1. religion and spirituality
2. islam

Education and Aspirations: Evidence from Islamic and state schools in Pakistan
and Nigeria
Masooda Bano1
Abstract
Drawing on survey and ethnographic data from Islamic and state schools in Pakistan and
Nigeria, this paper questions assumed effect of attendance in Islamic schools on
students’ levels of religiosity and aspirations. On both these counts, students from both
the groups show broadly similar results. Modern-school girls in Pakistan do record a
higher willingness to pursue a professional career. However, urban background,
increased exposure to television, and more educated mothers appear more likely
explanations for this difference than school effect. The Nigerian data supports this
analysis. The findings suggest that increasing employment opportunities, access to media,
and supporting female role models can make more Muslim females aspire for formal
employment than interventions targeted at reforming Islamic norms.
Key Words: Islamic schools, school-effect, aspirations, religiosity, female empowerment.
Note: This is a very early draft of this paper. Circulation is limited to 2015 Oxford AALIMS
Conference participants.
Introduction
Despite being conducive to empirical testing, the debate on whether religious schools
effect moral socialisation of children remains divisive. The assertion that schools don’t
just teach literacy and numeracy but also shape children’s moral worldview, has found
support in some studies that have attempted to measure the effect of religious schools on
students’ levels of religiosity (Barrett et al. 2007; Tritter 1992). Competing evidence
instead emphasizes the effect of household religiosity levels both in shaping the
preference for religious schools (Cohen-Zara and Sander 2008; Sander 2005) as well as
the levels of religiosity (Hill 2011). Both sides of the argument have, however, largely
been advanced drawing on data from Catholic or Jewish schools in the West. Madrasas
(Islamic schools), which are routinely accused of radicalising Muslim youth, have not
been subjected to such an analysis despite being ideally suited to it. This paper draws on
survey data with female students from madrasas and state schools in Pakistan and
northern Nigeria to assess whether time in madrasas or the family background seems to
play a more important role in shaping students’ levels of religiosity and future aspirations.
The results are surprising.
In terms of levels of religiosity, measured through knowledge of Islamic rules, conviction
in their fairness, desired levels of piety, and ritual practice, students from the two groups
show very similar results. On two out of four questions aimed at measuring levels of
ritual practice, madrasa students did show slightly higher results. But, drawing on
1
I will like to thank Abigail Barr for her assistance in developing the survey instrument and the research
design. Uday Anand, Athena Sharma and Santiago I. Tort provided valuable research assistance. The
study was developed under the ESRC/AHRC Ideas and Beliefs Fellowship (RES-071-27-0034) that I
held between 2009- 2012. In Nigeria the survey was implemented through DFID Education Sector
Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN). Contribution from ODID research fund is also gratefully
acknowledged. Lastly, the paper benefitted enormously from my many discussions with Imane Chaara.
1 ethnographic fieldwork, the paper shows group-effect is more likely explanation for that
than madrasa education. Thus, the paper first of all shows that the assumed impact of
madrasas on increasing students’ levels of religiosity in Muslim societies is potentially
exaggerated.
Second, the survey findings also challenge the assumed links between madrasa education
and lowering of material aspirations. Though not necessarily framed in terms of
aspirations, the assumption that madrasa education lowers students’ desire for material
well-being and this-worldly achievements, dominates the literature on both male and
female madrasa. It is routinely argued in the media and policy reports that madrasa
education trains students to value otherworldly rewards thus making it easier for jihadi
groups to mobilize madrasa students to sacrifice their life in jihad. Scholarship on female
madrasas, which has seen a boom in recent years, echoes similar assertions about the
impact of madrasa education on girls’ material aspirations. It is argued that madrasa
education increases young women’s adherence to orthodox Islamic gender norms which
when seen in light of liberal feminist framework don’t only appear out-rightly
discriminatory2, they also seem to lower girls’ material aspirations by training them to
value their role within the family over pursuit of professional career. Against these
assertions, again the survey results from the two contexts are surprising: the data on
material aspirations from the two set of student respondents shows little variation.
There is, however, one striking difference in results between the two student groups in
case of Pakistan: while showing similar material aspirations as madrasa students, modern
school girls are more willing to opt for professional roles than madrasa students when
presented with a dilemma where they are required to choose between a more orthodox
or a more liberal interpretation of Islamic gender norms. This result is apparently
inconsistent with the results on levels of religiosity where the girls from both the groups
showed equally high results. While being convinced of the fairness of Islamic gender
norms and aspiring for a high level of piety, school-girls are more willing to become
economically empowered, compromise family time to secure job promotion and are
more supportive of their husband’s decision to pursue non-Islamic modes of socializing
with professional colleagues if that socialization is seen to be important for professional
advancement. This desire to retain their religiosity but at the same time be flexible on the
rulings to maximise opportunities for material advancement is an important difference
between the two groups in Pakistan. What potentially might create this difference in the
approaches of the two groups has important implications for advancing the gender and
development programmes supported in many Muslim majority contexts. Most
development agencies involved in such programmes acknowledge the need to be
respectful of local norms yet encourage women to pursue paths that can trigger change
within these norms that restrict their agency.
