1. No category

Review: Was It Pluck or Luck That Made the West Grow Rich?
Author(s): David D. Buck
Reviewed work(s):
ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age by Andre Gunder Frank
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are so Rich and Some so Poor by David S.
Landes
China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of the European Experience by R.
Bin Wong
Source: Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1999), pp. 413-430
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078786
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Was It Pluck or Luck That
Made theWest Grow Rich?
DAVID
University
D. BUCK
ofWisconsin-Milwaukee
ReORIENT: Global Economy in theAsian Age. By andre
frank.
gunder
1998. Pp. xxix
+
Berkeley: University
416. $55 hardcover;
of California
$23.95
Press,
paper.
TheWealth and Poverty ofNations: Why SomeAre So Rich
and Some So Poor. By david
+
650. $30.
1998. Pp. xxi
China
s. landes.
New
York: Norton,
Historical Change and the Limits of the
Ithaca: Cornell
Experience. By r. bin wong.
Press, 1997. Pp- ix + 327. $45.
Transformed:
European
University
of these three books deals with how the West
became wealthy
three authors analyze the political
economy?
Each and powerful. All
the combinations
between
the economy
and political
pro
meaning
can be explained.
cesses?from
which Western
dominance
From this
common
ground they diverge quickly and sharply in their concerns,
and conclusions.
the dichotomy
of "pluck or
arguments,
Although
in The
their approaches,
David S. Landes
luck" greatly oversimplifies
is arguing for the pluckiness
Wealth and Poverty of Nations
of the Euro
of an exceptional
cultural
peans, whom he sees as taking advantage
to forge remarkable achievements
by which
they transformed
heritage
the whole world. Andre
Gunder
Frank in ReORIENT
and R. Bin
see the Europeans
as simply lucky, but
in China Transformed
Wong
lucky
in different
ways.
For Frank,
early modern
fournal ofWorld History, Vol. 10, No. 2
of Hawai'i Press
?1999
by University
413
Europe
was
a back
414
journal
of
world
history,
fall
1999
into an Ameri
ward part of the globe economically,
but it stumbled
can bonanza and then "used its American
to buy itself a ticket
money
on the Asian
train" (p. xxv). For Wong,
China
and Europe faced com
mon challenges
in production
and resource allocation
but diverged by
different
distinctly
developing
that the European
and Chinese
political
economies.
Wong
believes
economies
compa
political
produced
cen
standards of living and well-being
the
through
eighteenth
1800 the European
tury. He agrees that around
pattern
embodying
into an advantageous
and the nation-state
forged quickly
capitalism
the industrial
revolution,
position
trying to
leaving China
through
new
to
in
balance
of
wealth
and
the
the
world.
power
adapt
Not only do the three authors differ in their conclusions,
but the
rable
and style of each book is dramatically
different also. Landest
accounts
is elegantly written,
and
containing
long
diverting
new
Eurocentric
while
his
This
interpretations.
reaffirming
long-held
for a broad public audience
and presents
book is written
conclusions
similar to those of his earlier work, The Unbound Prometheus: Techno
inWestern
Europe from 1750
logical Change and Industrial Development
to the Present (New York: Cambridge
Press, 1969).l
University
Frank pursues a relentlessly
iconoclastic
the
scattering
approach,
evidence
volume
social science giants such as Marx and Weber
of Western
reputations
like tenpins in his rush to bowl over our vision of the past. His goal is
to overturn
all Eurocentric
social theory, including Landes's version.
He saves special vigor for attacking
another Harvard
scholar, political
scientist Samuel Huntington,
who warns of a coming clash of civiliza
Frank
tions.2 In one of his many assaults on European
triumphalism,
writes
boot
that "Europe did not pull itself up by its own economic
to
not
thanks
kind
of
and
any
straps,
European
certainly
'exceptional
1The
to volume
of a chapter
that Landes contributed
1969 book is itself an expansion
6 of The Cambridge
Economic History
Press, 1965). The
(New York: Cambridge
University
continues
version
the narrative
the long original
I, whereas
up to World War
expanded
at 1870.
its coverage
chapter ended
2The Clash Civilizations: The
Remaking of theWorld Order (New York: Simon and
of
of Western
civiliza
In this work, Huntington
argues that the dominance
1996).
a decline because of internal decay following
the end of the Cold War.
be entering
in a uni
that the West
has been
endorses Western
by arguing
Huntington
triumphalism
that other civilizations
versal phase for five hundred
years, yet still accepts
may be reinvig
to strengthen
to undertake measures
itself and writes,
"Multicul
orated. He urges the West
States and the West;
universalism
abroad threatens
turalism at home
threatens
the United
of religious and cul
the West
and the World"
(p. 318). He suggests that the reemergence
to the West
in particular.
derives
from Islamic and Asian
civilizations
tural challenges
Schuster,
tion may
Buck: Was
It Pluck or Luck That Made
theWest Grow Rich?
