1. law, govt and politics
2. government

Professional Autonomy vs. Political Control:
how to deal with the dilemma. Some evidence from the Italian core executive.
Nadia Carboni
Faculty of Political Science
University of Bologna
E-mail: [email protected]
Paper to be presented at EGPA Conference 2008
Study Group III – Personnel Policies
Sub theme 2: Professionalisation
Rotterdam, September 2008
ABSTRACT
The paper is an attempt to assess the impact of NPM inspired reforms on
the trade off between bureaucratic professional autonomy and political
control. It mainly aims to investigate on the extent to which administrative
reforms have affected traditional political and administrative roles, by
empirical accounts of the main changes into Senior Civil Service and the
consequences for the public sector innovation. The empirical analysis is
based on a case-study and it is conducted in the field of the Italian central
government, which was involved in a significant NPM – like reform process
during the Nineties, which introduced the principle of separation between
management and politics. The separation of politics from administration has
paradoxically resulted in the search of new forms of political control and
mechanism of integration between political and bureaucratic élites. The
gradual introduction of reforms combined with attempts to obtain a more
responsive bureaucracy by increasing political control seems to have had a
positive effect on the level of performance and professionalisation of Italian
Senior Civil Service.
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Nineties, Italian public administration has been facing reform
processes, according to two main directions (Mattei, 2007; Carboni, 2007; Gualmini, 2003; Endrici,
2001).
Firstly, the New Public Management (NPM) has tried to introduce managerial rationality into
the Italian bureaucracy (Rebora, 1999). This has not only redefined the role and responsibility of
bureaucrats who have been increasingly required to become public managers, but also the
relationship of the latter with politicians. As a consequence of reform process, the principle of
separation between politicians and top executives has been affirmed by law in 1993. Politicians are
expected to define policies, assign goals and responsibilities, and evaluate results; while managers
have been attributed the autonomy to manage their own unit and to be responsible for implementing
political plans. Hence, the NPM has challenged the traditional model of public administration by
introducing private-like and managerial logics and tools (Hood, 1991). It has attempted to transform
the “classical bureaucrat” (Putnam, 1975) into “manager”, by “letting the managers manage” it has
given them greater autonomy from the political bodies.
Secondly, another theme of reform concerned with Senior Civil Service is that of fiduciary
relations (Mattei, 2007; Carboni, 2007; Merloni, 2006; Endrici, 2001), by the expansion of
ministerial discretion in appointing top level bureaucrats, introduced in 1998 and consolidated by
the adoption of a spoils system in 2002. The introduction of spoils system can be seen as a response
to the greater autonomy given to bureaucrats, according to the separation of politics from
administration. Politicians look for more trustable and loyal bureaucrats than in the past, by
choosing who appoint at the top of bureaucracy. This impacts on the political-administrative
relationship in the direction of both a higher degree of integration between the two élites and an
increasing role of top executives in the decision-policy making process.
Given the above framework, it seems Italian public administration has been following opposite
trends. From one side, some kind of need for clarifying and strengthening political control emerges;
from the other side, the development of the Senior Civil Service is towards the creation of an
autonomous administrative élite (Mattei, 2007), by giving senior civil servants greater autonomy in
management and by allowing the access to top level positions to professional figures provided with
significant expertise, and ability to operate in an international and networking environment.
Hence, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is characterised by several paradoxes,
such as forms of party politicisation increasing the bureaucratic autonomy and reducing the scope
for partisan control of the administration.
Although political appointment might in practice undermine impartiality, it does not necessarily
lead to partisanship or clientelism (Mattei, 2007; Peters e Pierre, 2004; Svara, 2001). One of the
major thorny questions about the political control is how to avoid that the power of appointment
becomes an instrument to submit the bureaucratic system to the political willingness according to
loyalty rather than merit criteria of selection. By assuming a “positive” perspective on the political
control, I argue that the political control over the bureaucracy, as the condition that strengthens the
trust between the political and bureaucratic élites, might increase the bureaucratic accountability
and responsiveness via the power of political appointment. In these terms, political control involves
the capacity to set direction and maintain oversight, while bureaucratic autonomy involves
asserting professional perspectives in policy formation and adhering to professional standards in
implementation (Svara, 2001).
Indeed, political appointment has served as a structural incentive to overcome the low degree of
integration between political and administrative élites in the Italian case. The key reform objective
of political control was to break the old pattern of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.
It was one of mutual reserve and of “live and let live” attitude (self-restraint) resulting in an implicit
exchange between political power and job security (Cassese, 1984). In that case bureaucratic
autonomy was based more on the law enforcement than on the government capacity and
professionalisation. The party colonization model was associated with the clientelistic practices and
party patronage endemic in the First republic (1948-92): Italy state administration at all levels
became a docile, domesticated, overstaffed, inefficient and underpaid bureaucracy, whose members
tried to protect themselves against the external pressure of a single party government (Mattei,
2007).