The question then is that could this important difference in girls’ willingness to opt for
professional careers or more liberal interpretations of Islam that enable women to
maximize opportunities for material and social advancement be attributed directly to
school type. The paper will show how family characteristics combined with urban/rural
background, potentially become better predictor of this difference than madrasa
education. Given the limitations of the sample size (see section on methodology) instead
of attempting to run a regression analysis, the paper draws on four sources of data to
2 Examples include men having permission to have four wives, women getting half the
share of inheritance, etc. 2 illustrate why factors other than school type appear more likely explanation for this
difference. First, the paper is able to show important differences in the socio-economic
and cultural background of the students in the two groups that are statistically significant
and which in line with broader evidence in the literature can be argued to have a strong
bearing on girls’ levels of religiosity and aspirations. Two, it compares responses of
madrasa students between year 1 and year 4 (final year) because along with comparing
across school-types, within institution comparison between early and final grades is
widely used method to test whether time in school seems to have changed students’
values and aspirations. Comparing the responses from the first and final year madrasa
students, thus, helps triangulate the results from comparison between the two school
types. Such an analysis interestingly reveals that senior students in madrasas show a
slightly higher willingness for professional roles than those in year 1 thereby suggesting a
positive rather than negative impact of time in madrasa on girls’ willingness to adopt a
professional career.
Three, based on selected theological references and ethnographic fieldwork, the paper
shows how even within orthodox Islamic position and in the education imparted in
madrasas in Pakistan, motherhood is prioritized but pursuing a professional career is not
seen to be forbidden3 in Islam. As part of Islamic history, women in madrasas read in
detail about the wives of Prophet Mohammad, some of whom were professionally active
or managed their own business. Thus, a better appreciation of the complex nature of
Islamic theology and some familiarity with what actually is taught in madrasas, also helps
understand why it is problematic to assume that time in madrasa will necessarily build
negative attitudes towards pursuing professional career. There could potentially be other
factors contributing to development of such an attitude. Fourth, using the evidence from
Nigeria, we see that different results help establish the same position. Unlike the
evidence from Pakistan, schools girls in northern Nigeria 4 do not show higher
professional ambition than madrasa girls, but neither do we find any significant variation
in the socio-economic and cultural backgrounds of the girls in the two types of schools
in Kano that we see in Pakistan. Also, the level of opportunities available to girls the two
country contexts are quite different, which further helps explain why certain dimensions
of the socio-economic and cultural context rather than time in an Islamic school might
better explain Muslim girls’ willingness to pursue economically empowering professional
careers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents a brief review of the policy
debates and academic literature linking madrasas within radicalisation or heightened
levels of piety and confining of female agency. Section 2, defines religiosity and
aspirations and reviews the dominant approaches in the literature to measure religiosity
before presenting a rationale for choosing the four sub-measures of religiosity adopted in
this study. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 presents the results on levels of
religiosity. Section 5 presents the results on levels of material aspirations including
responses to the three vignettes developed to assess girls’ willingness to join professional
roles and opt for more liberal interpretations of Islam. Section 6 highlights the nonmadrasas factors that seem to explore why college girls in Pakistan show more
3 Ethnographic fieldwork with madrasas in Pakistan and northern Nigeria shows that discuss is focused on understanding what professions are most appropriate for women rather than arguing that women should not work at all. Jobs requiring too much interaction with the other gender are discouraged; teaching positions at school, college or university level are highly encouraged. 4 The Islamic schooling system across northern Nigerian states has same historical origin. Thus, the structure of female madrasas in Kano is the same as in other northern Nigerian states. 3 willingness to adopt liberal positions. Section 7 triangulates these findings from other
three sources of evidence. Section 8 concludes by situating these results in the broader
debate on how to reform informal institutions so that they become more supportive of
globally defined development goals.
Muslim women, madrasas and Islamic norms
Madrasas have been in the global spotlight since September 11 for their alleged links with
Islamic militancy. The fact that some of the senior Taliban leaders were trained in
madrasas operating in the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan made Pakistani
madrasas a particular target of western policy efforts aimed at Islamic de-radicalization.
Reforming madrasas has been an officially recognized part of the soft side of the US ‘war
on terror’, which has mainly relied on use of military force including drones. Madrasa
reforms have mainly focused on introducing modern subjects in madrasa curriculum
with the view that it will increase madrasa students’ access to formal job market therefore
reducing appeal for militant Islam. While the concerns around militancy have been
highlighted more in case of male madrasas and have mainly been aired by western policy
makers, media and academics from security studies, a rich academic literature drawing
from more traditional social science disciplines, especially anthropology and politics, has
emerged on growing number of institutional platforms that are today offering Islamic
education to Muslim women. These institutions have emerged across the Muslim world
since the 1970s and take many different forms. Many are informal operating as loosely
structured study circles which meet weekly others are formally organized degree
awarding educational institutions such as the female madrasas in Pakistan and their
counter parts in northern Nigeria.
While the interest in studying these movements has evolved more organically from
within the academic community, many of the studies on these movements have indirectly
ended up supporting the Islamic education and radicalisation thesis. Focused more on
studying how participation in these movements impacts women’s approach to gender
norms than on militancy, many of these studies argue that participation in these groups
leads to higher emphasis on attaining religious piety, reduces desire to confront
patriarchal power structures, and leads to higher appreciation for maternal roles over
pursuing a profession. Women within these groups are also seen to justify controversial
Islamic gender norms, such as men having permission to have four wives at any given
time when women must secure a divorce before remarrying, women inheriting half the
share of men, and two female witnesses required for every male witness in court disputes
in matters of commerce. Such studies argue that Islamic education in female madrasas is
very focused on making women idealize role of a mother, who by raising morally upright
children builds the nation. In this line of reasoning, Islamic education is in general argued
to downplay the importance of material wealth by emphasizing that Prophet was a
simple man who lived a simple life.
