1. sports
2. olympics

FRAMING THE OLYMPIC GAMES: IMPACT OF
AMERICAN TELEVISION COVERAGE ON
ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES
CAROLINE WALTERS AND SHEILA MURPHY5
The official mission of the Olympic Games is to utilize sport for the promotion of
peace and mutual understanding among the nations of the world. This laudable
goal, aided by the ability of the Games to attract an unparalleled global audience,
makes the Olympics one of the most powerful and influential public diplomacy tools
of our time. Unfortunately, such a tool may be undercut by the tendency of the
American media to portray the Games as a competitive and nationalistic spectacle.
This research examines the role that domestic television coverage plays in framing
the Olympic Games and the impact divergent frames may have on viewers. Results
suggest that television coverage which frames the Olympic Games in nationalistic
terms may actually serve to reinforce divisiveness and international rivalry, while
coverage framed in more international terms may promote the Olympic mission.
Keywords: framing, Olympics, sport, diplomacy, television
T
he modern Olympic Games are perhaps the single most recognized media event
capturing the attention of the global community on a recurring basis. In fact, the Games have
M s. Caroline W alters is a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State
([email protected]). She received her master’s degree in public diplomacy from the University of
Southern California in 2008. Sheila Murphy (Ph.D., University of Michigan) is a Professor at the
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California ([email protected]).
Her research focuses on how people make decisions and the factors that influence them.
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claimed such a prominent place on the world’s calendar that approximately one of every two
people in the world watch the Olympics on television, and it is broadcast in more countries
than any other event (Emerson & Perse, 1995; Tomlinson, 1996). In the United States,
viewership is even higher. According to Nielsen (2006), over 81% of all U.S. households
saw all or part of the 2006 Torino Olympics, making them the 8th most viewed event in U.S.
television history. Given such pervasiveness, the symbolic themes which accompany the
televised presentation of the Olympics have the potential to influence the opinions of a
substantial segment of the world population.
But what are these themes? When Pierre de Coubertin re-established the ancient Greek
tradition of the Olympic Games in 1896, his stated goal was for the Olympic Movement to
“contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport
practiced without discrimination of any kind…with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair
play” (International Olympic Committee, 2007). The International Olympic Committee
(IOC) has continued to officially endorse this mission and has also promoted the concept
of the Olympic Truce, which encourages all participating countries to lay down their
weapons during the Games in an effort to create a window for dialogue, reconciliation, and
diplomatic conflict resolution. Such high-minded objectives were echoed at the Olympic
Winter Games in November 2001 by IOC President Dr. Jacques Rogge when he stated, “The
IOC wishes that this peaceful gathering of all Olympic athletes in Salt Lake City will inspire
peace in the world” (International Olympic Committee, 2007).
However, this concept of the Olympics as a promoter of international dialogue and
world peace has been hotly contested by several Olympic scholars, who note that de
Coubertin’s establishment of the Games was at least partly motivated by his desire to find
a way for France to reassert its national power after losing the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
Indeed, demonstrations of nationalistic and political strength can still be found in the
Olympic Movement today. As Toohey and Veal (2000) state:
The overtly political organizational structure and rituals of the Games themselves exacerbate
the event’s political construction. They draw upon and provide symbolic capital to various
interest groups, despite the fact that the rhetoric and philosophy of the IOC suggest the
opposite… W hen, during the Olympic medal ceremonies, national anthems are played and
the flag of the victors’ countries are raised, when team sports are organized on national lines
and, during the Opening Ceremony athletes march into the stadium nation by nation, these
practices are overtly creating nationalistic tensions, self-regard, and rivalries. (p. 97-99).
Thus, it could be argued that despite the IOC’s stated desire to contribute to productive
international dialogue and peaceful coexistence, the Olympics actually serve as more of a
vehicle for displays of cultural and political dominance.
Putting this debate aside, international sporting events like the Olympics can indeed
open up a conversational space for nations that are having trouble engaging one another in
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a positive or constructive way, thus making sports a powerful tool for international
diplomacy. While sports are “not a cure for animosities and conflicts that have existed for
50 years,” scholars have suggested that the “success of the likes of Michael Jordan, Mark
McGwire, Jesse Owens, or Pelé can have positive effects beyond the playing field, onto the
political chessboard” (Goldberg, 2000, p. 69). Tomlinson (1996), for example, notes that at
the opening ceremony of the 1992 Olympics, nations from the former Soviet Union paraded
independently from Russia and 107 athletes from Kuwait and Iraq marched only nine
nations apart. Likewise, athletes from both North Korea and South Korea marched under
one flag at the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics in 2000. This “harmonizing
symbolism,” as Tomlinson calls it, has the potential to be a powerfully motivating force.
Unfortunately, the ideals of the Olympic Games have been repeatedly hijacked by
various governments, organizations, and athletes in order to advance their own agendas
—often at the expense of world peace and camaraderie. The use of the Games as a political
tool largely began with Hitler’s reinforcement of Aryan superiority at the 1936 Berlin
Olympics. This was followed by the performance of the black power salute by Tommie
Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, the Israeli hostage crisis of the
1972 Munich Olympics, and the Cold War boycotting of both the 1980 and 1984 Olympics
in Moscow and Los Angeles, respectively. The Games have also been used as an indicator
of acceptance into the Western, capitalized world. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1988
Seoul Olympics were framed as Japan and Korea’s entry into the elite halls of international
power, and this same tactic was also utilized by China’s Olympic Organizing Committee for
the 2008 Summer Games. Ironically, the motives of those who coordinate and participate
in the Olympic Games often run counter to the goals of the IOC.
The mission and purpose of the Olympics may be further distorted by the way the
Games are covered by the American media. While media outlets from all countries are guilty
of reporting on the Olympics (as well as other international events) from their own
perspective, the American media have been routinely criticized for their overly nationalistic
coverage (see Sabo, Jansen, Tate, Duncan & Leggett, 1996, for a review). As noted
previously, the vast majority of Americans experience the Olympics through the medium
of television. Consequently, the way that American television outlets choose to portray the
Games — in particular, the frames that they adopt for their coverage — may impact how the
American viewing audience perceives not only the Olympics, but also the participating
countries.
