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Not an easy partnership
In contrast to developments in the 20th Century, Europe is now forced to
work with China - and this is not always an easy task. Although both sides
agree on promoting a peaceful and stable international order conducive to
economic development, they tend to differ on how to do so. For instance
the EU prefers multilateralism, strong international regimes, a conditional
conception of sovereignty, and a universalist approach to human rights. In
contrast, Beijing tends to favor bilateralism and weak international institutions,
sometimes resorting to multilateralism and international law for soft balancing
a stronger rival. China also promotes the absolute notion of sovereignty and
a relativist view of human rights.
Despite these divergences, European countries and China are cooperating
fruitfully to ease tensions in some global flash points such as Iran, the Gulf
of Aden, and Mali. Enhancing mutual trust through confidence-building
measures is central to facilitate these kinds of joint efforts, which are hindered
by popular and misleading ideas such as China wants a divided and debilitated
Europe or that the EU aims to contain China economically.
Bilateral collaboration between Brussels and Beijing could also benefit greatly
from a practical strategy, which would focus on realistic and specific goals.
The reforms advanced at the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee
provide a positive climate to implement this approach through cooperation
in fields such as urbanization, social services, environmental protection, and
intellectual property rights. If China carries out this new round of significant
reforms, the prospects for a successful conclusion of a bilateral EU-China
investment agreement and/or a partnership and cooperation agreement
would soar dramatically. The impact of these eventual advances could be felt
beyond the economic pillar of the EU-China relationship, enabling both sides
to discuss more sensitive political and security issues.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
Can China and Europe reshape
relations?
China and the EU are in a position to take their relationship to a higher level. Building
mutual trust and narrowing the perception gap would be critical to deal with the
challenges and tensions that may arise says Ji Ling.
Jin Ling
Associate Research Fellow at the China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS)
Over the last ten years, relations between China and the European Union (EU)
have deepened and expanded to become multi-dimensional, multi-level and
wide-ranging. Both sides are now in a position to take the relations to a higher
level, a move that will benefit both China and Europe but also the rest of the
world.
Last year was marked by strong and dynamic China-EU interaction. The Summit
in Beijing in November laid out a strategic and long-term pragmatic vision for
the coming years, covering traditional areas such as trade, investment and
industry but also underlining the importance of cooperation in peace, security
and sustainable development. Significantly, this gives the China-EU relationship
a global dimension.
China and the EU also need to take advantage of each other’s reform agendas,
further deepen and broaden mutual cooperation and enrich the list of their
common interests. China’s economic reform agenda, for example, provides more
opportunities for EU enterprises doing business in China while the EU job and
growth agenda provides useful information and experience for China’s reform
and development. But whether these opportunities are taken up depends on
how both sides perceive and deal with possible challenges and tensions which
are the normal result of increased cooperation.
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Given the changing domestic, regional and global contexts, China and the
EU have yet to bridge a wide misunderstanding and misperception gap and
build deep mutual trust. China is still worried about the EU’s “ideology-based”
discrimination, signs of increased protectionist trends and possible EU-US joint
actions to contain China. The EU, for its part, has worries and concerns about
increased competition from China, the possible deviation of China’s peaceful
rise and development and the implementation of the reform agenda. In addition,
the EU is uneasy about China’s “divide and rule” tactics as regards EU member
states.
Narrowing the perception gap and building mutual trust requires not only a topdown approach but also one that is bottom-up. The leaders of the two sides
should take every opportunity to show their interest in building close ties and show
confidence in each other’s development paths. People-to-people exchanges are
also the basis for a sustainable and long-term relationship which requires both
sides to further explore effective ways for bilateral exchange. At the same time,
healthy economic cooperation will remain the anchor of bilateral cooperation.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
EU-CHINA PARTNERSHIP: LESS STRATEGIC,
BUT STRONGER
EU-China relations need a less strategic, but stronger partnership says Mikael
Mattlin, arguing that both sides should pursue deeper cooperation in a pragmatic,
trial-and-error manner.
Mikael Mattlin
Researcher at the Global Security Research Programme at
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Finland
Two major structural changes have impacted on the EU-China strategic
partnership.
The first concerns the wider global security context. The EU-China strategic
partnership was born at a time when Javier Solana’s first European Security
Strategy called for developing strategic partnerships with major countries. At
the time, the EU seemed to be developing into a genuinely global, foreign and
security policy actor, which fit well with China’s impetus on multi-polarity.
In the context of the Iraq War, given the strong criticism that the conflict aroused
in Europe, the EU may have seemed - from Beijing’s vantage-point - a suitable
counterweight to American unilateralism. China’s remarkable economic rise
and increased political and military clout at a time that the EU has lost external
influence in the aftermath of the European debt crisis, has profoundly changed
this picture. Today, China does not regard the EU as a major, independent global
security player, and there are doubts about this within the EU itself.