However, there is also a strong counter narrative in the literature on these institutions
that based on similar nature of fieldwork draws very different conclusion about the
impact of Islamic education on the girls’ attitudes and aspirations. This set of literature
argues that though prioritizing maternal roles, participation in Islamic study circles or
madrasas empowers Muslim women within the established structures of authority. These
studies show that better knowledge of Islam makes these women learn many rights that
Islam gives to the women enabling them to make more demands on their husbands.
These women often are see to strategically use their newly acquired Islamic knowledge to
4 argue for increased authority within the household. Islamic education is also seen to
improve the psychological well-being of the students. By increasing girls’ conviction that
things are ultimately in the hands of God, Islamic education makes them feel less
vulnerable to submit to any authority structure (formal or informal) that they do not
believe is right. Finally, these studies also note that authors who argue that Islamic
education leads to increased orthodoxy, ignore one important evidence that women
following the same Islamic study group actually end up showing a lot of variation in
choosing which specific Islamic interpretation to follow. These studies show that
whether women choose to follow a more liberal interpretation or the orthodox one,
often in seen to have a direct correlation with their socio-economic background and
prior educational levels of the students. For instances, studies show that Islamic study
circles catering to women from affluent families and having a professional background
are led by preachers who themselves are modern educated and are able to reason how
lslamic norms can fit the demands of modern time. These competing positions in the
ethnographic studies on how women engage with the knowledge received within the
Islamic study circles and how this education impacts their aspirations, worthy of further
testing using survey methods; however, efforts of this nature remain limited.
Survey based work on madrasas has increased since September 11, however, much of
this work has focused on testing links between poverty and madrasa enrolment. Only a
couple of studies have actually drawn on survey data to study the impact of madras
education on social values and economic attitudes of the students. The closest to such
attempts is the work of Asadullah and Chaudhry (2010). Looking at female graduates of
registered secondary state schools and madrasas from rural schools in Bangladesh, they
argue that madrasa students differ on attitudes related to working mothers, desired
fertility, and higher education for girls even when controlling for individual, family and
school traits. Further, in this paper exposure to female and younger teachers is associated
with more favourable attitudes among graduates. Though the authors do not compare
the two groups on levels of religiosity or material aspirations, this study comes closest to
the effort being made in this paper.
Theoretical overview
Before we attempt to measure individual or collective levels of religiosity, it is important
to discuss how we define it. There is a rich literature, especially within sociology of
religion, dedicated to identifying the various components of religious behaviour that
together arguably help determine individual or collective levels of religiosity. McAndrew
and Voas (2011) in a paper titled Measuring Religiosity Using Surveys, argue that religion
being very highly complex phenomenon is multidimensional in construct. Noting that
there is a difference between religious affiliation (nominal association with religion by
birth) and religious commitment (attitudes, behaviour and values) which can have
varying degrees, they argue religiosity to be concerned with the latter. While it is agreed
in the literature that quantification of religiosity is possible, there are no clear standards
regarding which of the following aspects, preferred by different studies, should be
measured: belief, practice, formal membership, informal affiliation, ritual initiation,
doctrinal knowledge, moral sense, core values, or how your regard others. Consequently,
studies attempting to measure the impact of school type on levels of religiosity have used
different dimensions to measure students’ levels of religiosity largely shaped by what to
the authors of those studies was the most convincing measure of religiosity in the given
context.
5 This study chose to study religiosity by focusing on four dimensions: the degree of
knowledge about core Islamic rulings, the degree of conviction in their fairness,
aspirations to be close to God, and ritual practice.
R1. Knowledge of Islam was measured by asking if the respondents think that the
following rulings are part of Islam: men having the permission to have four wives,
women having half the inheritance, and two witnesses required for one male witness in
matters of commerce.
R2. Belief in fairness of Islamic norms was tested by following up on each one of the
three questions mentioned in R1 by asking if in their view by giving men that right, Islam
gives women lower status than men. Affirmative answers were seen to question the
fairness of Islamic law.
R3. Aspiring to be close to God was measured by asking a number of questions within
the section on aspirations that can help measure one’s desire for religious piety. Key
dimensions covered were: aspirations to have time, places, and freedom to pray and pray
regularly; to have the time, a place, and freedom to read the Quran and to read the
Quran regularly; to have the time, freedom, and the means to do Hajj; to have religious
virtue in eyes of those around you; to have religious virtue in her own eyes, and to have
religious virtue in the eyes of Allah.
R4. Ritual practice was measured by asking respondents if they performed a specific
religious ritual and if yes then how frequently. Ritual practices covered included both
obligatory Islamic rituals as well as some optional ones: five compulsory prayers plus the
optional tahajjud, midnight prayer; frequency of reading the Quran; fasting in Ramadan,
and levels of giving under the compulsory Islamic obligation of zakat as well as the
optional forms of giving sadeeqa and kheerat. Response options ranged from never to
daily.
While a weighted average that could turn the responses to above questions into a
religious index, has not yet been calculated, for purposes of conceptual reasoning,
variable 2 and 3 are argued to be double the weight of variable 1 and 4 in determining a
student’s level of religiosity. The rationale for this is that ritual practice is the most
publicly observable aspect of one’s stated religiosity. It can therefore be prompted by
many other motives, such as desire to express conformity with expected group norms
especially in contexts where lack of observance of the rituals can lead to exclusion from
the group. The need to differentiate between responses to publically observable rituals
and private religiosity has therefore been emphasized routinely in the studies attempting
to measure levels of religiosity (Barrett et al. 2007). In most Muslim societies where
religion still retains a strong hold on the public sphere, the group pressure to take part in
publically observable Islamic rituals becomes even more pronounced. Because in such a
case, external pressure rather than internal conviction can become a plausible explanation
for taking part in a publically observable ritual practice, this measure while included, is
argued to be least reliable of people’s levels of religiosity than the other three.