The present research examines the potential impact of nationalistic and international
media frames on potential Olympic viewers and, by extension, the ability of the Olympics
to serve as an effective public diplomacy tool. More specifically, Study 1 analyzes the effect
these divergent frames have on public perceptions of whether the Olympics achieve the
objectives laid out by the IOC. Study 2 looks at the broader implications these nationalistic
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and international frames may have on public perceptions of other nations, and on support
for aggressive foreign policy positions such as preemptive attacks.
THE FRAMING OF SPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS
The concept of framing can be understood as the process of shaping the opinions and
perspectives of others by including, excluding, or emphasizing certain aspects of an issue
or event. Entman (1993) has defined framing as follows:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described… .[T]he frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand
and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it. (p. 52-54)
Framing can be distinguished from related constructs such as agenda-setting or priming
in that it does more than make a particular issue salient or more cognitively accessible
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Miller & Krosnick, 1996). Framing also influences how
individuals are likely to think about that issue by focusing attention on certain key elements.
To "frame" an issue or event is to select one among a number of possible ways of looking
at something. For example, the Olympics could be framed as more of a celebration than a
competition or, alternately, as a competition among individuals each striving to achieve their
personal best. Nationalistic elements inherent in the Olympics Games such as distinct
costumes, flags, and anthems almost certainly prime the category of country among all
viewers. But the U.S. broadcast media takes this one step further. By focusing
disproportionate attention on the American athletes and events that American athletes might
win, through the constant tallying of each country’s medal count, and by allowing highly
charged competitive rhetoric from network commentators, the Olympics are portrayed using
a hypernationalistic “us versus them” frame (Sabo et al., 1996).
To be sure, media frames serve many useful purposes. As McQuail (2003) rightly points
out, media outlets are the principal means of public expression in modern society, and the
frames they utilize help citizens to make sense of the overwhelming and often very complex
amount of information available, thus enabling the public to better interpret and digest news
and other data.
However, American television networks also depend on profits and are therefore
primarily concerned about attracting the largest share of viewers possible. As a result, the
framing of media content is often constructed according to the tastes of the audience, and
news organizations frequently frame issues using the most provocative or entertaining
format rather than the most realistic or informative format (Wicks, 2005). Consequently, the
framing of media content is “constrained by the anticipated reaction of the audience — or,
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to use a different language, by what the American political culture finds permissible”
(Kinder, 2007, p. 156). As a result, media outlets often rely on the dominant societal frames,
thus reinforcing the way media consumers currently interpret their reality (Callaghan &
Schnell, 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).
Of particular relevance to this study is television’s framing of international and sporting
events. As Gruneau (1989) states, the way that sports competitions are portrayed to
audiences in the United States involves a multitude of decisions regarding which images,
camera angles, sports statistics, styles of language, theme songs, and storylines will be
employed. These choices are often based on what the program’s producers feel are in line
with the “dominant ideological tendencies” of our society. Thus, the “processes of selection
and representation involved in the production of sport for television have been viewed as
manifestations of such (allegedly) ‘dominant values’ as hero worship, instrumental
rationality, obedience to authority, possessive individualism, meritocracy, competitiveness,
and patriarchal authority” (Gruneau, 1989, p. 135). Through these frames, some aspects of
sporting events are highlighted while others are either de-emphasized or completely omitted.
The most common frame used in the televising of sports is an emphasis on competitive
conflict. Despite sport being a form of competition where cooperation is often necessary in
order to agree upon rules and the authority of the referee, extensive research by Bryant,
Comisky, and Zillman (as cited in Bryant & Raney, 2000) has shown that sports
commentators frequently use war-like metaphors and conflict-driven language to highlight
the competitive aspect of sports. Prior research has also demonstrated that this aggressive
language influences viewers’ perceptions of violence in sports (Sullivan as cited in Bryant
& Raney, 2000). Indeed, Comisky concluded that such “‘findings are suggestive of the great
potential of sports commentary to alter the viewer’s perception of the sports event’” (as cited
in Bryant & Raney, 2000, p.170). Implicit in this competitive frame is the idea that the
winner/loser binary is the singular most important element of sport.
Other experts have pointed to the framing of sports as a high drama or storytelling event,
designed to increase the entertainment value of the sportscast regardless of outcome. By
elevating the sporting event to the level of dramatic conflict and using the elements of drama
(such as plot, symbolism, and social message) in its presentation, the broadcast is able to
grab and hold the attention of viewers. This use of narrative in sports media demonstrates
that there is a “point of convergence for two dominant ‘models’ of coverage—‘news
actuality and dramatic entertainment.’ Televised sport brings these elements together in a
unique manner” (Gruneau, 1989, p. 145).
Sporting events that take place between nations bring other frames with them as well.
Levermore (2004) found the stereotyping of national populations to be commonplace in an
analysis of World Cup 1998 media coverage. Germans, for example, were frequently
referred to as “thorough, efficient, cold-hearted, and with no sense of humor” (p. 21).
Similarly stereotypic references were made to describe Japanese, Iranian, Korean, British,
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and Cameroonian players. Such tendencies were also found by Sabo et al. (1996) who
documented many specific instances of nationalistic bias contained within 340 hours of
American television coverage of seven different international athletic events:
Nationalism thrives on “we versus they” scenarios. In this regard, we found that
commentators characterized athletes from Communist bloc, or formerly Communist bloc,
countries in ways that suggested they are cheaters, machine-like, inhuman, and without
feelings. In contrast, athletes from the United States and its allies were generally featured as
warm, fair, and human… .It was stated or implied that some nations bring a political agenda
to international athletic events, but the hidden assumption being conveyed was that the
United States has no such political agendas. W hereas doubts are raised about the state
funding of athletes from other countries, problems linked to corporate sponsorship of athletes
in the United States or W estern democracies are unstated. Comments about drug use among
Chinese or East German athletes ignored the fact that some U.S. athletes use drugs as well.