The impact of reforms on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was therefore to
move from self-restraint to complementarity pattern. The idea of complementarity better depicts the
complexity of a relationship that includes distinctions and overlaps, distinct perspectives, but also
interdependency and reciprocal influence (Svara, 2001). This model seems to partially solve the
main paradox emerging from administrative reforms in Italy: how can politicians exert control over
bureaucracy and giving it at the same time autonomy and responsibility?
The empirical relevance of the above concepts is founded on the basis of a comprehensive
research carried out between the end of the Nineties and the beginning of the millennium at the
Italian central government. The aim of the overall study was to reconstruct the portrait of Italian
Senior Civil Service after administrative reforms, by focusing on the changing relationship and
political control pattern between politics and administration within the core executive. Focusing on
a single level of government allows making comparisons easier, by controlling the effects of
historical, cultural and social differences among different levels of government.
The results discussed in this paper are therefore part of that extended research and are specifically
based on qualitative data collected between 2004 and 2007. For that I used in-depth semi-structured
interviews with both top officials and (former and current) ministers and deputy ministers. The
interviews average about one hour in length and were all recorded and transcribed. Open-ended
questions were asked about the respective perceptions and expectations concerning politicaladministrative relationship, bureaucratic and political role, political control, administrative reforms,
human resources management, etc.
By a qualitative analysis, this study aims to obtain insights into the role conceptions (“theories in
use”) of ministers and top departmental officials, and into the perception they have about their
interrelationships under the changing environment. This is to put light on the effects of NPM-like
reforms on the professionalisation of management in public administration, dealing with the trade
off between professional autonomy and political control.
The paper will be structured as follows. The first paragraph will review the theoretical
background about the evolution of the political-administrative relationship in contemporary
democracies; the second one will provide a summary of Italian Senior Civil Service’s reforms; the
fourth one will present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis; the last one will draw some
conclusions about the effects of administrative reforms on the professionalisation and core
competences of management in public administration.
2. Theoretical background on the political-administrative relationship
The relationship between politics and administration has been one of the most central topics in
public administration since the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber. For many years, the
dominating perspective was that there was, or at least should be, a clear distinction and hierarchy of
labour between politicians and bureaucrats: the politician works as a sovereign representative of
political values and interests; the bureaucrat is a subordinate policy executor, whose major concern
is efficiency. This classical dichotomy has long been challenged. Several studies have suggested
that in reality the respective role conceptions and interaction patterns between politicians and
administrators are more differentiated (Suleiman, 1984; Dogan, 1975; Putnam, 1975; Aberbach,
Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Panebianco, 1986; Peters, 1987; Isernia, 1995; Svara, 2001).
Firstly, the most recent systematic research effort on the topic dated back to the beginning of the
1980s. At this time Italy – along with Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and US –
was part of a comparative study undertaken by Aberbach et al. (1981) on the attitudes, values and
patterns of behaviour of governmental élites in Western democracies. Aberbach et al. (1981) found
out a growing involvement of civil servants in what had traditionally been described as “political
role”. Of their famous four images to describe the relationship between politicians and
administrators, image IV (the complete blurring of roles) seemed to be the dominant pattern of
political-administrative interaction in the Eighties.
Secondly, Peters (1987) identifies five ideal-typical models of interaction on a continuum goes from
the “traditional Weberian separation and hierarchy” to the “administrative state”, in which
bureaucrats dominate the policy process thanks to their expertise, making the role of political
leaders marginal. In between both ends of the continuum there are the intermediate categories of
“village life”, “functional village life” and “adversarial politics”. On one hand, the notion of
“adversarial politics” refers to a strongly politicized relationship in which politicians and
bureaucrats compete for control over public policy; on the other hand “village life” means a
cooperative and consensual based relationship between the two governmental élites, who are moved
by the same goals.
Thirdly, Svara (2001) proposes an alternative framework for conceiving contemporary politicaladministrative relationships. His key notion is one of ‘complementarity’, founded on the
assumption that “politicians and administrators are highly dependent upon each other for getting
their respective jobs done” (Svara, p, 2001). For interpreting political-administrative interactions,
Svara adopts two dimensions: political control and professional independence. The control
dimension refers to the capacity of politicians to set directions and maintain oversight, while the
independence dimension focuses on the professional capacity of bureaucracy in policy formulation
and implementation. The author suggests that a high level of political control may actually co-exist
with a high level of professional independence. Svara calls this a state of complementarity: it entails
reciprocal influence and mutual deference between elected officials and administrators. Bureaucrats
are involved in shaping policy by giving it specific content and meaning in the implementation
process. Politicians oversee implementation, controlling over bureaucratic performances. In this
way politicians and bureaucrats maintain distinct roles based on their perspective and values, and
their formal positions, but they behaviours necessarily overlap. Complementarity seems to solve a
typical dilemma in public administration life. How can politicians keep control and, at the same
time, allow bureaucratic independence in terms of professional values and standards and
responsiveness to the public? The solution might be in recognizing the reciprocal values, role and
influence that underlie complementarity. Political élites could in theory dominate administrative
action, but they are bounded by a respect for bureaucratic competence and commitment.