Variables 2 and 3 on the other hand asked about people’s inner beliefs and aspirations,
which are publically unobservable and are therefore comparatively more true reflection
of people’s inner convictions and desired levels of religiosity. In comparing the levels of
religiosity between the two groups understudy, the paper thus conceptually places the
highest weight on these two variables. Variable 1, which attempts to measures one’s
6 knowledge about Islam, can potentially be a useful measure of one’s levels of religiosity.
However, since the questions aimed at testing the knowledge of girls about Islamic ruling
presented three complex Islamic rulings quite simplistically, a no response could indicate
not a lack of knowledge of that ruling but a disagreement with the way the ruling was
summarized. Therefore, this variable again will be conceptually given less weight
compared to variables 2 and 3 in developing a religiosity index.
The second concept used in this paper that needs clarifying in the concept of aspirations.
We need to be clear what we mean by it and why measuring difference in material or
spiritual aspirations of students from madrasas and modern schools could be an
important lens to understand the impact of madrasa education on girls’ future life
outcomes. The study of aspirations, normally a focus of psychology, is gaining increasing
currency in development. Aspirations are defined as forward-looking goals or targets
(Locke and Lathan, 2002). Within development studies there is currently much interest in
exploring the links between aspirations and poverty, with increasing number of papers
arguing that lower aspirations lead to lower achievement. Bernard et al. (2014) note that
‘in economic terms, we might think of aspirations as bounds among individuals’
preferences, the limits of the choice sets which they consider as relevant for them and
motivate their actions’. They further argue, ‘Once formed, our aspirations can function
like other mental models in limiting the possible futures we consider by focusing our
attention on some future options and filtering out others.’
Presenting the comprehensive review of the literature on aspirations from sociology,
social psychology and economics, Bernard et al (2014) summarize four key features of
aspirations. First, aspirations express goals or goal-orientations (or desired future endstates) that are relevant to well-being broadly defined. Second, aspirations evolve over
time in response to life experience and circumstances. Authors have used different terms
for the experiences that shape aspirations: intra-personal and extra personal
environment, vicarious experience, and aspiration window to cite a few. In particular,
social comparisons and learning from relevant others are important determinants of
aspirations. Appadurai (2001) and Ray (2002) argue that individuals largely form
aspirations by observing the outcomes of individuals whose behaviours they can observe
and whom they can identify. Social psychologists also argue that aspirations and broader
beliefs about self-efficacy are largely modelled on the experience of others in the
immediate environment (Bandura 1977). This has been referred to as one’s ‘aspiration
window.’ Third, as goals, aspirations are an important influence on behaviour (or actions)
and thus attainment or outcomes. Aspirations motivate behaviour. They serve to
mobilize and direct energy into action with respect to their objectives, thus providing
motivate power for action.
Many studies find significant impact of aspirations on choice and or attainment. Serneels
and Dercon (2014) for example show that mothers’ aspirations matters for their
children’s education outcomes. The paper observes a strong relationship: aspiring to one
additional year of schooling lifts the grade achieved at age 15 by 1.8 years on average.
The fact that in these studies aspirations are increasingly being linked to actual
achievement and aspirations in turns seem to be influenced by one’s immediate reference
group, the kind of schools one’s attend can thus have important influence on one’s
aspirations and future life outcomes. If it is that madrasa education indeed ends up
reducing women’s material aspirations and pursuit of economic empowerment then the
impact of madrasas runs directly opposite to what development agencies are trying to do
through their gender and empowerment programmes in countries such as Pakistan and
7 Nigeria. Raising women’s aspirations, making them economically empowered, making
them challenge existing structures that deny them equal legal status, is at the heart of the
gender and development efforts. Many development agencies are investing not just in
education and jobs for women, they are actively funding major programmes aimed at
changing attitudes not just of men but also of women by giving them awareness to aspire
high and change the surroundings around them: DFID Pakistan is currently developing a
£80 million programme targeted purely to changing gender norms. This programme is
meant to complement DFID’s more traditional interventions aimed at increasing girls’
access to education, health and economic opportunities. It is due to this increased
interest within development theory and practice on seeing aspirations as a critical first
step towards shaping life’s ambitions and long term outcomes that this survey focused
on comparing aspirations between the two groups.
Methodology
This paper presents an analysis of the effect of madrasa education on students’ levels of
religiosity and aspirations based on results of a survey implemented in two Muslim
majority contexts: Pakistan and northern Nigeria. The two countries present two
important regions with strong Islamic influence: South Asia and West Africa. The two
countries make a good comparative case because of the large number of Islamic schools
they host. Pakistan has a rich network of madrasas and northern Nigeria has a large
network of Tsangaya (Quranic) and Islamiyya schools. Both countries have also been
suffering from radical and militant Islamic groups.
The inspiration for this survey came from a larger ethnographic study that involved
prolonged fieldwork with female Islamic study groups across these two contexts and
Syria between 2007-2012 (Bano forthcoming). This comparative ethnographic fieldwork
led to identification of five dimensions which could particularly benefit from further
exploration through survey data: family background, psychological health, levels of
religiosity, locus of control5, and future aspirations. This paper draws on the survey
results on three of these dimensions— family background, levels of religiosity and future
aspirations— to see if attendance in Islamic versus state schools correlates to any one’s
religiosity levels or future aspirations and if yes then is it best attributed to school effect
or whether the family background, when unpacked for the socio-cultural and economic
variations, provides more plausible explanations for any difference in outcomes.