Such stories about Soviet women gymnasts and East German women swimmers point up the
contrast between the “good” (us) and the “bad” (them). (p. 18)
The authors summarized their results by calling national bias within sports telecasts the
“fly in the ointment” for televised international sports (Sabo et al., 1996, p.19).
But referring to nationalistic media bias as merely a “fly in the ointment” suggests minor
or inconsequential effects. Prior research on in-group/out-group bias suggests otherwise. For
example, Tajfel’s (1978) work on the minimal conditions necessary for individuals to give
preference to their in-group showed that even when people were randomly assigned to a
group that never actually met, they rated members of their in-group more positively and,
conversely, members of the out-group more negatively. One way to explain this
phenomenon is through the lens of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hogg &
Abrams, 1988). This theory asserts that groups only exist in contrast to other groups. In
other words, in order for an “us” to exist, a “them” must exist as well. This process is not
inherently evil but is a natural result of an individual’s attempt to understand their world by
undergoing a “process of categorization” and dividing the world into “comprehensible units”
(Hogg & Abrams, 1990, p. 2). However, according to Social Identity Theory, when a
category includes oneself, an individual’s “desire for positive self-evaluation provides a
motivational basis for differentiation between social groups” in a way favorable to both
one’s in-group and, as a result, oneself (Hogg & Abrams, 1990, p. 3).
Drawing on these concepts, Rivenburgh (2000) argues that when the nation is viewed
as the salient in-group, as is often the case during international sporting events, people are
much more likely to protect or maintain national identity in order to maintain positive selfperceptions. Not surprisingly, American television outlets either consciously or
unconsciously promote a point of view which favors the U.S. when reporting on events that
takes place in an international context. In fact, as Rivenburgh points out, this focus on
national identity is no doubt “encouraged by the knowledge that the producers of media are
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constructing news for a national audience with which they share national membership”
(Rivenburgh, 2000, p. 306). Entman (1991) provides a classic example of Social Identity
Theory’s relevance to the framing of international events in his analysis of the KAL and Iran
Air incidents. Through a content analysis of media coverage, he demonstrates that while the
1983 Soviet shooting of KAL Flight 007 was framed by the American media as an act of
aggression, the similar incident of a 1998 American shooting of Iran Air Flight 655 was
framed as an “understandable accident.” Entman’s analysis aptly illustrates that the framing
of both incidents served to protect U.S. national identity and therefore enabled Americans
following the stories to maintain positive perceptions of their own in-group.
AMERICAN TELEVISION AS FRAMER OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES
To date, American television networks that have broadcast the Olympic Games have
chosen to adopt frames which bear a striking resemblance to the generic sports and
international news frames described above. As a result, they portray an image of the
Olympics which is very different than that which is outlined by the IOC’s official mission.
In fact, Epsy (1979) argues that the Olympics are being distorted from their original intent
into “an extravaganza that reflects and enhances the competitive and divisive interests in the
world” (p. 162). Scholars such as Emerson and Perse (1995) have observed that “instead of
promoting understanding among the earth’s peoples as de Coubertin had hoped…the
broadcasts of the Games perpetuate present day stereotypes” (p. 80). Thus, the frame being
employed by American television networks in their coverage of the Olympic Games
emphasizes the in-group/out-group dynamic which is central to Social Identity Theory,
perhaps raising international tensions and undermining the very purpose of the event. In
reality, this is unsurprising. As previously noted, media outlets will often utilize the frames
which are culturally resonant with their target audience.
This emphasis on competitive conflict and nationalism rather than internationalism and
athletic skill in the Olympics has been further highlighted by the regular conflation of
political power and victory in international sporting events. One of the best examples of
“competitive importance attached to an inter-state sporting contest was…when ice hockey
matches between the U.S. and Soviet Union were played in a volatile competitive context
and where the winning team depicted its political system as the pre-eminent one”
(Levermore, 2004, p. 19). By employing the dominant competitive frame for its Olympic
coverage and imbuing international sporting events with political significance, the media
served to portray the Olympics — and politics by extension — as a zero-sum game. Such
promotion is not only contrary to the official mission of the IOC, but likely serves to
reinforce existing international tensions.
In a detailed study of ABC’s television coverage of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los
Angeles, Meadow noted that the network gave its presentation such a nationalistic frame
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that it appeared “overwhelmingly preoccupied” with American athletes and the sports that
are normally popular in the United States. He found that U.S.-related coverage of the
Olympics took up 44.7% of total coverage, while African athletes received only 2.8% and
South Americans just 2% (as cited by Houlihan, 1994). Likewise, NBC’s coverage of the
1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta was criticized for largely ignoring the successes of foreign
athletes: the exciting 1500 meter freestyle race that was won by Australian athlete Kieren
Perkins was never even broadcast because no American athlete placed in the event. As a
result, many international visitors who traveled to the Games felt slighted at what little
attention was paid to their country’s athletes. The message that was sent to these foreign
tourists was that “the Olympics are not about international competition, but about
competition between America and the world” (Meadow as cited by Houlihan, 1994, p. 156)
— a perspective that makes sense in the context of Social Identity Theory but which is
completely antithetical to the official goals of the IOC.