The second major change concerns the fast-closing knowledge and skills gap
between Europe and China. Economic complementarity, that used to be a major
driver of EU–China trade relations, is much less clear than before. Instead, we
see more direct competition between European and Chinese industries, from ICT
to renewable energy. Unavoidably, that also brings with it more trade disputes.
In short, some of the basic premises of the strategic partnership have altered.
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Raised expectations
One of the basic problems with the strategic partnership lies in the very term
itself. Deeper institutionalised cooperation started off from the wrong end,
with grandiose talk and visions that the two sides ultimately failed to live up to.
Infatuation with the words “strategic” and “strategy” is often counterproductive,
as it raises expectations and gives the wrong impression about what the
relationship is about. In addition, in a world where will soon be more strategic
partnerships than countries, the adjective becomes utterly void and meaningless.
What EU-China relations need are a less strategic, but stronger partnership. A
more sustainable way to build the relationship could be to take a page from
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s book, and pursue a mozhe shitou guo he
(cross the river by feeling the stones) approach, i.e. pursue deeper cooperation
in a pragmatic, trial-and-error manner. This implies changing emphasis from a
top-down to a bottom-up approach.
Building trust
If EU–China relations are plagued by a trust gap, as is often claimed, then why
not build trust the way it works in social relations: through dense interaction that
increases mutual understanding and a sense of reliability? Although the “highlevel people-to-people dialogue” launched last year is a bit of a contradiction
in terms, the substantive content is the correct direction. Student exchange
programmes, similar to the Erasmus, have long-term constitutive value.
A second ground for building stronger relations is mutual respect for each other’s
value-community. This is seemingly obvious. However, in practice it has been
a hard nut to crack in EU–China relations. In earlier years, the relationship was
afflicted by European criticism of various aspects of China’s human rights record.
Recently, both individual EU member states and the EU have become more timid
and circumspect in their criticism (the media is another story). Simultaneously,
many Chinese observers have become more openly critical, even dismissive,
of the EU and European values. The rhetorical balance clearly shifted sometime
around 2008–10, following the Beijing Olympics and the beginning of the debt
crisis.
The EU never got very far by openly criticising China’s value-community. China
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
will discover the same, as the EU’s normative nature is ingrained in the very
fabric of what the Union is about. Making virtue out of necessity, perhaps the
EU and China could explore something similar to what has worked reasonably
well across the Taiwan Strait in recent years? In other words, observe a tacit
“diplomatic truce” on value-related issues, including not trying to undermine the
other side’s hard-won integration achievements.
China’s so-called 16 + 1 initiative of institutionalising cooperation with a subset of
Eastern and Central European EU members as well as some non-members is a
case in point. If the underlying motivation behind this initiative is to try to remold
Europe in China’s image, then this is not a very smart strategy in the context of
building stronger EU–China relations. Trust takes long to build, but is easy to
lose.
Lopsided economic relations
The centre of gravity in EU–China relations still lies in economic relations, with
a heavy focus on trade – and this leads to a certain degree of lopsidedness.
Similarly, some EU countries’ companies have invested a great deal in China,
while their home countries have received only a trickle of investment in return. It is
often claimed by true believers in trade globalisation that transnational networks
of production ultimately benefit all. This is a somewhat naïve view. While it is
certainly true that the imbalance in EU–China trade patterns are partly due to
European companies exporting to the EU from China, this is not the whole picture
In an age when capital moves far more freely and rapidly than labour, it is more
relevant than ever to ask the old question: is what is good for GM also good
for America? If EU-China business integration leaves behind too many closed
factories, downsized R&D centers, unemployment, trade deficits and diminished
tax receipts in Europe, then it will be an uphill struggle to convince the average
EU citizen that it is beneficial to everyone.
With the launch of negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty that will include
also market access issues, and the recently unveiled reform goals of the CPC
Central Committee’s Third Plenum, there is hope that EU–China commercial
relations can be rebalanced through more mutual direct investment and more
access for EU companies to the Chinese service sector, where Europe still
holds undeniable competitive strengths in financial services and various cultural
products.
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The reality of EU-China relations
The EU and China are partners in need and partners indeed. There is a large potential
for both sides to share experiences and forge cooperation writes Men Jing.
Men Jing
Professor of European Union-China relations, EU
International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department,
College of Europe
Despite the fact that the European Union (EU) and China are ‘strategic partners’,
neither the EU nor China regards the other as the most important partner on
their foreign policy agenda. For the EU, aside from its focus on transatlantic
relations, relations with neighbouring countries from Africa to Asia are no less
important. Noticeably, China’s position in the EU’s foreign policy agenda has
been increasing in recent years. On the one hand, the EU approves of China’s
continued reforms and increased economic ‘opening up’, and is eager to see
the cooperation with China steadily broadened and deepened, both bilaterally
and multilaterally. On the other hand, China’s rise presents a global challenge.
The fact that China, the country with the largest population in the world, can
maintain an impressive GDP growth rate for more than three decades strongly
challenges the claim that the end of the Cold War signalled the ‘end of history’.