The survey was implemented with girls between 10-14 grades who were in the age range
of 16-20. They were selected from modern state school or colleges and Islamic schools.
It is important to note here that the terms school and college are being used
interchangeably in this paper because the same academic years are categorised differently
in the Pakistani and Nigerian education system. In Pakistan, state school system only
runs till Grade 10, and Grade 11 and 12 are classified as first two years of college. In
Nigeria, Grade 11 and 12 are still part of the Senior School (SS). There is also a
difference in the organization of female madrasas in the two countries. In Pakistan
female madrasas mainly cater to girls after they have complete Grade 10 in state or
private schools and offer a four-year degree programme. Madrasa education in Pakistan
is thus mainly focused on providing education that is equivalent of Grade 11-14
5 Perhaps explain why the other two are not discussed here. 8 education. This meant in Pakistan, the survey had to be carried out with girls in madrasas
and modern state run colleges. In case of Nigeria on the other hand, Islamiyya schools
run parallel to state schools from primary to all the way to Senior Secondary (Grade 12).
In case of Nigeria, it was therefore more appropriate to survey girls from final years of
Senior Secondary classes across the two types of schools. The average age in the Nigeria
sample was therefore younger as students were selected from Senior Secondary school
grade. In case of Pakistan on the other hand the girls were selected up to Grade 14, i.e.
the final year in a madrasa and a college. The reason sampling this slightly different age
grouping in the two contexts in justified is that it is more accurately reflective of each
country’s Islamic schooling landscape.
A critical feature of the student sample selection was that students were selected from
the base year as well as the final year in both the contexts. In case of Pakistan, students
were selected from Year 11 and Year 14, i.e. first and last year of a madrasa and a
modern college. In case of Nigeria, they were selected from Grade 9 and Grade 12, i.e.
first and last year of an Islamiyya school and a state school. This was meant to help
assess whether those in the senior years had absorbed the values of the given school.
This methodological strategy has been popular within many other studies aimed at
measuring impact of time in school on religiosity and attitudes.
The selection of the madrasas and colleges was based on purpose sampling; students
were selected randomly from the two school types using the school register. In Pakistan,
girls were selected from two prominent madrasas and two prominent colleges in Lahore
and Rawalpindi. Both are major cities in Punjab, the largest Pakistani provision. The
selected institutions were seen to be good representative of their school type in that city.
A total of 550 students were selected from across the four participating institutions. In
Kano the logistical arrangements were facilitated through a development programme
which allowed for easy access to a larger number of SS schools. The survey was
implemented in a total of 9 state schools and nine Islamiyya schools in Kano. These
schools were selected across three Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Fagge,
Kumbosto and Albasu. In total, 1600 students were surveyed, majority however were
from the state schools due to the bigger class sizes in state schools. The survey was
implemented in a hall normally made available by the participating school, where all the
selected students were seated and made to fill the questionnaire. The questions were read
out aloud by a research assistant and students were required to mark their response on
the questionnaire.
Given the sample sizes, which particularly in case of Pakistan, were determined by
practical considerations6, the contribution of this paper rests not in presenting a formal
model. Instead, the focus is on establishing that contextual factors seem to have strong
links to shaping religiosity levels and aspirations of girls in these two societies. These
links, if further tested, could have important policy consequences.
Results
Madrasa education and religiosity
6 In Pakistan, access had to be secured individually from each participating school and madrasa thus making it difficult to cover a large number of institutions. 9 As outlined in the section on methodology, levels of religiosity were measured by
focusing on four sub-variables. Table 1 lists responses to key questions asked to measure
responses on these four sub-variables.
Table 1. Levels of Religiosity for Madrasa and Modern Schools, Pakistan
Madrasa
Mean
S.D.
Modern School
Mean
S.D. X2
5.240566
3.547703
p-value
a) Ritual Practice
How many times do you pray in the day?
0.460430
1.482888
How often do you recite the Quran?
221.502
0.0000
171.059
0.0000
Do you fast during Ramadan?
1.009390
0.096672
1.097222
0.330124
14.4680
0.0000
Do you donate Zakat?
0.500000
0.501460
0.694657
0.461434
16.6577
0.0000
Do you donate Sadaqa?
0.965000
0.184241
0.901460
0.298589
7.0101
0.008
Do you donate Kheerat?
Have you completed the Arabic recitation of the Quran
(at least) one time?
Have you read the Quran with translation?
0.876405
0.330048
0.900735
0.299568
0.6564
0.418
0.985916
0.118117
0.968532
0.174886
1.5719
0.210
2.500000
0.545777
2.261168
0.575809
7.1850
0.028
3.000000
0.000000
2.921502
0.356901
2.5704
0.277
2.942584
0.288489
2.770035
0.557286
17.6791
0.0000
2.976303
0.205653
2.431579
0.875962
70.3004
0.0000
0.104167
0.308709
0.069204
0.254241
0.7326
0.392
Do you think that, by giving women half the inheritance
0.080189
rights of men, Islam gives women lower status than men?
0.272228
0.056140
0.230598
1.1342
0.287
0.048544
0.215436
0.169118
0.375547
16.4767
0.200
0.990196
0.098771
0.996466
0.059444
0.000
0.999
0.995169
0.069505
0.964664
0.184954
0.0207
0.886
1.000000
0.000000
0.982270
0.132205
2.9238
0.087
0.980392
0.138990
0.931655
0.252793
0.0009
0.976
0.990244
0.098531
0.985612
0.119301
0.4823
0.487
1.000000
0.000000
0.982206
0.132436
2.8806
0.090
b) Religious Knowledge
In your understanding, does Islam allow men to have
four wives?