Meadow is not alone in his conclusions. In fact, several scholars have documented this
nationalistic bias in American television coverage of the Olympic Games. In a comparative
analysis of the NBC, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and TEN (Australia)
telecasts of the 1988 opening ceremony in Seoul, Larson and Rivenburgh (1991) found that
NBC devoted only 49 minutes, 57 seconds of its broadcast to cultural performances,
compared with 81 minutes, 58 seconds for TEN and 85 minutes for the BBC. When the
network missed the beginning of one South Korean dance because of a commercial break,
it spent only 26 seconds on it before cutting to an athlete interview and then to another
commercial break, thus preventing the American audience from “becoming engaged in the
Korean cultural narrative that flowed through all the performances” (Larson and
Rivenburgh, 1991). Moreover, NBC spent less time on the entry of the athletes than did the
other networks: they mentioned only 86 of the 160 national teams entering the stadium
(compared to 111 on TEN and 134 on the BBC), thereby ignoring 46.3% of the participating
nations. The authors conclude that “television constructs the Olympic spectacle into
multiple realities, and that it does so with profound implications for images of nation,
culture, and the Olympic movement” (Larson and Rivenburgh, 1991). As a result of such
skewed coverage, it is quite possible that Americans have a more biased perspective, not
only with respect to the Olympics and the mission of the IOC, but of international
community as a whole.
American television outlets do indeed have legitimate reasons for framing the Olympic
Games in these nationalistic and competitive terms. Given that it is extremely hard to
maintain viewer interest in any event that spans sixteen days, such frames are designed to
provide the most entertainment value to the widest possible American audience —
regardless of whether or not they conform to the values which the IOC wishes to project.
When one considers the staggering amount of money which networks must now pay for
broadcasting rights to the Games (NBC paid over $600 million for rights to the 2006
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Olympics), it becomes understandable that their primary concern is the ability to cover such
costs.
In fact, one might argue that the very success of these nationalistic and competitive
frames is the reason that the Olympics have become as big a spectacle as they are today.
Prior to the 1960s, U.S. broadcasters did not believe that Americans would be particularly
interested in watching a multi-sport event held in a remote location, especially one that
featured unfamiliar events such as the pentathlon and the luge. Some contend that interest
in the Games only came about as a result of television’s portrayal of the event through the
frame of international rivalry combined with the use of nationalistic competition as political
theater. In this way, the American media and the IOC are engaged in a symbiotic, mutually
beneficial relationship: the IOC needs the American media to continue legitimizing and
promoting the Olympics, and the American media sees the Olympics as a jewel in the sports
broadcasting crown.
But could the American media’s nationalistic portrayal of the Olympic Games
ultimately undercut the very purpose of the event? In Study 1, we examined whether — far
from promoting world peace — adopting a competitive and nationalistically-centered frame
for Olympic coverage actually serves to reinforce international rivalry and undercuts the
intended objectives of the IOC. More specifically, Study 1 predicted that:
H1:
H2:
Individuals exposed to a nationalistic frame of the Olympic Games will be more likely
to view the Olympics from a nationalistic perspective, and
will be less likely to perceive the Games as supportive of official IOC goals.
We further predicted that if American television outlets were to reshape their
broadcasting of the Olympic Games so as to adopt a more universal, internationally-centered
frame, the goals of the IOC may be better realized. Thus, we predicted that:
H3:
H4:
Individuals exposed to an international frame of the Olympic Games will be less likely
to view the Olympics from a nationalistic perspective, and
will be more likely to perceive the Games as supportive of official IOC goals.
In Study 2, we considered the broader implications these nationalistic and international
frames may have on the American public’s perceptions of other nations and certain foreign
policy decisions. Here we predicted that:
H5:
H6:
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Individuals exposed to a nationalistic frame of the Olympic Games will be less likely
to demonstrate willingness for international engagement and trust, and
will be more likely to support aggressive foreign policy actions.
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By contrast, we hypothesized that viewing a more universal, internationally-centered
frame would have the opposite effect. In other words:
H7:
H8:
Individuals exposed to an international frame of the Olympic Games will be more
likely to demonstrate willingness for international engagement and trust, and
and will be less likely to support aggressive foreign policy actions.
In addition to these hypotheses, we chose to examine the effects of both the nationalistic
frame and the international frame on viewer interest. As noted previously, current portrayals
of the Olympics by American broadcasting companies are pursued because the networks
believe that adopting a less nationalistic, more international frame would not generate as
much interest and would significantly decrease viewership and revenue. Consequently,
testing the effects of each frame on the willingness of the participants to watch and/or attend
future Olympic Games was seen as an important part of measuring the commercial
feasibility of adopting a more international Olympic frame. In both Study 1 and Study 2 we
tested the following:
RQ1: Is there a relationship between how the Olympics are framed and audience interest?
STUDY 1
Method
Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes at a major university. All
participants filled out a pre-viewing survey. This survey first assessed participants’ preexisting interests which could affect the efficacy of a particular frame (such as their interest
in travel, sports, foreign policy, and international affairs) using a 10-point Likert scale. The
pre-viewing survey then asked participants to respond to a series of 10 items adapted from
Emerson and Perse’s (1995) Olympic Viewing Motivation Scale, which was designed to
assess the extent to which a variety of motives play a role in whether or not the respondent
would watch the Olympics on television. These motives included the following: to learn
about other countries and cultures; to root for my country’s athletes; to feel like a citizen of
the world; to admire the dedication and athletic skill of the participants, to feel the thrill of
competition; to relax or unwind with family and friends; to learn more about different
Olympic sports; to participate in an historic event; to be able to discuss the event with others
in the future; and to experience a sense of pride for being a citizen of my country. The extent
to which the respondent agreed or disagreed that their Olympic viewing would be motivated
by each of the above was measured using a 10-point scale ranging from “Not at All” (1) to
“Extremely” (10).
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Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions — a
nationalistic frame condition, an international frame condition, or a control group. Those
assigned to the nationalistic frame condition were shown a 4-minute video compilation of
images from past Olympic Games that primarily featured U.S. athletes and the U.S. role in
the Games, ceremonies in which U.S. athletes won gold medals with the American flag
displayed prominently in the background, and demonstrations of nationalism on the part of
both U.S. and foreign athletes (such as the waving of a flag). In the nationalistic condition
at least two minutes or half of the video was exclusively dedicated to images of American
athletes and activities. Those assigned to the international frame condition were shown a
video compilation of images of equal length but featuring international opponents
celebrating together and competition among athletes from all nations (not primarily U.S.),
with a heavy emphasis on the skill of the athletes rather than their nationality (for example,
gravity defying snowboarding, gymnastic events, ice skating, races). Both video
compilations included the same opening and closing scenes and featured roughly the same
number and range of Olympic events. All images were taken with permission from
commercially available footage of the 2004 Summer Games and the 2002 Winter Games.