Its reform experience demonstrates that there is an alternative way of achieving
development and growth. Such a growth model is not necessarily in line with the
objectives of the EU’s China policy.
China’s current foreign policy attaches great importance to big power relations,
as Beijing actively promotes a multipolar structure in the world. Among the big
powers, the US, for good or bad, always remains China’s number one concern.
Russia, as an influential neighbour and a member of the UN Security Council,
is more important to China when it comes to strategic and security issues.
The EU, as a regional organisation of 28 Member States, is often divided in its
policymaking, and, thus, cannot live up to China’s expectations to counterbalance
the US. Therefore, the EU is always overshadowed by the US or Russia in China’s
foreign policy agenda.
The only time that the EU was given considerable attention by China was in 2003
and 2004, when the strategic partnership was established by the two sides. Yet,
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
the EU’s failure to lift the arms embargo as well as its readjusted transatlantic
policy after 2003 obliged the Chinese leadership to re-evaluate the role of the
EU in China’s strategic design. In recent years, as China focuses more on its
neighbourhood relations and its relations with the developing world, the EU can
be said to be, at best, ranked second in terms of China’s diplomacy.
Admittedly, while neither the EU nor China treats the other as the most important
partner in the international arena, they have forged close cooperation on a
wide range of issues. Yet, a look at the three pillar dialogue between the EU
and China reveals that the first pillar, the political dialogue, and the third, the
people-to-people dialogue, are much less developed compared to the second
one, the economic and sectoral dialogue. In other words, trade and economic
cooperation serve as the cornerstone in bilateral relations. Without trade and
economic cooperation, EU-China relations are rather limited. Therefore, the
nature of EU-China relations is ‘doing business’. Based on the principle of
mutual benefit, Brussels and Beijing should explore possibilities for increased
cooperation, not only focusing on economics and trade, but gradually extending
to politics and public diplomacy.
Since the EU and China are ‘business’ partners, cooperation and competition
coexist. Apart from rapidly growing trade volume and bilateral investment, the
‘bra wars’ in 2005, in which the dramatically increased trade inflows from China
destroyed the textile trade balance between the EU and its importers, typified
the problem of unequally distributed benefit in business relations. The many EU
anti-dumping cases against Chinese imports can be regarded as a warning from
Brussels against the rising deficit in its trade relations with China. In recent years,
‘reciprocity’ becomes the key word in EU’s economic and trade relations with
China. In the EU-China investment agreement negotiations, the EU is expected
to apply this principle of reciprocity with its Chinese counterpart in order to secure
a more open market from China.
Nevertheless, the EU and China are both partners in need and partners indeed.
They have jointly adopted the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda, the document
out of the most recent bilateral Summit in last November. From energy security
to sustainable development, from climate change to environmental protection,
from urbanisation to agricultural modernisation, from information technology to
cyber security, the EU and China have a large potential to share experience and
to forge cooperation. Such cooperation is steadily increasing, both in depth and
scope, which creates good opportunities for both sides to continue to benefit
from the partnership.
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DOES CENTRAL EUROPE’S COOPERATION
WITH CHINA UNDERMINE EU POLICY?
Each EU member state, including CEE countries, pursues its own bilateral policies
towards China. The challenge for the EEAS will be to embed these into an overall EU
framework for EU-China relations.
Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar
Analyst, International Economic Relations and Global Issues
Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).
In April last year, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Poland and, apart
from talks with Polish officials, he attended a meeting with prime ministers from
16 Central and Eastern European countries – CEE16 (eleven EU and five non-EU
members). He also took part in a huge economic forum, where he addressed
proposals for reinvigorating relations with the region.
At that time, nobody could imagine that these two events would become the
springboard for two phrases: “16+1” and the “12 Measures”. At the business
forum, there were no “12 points”, only an eye-catching speech with economic
and non-economic pledges, while the Summit seemed to be an ad hoc highlevel meeting of 16 prime ministers and Wen Jiabao.
The situation changed after Wen returned to China. The Chinese Ministry of
Foreing Affairs (MFA) drew from his speech 12 pledges and packed them into
one box and called it “China’s 12 Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation
with Central and Eastern Countries”. Then, in September 2012, the Chinese
MFA held an inauguration ceremony in Beijing for the China-CEE Cooperation
Secretariat together with the first meeting of 16 coordinators. Additionally, the
China-CEE16 Summit, to be held in Bucharest on 25 November, reflects the
transformation of the ad hoc Warsaw meeting into a 16+1 regular (presumably
annual) format.
EU-China: The next ten years | Guest Contributions
After these events, some have voiced opinions that the involvement of EU
Member States from Central Europe in the new format might undermine the EU’s
wider China policy. But is there anything to be worried about? Well, let us dispel
four myths about the “16+1” and “12 Measures”:
1.The CEE16 is a united block. In fact, the CEE region, which consists of
16 states, is a Chinese idea and initiative. The People's Republic of China
(PRC) claims that those 16 states are former socialist countries with which
China has long maintained diplomatic relations. Furthermore, most of
them are EU members or have aspirations to join the EU. But obviously
the 16 states are different from one another in terms of their size, scope of
economic development, and even geographical location, plus five are not
EU members.