In your understanding, does Islam give women half the
inheritance rights of men?
In your understanding, does Islam require two female
witnesses for every one male witness in a court of law?
c) Convictions on Fairness
Do you think that, by allowing men to marry four wives,
Islam gives women lower status than men?
By giving female witnesses half the weight of male
witnesses in a court of law, Islam gives women lower
status then men?
d) Aspired Levels of Closeness to God
Do you aspire to have the time, a place, and freedom to
pray and to pray regularly?
Do you aspire to have the time, a place, and freedom to
read the Quran and to read the Quran regularly?
Do you aspire to have the time, freedom, and the means
to do the Haaj?
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in the eyes of those
around her?
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in her own eyes?
Do you aspire to have religious virtue in the eyes of
Allah?
(1) chi-squared test
10 The table shows that on the two most important sub-measures of religiosity (conviction
in fairness of Islamic gender norms, and aspiration to be close to God) girls from both
the groups in Pakistan show equally high levels when tested at 5% level of significance.
The two groups show slight differences in responses on the other two sub-variables
(knowledge about Islam, and ritual practice). Put together the differences on these subvariables are, however, not significant, especially when we keep in view how these four
sub-variables were ranked in the section on methodology. It is also important to note
that on ritual practices the results are mixed. On levels of giving, college girls in fact
show slightly higher score, while on saying regular prayers and undertaking reading of
Quran, the madrasa girls do better. Ethnographic fieldwork carried out madrasas in both
Pakistan and northern Nigeria will suggest that regular prayer and routine reading of the
Quran in madrasas could most probably be linked to group-effect rather than necessarily
being a reflection of higher levels of inner conviction in religion. Madrasas in Pakistan
are boarding facilities where prayers and daily Quran reading is part of publicly visible
rituals that all students are required to follow. To measure if madrasas education really
translates into genuinely increased commitment to performance of publically observable
Islamic rituals, the study needs to adopt a longitudinal approach where differences on
ritual practice between girls from the two school types are measured four to five years
after they have left school.
Thus, looking across the sub-variables of levels of religiosity, it is difficult to argue that
madrasa education leads to significantly higher levels of religiosity. On the two most
critical measures of levels of religiosity, desire for closeness to good, and conviction in
fairness of Islam, the girls in colleges show equally high scores.
Madrasa education and aspirations
The survey results on questioned aimed at measuring the impact of madrasa education
on shaping material aspirations of the students in the two types of schools similarly do
not record any significant difference. Despite studies recording the emphasis on
simplicity placed in madrasa education, Table 2 shows that madrasa students showed
similarly high material aspirations as college girls. The fact that college girls are on the
average from slightly better economic background to begin with, will in fact suggest that
by wanting as much as the college girls want, the madrasa girls are arguably showing even
higher level of aspiration as they are trying to bridge a bigger gap.
Table 2. Levels of Material Aspirations for Madrasa and Modern Schools, Pakistan
Madrasa
Mean
S.D.
Modern School
Mean
S.D.
X2
1
p-value
Material Aspirations
Do you aspire to be married?
0.882927
0.322295
0.856140
0.351565
0.7436
0.389
How many sons do you aspire to have? (2)
1.703448
0.515377
1.605263
0.946797
1.3613
0.1742
How many rooms for living and sleeping do you aspire
to? (2)
How much money (per month) do you aspire to? (2)
4.521212
1.977273
5.488889
3.694398
-3.5514
0.0004
27,543.31
28,388.11
142,050.6
1,234,224
-1.5151
0.1309
How many cars/jeeps do you aspire to (for yourself or
1.473333
1.001319
2.018182
1.517428
-4.4402
0.0000
11 with your husband)? (2)
Do you aspire to have a job of your own?
0.829787
0.376823
0.797153
0.402837
0.7802
0.377
(1) Chi-squared test (2) t-test
Aspiration for professional roles
Where the results from the survey do record a difference between the girls from the two
school-types, and in quite interesting way, is on the three vignettes designed to make girls
choose between an orthodox and liberal interpretation of an Islamic gender norm. These
three vignettes presented three scenarios to the girls, which could potentially create a
slight dilemma by making girls choose between a conservative and a more liberal
interpretation of gender norms. Scenario 1 presented a dilemma where a woman had a
choice between accepting a promotion that will be good for her career advancement but
which would leave her less time to spend with her children. Scenario 2 presented a
dilemma where a woman’s husband loses his job and she has to decide whether to help
him by taking up a job herself or to stay at home and help what she can by trying to
spend more economically. Scenario 3 created a dilemma where a husband whose career
requires socializing with colleagues in clubs and parties, where alcohol is served and
wives are expected to join, puts pressure on the wife to join him in these activities. The
woman has to choose whether to support the husband and join him or leave him and
follow a virtuous path. For each of these scenarios women were given four possible
response options. These varied from no dilemma straight away accept the liberal norm,
some dilemma but accept the liberal norm, some dilemma but do not accept the liberal
norm, and no dilemma straight away reject the liberal norm.
Table X. Dilemmas for Madrasa and Modern Schools, Pakistan
Madrasa
Mean
S.D.
Modern School
Mean
S.D.
X2
1
p-value
Dilemmas
Career or husband and child?
3.408867
0.9674506 2.735714
1.158486
Contribute to household income or save money?
2.460396
1.041868
1.678571
0.9333937 70.7339 0.000
Go to events with husband or leave husband for a more 2.963158
virtuous path?