415
ism' of rationality,
ity, in a word?of
Europe may owe
institutions,
technology,
genial
entrepreneurship,
that
race" (p. 4). Instead, Frank urges us to consider
success to Asia
its present
and then concludes
by
of human
life around the
the unity and interrelatedness
emphasizing
of the
globe. He asks us to accept the fact that since the discovery
the world has become a single system typified by "diversity in
Americas
in original).
unity in diversity" (p. 319, emphasis
unity and celebrating
to emphasize
the
the way Frank never passes up the opportunity
Along
those of others. Just as Landes has long
clash of his judgments with
Eurocentric
Frank has grown accustomed
interpretations,
championed
to fighting for his scholarly conclusions
with acuity and relish.
than either Lan
offers a markedly more restrained approach
Wong
in
audience
interested
des or Frank and aims his book at a professional
of comparative
history. On the basis of carefully explained
problems
buttressed
wide
arguments,
by
reading in recent historical
scholarship
a determined
in English, Chinese,
and Japanese, he mounts
compara
in hopes of establishing
tive approach
that similar situations produce
outcomes.
to "avoid
He has two main purposes:
different historical
of analysis and dynamics
of historical
categories
European
privileging
to
"the
difficulties
of
and
recognize
explaining
long-term
change"
processes of change and continuity"
(pp. 2-3).
with awareness
of the others'
Each of these authors has written
is
views and positions.
that "anti-Eurocentric
Landes declares
thought
on
to
to
fact"
and
also
then
goes
contrary
simply anti-intellectual;
state in a footnote
in particular are "bad his
that Frank's conclusions
of Landes, whom he sees as
tory" (p. 514). Frank is equally dismissive
a practitioner
of Eurocentric
bias (pp. 17, 20). Wong
studied at Har
vard and tells us that in his doctoral
Landes
exams,
posed a question
"about what he [Landes], as a historian
of Europe,
could
learn by
it
wasn't
time
with
the
that
worth
much
studying China,"
implication
or effort. Wong
a
is
"This
book
belated
response"
explains,
(p. ix).
several times as an ally in attacking Eurocentric
Frank refers toWong
dissociates
himself
from
221, 343), yet Wong
history
(pp. 50, no,
at either
economies
Frank through arguments
for two distinct political
end of Eurasia. Far from seeing the unity of the world, Wong
argues
and writes
that "the plurality of his
against theories of convergence
of multiple,
torical pasts makes more
open, and
likely the persistence
is
futures" (p. 293). The
truth
that each of these authors
contingent
a highly distinctive
has developed
and some consideration
approach,
of their particular
approaches
is warranted.
4i6
David
journal
Landes's
European
of
world
history,
fall
1999
Exceptionalism
book comes from the Stanford
that The Wealth
and Poverty of
iswithout
Nations
In his title Landes first calls up
sustained arguments.
Adam Smith's
shade and then states in the subtitle that the book will
some
are rich and others poor. Instead Landes,
nations
in
explain why
a
struc
David's words, gives us "a series of decorated
panels adorning
ture one cannot
In his response, Landes noted with
fully discern."3
some pleasure
the book's brisk sales and commented
that the individ
The best
economist
characterization
Paul David,
of Landes's
who
noted
ual chapters
constructed
of his book?David's
"decorated panels"?were
carefully
tableaus that could be read almost at random, but would
still leave the reader with a strong impression of his overall argument.
For example,
entitled
discusses with ele
"Golconda,"
chapter n,
in India. Landes
the
of
erudition
and
gance
story
expansion
European
retells the story of Robert Clive 's rapacious creation of an immense per
as
sonal fortune by the age of thirty-four, but characterizes
the Mughals
evidence
that
tyranny and then dismisses
ruling with typical Muslim
trade in the Indian Ocean was thriving before the Europeans
arrived.