Bureaucratic élites could use their relevant resources to become self-directed as well, but they are
constrained by a commitment to accountability.
These various typologies were the starting point for our analysis of Italian political-administrative
relations. Like the aforementioned scholars, we focused on both the role conceptions of ministers
and top officials, and their “life at the top”.
3. The changing role of Italian Senior Civil Service at central national government
Political and institutional context
First, we need to outline the context of political-administrative relations in Italy. The Italian
administrative reform is enclosed into the general transformation process the political system has
been faced since the beginning of the 1990s.
Broadly speaking, the Italian political system has been characterized since its constitution by the
following factors: the dominance of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and its satellites for
almost 50 years, the tactical exclusion of the second largest political party (and culture) – the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) – from national power until 1990s, the systematic colonization of the state
machine; the routinisation of what is called “illicit governance”, based on extensive network of
exchange spanning the public administration, public sector, and political parties (Bull and Rhodes,
pp. 5, 1997).
This traditional model has been undergone a deep crisis mainly due to conjunctural elements
triggered by the scandal Tangentopoli and the consequent collapse of traditional parties between
1992 and 1994, giving a way to the change of the overall political-institutional system and regime
(from First to Second Republic).
Firstly, the changing government élite in terms of values, ideologies, and social background has
been mainly reflected in the new party system, but also in the administrative logic of action.
Secondly, the introduction of the plurality electoral system in 1993 (which has significantly
downsized the number of political forces), and a quite stable bipolar competition among parties
have reduced the distance between bureaucracy and citizens (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1997;
Pasquino, 2002; Fabbrini, 2004). Indeed, this process has required a higher degree of bureaucratic
accountability and responsiveness, that is a closer relation between who is directly elected – the
politicians – and who is responsible for the implementation of the program people vote – the
bureaucrats –, challenging the traditional interaction pattern between the two élites. Without such a
scenario, any reforms would have been considerably watered-down.
Administrative reforms
In Italy, the reform cycle of the 1990s was much more radical than in other European countries,
due to certain specific factors: the need to downsize public debt in order to enter the European
Monetary Union (EMU); scandals and misconducts inside the political class, the reform of the
electoral system, etc.
First of all, we need to review the main features of Italian bureaucracy before the reform process.
According to the description depicted by Aberbach et al. in the Eighties and by the well-known
Italian scholar Cassese, the Italian senior civil service was distinguished by:
- underrepresentation of women
- southernization of jobs
- high average age
- dominance of law backgrounds
- system of promotion linked to the length of office and seniority
- careers organized on a formal-legal basis
- low degree of public/private mobility
- limited use of flexible employment contracts
- weak “representative bureaucracy”
- compliance to formal rules and procedures
- prevalence of ex ante controls
- no evaluation of civil servants.
Indeed, the emerging picture was that of senior civil service as an “ossified structure” (Cassese, pp.
59, 1999), where access was restricted through internal promotion and the career pattern ruled by
age and length of service: the Italian senior civil servants has therefore resulted as aged, with a low
degree of professionalization, limited mobility, marked underrepresentation of women and a high
percentage of law graduates.
Two different kinds of pressures seem to have changed so far this ossified world: increasing
political control by the power of appointment and stronger bureaucratic autonomy by giving top
officials more power and responsibility. As we see in the next paragraph, it looks like that Italian
bureaucracy has successfully been managing these two conflicting tensions.
The Italian SCS, although many attempts to reform it since it has been built in 1972, has been
challenged late, compared to other western bureaucratic élites. The first significant reform dated
back to 1993, with the d.lgs. n. 29/1993 on the privatisation of the public roles, and it has been
recently reorganized by the Testo Unico n. 165/2001 and the L. n. 145/2002. The aim of the reform
process was to redefine the role, the skills, the professional expertise, and the career pattern of the
top bureaucrats.
Briefly, this process has been made up with continuous normative refinements focusing only on the
institutional design, underestimating the role and perceptions of the main actors involved in the
reform.