2.There is a common CEE16 policy towards China. It is difficult to find common
ground in terms of the CEE16’s overall relations with China. Each country is
focused on bilateral relations with the PRC and emphasises similar benefits
that China may derive through stronger relations with them alone. In this
sense, the 16 states are competitors.
3.The China–CEE16 is an institutionalised cooperation format. In fact, the
Warsaw Summit was not a 17-state forum in which all of the participants
together discussed joint projects. It was really a format for bilateral meetings
between 16 prime ministers and Wen Jiabao. Furthermore, there is no
CEE16 joint institution for cooperation with China. The Secretariat is purely
a Chinese entity inside the Chinese MFA, responsible for coordination
among Chinese institutions engaged in “12 Measures” implementation.
4.12 Measures is an attractive offer for the CEE16. The “12 Measures”
seem to be more of a political declaration than an economic programme.
Problems with implementation, especially some economic points – e.g. the
US$10 billion credit line to the group, which conditions are unfavourable to
EU members and when spread across the 16 states turns out not to be a
highly generous offer - are good examples. Bearing in mind these problems,
China probably will announce at the Bucharest Summit some new points or
modifications of the old ones.
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Allegedly, China’s involvement in the CEE is the result of its perception of the
EU as a crisis stricken entity. The economic problems on the EU’s periphery
have paved the way for China to pay more attention to the CEE. Taking into
account China’s inclination to cooperate with large counterparts, the PRC
has “created” the CEE16 region to enable that concept. Moreover, for China,
due to its long historical experience in the region, relations with former
socialist states are, to some extent, easier and less political than with the
whole EU. Perceiving these states as one entity and embarking on a common
strategy towards them is meant to facilitate China–CEE cooperation. This
format is “logistically” convenient for China. It is also a useful mechanism for
the countries in the CEE16 as it provides all of these states the chance to
meet annually with the Chinese prime minister and discuss bilateral issues.
However, the “16+1” format has raised concerns in Brussels. Nevertheless,
apart from EU China policy, which is a general framework for all 28 states,
in fact each EU member pursues its own bilateral policies towards China.
Eleven CEE EU countries with less economic and political clout than the “old”
EU members are apparently eager to use China’s rising interest in the region
to emulate, to some extent, the old members’ policies towards the PRC.
The China–CEE16 format seems to be a good venue for that. In this sense,
the CEE EU members’ bilateral relations with China do not differ from the
approaches taken by the other, “old” EU states towards Beijing.
Both “old” and “new” EU members’ bilateral relations with the PRC pose a
challenge for the EEAS, though. Its inevitably tough task will be to embed
these bilateral approaches into an overall EU framework for EU–China
relations.
Sanja Vasic, Belgrade, Chamber of Commerce and
Jin Ling, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
Li Tie, China Centre for Urban Development of the National,
Zhang Yuanyuan, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Giles Merritt, Friends of Europe
Francis Snyder, Peking University School of Transnational
Law and Joe Zou, Huawei
From left to right: Cheng Weidong, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Ingrid d' Hooghe,
Clingendael, Shada Islam, Friends of Europe,Herman Van Rompuy, European Council, Patricia Diaz,
Friends of Europe and Ji Rong, Mission of the People's Republic of China to the EU
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
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ANNEX I – List of participants
Paal Aavatsmark, Counsellor, Foreign Policy,
Mission of Norway to the EU
Paula Abreu Marques, Head of Unit Responsible
for EU-China Cooperation, European Commission,
Directorate General for Energy
João Aguiar Machado, Deputy Director General,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Trade
Victor Angelo, International Affairs, Strategist &
Columnist, Visao Magazine
Danijlel Apostolovic, First Secretary, Mission of
Serbia to the EU
Oana-Andreea Arsanu, Assistant, European
External Action Service (EEAS)
Marika Armanovica, Administrator (China, Burma,
Trade, ASEAN), European Parliament, Directorate
General for External Policies
Ailara Astanakulova, Masters Student, University of
Antwerp Management School (UAMS)
Thomas Avenati, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Jan Bakkes, Senior Project Leader, Global and
European Outlooks, Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency
Pedro Ballesteros Torres, Principal Administrator,
International Relations and Enlargement, European
Commission, Directorate General for Energy
Nicole Baromska-Glab, Assistant, European
Commission, Legal Service
Leanda Barrington, Senior Adviser, Cambre
Associates
Benjamin Barth, Team Member, Centre for
European Studies (CES)
Sudeshna Basu, EU Public Affairs Manager, Huawei
Technologies
Raphaël Beaufret, European Affairs Advisor, Sanofi
Louis Bellemin, Advisor to the President, National
Authority for Scientific Research (ANCS)
Vijay Bhardwaj, Head of Unit for External Relations,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Budget
Alison Birkett, International Relations China, Japan,
Korea, European Commission, Directorate General
for Communications Networks, Content and
Technology
Helene Blondel, Translation & Sinology, BelgianChinese Chamber of Commerce (BCECC)