Behind
this diverting
tableau Landes finds confirmation
that by the
India was hamstrung
century
eighteenth
rights
by "limited property
and technological
while Western
backwardness,"
Europe was "well on
its way to the Industrial Revolution"
and "had long since passed Asia
by" (p. 165).
so artfully is a conclusion
The structure that Landes has decorated
success
that the West's
that it
began before the industrial revolution,
was internally generated,
and that ever since the industrial revolution,
the rest of the world must struggle to assimilate
the European
pattern
an industrial
"some countries made
for themselves:
and
revolution
became
He asserts
rich; others did not and stayed poor" (pp. 168-69).
that Western
after 1000
Europe developed
key cultural characteristics
ce.
that made
the Middle
Ages
this great transformation.
possible
inventive
[was] one of the most
Indeed, "Europe of
societies
that history
3David
(20 November)
spoke at a session
ation meetings
in Chicago
that was devoted
to Landes and David,
In addition
of Nations.
of the 1998 Social Science History Associ
of The Wealth
and Poverty
solely to a discussion
the panelists were Kenneth
Pomeranz, George
with Jonathan
Liebowitz
serving as chair.
McCloskey,
and Deirdre
Grantham,
Joel Mokyr,
Frank and Wong
the conference,
and they too appeared
both attended
together on a panel
entitled
the European
'Miracle': Comparisons,
Connections,
(19 November)
"Orienting
with papers by Frank, Pomeranz,
and Wong,
followed
from
Conjectures,"
by comments
two sessions and the views expressed
Bruce Cumings
and James M. Blaut. These
by the
authors and panelists
have
informed my own analysis of these three books.
It Pluck or Luck That Made
Buck: Was
theWest Grow Rich?
417
was the
had known"
(p. 45). Still, "the hinge of this metamorphosis
emu
in
in
18th
and
the
Britain
Industrial Revolution
century
begun
and
All
this
lated around the world"
pares down,
(p. 168).
rephrases
on sociological
the arguments Lan
with
increased emphasis
aspects,
in The Unbound Prometheus. Landes reasserts in his new
des advanced
Eurocentric
of modern history that
book the dominant
interpretations
North
for at
and
American
historians
have prevailed
among European
two
least
centuries.
of the Industrial Revolution,"
Landes
In chapter
13, "The Nature
as
is
his
for
factors
about
what
the
three
position
bringing
emphasizes
most momentous
in
times:
of
the
substitution
modern
(1)
change
of inanimate
for human
for ani
labor; (2) the substitution
machinery
mate sources of power; and (3) the availability
of abundant and diverse
a ringing defense
raw materials
for production
(p. 186). He presents
a
on
of
transformation
based
the logic
against the evolu
revolutionary
of European
tionary interpretations
changes advanced by younger eco
It
who emphasize more
formal economic
historians
analysis.
not
to
to
calculations
needs
that Landes does
be noted
try
challenge
Instead he follows Harvard
and models
used by these cliometricians.
Nobel
laureate Simon Kuznets's paradigm based on "the logistic (lazy
nomic
S) curve of possibilities
sequence?
implicit in a given technological
slow gains during the experimental
stage, followed by rapid
preparatory
are exhausted"
advance
slows down as possibilities
that eventually
(p.
189).
R. M. Hartwell
historian
criticized The Unbound
The economic
in a 1971 review article, calling Landes "an old economic
Prometheus
historian
research and narrative
skill, but unfa
strong on empirical
miliar with economic
theory about the causes and process of growth
an ignorance of basic economics."4
In his
and even often display[ing]
new book Landes continues
over economic
to emphasize
sociological
in terms of economic
analysis. For Landes Europe's success ismeasured
but based on the superiority of its culture. "If we learn
advancement,
from the history
anything
makes all the difference"
Landes
believes
of economic
it is that culture
development,
(p. 516).
that European
culture
4 R. M. Hartwell
can
best
be understood
and Robert Higgs,
"Good Old Economic
History," American Histori
reviewers also have criticized Landes's control of economic
76 (1971 ): 474. Other
review injournal of Economic History 31 (1971): 497, where
theory. See Nathan
Rosenberg's
in economic
he points out Landes's
Asa Briggs felt that
"lack of interest
explanations."
was a book "strong as an essay of interpretation"
Prometheus Unbound
but that it showed
cal Review
weakness
in economic
history:
Encounter
33
(1969):
850.