In detail, the 1993 reform has significantly reviewed powers of senior officials. As a result the
senior civil servants have got both more autonomy over expenditure and responsibility for technical
and administrative implementation of policy. In addition, increased flexibility in public service
employment contracts; greater mobility both within and outside the administration; decentralization
of recruitment and training, were introduced within the public sector at that time.
By taking as an example company-like HR management styles and practices, a number of major
innovations marked a break with the past (Gualmini, 2007). Firstly, the special public law regime
for civil service employment was dismantled in favour of collective bargaining: a private regulation
of civil servants’ employment conditions and wages, based on centralized collective bargaining
with the trade unions, was introduced. Decentralized and individual bargaining were included in the
reform process, in order to link productivity/performance with the salary. Indeed, assessment bodies
were set up for performance evaluation. Openness to external recruitment was actively promoted, as
well as mobility within the public sector and between the private and public sector.
Furthermore competitive training courses have been introduced and opened to all those passing an
initial competition (not only to those already employed in the public sector, but also to those under
35 years of age with a university degree). The candidates, who pass the initial competition, are
supposed to attend one training year at the High School of Public Administration, included a six
months internship in the public or private organization.
In 1998, legislative decree no. 80 completed the reform process by extending collective bargaining
to top level civil servants, and by introducing a kind of spoils system for those senior civil servants
(grade 1) who had to be confirmed or removed from office within the first three months of each new
legislature. In 2002 the spoils system was extended to grade 2 senior civil servants as well. The
minimum term for senior civil servants’ contracts was also abolished, and the percentage of external
access to senior positions was increased.
However, looking at the turnover within national core executive in the 1998 and 2005 (respectively
Prodi and Berlusconi government), it is misleading to talk about “spoils system” like in the
American contest. In 2005, 55% of senior positions was confirmed; while 23% was removed, that
it means “moved to another position in a different department”. Data from the Prodi government are
quite similar, since the 46% of top level positions were confirmed (Department of Public Function,
2005).
To recap, traditional ways of blending political control with professional policy advice have been
recently challenged in Italy. These challenges are primarily related to the quest for modernizing
administration and efforts to restore the trust of citizens and civil servants in the political system.
Structural reforms seek to strengthen professional policy-making within the civil service, but the
new interfaces between politics and administration and greater flexibility in civil service
appointments clearly reinvent mechanisms for political control.
The following table summarizes the major changes within the Italian bureaucracy after
administrative reforms, under the transition of the political-institutional setting.
Tab. 1 Features of Italian Bureaucracy before and after administrative reforms
ITALIA
I REPUBLIC
(1948 - 1992)
ITALIA
II REPUBLIC
(1993- 2007)
Recruitment
Centralized
Centralized – Introduction of
decentralized recruitment in public
functional bodies
Selection
Competitive exam
Competitive exam + limited use of
“short- term and ad personam
contracts”
Mobility
Low mobility – career pattern inside
the same department
Limited mobility inside and outside
public administration
Training
General and law training
General and law training, but more
differentiated educational background
None
Limited – by 1998 senior positions
could be appointed to people outside
bureaucratic career, within given
percentages
Administrative structure
Hierarchical
Hierarchical - Decentralized
Political Control
Party colonization
Spoils system
Organizational culture
Self-restraint Pattern
Complementarity Pattern
Exchange with the private sector
4. Political control and professional autonomy within the Italian core executive: an
empirical analysis
The purpose of the qualitative analysis I carried out between 2004 and 2007 at the Italian central
government, was to find out how politicians and bureaucrats have been actually facing the process
of reform and to what extent they have been implementing innovation. The political - institutional
setting as well as the rule of law are certainly important in order to establish any change. However,
they are not by themselves sufficient to create a new model of managerial leadership. The logic of
action, values, cultural processes of those who are at the top of the political-administrative system –
senior civil servants and political leaders – are definitely to be taken into account. They proceed in
the interpretation and implementation of reforms by the vision they have about processes and
reality. Their actions are the means through which they implement the innovation process.
I confine the following account of “interaction at the top” in the Italian core executive to the
relationship between ministers and their chief departmental officials. Although the ministries/top
bureaucrats I interviewed had their own organizational characteristics, in general the variations in
role conceptions and interaction experiences of the office-holders did not seem to differ
systematically along departmental lines.
The differences are more nuanced across institutional levels of government. There is substantial
variation in governmental structure, political dynamics, and cultural values among different
institutional levels (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Capano and Gualmini, 2006; Rebora, 1999). Both
of these sources of difference are likely to affect how politicians and administrators interact with
each others.
The interviews were held in order to uncover the norms and codes guiding the behaviour of both
groups of actors. The risk of questioning role expectations is, however, that they may produce
socially desirable answers. To reduce these effects I asked respondents to report not only about their
own role (expectation), but even to describe the behaviour and image of their counterparts. In
addition, all respondents were assured that they would not be personally identified with any
quotations.