Else Boonstra, Administrator for China, Japan,
India & EIDHR, European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC)
Pierre Borgoltz, Coordinator, Cooperation Central
Asia, European External Action Service (EEAS)
Vito Borrelli, China Desk, European Commission,
Directorate General for Education and Culture
Oliver Brauner, Researcher for the China
and Global Security Programme, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Giovanni Bravo Vanegas, Counsellor, Mission of
Mexico to the EU
Guido Broekhoven, China - Africa Programme
Manager, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
European Policy Office
Reinhard Bütikofer MEP, Member, European
Parliament, Committee on Industry, Research and
Energy
Lisa Buzenas, Political Officer, EU relations with
Central, South and East Asia, Mission of the United
States of America to the EU
Eric Callens, Xinhua News Agency European
Regional Bureau
Fraser Cameron, Director, EU-Asia Centre
Geert Cami, Co-Founder & Director, Friends of
Europe Les Amis de l'Europe
Alessandro Carano, Managerial Adviser, Head of
Unit, Institutional and Operational Policies Outside
the EU, European Investment Bank (EIB)
Yaou Chen, Counsellor, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Cheng Weidong, Deputy Director of the Institute
of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), Institute of European Studies
Alice Choi, Deputy Representative, Hong Kong
Economic and Trade Office
Xavier Coget, Policy Co-ordinator, China, European
Commission, Directorate General for Trade
Susanne Connolly, Media Relations and Outreach
Officer, Mission of Canada to the EU
Pierre-Valentin Costa, Liaison Officer, EU
Correspondent, Inter Euro Media
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João Da Graça Santos, Officer, Market Access,
Industry, Energy and Raw Materials, European
Commission, Directorate General for Trade
Vincenzo De Benedictis, European External Action
Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff
(EUMS)
Eva De Bleeker, Policy Officer, European
Commission, Directorate General for Trade
Nicolas de Gennes, Campaign Strategy Advisor,
Mostra Communications, Media Relations
Department
Marjolein de Ridder, Strategic Policy Analyst, The
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
Thierry de Wilde, Conseiller affaires intérieures,
Permanent Representation of France to the EU
Dennis Debosschere, Student, University of
Antwerp Management School (UAMS)
Jean Christophe Defraigne, Lecturer, University of
St Louis
Uyanga Delger, Independent Legal Expert
Christopher Dent, Professor in East Asia's
International Political Economy, University of Leeds,
Department of East Asia Studies, and White Rose
East Asia Centre (WREAC)
Filip Deraedt, Policy Officer, Trade Relations with
China, European Commission, Directorate General
for Trade
Bart Dessein, Professor Chinese Studies, Gent
University, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences
Ingrid d'Hooghe, Senior Research Associate,
Netherlands Institute of International Relations
(Clingendael)
Patricia Diaz, Programme Manager, Friends of
Europe Les Amis de l'Europe
Verena Diesch, Assistant, Representation of
Baden-Württemberg to the EU
Dan Dinuta, Head of Section, Trade Policy, TPC
Comity, EFTA, The Stability Pact (trade aspects),
OCDE, Permanent Representation of Romania to
the EU
Utku Dogan, Assistant, Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TÜSIAD)
Niall Duggan, Acting-Chair in Modern Chinese
Society and Economy, Centre for Modern East
Asian Studies, Göttingen University, Seminar für
Politikwissenschaft
Friends of Europe | Global Europe
Peter Durajka, COASI Delegate, Permanent
Representation of the Slovak Republic to the EU
Ben Eckman, Second Secretary & NATO Political
Liaison, Mission of New Zealand to the EU
Julia Ewert, Research Fellow, EU-Asia Centre
Fan Ying, Director of the Department of Development
and Plan China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU)
John Farnell, Independent Researcher on EUChina relations and former visiting fellow at Oxford
University
David Fernandez Lacueva, Agent, COEXPRO
Afonso Ferreira, Policy Officer, European
Commission, Directorate General for
Communications Networks, Content and
Technology
Pierrick Fillon-Ashida, Policy Officer, International
Dimension of the Framework Programme,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Research and Innovation
Fu Jing, EU Bureau Chief, China Daily
Fu Qian, Journalist, China Youth Daily
Tetsuro Fukunaga, Executive Director, Japan
Machinery Centre for Trade & Investment (JMC)
Nathalie Furrer, Director, Friends of Europe Les
Amis de l'Europe
Bart Gaens, Programme Director (Acting), Global
Security, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
(UPI)
Kurt Gaissert, Adviser, Representation of BadenWürttemberg to the EU
Alessandro Gallo, Student, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(VUB)
Chun Gan, Journalist, Xinhua News Agency
European Regional Bureau
Anurag Goel, Counsellor, Mission of India to the EU
Adam Gono, Assistant to the Secretary General,
European Liberal Youth (LYMEC)
Andrej Grebenc, Advisor, European Commission,
Research Executive Agency (REA)
Thomas Grusemann, Corporate Group
Representative, TÜV Rheinland
Gu Ziruo, Third Secretary, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Cem Gündüz, Counsellor, Mission of Turkey to the
EU
Claudia Gutiérrez, Asia Pacific Analyst, Instituto
Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE)
Artur Habant, Counsellor, Permanent
Representation of Poland to the EU
Guo Haiyan, Counsellor, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Marjut Hannonen, Member of Cabinet, European
Commission, Cabinet of EU Commissioner for Trade
Karel de Gucht
Freja Hansen, Assistant, Representation of North