The images in both conditions were accompanied by the song Titans Spirit by Trevor Rabin.
Participants in the control condition were not shown any video. A manipulation check of the
two videos was conducted on 20 undergraduates with 10 students viewing each video and
then completing Emerson and Perse’s (1995) Olympics-related Nationalism and
Internationalism Scales (described in more detail below). The results of this manipulation
check suggested that the videos did differentially evoke the two desired Olympic frames.
Participants were then asked to fill out a post-viewing survey, which asked respondents
to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a series of statements designed by Emerson
and Perse (1995) to measure Olympic-related nationalistic sentiments. Prior research has
demonstrated that these two subscales effectively measure feelings of Olympic-related
nationalism and internationalism among survey respondents. Items from Emerson and
Perse’s Olympic Nationalism Scale include the following: it makes little difference to me
if the American entry wins in the Olympics; success at the Olympics brings prestige to the
U.S.; the Olympics make me feel that the U.S. is the greatest nation in the world; the
Olympics make me realize that we should strive for loyalty to our own country before we
can afford to consider world brotherhood; I feel angry at U.S. athletes when they do not win;
I feel angry at non-U.S. athletes when they beat U.S. athletes. Items from Emerson and
Perse’s Internationalism Scale (conceptually similar to our international frame) include the
following: the Olympics make us more aware of our differences rather than our similarities;
the Olympics provide a common ground for cooperation; watching the Olympics gives me
a sense of belonging to the global society; watching the Olympics makes me feel that it is
better to be a citizen of the world than of any particular country; watching the Olympics
makes me feel that I am a member of the international community.
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Next, the post-viewing survey measured the extent to which participants believed that
the Olympic Games do or do not fulfill various aspects of the International Olympic
Committee’s stated goals. Using a 10-point scale, respondents indicated the extent to which
they felt the Olympic Games achieve each of the six following IOC objectives: promote
world peace; celebrate individual achievement; promote feelings of friendship and solidarity
with the people of other nations; blend sport with culture and education; promote
understanding and respect for the people of other countries; and encourage sports.
Interspersed within these six IOC goals were two counterobjectives: promote national pride;
and display the U.S.’s strength and power. The survey then assessed each respondent’s
interest in attending and watching future Olympic Games using a scale that ranged from
“Not at All Interested” (1) to “Extremely Interested” (10).
Finally, respondents were asked a series of demographic questions including age,
gender, ethnicity, nationality, year in college, and major. In addition, they were asked how
many hours of television they watch per week (on average) and how much coverage of the
2002, 2004, and 2006 Olympic Games they had watched using a 5-point scale (Not at All,
A Little, Some, Quite a Bit, A Lot). All respondents were subsequently debriefed about the
experimental conditions and thanked for their participation.
Results
One hundred and twenty-eight individuals completed both the pre-viewing and postviewing surveys. To be eligible to be included in the subsequent analyses respondents had
to be United States citizens. Eight participants who were not U.S. citizens, and therefore
may not have responded to the nationalistic frame, were excluded from subsequent analyses.
The remaining 120 respondents were equally represented in terms of gender in the three
experimental conditions with 20 males and 20 females in each of the three experimental
conditions — nationalistic frame, international frame, and control condition.
Analyses. All dependent variables were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance
followed by paired contrasts between each of the three experimental conditions
(nationalistic, international, and control) to determine precisely which conditions were
significantly different from one another. All analyses used the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) software Version 15.
Pre-existing interests and demographics. There were no significant differences on any
of the pre-existing interests or background variables between the three experimental groups.
The only pre-existing interest found to predict participant interest in viewing and attending
future Olympics was an interest in sports. All subsequent analyses were run both with and
without interest in sports as a covariate. Since there were no statistically significant
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differences between these two sets of analyses we report the more conservative analysis of
the two — the analysis without a respondent’s interest in sports as a covariate.
Motives for viewing Olympic Games. Ten items were adapted with some slight wording
changes from Emerson and Perse’s (1995) Olympic Viewing Motivation Scale to assess
participants’ preexisting motivations for watching the Olympic Games. There were no
significant differences by experimental condition for any of the individual motivations or
for the scale as a whole.
Olympic nationalism versus internationalism. Table 1 reports the mean scores by
experimental condition of Emerson and Perse’s (1995) Olympic Nationalism and
Internationalism Scales. Scientific notation is used to identify which conditions are
significantly different at p < .05. Entries in a row representing a particular dependent
variable that do not share a letter subscript are significantly different from one another.
On average, participants in the nationalistic frame condition of the current study scored
significantly higher on Emerson and Perse’s Olympic Nationalism Scale (M = 5.54) than
those in both the control (M = 4.72; F(1,78) = 17.41, p < .001) and the international frame
condition (M = 4.26; F(1,78) = 51.06, p < .001; F(2,118) = 18.81, p < .001 in the overall
one-way analysis of variance). Conversely, participants exposed to the international frame
scored significantly higher on Emerson and Perse’s Olympic Internationalism Scale (M =
5.63) than their counterparts in both the nationalistic frame (M = 4.01; F(1,78) = 53.9, p <
.001) and control condition (M = 4.51; F(1,78) = 71.01, p< 001; F(2,118) = 31.33, p < .001
in the overall one-way analysis of variance). This suggests that the different compilations
of Olympic images in the present study did indeed invoke the desired frames.