First we focus on the two parties’ accounts of their respective role conceptions.
Role perceptions
Interviewees largely agree that the weberian ideal-type of separation between the sphere of politics
and the sphere of administration should be the principle which shapes the distinction of roles and
tasks between politicians and bureaucrats. However, both ministers and top officials state that this is
not always the case, because bureaucrats tend to assume a political role, and politicians interfere in
administration field. Hence, while bureaucrats mention primarily interference in administrative
issues as the main point of weakness of politicians, politicians similarly accuse bureaucrats to
escape their sphere of competence playing a decision role that is not up to them.
At the same time both groups of actors recognize their respectively points of strength: the top
officials identify as elements of force the ability of politicians to define the policy guidelines and
the legitimacy that comes from their electoral mandate, as well as the capacity to transform political
preferences into public policies. Politicians themselves admit the superiority of bureaucrats as far as
the knowledge of the administrative machinery and the technical competence.
An interesting aspect that emerges from the considerations of some politicians, is the idea of an
“hybrid profile”, that is a politician who has, in addition to the capacity of defining the vision, a
certain degree of technical knowledge:
“I do not assume any drastic distinction between politicians and bureaucrats. I hate classify minister as
somebody who knows only politics and nothing else. If you have any competence, it is worthy to use it. I am used to
discuss policies with top administrators and it is certainly good to have an administration made up of people who have
an adequate level of educational and technical background”.
As far as role expectation, cabinet ministers expect civil servants to be responsive to their
guidelines, while top bureaucrats expect politicians are able to set clear direction. Ministers strongly
demand for collaborators with whom they have close relationship. Indeed, the top executive is
expected to harmonize political goals with organizational action. In this regard, administrators
demonstrate responsiveness to politicians and their programs.
From interviews I identify some key qualities that both ministers and top officials perceive as
essential for each other in order to perform their roles as well as what each party ideally should
bring to the relationship. A highly professional policy development and the capacity to deliver
intended outcomes in policy implementation are emphasized as valuable elements of the
bureaucratic role. Shifts in the political accountability doctrine and a more politically exposed
‘executive branch’ have developed so far ministerial ability to “manage” the department.
Political-administrative relationship
Although most of interviewees describe the political-administrative relationship in terms of
dichotomy citing the legislative decree of reform (dlgs.vo 29/1993), when they are asked for day-today interaction, they figure out a pattern of relationship more based on integration than separation.
According to respondents’ view, bureaucrats are “technical experts, who control politicians’ work,
thanks to their skills and competence in the field” and politicians are “decision makers who need
top administrators’ professional advices in order to define policy issues and problems”. The system
seems to be ruled by a “check and balance” logic of action.
“I believe in the political-administrative interdependence, that means policy decisions are taken by both politicians
and bureaucrats. The former identify the set of values and goals, the latter bring expertise, knowledge based rationality
and available means”
A politician says:
“It often happens to me that I need technical competence which only the bureaucrat has. For instance, there could
be decision-making issues demanding knowledge of the sector and of the administrative machinery to which only
bureaucrat can contribute”:
Indeed, top administrators offer both professional and political advice and thus their roles overlap
with politicians.
“However, collaboration sometimes is not easy going – a minister says - it depends on personal issues”.
The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats actually ranges from conflict and tension on
one hand, to collaboration and cooperation on the other hand:
“Cooperative pattern is more usual when you deal with people you trust and who have outstanding personal
qualities – he goes – If you surround yourself by excellent colleagues, you won’t have any problem in the relationship”
As far as the “personal dimension” of the relationship, almost all the interviewed politicians agree
with the importance of the individual personal attitudes beside professional skills, not only for the
nature of the interaction, but also for the effectiveness of the administrative action:
“A good top official is who serves any minister and effectively works for any government, irrespective of its
political identity”.
In the same way, top officials recognize that when the political-administrative relationship at the top
are deemed to be good, they produce an ideal setting for more successful policy-making at large:
“In the case of good relationship, you know, mutual expectations are clear, mutual trust is self-evident, and the
transaction costs of the relationship are low.”
Finally, even if the weberian ideal-type of separation keeps to be the prescriptive model for
political-administrative relationship, in practice ministers and top department officials
overwhelmingly emphasize the cooperative character of their interaction. Both politicians and
bureaucrats questioned on their life at the top seem to outline a relationship mainly oriented towards
complementarity of roles and functions. The norms governing the relationships of ministers and top
officials reflect the growing awareness of interdependency: both sides stress professionalism,
teamwork, collaboration.