Denmark to the EU
Alisa Herrero Cangas, Policy Officer, EU External
Action Programme, European Centre for
Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Joelle Hivonnet, Senior Policy Officer, European
External Action Service (EEAS)
Jonathan Holslag, Research fellow, Brussels Institute
of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS)
Xiaobing Hong, Second Secretary, Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the EU
Jan Hoogmartens, China Desk Manager, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Belgium
Hu Hongbo, First Secretary, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Shada Islam, Director of Policy, Friends of Europe
Les Amis de l'Europe
Bent Jepsen, Coordinator, Astralie Geie
Ji Rong, Deputy Director, Press and
Communication Department, Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the EU
Jia Liuwei, Attaché, Mission of the People's Republic
of China to the EU
Jiang Xiaoyan, Counsellor, Press &
Communications, Mission of the People's Republic
of China to the EU
Jiang Wenzhu, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Jin Ling, Associate Research Fellow, China Institute
of International Studies (CIIS)
Jin Biaorong, Chief Correspondent, China Radio
International (CRI)
125
Adam Jirousek, Official, Antitrust - Pharma
and Health Services, European Commission,
Directorate General for Competition
Jan Jonckheere, Editor, Chinasquare.be
Daniel H. Jordan, Managing Director, Touchroad
International Holdings Group
Cora Francisca Jungbluth, Project Manager,
Programme Germany and Asia, Bertelsmann
Stiftung
Siti Arfah Kamaruzaman, Counsellor, Economic
Affairs, Mission of Malaysia to the EU
Violeta Kasapian, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Michael Keymolen, Head of Unit, IT Resources and
Document Management, European External Action
Service (EEAS)
Johan Knoppers, Deputy Head of Unit, Relations
with other EU Institutions and agricultural NGO's,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Agriculture and Rural Development
Philip Koch, Desk Officer, Hamburg Chamber of
Commerce
Christian Krökel, Parliamentary Assistant, European
Parliament
Michal Krol, Research Associate, European Centre
for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Bartczak Krzysztof, Counsellor on EU Foreign
Policy and External Action, Permanent
Representation of Poland to the EU
Tilmann Kupfer, Vice President, Trade &
International Affairs, BT Group
Anna-Elisabeth Larsen, Assistant, Danish Dairy
Board
Bernice Lee, Research, Director for Energy,
Environment and Resource Governance, Chatham
House, Royal Institute of International Affairs
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Director, European Centre for
International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Margot Lenoir, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Christopher Lewis, Journalist, EIR Nachrichten
Agentur
Danning Li, Europe-China Program Coordinator,
The Nature Conservancy
126
Jianmin Li, Minister Counsellor, Education and
Culture, Mission of the People's Republic of China
to the EU
Li Xiaofei, Assistant, China Daily
Liu Lifang, Third Secretary, Economic &
Commercial, Mission of the People's Republic of
China to the EU
Ge Liu, Correspondent, People's Daily European
Center
Qin Liu, Journalist, China Central Television (CCTV)
André Loesekrug-Pietri, Chairman & Managing
Partner, A CAPITAL
Fabrizio Lucentini, First Counsellor, Trade Policy,
Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU
Ma Shaoxuan, First Secretary, Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the EU
Ma Zhengang, Vice Chairman, China Public
Diplomacy Association (CPDA)
Nick Mabey, Chief Executive, Third Generation
Environmentalism (E3G)
Lars Jorgen Magnusson, Principal Admnistrator,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Budget
Felix Mallin, Research & Executive Assistant,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German
Institute for International and Security Affairs
Hubert Mandery, Director General, European
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC)
Cristina Marcuzzo, Research Programme Officer,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Research and Innovation
Zoltán Martinusz, Director, Enlargement, Security,
Civil Protection, FAC support, Council of the
European Union
Françoise Masson, Manager, The Belgian
Economic Journal
Martin Matas, European Commission
Mikael Mattlin, Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of
International Affairs (UPI)
Tamas Matura, Research Fellow, École supérieure
des sciences commerciales d'Angers Centre for
European Integration
Men Jing, InBev-Baillet Latour Professor of
European Union - China Relations, EU International
Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department,
College of Europe
Friends of Europe | Global Europe
Giles Merritt, Secretary General, Friends of Europe
Les Amis de l'Europe
Vincent Metten, EU Policy Director, International
Campaign for Tibet
Ning Mi, Policy Officer, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Xiaojuan Miao, Correspondent, Xinhua News
Agency European Regional Bureau
Russel Mills, Head of Brussels Office and Global
Director Energy & Climate Change Policy, Dow
Mary Minch, Former EC Official
Jessica Mitchell, Policy Analyst, European
Commission, Joint Research Centre
Andrea Mogni, Former Policy Coordinator,
European External Action Service (EEAS)
Vital Moreira MEP, Chairman, European Parliament,
Committee on International Trade
Olivier Mortet, Conseiller pour la coopération
policière, Permanent Representation of France to
the EU
Tracy Murphy, Associate Consultant, APCO
Worldwide Brussels Office
Mihai Costin Nitoi, Counsellor, Cyber Security, EU
Internal Security, Permanent Representation of
Romania to the EU