International Olympic Committees objectives. Participants were asked to use a 10-point
scale ranging from Not at all (1) to Extremely well (10) to assess the extent to which they
felt the Olympic Games met six objectives either explicitly or implicitly stated in the
mission statement of the IOC (see Table 2). A series of one-way analyses of variance
revealed that there were significant differences by condition for four of the six IOC
objectives: promoting world peace (F(2,117) = 46.41), promoting feelings of friendship and
solidarity with the people of other nations (F(2,117) = 24.82, p < .001; blend sport with
culture and education (F(2,117) = 15.66, p < .001; promote understanding and respect for
the people of other countries (F(2,117) = 25.09, p < .001. Encouraging sports and promoting
individual achievement were not statistically significant in the one-way analysis of variance.
Both of the two counterobjectives — promoting national pride and display the U.S.’s
strength and power —were also significant by condition (F(2, 117) = 4.10, p < .01 and
F(2,117) = 13.79, p < .001, respectively).
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TABLE 1
FEELINGS OF OLYMPIC NATIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONALISM AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
These items were adapted from Emerson & Perse’s (1995) Nationalism and Internationalism
Scales.
The letter subscripts indicate scientific notation. Means that are statistically significant from
one
another do not share the same letter subscript. An asterisk indicates that the item was reverse
coded.
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TABLE 2
EXTENT TO WHICH OLYMPICS SERVE
VARIOUS OBJECTIVES AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
Planned contrasts between each of the three framing conditions revealed that
participants in the nationalistic condition did not differ from the control condition on 5 of
the 6 items, differing only on the extent to which they felt the Olympics celebrate individual
achievement (7.10 and 7.25, respectively F(1, 78) = 4.58, p <.04). In contrast, participants
in the international framing condition scored significantly higher than those in the control
condition on 4 of the 6 items including promoting world peace (F(1,78) = 48.5, p< .001),
promoting feelings of friendship and solidarity with the people of other nations (F(1,78) =
25.77, p < .001), blending sport with culture and education (F(1,78) = 14.57, p < .001) and
promoting understanding and respect for the people of other countries (F(1,78) = 27.04, p
< .001). Those in the international condition did not differ from those in the control
condition on ratings of whether the Olympics encourage sports or celebrate individual
achievement.
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FIGURE 1
INTEREST IN FUTURE OLYMPICS AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
Planned comparisons were also conducted on the two IOC inconsistent objectives of
displaying the U.S.’s strength and power and promoting national pride. On both of these
IOC-inconsistent items, participants in the nationalistic frame condition gave significantly
higher ratings (M = 6.90) than those in both the control condition (M = 6.40; F(1,78) = 9.28,
p <.003) and the international condition (6.71; F(1, 78) = 50.90). There was no significant
difference on these items between the control and the international frame condition.
Interest in attending and watching future Olympic Games. As indicated by Figure 1,
there was a significant influence of frame with participants in the nationalistic (M = 5.62;
F(1,78) = 7.45, p < .01) and international (M = 6.18; F(1,78) = 17.57, p < .04) frame
conditions reporting greater interest than those in the control condition (M = 4.53) in
attending future Olympic Games (F(2,118) = 9.15, p< .001 overall). There was also a
significant increase in intention to watch future Olympic Games on television with those in
both the nationalistic (M = 7.13; F(1,78) = 9.278, p < .003) and international (M = 7.15;
F(1,78) = 8.29; p < .001) frames reporting a significantly higher interest in viewing future
Olympic Games than those in the control condition (M = 6.18; F(2,118) = 4.80, p < .01
overall).
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STUDY 2
Method
Participants were once again recruited from the same undergraduate class at the same
major university one semester later. Participants were informed that they would be filling
out two unrelated surveys — one assessing their interest in the Olympic Games and a second
assessing their opinions on international affairs ostensibly for a graduate student’s
dissertation.
Olympic pre-viewing survey. The Olympic pre-viewing survey and procedure were
identical to that employed in Study 1. Respondents first filled out a survey that assessed
participants’ pre-existing interests which could affect the efficacy of a particular frame (such
as their interest in travel, sports, foreign policy, and international affairs) using a 10-point
Likert scale. The survey then asked participants to respond to a series of 10 items adapted
from Emerson and Perse’s (1995) Olympic Viewing Motivation Scale, which was designed
to assess the extent to which a variety of motives play a role in whether or not the
respondent would watch the Olympics on television. Participants were then randomly
assigned to one of three experimental conditions — a nationalistic frame, an international
frame, or a control group which was not exposed to an experimental frame — using the
same stimulus materials as described in Study 1.
Olympic post-viewing survey. Next, participants were asked to fill out an Olympic postviewing survey that once again asked them how interested they were in both attending and
watching future Olympics on a 10-point scale ranging from “Not at All Interested” (1) to
“Extremely Interested” (10). Unlike Study 1, participants in Study 2 did not complete
Emerson and Perse’s Olympic Nationalism Scale (1995) or the items designed to measure
the extent to which participants believed that the Olympic Games do or do not fulfill various
aspects of the International Olympic Committee’s goals. Instead, participants in Study 2
were asked to what extent the Olympic Games made them feel proud and excited using a 10point Likert scales ranging from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (10). Respondents were
then asked the same series of demographic questions as in Study 1 including age, gender,
ethnicity, nationality, year in college, and major. In addition, they were asked how many
hours of television they watch per week (on average) and how much coverage of the 2002,
2004, and 2006 Olympic Games they had watched using a 5-point scale (Not at All, A Little,
Some, Quite a Bit, A Lot).
Public opinion survey. The second, ostensibly unrelated, survey was administered by
an unfamiliar graduate student immediately after the Olympic survey allegedly as part of his
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dissertation research. In this survey, participants first completed a modified version of
Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat’s (2004) measure of international trust. Respondents were
asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with each of the following statements on a 10point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (10): the United
States can trust other nations; the United States can’t be too careful in dealing with other
nations; most of the time other nations try to be helpful to the United States; and other
nations are just looking out for themselves. Respondents were then asked how much they
agreed with a series of items also adapted from Brewer et al. designed to measure
internationalism and isolationism which included the following statements: the United States
should not concern itself with problems in other parts of the world; the United States should
try to solve problems in other parts of the world; the United States should give humanitarian
aid like food and medicine to foreign countries even if they don’t stand for the same things
we do; the United States should use military force to solve international problems; the
United States should give financial assistance to countries in economic crisis; and the United
States should devote a significant portion of its budget to defense.