Furthermore, the administrative reforms, one of the interviewees says, have increased the level of
administrative performance and professionalisation, making the relationship closer and closer to the
complementarity model drawn by Svara:
“The profile of top administrator as ‘manager’ appointed to top positions on the basis of both political and merit
criteria is no more unrealistic within public administration. Especially in local governments, he has showed to work
well for the good governance of the territory”.
Political control
Since the recent reform of senior civil service in Italy has significantly increased political control
over bureaucracy by the political appointment of senior positions, a political debate has been going
on the fear of the “Americanization” of the Italian civil service.
Among the interviewees, there are those who believe that the use of spoils system is potentially an
effective tool to increase the level of overall performance of politico-administrative system, as it
builds up a trust relationship between political leaders and top administrators:
“The spoils system makes the bureaucratic machine responsive to the changing political environment. It is a means
for providing government with trustable and loyal people at the top, in order to get bureaucratic compliance”.
Especially among the interviewed senior civil servants, there is a common agreement with making
appointment process as transparent as possible, by giving evidence of the selection procedures and
recruitment policies. Work experience and achieved results should be the essential elements to be
evaluated in the appointment.
With regard the point of view of politicians, they broadly say that having a trust relationship with
the chief executives helps in implementing public policies.
“There may be some relevant political changes that is not possible to realize without a liaison expressing those
directions. For instance, we cannot claim that Thatcher should have kept top positions appointed by the previous
Labour party, in order to make reforms. It is clear that Thatcher needed senior administrators who were sensitive to
her ideology and policy”
Although partisan views or personal preferences of civil servants should not interfere with their job,
an essential element that ministers feel top officials should have is properly “political sensitivity”.
The concept involves political trust and policy feeling. Trust is not defined in party-political terms
but as ministers come increasingly to rely on developing personal loyalties among officials rather
than simply on party membership.
Furthermore, a politician stresses that appointment process does not always relies on political
criteria, by citing examples of highly skilled managers who were not removed because of their
capacity:
“When one proves to be good, it does not make any sense to remove him - underlies one of our respondents - , the
effectiveness of administrative action depends mostly on the professional qualities of the manager. Indeed, it is essential
to choose the right people to be placed at the top of the bureaucratic structure”.
The use of the spoils system in Italy was also favoured by the openness to external recruitment
introduced in 1998. It gives the chance to appoint to senior positions professional figures coming
outside public administration. These external profiles (the so called “In-and-Outers”) are less aged
than traditional senior civil servants, and come mainly from public bodies (Italian Institute of Social
Security, Bank of Italy, University, etc.) or from private enterprises (usually by consulting
companies).
As far as “in-and outers” managers, opinions of respondents are divided between those who see
positively them as they bring innovation practices inside the administration, and those who conceive
them as a threat to the right functioning of the system.
Broadly speaking, the common thought among interviewees is that spoils system is a potential tool
for increasing the professional level of administration, for instance by allowing direct entry of
qualified and well trained people at the top of the system. However, it should be used “cum grano
salis”, otherwise it could become a threat for democracy.
Opinions about reforms
The majority of our respondents perceive the effect of reforms as positive at large, citing few
innovative elements arising from the administrative change of the last twenty years.
First, the reforms have allowed well educated and trained young people (the so called “high fliers”)
to get fast into the system compared to the past. One of the interviewed chief executive who “has
flown” to the top, by passing competitive exams at the High School of Administration says:
“We have been trained to manage economic, financial, personnel resources in a innovative way. We have learned
to work in a international network, and to use writing and speaking skills in the right way. We have learned to be a
manager in public administration”
Secondly, the same logic applies to “in-and outers”, since they potentially bring innovation and
know-how inside the public sector as well.
Generally, it seems that the most significant change perceived by interviewees is the increased
professional level and core competences of top administrators after reforms:
“Today we have very capable managers at the top of administration compared to the past. Especially in some
technical departments, such as the Department of Finance, there is a significant mobility between public and private
sector” a politician says. He cites examples of charismatic bureaucratic leaders who have been going
in and out administration - according to the American model of “in-and-outers”- and who have
worked for prestigious worldwide consulting companies.
In conclusion, the effects of reforms are positively perceived by both politicians and bureaucrats
(being the former a little be more enthusiastic than the latter), although all the respondents stress
that the implementation of innovation still needs time to be completed. It takes time to make
changes within the logic and rules of administrative action.
“Thanks to recent reforms, top civil servants have started to assume more responsibility than in the past. Somehow
I could say that the famous “culture of results” has begun to be implemented. Today bureaucrats pay much more
attention to result than ten years ago. It is a big step towards the managerialization of public administration. A long
way has been passed over, but still a few steps need to be done”.
By summarising, the interaction of elected officials and administrators that have been observed
in the Italian case, shows the following characteristics (tab. 2):
-
both élites maintain distinct perspectives based on their unique values and the differences in
their formal positions;
bureaucrats have partially overlapping functions as elected officials provide political
oversight of administration and administrators are involved in policy making;
there is interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and
administrators.