Jiro Okuyama, Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of
Japan to the EU
Veronika Orbetsova, Research and Academic
Assistant, College of Europe
David O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer, European
External Action Service (EEAS)
Felipe Palacios Sureda, Investment Affairs Manager,
European Commission, Directorate General for Trade
Katarzyna Palasz, Assistant, European
Commission, Directorate General for
Communications Networks, Content and
Technology
Javier Palmero Zurdo, Deputy Head of Unit,
International Affairs, European Commission,
Directorate General for Internal Market and
Services
Chao Pan, Third Secretary, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Wolfgang Pape, Research Fellow, Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS)
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
George Paterson, Policy Officer, Climate Finance,
European Commission, Directorate General for
Climate Action
Gisela Payeras, Director, Government Affairs
Emerging Market & Asia Pacific, GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK) Corporate & European Government Affairs
Isabelle Pernot du Breuil, China Affairs Policy
Expert, Directions Internationales Associées
Máté Pesti, Second Secretary, COASI Delegate,
Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU
Constanze Picking, Executive Director, EUChinaLink
Moritz Pieper, PhD canditate, University of Kent,
Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS)
Chow Ping, Ex-post Control Officer, European
External Action Service (EEAS)
Sylvain Plasschaert, Professor, University of
Antwerp
Vincent Ploquin, Assistant, Comité de Politique
commerciale, Permanent Representation of France
to the EU
Jean Plume, Director, Association Belge de
Services (ABS)
Jolita Pons, Desk Officer, Hong Kong, Macao,
European External Action Service (EEAS) Joint
Situation Centre
Matthew Powell, Chief Executive Officer, Primax
Lluís Prats, Acting Director, Resources and Internal
Control, European Commission, Directorate
General for Enterprise and Industry
Radostina Primova, Researcher, EU Energy
Policy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) Institute for
European Studies (IES)
Franziska Pudelko, Assistant, Representation of
Baden-Württemberg to the EU
Yi Qiu, Counsellor, Mission of the People's Republic
of China to the EU
Martijn Quinn, Member of Cabinet, Disasters,
Climate Change, Energy and Energy Security,
Environment, Research, Transport, Employment,
Industry, European Commission, Cabinet of EU
Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Kristalina
Georgieva
Camilla Randazzo, Policy Officer, European Affairs,
Servier
127
Michael Reiterer, Senior Advisor, Asia & Pacific
Department, European External Action Service
(EEAS)
Aurélien Renard, Director, Business Development &
Marketing, Gallup Europe
Kyriakos Revelas, Senior Policy Officer, European
External Action Service (EEAS), Division Maghreb
Mario Esteban Rodriguez, Asia-Pacific Researcher at
Real Instituto Elcano (RIE) and Professor of Chinese
Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid,
Spain
Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS)
Wolfgang Rudischhauser, Chair, Working Party on
Non-proliferation, European External Action Service
(EEAS)
Jarno Ryckeboer, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Gerhard Sabathil, Director North East Asia and the
Pacific, European External Action Service (EEAS)
Rahul Sahgal, Attaché d'Ambassade, Mission of
Switzerland to the EU
Serkan Sariguney, Assistant, Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TÜSIAD)
Christoph Saurenbach, Policy Officer, European
Commission, Directorate General for Trade
Véronique Scailteur, Director, Goverment Relations
Europe, Procter & Gamble
Anka Schild, Policy Advisor Trade & International
Relations, Siemens EU Affairs Office
Johannes Schneider, Seconded National Expert
in Professional Training, European Commission,
Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry
Karl Peter Schön, Head of Department & Scientific
Director, Federal Office for Building and Regional
Planning, Germany
Stefanie Seedig, Counsellor, COASI Delegate,
Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU
Anita Sek, Researcher on EU External Action, Trans
European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
Dmitry Semenov, First Secretary, Mission of the
Russian Federation to the EU
Ana Maria Serban, General Secretary, European
Development Platform (EDP)
128
Pedro Serrano, Principal Advisor on External
Affairs, European Council
Ivanna Silva, First Secretary, Mission of Argentina
to the EU
Ludmila Silva, Managing Director, Institute for
Scientific Advancement of the South (ISAS)
Francis Snyder, Professor of Law and Co-Director
and Jean Monnet Professor ad personam, Peking
University School of Transnational Law
Song Ronghua, General Secretary, China Public
Diplomacy Association
Xinning Song, Jean Monnet Chair ad Personam,
Renmin University of China Centre for Europan
Studies
George Ciprian Stanciu, Student, Université Libre
de Bruxelles (ULB)
Dinos Stasinopoulos, Former EC Official
Pawel Stelmaszcyk, Advisor, European Mobility
Network, European Commission, Directorate
General for Mobility and Transport
Jim T.W Stoopman, Programme Coordinator,
European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
Mingxi Sun, First Secretary, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Leo Sun, President of the European Public Affairs
and Communications Office, Huawei Technologies
Réka Szántó, Manager International IP and Trade,
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries
and Associations (EFPIA)
Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, Analyst, International
Economic Relations and Global Issues Programme,
Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).