(1) Chi-Squared test
1.020276
2.728261
1.024464
47.4094 0.0000
6.3368
0.096
The survey results show that on scenario 1 and 2, college girls in Pakistan showed a
significantly higher willingness to opt for more progressive interpretations (See Table 3).
Even on scenario 3 college girls showed higher willingness to pursue the more
progressive position, i.e. to secure a job, but the difference in responses was not
statistically significant. Here it is important to note that in all three cases, many madrasa
girls also opted for liberal interpretations thereby highlighting the need to remember the
diversity within each group type (see Figure 1). But, on the whole there was a significant
difference between the two groups in willingness to opt for liberal interpretations of
Islam that allow them to benefit from modern life opportunities, while retaining same
conviction in fairness of orthodox Islamic norms and being equally keen on being close
to God.
12 Figure 1. Answers to dilemmas for Madrasa and college students 13 Source: Own elaboration Can this important difference in approach towards engaging with modernity be
attributed simply to madrasa education? The next section presents the counter-evidence.
Evidence on household differences
The school related cross-group difference in willingness to opt for liberal norms
becomes more nuanced when we look at the data on the socio-economic and cultural
background of the students. The data shows significant differences between the two
groups on four counts, which keeping in view the broader literature on gender and
development, can help explain the reason for different levels of willingness to follow the
progressive interpretation. One, calculated on basis of reported income plus family asset
ownership, college girls in general do seem to belong to a slightly better income group
than madrasa students (See Table 4).
Table 4. Household Socioeconomic Characteristics for Madrasa and Modern Schools, Pakistan
Madrasa
Mean
S.D.
a) Urban Background
Are you a boarder, i.e., do you live in accommodation
provided by the college/madrasa?
b) Exposure to Television
On average, how many hours of Cable TV do you watch
in a day?
c) Parent Background
Type of education completed by father
Type of education completed by mother
Mother's Occupation
d) Household Income
Father's Income
Mother's Income
Modern School
Mean
S.D.
t-stat1 p-value2
0.624390
0.485466
0.185714
0.389572
10.6656 0.0000
1.859903
1.479532
3.385417
1.597274
-10.9431 0.0000
3.971292
2.229665
1.179245
2.049657
1.452743
1.051266
5.758741
4.807018
1.538194
1.745524
1.748627
1.598758
10.1925 0.0000
-17.8593 0.0000
-3.0242 0.0026
15,572.5
15,500.0
15,764.2
8,346.7
112,904.9
104,892.9
549,381.4
459,035.4
-2.7759
-1.2599
d) Other Household Characteristics
How many rooms (including bedrooms, living rooms and 4.164251 2.048461 6.062937 3.399106 -7.7084
drawing room) are/were there in this home
How many people do you share a room with to sleep at 7.964286 4.752732 2.062500 1.463735 16.7482
night?
How many of the following are used or owned by the
people in your home?
Fans 5.375000 3.291922 7.747253 4.452181 -6.5417
Clocks 3.333333 2.124927 5.311355 3.448430 -7.5946
Bed/Charpoi 8.778443 5.035299 6.091912 3.780266 5.9428
Electricity 0.995169 0.069505 1.000000 0.000000 -1.0000
Electric Iron 1.670391 1.079828 1.992537 1.151428 -3.0091
Flush Toilet 1.975155 1.548993 3.229008 2.764207 -5.9730
Pit Toilet 1.975610 1.903783 2.019608 1.573169 -0.1311
Tap Water 4.807143 3.815712 7.905213 5.187028 -6.4388
Bicycle 1.547368 1.412470 1.527027 0.943621 0.1238
Scooter or Motorcycl 1.491525 0.736656 1.620253 1.109356 -1.1566
Colour TV 1.544000 1.322900 2.083333 1.421589 -3.6345
Video/VCR/DVD 1.222222 0.559581 1.518135 1.750278 -1.9584
Telephone 1.472222 1.275844 1.550265 1.083661 -0.3441
0.0059
0.2148
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3185
0.0028
0.0000
0.8961
0.0000
0.9017
0.2485
0.0003
0.0515
0.7323
14 Mobile Phone
Tape Recorder/CD Pla
Radio
Gas/electric cooking
Camera
Refrigerator
Air Conditioner
Computer
Car/Jeep
Sewing Machine
Washing Machine
3.585799
2.693694
5.313208
3.602926
-5.6976 0.0000
1.230769
0.581256
1.362162
0.717541
-1.3639 0.1756
1.326531
0.746876
1.437908
0.916444
-0.8574 0.3933
1.944882
1.454643
1.903084
1.219074
0.2744 0.7841
1.385714
0.728167
1.792453
1.506491
-3.0083 0.0029
1.370079
0.990456
1.620968
1.087974
-2.2443 0.0256
1.650000
1.166850
2.886364
2.527254
-4.6621 0.0000
1.307692
0.609049
1.737705
1.380662
-3.9438 0.0000
1.461538
0.859338
1.705128
1.176205
-1.2618 0.2137
1.560694
1.122219
1.434615
0.891592
1.2401 0.2159
1.456250
1.131854
1.467681
0.960032
-0.1065 0.9152
Two, there is significant difference in the rural and urban background of the girls in the
two groups. Though based in the same cities, madrasas overwhelmingly cater to girls
from rural areas, who were living in the madrasa provided boarding facilities. The schoolgirls were on the other hand from families living in those very cities. The cultural
difference between the families of the two set of girls was also reflected in the high
difference in language spoken at home: majority of school girls reported Urdu (the
official language in Pakistan, mainly spoken in cities and within families which are more
educated) as the language spoken at home; majority of madrasa girls reported Punjabi
(provincial language spoken mainly in rural areas) as the main language spoken at home.