The result is a pattern of complementarity, that presumes distinction, as well as interdependence.
The former includes distinct background and values of politicians and administrators, respect for
political supremacy by bureaucrats, and not politicians’ involvement in administrative management
and practices; the latter means administrative involvement in policy making and autonomous
exercise of discretion. Complementarity is grounded in a pattern of overlapping roles in the
political-administrative relationship, but at the same time it draws on models of separate roles,
administrative autonomy and political responsiveness as well (Svara, 1999).
Furthermore, evidence from the Italian case, as well as from other western democracies (Peters and
Pierre, 2004; Page and Wright, 1999, 2007), points out that more than really a “spoils system
regime” we find subtle new forms of politicization, as ministers seek to make administrators more
responsive to their direction. The parts must be distinguishable but they are tied together in an
interdependent relationship – often cooperative, but sometimes contentious – and each complements
the other to form the whole of the governmental process.
Tab. 2 Components of political-administrative relationship at central government
Politicians
Selection procedure
Appointment
Bureaucrats
Merit + Political criteria
Pattern of behaviour
Political accountability
Responsive competence
Values and standards
Political commitment
Ideology
Vision
Values
Professionalism
Commitment to public interest
Accountability
Expertise
Role
Formulation of mission
Policy approval
Oversight
Staff evaluation
Consensus building
Policy advise
Administration
Management
Policy development
Discussion of results
The empirical analysis of the Italian case has showed us: (a) an emerging pattern of relationship
between politicians and bureaucrats more oriented to managerial and professional competence than
in the past; (b) a different model of political control (from the “party colonization” model to a type
of “spoils system”, which recalls the American one, although under different political-institutional
conditions). From an overall point of view, the political control has therefore increased in line with
the purposes of reforms and the demands of the changing political-institutional setting; bureaucratic
autonomy, understood in terms of professional independence, has increased as well. This supports
our initial hypothesis that “political control” and “bureaucratic autonomy” are not two opposite, but
strictly intertwined concepts.
The increase in management skills is particularly attested by the new manager profiles emerging
from reforms (“the high fliers”and “in-and-outers”).
The different ways of access to senior positions gradually introduced by law have begun to produce
effects, albeit relative and limited, but still visible:
- access to senior position in public administration starts to be considered attractive even by
those who come from the private sector;
- access of well educated and trained young people (“the high fliers”) is gradually changing
the old-fashioned bureaucratic culture into a new pragmatic-professional one.
While in the pre-reform regime, systems of selection and career, based on exogenous factors (titles,
examinations, good relations, etc.) have prevailed, in the post-reform systems of selection and
career are more oriented to take into consideration endogenous factors (professionalism,
performance, experience, etc.). It is clearly evident by our analysis that the traditional bureaucratic
model of leadership has undergone significant changes: professional competence, work experience
outside the public administration, goal achievement, level of performance have all become essential
elements for career development.
Furthermore, the traditional patronage model has been gradually replaced by a system of spoils
aimed to promote greater mobility not only internal but also external to the public organisation.
We can now draw some speculative insights for our initial question, on the basis of the
aforementioned results.
A) The influence of institutions in shaping innovation
First, the analysis of the Italian case confirms that changes in political – administrative relations
remain path dependent (Page e Wright, 1999, 2007; Rhodes and Weller, 2001; Peters and Pierre,
2001, 2004). Each country has a unique set of experience of state and nation building as well as the
role that bureaucracy plays within these processes. Bureaucratic forms and structures tend to reflect
national experience. This partially explains why we have different answers to two fundamental
questions of bureaucracy: efficiency and control across western democracies (Page e Wright, 1999).
There has been considerable agreement in terms of shared ideas about reforms, managerial styles of
administrative processes and behaviour across different countries; however, there has been less
convergence when it comes to structural arrangements and civil service organization (Gualmini,
2007). The NPM reform concepts (i.e. the model of separation between politicians and bureaucrats)
are evidently filtered, interpreted and modified through the combination of nationally based
processes. The national political-administrative history, culture, traditions and style of governance,
developed in an evolutionary manner, combined with the instrumental actions taken by political and
administrative leaders to further collective goals through administrative design and active national
administrative policy, is an important factors in shaping the reforms’ implementation;
In some cases it has had paradoxical effects such as in Italy, where the increasing autonomy given
to top administrators has resulted in a more politicized senior civil service. As our analysis has
shown, the separation of politics from administration has led to the search of new forms of political
control and mechanism of integration between political and bureaucratic élites. This apparent
contradiction could be explained by taking into account the effects of the changing political and
institutional environment, which has been demanding more and more accountability and
responsiveness attitude by both politicians and bureaucrats.