Szabolcs Tapaszto, Policy Specialist (Asia),
European Parliament
Jenny Theresia Permatasari, Masters Student,
University of Antwerp Management School (UAMS)
Felix Theus, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Tina Tsai, EU Public Relations and Communications
Manager, Huawei Technologies
Andrey Tsyvov, Second Secretary, Mission of the
Russian Federation to the EU
Friends of Europe | Global Europe
Richard Turcsanyi, Visiting Fellow, European
Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
Alberto Turkstra, Programme Coordinator,
European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
Cristiana Tzika, First Secretary, Permanent
Representation of Cyprus to the EU
Takako Ueta, Professor, International Christian
University, Department of Politics and International
Studies
Waltraut Urban, Freelance Economist, Austrian
Institute for Research on China and Southeast Asia
Guy Van Haeverbeke, Honorary Secretary General
& Member of the Board, Trans European Policy
Studies Association (TEPSA)
Bavo Van Kerrebroeck, Student, University of
Antwerp Management School (UAMS)
Hannes Van Raemdonck, EU Public Affairs
Manager, Huawei Technologies
Herman Van Rompuy, President, European Council
Robert F. Vandenplas, Managing Director,
Belgoprocess
Ummugulsum Varli, Commercial Counsellor,
Mission of Turkey to the EU
Sanja Vasic, Secretary, Center for International
Economic Relations, Belgrade Chamber of
Commerce
Daniel Verheyden, Attaché Asia Desk, Brussels
Invest & Export
Laura Vermeer, Junior Researcher, European
Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
Jan von Herff, Senior Manager, Trade & Industry
Policy, BASF
Ekaterini Vourka, Linguist Administrator, Council
of the European Union, Crisis Management and
Planning Directorate (CMPD)
Yushen Wang, Correspondent, Jiefang Daily
Ruiping Wang, Fellow, Université Libre de Bruxelles
(ULB)
Qiong Wang, First Secretary, Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the EU
Wang Linxia, First Secretary, Press and
Communications, Mission of the People's Republic
of China to the EU
EU-China: The next ten years | Europe-China Forum
Wang Weidong, Professor, China Jiliang University
Robert Weaver, Managing Partner, Syllion
Thomas Wiley, Head of Sector, Regional
Programmes in Asia, European Commission,
Directorate General for Development and
Cooperation - EuropeAid (DEVCO)
Jessica Williams, Research and Editorial Assistant,
Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation
Manharsinh Yadav, Second Secretary, Mission of
India to the EU
Hengyuan Yan, Chief Correspondent, China
Economic Daily
Min Yan, Coordinator, China-Europa Forum
Tuo Yannan, Reporter, China Daily
Mingdeng Yi, Brussels Correspondent, Beijing Daily
Zifen Yu, Correspondent, People's Daily European
Center
Xichao Yu, Researcher, European Institute for Asian
Studies (EIAS)
Serena Yu, Second Secretary, Taipei Representative
Office to the EU & Belgium
Qianwen Yu, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
Yu Xiang, Second secretary, Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the EU
Claude Zanardi, Post Graduate Research Student,
King's College London, Department of War Studies
Zhang Haiyan, Academic Director, Euro-China
Centre, University of Antwerp Management School
(UAMS)
Zhang Lei, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel (VUB), Institute of Contemporary China
Studie
Zhang Xinghui, Brussels Bureau Chief, China Youth
Daily
Zhang Lirong, Chargé d'Affaires, Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the EU
Zhang Yuanyuan, Former Ambassador, Embassy of
China to Belgium
Zhang Jiaming, Law Clerk, Jones Day
Zhang Jingyuan, Student, University of Antwerp
Management School (UAMS)
129
Zhang, Jie Correspondent, People's Daily,
European Center
Zhang Xinghui, Brussels Bureau Chief, China Youth
Daily
Zhuang Jixi, Student, Université Paris Sorbonne
Paris IV, Département Affaires Européennes
Joe Zou, EU Public Affairs Manager, Huawei
Technologies
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