Next, respondents were asked to indicate how friendly each of 25 nations are toward the
United States on a 10-point scale ranging from “Extremely Unfriendly” (1) to “Extremely
Friendly” (10). These items were also adapted from Brewer et al (2004). Finally,
respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements
designed to measure support for a number of aggressive foreign policy positions including:
the military-led intervention against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; the decision
to label Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as an “Axis of Evil”; the decision to place tariffs on steel
imports; the decision to try Al Qaeda prisoners before military tribunals (as opposed to U.S.
civilian courts); the decision to increase foreign aid to poor countries; and recent efforts to
bring democracy to the Middle East. Respondents were also asked the extent to which they
agreed that in the future the United States should: adopt tougher immigration policies; take
pre-emptive military action; send troops abroad to spread democracy; and restrict the sale
of foreign products within its own borders. After completing this survey, respondents were
debriefed about the experimental conditions and thanked for their participation.
Results
One hundred and twenty-four individuals completed both surveys. Data from four
individuals who were not U.S. citizens, and thus may not have reacted to the framing
manipulation, were excluded from subsequent analyses. The remaining 120 respondents
were equally represented in terms of gender in the three experimental conditions with 20
males and 20 females in each condition.
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FIGURE 2
INTEREST IN FUTURE OLYMPICS AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
Pre-existing interests and demographics. A series of one-way analyses of variance using
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software Version 15 revealed that
there were no significant differences on any of the pre-existing interests or demographics
either between experimental conditions in Study 2 or between Study 1 and Study 2.
Motives for viewing Olympic Games. Similarly, there was no significant difference
between the three experimental conditions on the 10 items adapted from Emerson and
Perse’s (1995) Olympic Viewing Motivation Scale assessing participants’ preexisting
motivations for watching the Olympic Games either between experimental conditions in
Study 2 or between Study 1 and Study 2.
Interest in attending and watching future Olympic Games. As indicated in Figure 2,
there was once again a significant effect of frame with participants in the nationalistic (M
= 5.58; F(1, 79) = 8.51, p < .005) and international (M = 6.15; F(1,79) = 21.77, p < .001)
frames reporting significantly greater interest than those in the control condition (M = 4.50)
in attending future Olympic Games (F(2,118) = 10.63, p < .001 overall analysis of variance).
There was also a significant increase in intent to watch future Olympic Games on television
with those in both the nationalistic (M = 7.03; F(1,79) = 8.20, p < .005) and international
(M = 7.33; F(1,79) = 15.47; p < .001) frames reporting a significantly higher interest in
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viewing future Olympic Games than those in the control condition (M = 6.08); F(2,118) =
7.65; p < .001 overall).
Emotions Olympics elicit. Respondents were asked to gauge the extent to which the
Olympics evoked the emotions of pride and excitement on a 10-point Likert scale ranging
from Not at all (1) to Extremely (10). Interestingly, there were no significant differences by
experimental condition in the extent to which respondents reported feeling excitement or
pride, which suggests that these emotions were not driving differences on other dependent
variables.
International trust. As shown in Table 3, participants in the nationalistic frame
condition produced levels of international trust (M = 4.11) that were significantly and
consistently lower than those in the control condition (M = 5.49; (F(1,79) = 59.30, p < .001)
which in turn were significantly lower than those in the international condition (M = 6.44;
F(1,79) = 33.95, p< .001; F(2,118) = 88.99, p < .001 overall).
Internationalism versus isolationism. Table 3 also reveals that participants in the
nationalistic frame condition reported the highest levels of isolationism (M = 6.16),
significantly higher than participants in the control condition (M = 5.56; F(1,79) = 19.66,
p <.001). Those who were exposed to the international frame had significantly lower levels
of isolationism (M = 4.64) than those in both the nationalistic (F(1,79) = 127.33, p < .001)
and control conditions (F(1,79) =19.66; F(2,118) = 67.74 overall).
Ratings of friendliness toward the United States. The average friendliness score of the
25 countries toward the United States revealed a consistent pattern with respondents in the
international frame condition giving the highest friendliness ratings (M = 5.54) followed by
those in the control condition (M = 4.60; F(1,79) = 20.68, p < .001) which in turn was
significantly higher than the average rating of participants in the nationalistic frame
condition (M = 3.97; F(1.79) = 13.59, p < .001; F(2,118) = 36.19, p < .001 overall).
U.S. policy decisions. As shown in Table 4, participants in the nationalistic frame
condition (M = 5.49) were more likely than those in the control condition (M = 4.75; F(1,79)
= 19.50, p< .001) to support aggressive foreign policies. Those in the control condition
were, in turn, more likely to endorse aggressive foreign policies than those in the
international frame condition (M = 4.46; F(1,79) = 7.32, p <.008; F(2,118) = 25.86, p < .001
overall).
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TABLE 3
MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND
ISOLATIONISM AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
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TABLE 4
SUPPORT FOR AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY AS A FUNCTION OF FRAME
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DISCUSSION
The goals of this research were fourfold: first, to test the effects of nationalistic and
international framing on the American viewing audience’s perceptions of the Olympic
Games; second, to test the effects of these frames on viewers’ perceptions of whether the
official objectives of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are being achieved; third,
to test the effects of both frames on viewer receptivity toward international engagement and
trust; and fourth, to test the effects of both frames on viewer support for aggressive U.S.
foreign policy. In addition, we explored the validity of the concern that adopting a more
international frame for the Olympic Games would necessarily decrease American interest
in attending and watching future Games.