Hence, the actual balancing of professional autonomy and political control results path dependent.
B) Organizational Culture as a powerful explanatory variable
Organizational culture is also an important factor in explaining changes within organizations.
The concept of “organizational culture” comes from organizational studies (Schein, 1992), which
define it as the set of values, norms, attitudes and beliefs making up every organization. Since this
set of values is increasingly rooted inside organizations, it shapes members’ identities and practices
over time. Hence, organizational culture can contribute substantially to the cohesion of the whole
organization, while at the same time either favouring or hindering evolution and change (Egeberg,
1998).
Indeed, the characteristics of administrative systems themselves, as reflected in the specific
organizational-administrative culture, playing a leading role in implementing innovation.
Comparative studies have pointed that where organizational culture is shared and has become
institutionalized among civil servants, this could limit desired change or it could act as a filter of
selection among alternative reforms (Gualmini, 2007).
In Italy the deep-rooted institutionalization of a legal and juridical culture prevented the initial
implementation of extensive reforms. The dominance of a red-tape philosophy, traditional
compliance to formal rules, and the presence of ex ante controls, contribute to explain the delay
with which NPM reforms were introduced in Italy compared to Anglo-Saxon countries.
However, this old-fashioned bureaucratic culture has been gradually dismantled by the increasing
awareness of both politicians and bureaucrats that they need to adapt to the changing environment
and develop new logics of action, practices, values, etc.
It does not mean bureaucratic culture is going to disappear, but simply it is in a challenging and
updating process. In the Italian case, the new professional and managerial profiles who have
recently entered public administration have considerable helped to disseminate innovative cultural
approaches and modernization within public sector. This has built up a favourable context for
implementing reforms more effectively than in the past and for improving political-administrative
interaction at the top.
Finally, turning to our question, we can conclude that the trade off between professional autonomy
and political control mainly depends on both political-institutional and organizational variables.
Evidence from the Italian case allows us to argue that the balancing of professional autonomy and
political control is more likely to be when the following political-institutional and organizational
conditions are satisfied:
i)
a stable political-institutional system, whose fragmentation degree is low; for instance,
in the case of stable executives based on a cohesive parliamentary majority, politicians
are resulted to be more able to set direction, address and control bureaucracy
(Panebianco, 1986; Chiarini, 2000; Gualmini, 2007);
ii)
an autonomous bureaucratic élite, where the degree of autonomy refers to the level of
institutionalisation and professional independence of the bureaucracy. In other terms it
means a bureaucratic élite provided with legitimacy, innovative shared culture, and
especially with the capacity to offer politicians professional advice and problem solving
(Freddi, 1989; Svara, 2001; Peters and Pierre, 2004; Page and Wright, 2007).
5. Conclusions
Civil service changes
In the last two decades administrative reforms, new public management, politicization and political
changes have created new demands affecting the roles and workings of ministers and top officials.
Several comparative studies indicate similar shifts in the structural and cultural incentives
governing the role conceptions of politicians and bureaucrats and, consequently, the nature of their
relationships (Peters and Pierre, 2001, 2004; Page and Wright, 1999, 2007; Rhodes and Weller,
2001).
In the Italian case, administrative reforms such as agencification and civil service managerialism
arrived comparatively late; in addition, compared to many Anglo-Saxon countries, they were
incremental and limited in scope (Gualmini, 2003). Nevertheless, they have undoubtedly stimulated
demographic and cultural changes. Demographically, Italian bureaucracy has witnessed an
increasing number of outsiders (from business, local/regional government, non-profit), as well as
women and comparatively younger people, reaching the top 2 ranks in the ministries. Culturally,
new approaches to government and governance have been affecting politicians and bureaucrats,
both called to manage an increasingly complex environment.
Political changes
According to the political-institutional dimension, the degree of fragmentation of the Italian
political system has consistently decreased in the last fifteen years. The introduction of a plurality
electoral system has favoured the creation of a new party system structure, making the basis for an
alternation of the political power and a clearer division of majority and opposition in parliament.
Hence, two developments in the political domain have affected political-bureaucratic relationships
most clearly. The increasing volatility of the Italian voter and the fear of political punishment by the
electorate have made both politicians and bureaucrats to be more responsive to the public and more
“performance and policy oriented” than in the past.
As a result, the relationship between politics and bureaucracy in the Italian core executive has been
transformed in a pragmatic-professional transaction between office-holders with (potentially)
complementary contributions to successful policy-making. The new political- institutional order and
the effect of administrative reforms has given the way to a more productive collaboration at the very
heart of national government, by giving evidence of the inconsistency of the dilemma between
professional autonomy and political control.
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