Third, girls in schools reported having higher access to TV and watching more hours of
TV than girls in madrasas where close to 40% reported watching zero hours of TV per
week. Fourth, mothers of college girls in general had higher education qualification than
those of madrasa girls. These findings when situated in findings from within the broader
development literature present a strong ground for arguing that these differences in
socio-economic and cultural background could potentially play a more important role in
shaping girls’ willingness to opt for professional career and more liberal Islamic norms
than the school type.
15 Figure 2. Family differences for madrasa and college students (clockwise 1-3)
Source: Own elaboration
Girls in major cities of Pakistan such as Lahore and Rawalpindi are much more likely to
be exposed to female role models, which in the literature is seen to be important for
encouraging women to pursue professional roles. Beaman et al. (2012) find that, in
Indian villages where girls had female role models because the village was randomly
assigned to reserve a seat on the village council for a woman, the gender gap in
occupational aspirations declined among girls themselves and among parents. Similarly,
the role of access to TV and cable TV network is increasingly argued to give women
ideas to demand change. Chong et al. (2012) and Chong and La Ferrara (2009) showed
that exposure to TV shows with strong female role models and smaller families in Brazil
reduced fertility and increased divorce. Jensen and Ostre (2009) have shown that
exposure to soap operas depicting urban women reduced fertility and domestic violence
and altered beliefs about women’s autonomy in rural India. Other experimental studies
find that providing concrete information about untapped opportunities can boost
investment. Jensen (2012) finds that, in Indian villages randomly selected for recruitment
visits publicising opportunities in call centres, young women increased their labour
market participation and enrolment in relevant courses, delayed their marriage and their
firs children, and reported higher career aspirations. Parents enrolled girls in school more
and fed their daughters better.
16 Nigerian evidence
So far we have discussed results from Pakistan, the results from Nigeria need separate
treatment because unlike Pakistan, the survey data from Nigeria did not record any
significant difference between the two groups on any comparative dimension. In case of
Nigeria, even on knowledge of Islamic rules and ritual practice the girls in schools in
Nigeria scored as high as girls in madrasas. There is also no difference in responses to the
three vignettes that were designed to measure girls’ willingness to choose a more liberal
interpretation of Islam (Data tables under preparation; to be added soon). School-girls in
Nigeria show low willingness to accept the liberal norms as do the girls in madrasas. This
overwhelmingly similarity in responses from the two groups in Nigeria also supports the
argument that socio-economic and cultural contexts of the girls might be more important
than Islamic education in shaping the levels of religiosity and future aspirations. Unlike
Pakistan, there is no obvious difference in the socio-economic profile of the students in
the two groups. These results might seem odd, but they become understandable when
we remember that madrasas in Kano are organised as schools unlike Pakistan where they
offer four years degree after completing Grade 10.
Islamiyya schools in Kano run parallel to the state schools. The main difference between
them and the state school is that they offer a more integrated curriculum with a high
share of Islamic education than would be offered in the state schools. Since majority of
Islamiyya schools are community-owned and offer better quality of education than state
schools, it is understandable why the socio-economic and cultural background of the
students in the two groups did not differ in Kano unlike Pakistan where going to
madrasa means exiting the modern schooling system. This, however, does still raise the
question as to why do girls from neither of the two groups in Kano record a significant
choice in favour of liberal norms that allow for pursuit of professional career and
increased financial independence. It is argued that the reason there might lie in the
difference between the socio-economic conditions in Kano and the urban cities of
Punjab where the survey was implemented. Lahore and Rawalpindi are much more
affluent than Kano and also do better in terms of offering educational and professional
opportunities for women. If we keep this difference in view then it is possible to argue
that the lower willingness within women from both the school types in Kano to pursue
more liberal Islamic norms again supports the argument that it is the socio-economic and
culture context rather than Islamic education per se which shapes girls’ willingness to
pursue a liberal or conservative interpretation of Islam.
Reforming norms versus creating opportunities
The evidence from both the contexts shows an overwhelming persistence of Islamic
values. When it comes to conviction in Islamic faith and its fairness, even modern
schools girls have expressed no doubt. Islam is seen as a just and fair religion. Most girls
justified some of the controversial Islamic gender norms as being reflective of different
biological make up of men and women. This high persistence of Islam raises a number
of important points for policy as well as academic purposes. One, the high levels of
religiosity even within the modern school girls in both the countries shows that modern
education in itself does not necessarily reduce conviction in religious beliefs. Two, the
fact that conviction in fairness in Islamic gender norms remains very high across the two
groups, and modern school girls feel that they can opt for professional roles without
compromising their desire to be pious, shows that discourse on Islam in the West often
ignores the potential available within the Islamic tradition to modernize. Seen this way
17 the question becomes not why Islam in restrictive of female agency but what are the
individual characteristics or societal conditions which make some Muslim women prefer
to choose the restrictive interpretations and make others opt for a liberal outlook. Third,
and most importantly, the evidence that desire for professional roles is higher within girls
who are urban based, have better access to media, and have better educated mothers,
would suggest that liberal interpretations of Islam are automatically likely to become
more popular when the opportunities become available for women to engage with
economic opportunities. Development agencies faced with the dilemma of addressing
restrictive norms through direct interventions to reform them or through focusing on
wider economic and social development (Duflo 2012; Klugman et al. 2014), could
therefore benefit from focusing on the latter.
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