As shown in Table 1, when individuals were exposed to a nationalistic frame of the
Olympic Games, they were more likely to endorse nationalistic items from Emerson and
Perse’s (1995) Olympic-related Nationalism Scale such as “the Olympics make me feel that
the U.S. is the greatest nation in the world” and “the Olympics make me realize that we
should strive for loyalty to our own country before we can afford to consider world
brotherhood.” They were also more likely to reject internationally cooperative statements
such as “the Olympics provide a common ground for cooperation” and “watching the
Olympics makes me feel that it is better to be a citizen of the world than of any particular
country.” Individuals exposed to the international Olympic frame showed the exact opposite
pattern of results. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 3 and suggest that the framing of
the Olympics can have a major influence on how the Games themselves are viewed.
How the Games were framed also had a significant impact on whether or not individuals
felt the Olympics were fulfilling IOC objectives. As shown in Table 2, those individuals
who were exposed to the international frame generally perceived the Olympics to be much
more supportive of the goals of the IOC than those exposed to the nationalistic frame or the
control condition. Conversely, those individuals who watched the nationalistic frame
generally perceived the Olympics to be much more antithetical to the goals of the IOC than
those from the international frame or the control condition. Thus, Hypotheses 2 and 4 were
also supported. This suggests that the heavily nationalistic framing of the Olympic Games
by American television networks may serve to undermine the mission of the IOC and the
very purpose of the Games. On a more optimistic note, our findings also suggest that if these
networks were to adopt a more international frame, the mission of the Games may be better
served.
Study 2 examined the broader implications these nationalistic and international Olympic
frames may have on public perceptions of other nations or aggressive foreign policy. As
shown in Tables 3 and 4, individuals who were exposed to a nationalistic frame of the
Olympic Games were less likely to demonstrate receptivity toward concepts of international
trust and engagement, and were more likely to support aggressive foreign policy decisions
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like preemptive military action as predicted in Hypotheses 5 and 6, respectively. In contrast,
individuals who were exposed to an international frame of the Olympic Games were more
likely to demonstrate receptivity toward concepts of international trust and engagement, and
were less likely to support aggressive foreign policy actions as predicted in Hypotheses 7
and 8.
The ramifications of these results are wide-ranging and point to an unintended, but
potentially dangerous, consequence of framing the Olympics in a nationalistic manner. By
employing an extremely nationalistic frame, American television networks may be
encouraging negative attitudes toward other nations. As our findings show, these negative
sentiments include a willingness to support international isolation and/or aggressive
international action. Not only is such support in direct opposition to the mission of the IOC,
but public opinion could influence U.S. foreign policy decisions in ways that increase
international tension and promote rivalry among nations.
This overall pattern of results is consistent with the tenets of Social Identity Theory,
which argue that when national identity is the most salient categorization, individuals will
be motivated to promote positive views of their national in-group and negative views of the
out-group. As a result, nationalistically framed Olympic broadcasts may encourage viewers
to be less engaged and open to cooperation with other countries. By extension, Social
Identity Theory also suggests that adopting a more international frame — or at least making
national identity less salient in Olympic coverage — might generate more positive attitudes
and actions among American audiences.
Interestingly, our findings also demonstrate that the adoption of a more international
frame for Olympic broadcasts would not necessarily decrease viewership. Instead, exposure
to Olympic coverage in both the nationalistic and international frame conditions increased
the interest of the participants with respect to both attending and viewing future Olympic
Games (see Figures 1 and 2). Contrary to what media outlets have argued, nationalisticallyframed coverage might not draw any more viewers than a broadcast which focuses on
cooperation, athletic skill, and athletes from a variety of countries.
Limitations and Future Research
Like most studies, this one suffers from a number of limitations. Perhaps the greatest
limitation is the use of relatively brief clips to evoke the desired frames. Obviously, having
individuals watch actual coverage of the Olympics would have greater ecological validity.
Similarly, a more compelling case could be made if we could measure actual behavior in
terms of subsequent Olympic viewing rather than behavioral intent. We also acknowledge
that we used only a very narrow segment of the U.S. population (undergraduates at a major
university who are younger and better educated than the majority of Olympic viewers).
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Moreover, the sample size per condition did not allow for in-depth analysis of within group
differences (i.e. in terms of gender, race, etc).
There are also a number of other experimental conditions that would have been of
interest. For instance, examining the impact of American media commentary on viewer
perceptions of the Olympics would obviously have been very worthwhile. Also, research
which compared the framing of U.S. Olympic coverage to the frames adopted by media
outlets in other countries — and then correlated levels of support for IOC goals and
international engagement in each country — would have proved extremely valuable. Finally,
our study effectively limited discussion to the possibility of only two frames: nationalistic
and international. This focus was not meant to suggest that alternative or “mixed” frames
do not exist or are irrelevant to Olympic broadcasts. Thus, an exploration of a wider array
of possible Olympic media frames would be most welcome. Lastly, we do not mean to
suggest that television coverage of the Olympics is the only or even the primary influence
on viewers’ attitudes toward other nations. Citizen attitudes, advertising demands,
international business concerns, and government priorities all come together to influence the
ways in which media outlets choose to cover certain topics. The relative size of the media’s
role in shaping public opinion about the Olympics, as well as identifying other key factors
in this process, are topics for future research.
Conclusions
This research exposes a contradiction between how the modern Olympics Games are
currently being presented to the American public and the official mission of the IOC. Our
results reveal important and potentially alarming consequences of the use of highly
nationalistic framing with respect to the Olympic Games, and perhaps international events
more generally. These findings make a strong argument for the need to reframe or at least
soften American television coverage of the Olympic Games. Ultimately, this research
provides insight into how sports diplomacy, competition, national rivalry, internationalism,
Social Identity Theory, and the concept of framing fit together in the media’s portrayal of
the Olympic spectacle, and how we might be able to steer a more productive course in future
coverage of international events.
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