journal
4i8
of
world
history,
fall
1999
societies
through the insights of Max Weber, who held that Protestant
inWestern
"a new kind of man?ratio
Europe
internally generated
as a
and productive"
nal, ordered, diligent
(p. 177). These
people,
a
new
new
mode of production)
that we
economy
(a
group, "created
as
know
remarks in the
(industrial)
( p. 178, parenthetical
capitalism"
is out of fashion and that "most his
original). He admits that Weber
torians today would
look upon the Weber
thesis as implausible
and
"I do not agree" (p. 177). This atten
and then declares,
unacceptable"
means
tion to sociological
that Landes's characteriza
argumentation
tion of European
how European
culture,
exceptionalism
emphasizes
to
its
its
and
but
tech
openness
religion
politics,
especially
including
to
its
has
economic
of
led
innovation,
superior pattern
nological
growth and material well-being.
to arguments
nature of
Landes's devotion
based on the distinctive
a
is
of
culture
hallmark
this
book
and
shows
that
Western
European
over the past three decades. Lan
his approach has remained constant
of cliometricians
who spin elegant economic
des writes disparagingly
theorems carefully gathered from statistics of the early modern
era, but
in
the
of
he has little to say about theoretical
field
developments
polit
in this new book Landes continues
ical economy.
Indeed,
largely to
in post-Marxist
and post
that have emerged
ignore the two positions
ian theories
of
"old
of political
One
called
Weber
economy.
these,
the
of
histori
institutional
economics,"
any
contingency
emphasizes
and argues that different
defined
cal development
societies?variously
or
tra
as civilizations,
other
units?follow
different
nations,
political
or
is
institu
"new
The
second
"positive political
economy"
jectories.5
in a con
defined as "the study of rational decisions
tional economics,"
text of political
and economic
institutions."6
The
second position,
and Mancur Olson,
has so far had lim
associated with Douglass North
economic
of its
because
ited impact on the study of world
history
its
rational choice paradigm,
with
formalistic,
rigorous char
together
a
acter. These
have
had
considerable
ideas, however,
impact on the
study of economic
growth
in contemporary
societies.7
5Old
views are represented
in the Journal of Economic
economic
institutional
Issues,
Iwish to thank Neil Buchanan
for Evolutionary
Economics.
published
by the Association
for pointing me toward this school of political
economy.
6
in large measure
from James E. Alt
and
of this field derives
My own understanding
on Positive Political Economy
A. Shepsle,
Kenneth
eds., Perspectives
(New York: Cambridge
and
C. Taylor,
"Political
Science
Press, 1990) and Peter A. Hall and Rosemary
University
the Three
New
Institutionalisms,"
Max-Planck-Institute
fur Gesellschaftsforschung
Paper
96/6 (June 1996).
7 See Robert
Bates,
"Macropolitical
spectives on Positive Political Economy,
in the Field of Development,"
Economy
Bates's
ed. Alt
and Shepsle,
pp. 31-54.
in Per
account
is
Buck: Was
It Pluck or Luck That Made
theWest Grow Rich?
419
in theory that made me critical of
It was not Landes's shortcomings
world
it was his dismissiveness
of the non-European
his book. Rather,
as existing
For
in a slough of despotism,
and
darkness.
Landes
poverty,
the one correct answer has
the past is a complex
anagram from which
in
indus
from
the Enlightenment,
Western
derived
Europe,
appeared
The rest of human experience?
and the nation-state.
trial capitalism,
the dominant
tradi
intriguing as it may be to those within
European
to those outside
it for purposes of maintaining
their
tion or important
a
own identity?is
of
and
record
despotism,
exploitation,
essentially
of Western
the benchmarks
failure to replicate
Europe's accomplish
ments.
lacked range, focus and above all,
"To begin with, the Chinese
one people after another,
curiosity"
"conquered
(p. 96). The Aztecs
a
and
of
above
all a terror" that "took
combination
art, power,
using
of blood sacrifice" (p. 103). In Russia,
or honestly"
(p. 241). "The new
little different,
then, from Asia's auto
sometimes
cratic despotisms,
decked
with
trap
though
republican
was
a
"The
Ottoman
empire
only
typical despotism,
pings" (p. 313).
more warlike"
leave little question
about
quotations
(p. 398). These
that did not join the rush to indus
Landes's views on those societies
the interpreta
labels those who would question
trialization.
Landes
as
tions of Eurocentric
value
who
history
"Europhobes"
feeling over
the form of the industrialization
labor would not work
were
'states' of Latin America
"unfree
well
has
and would
civilization
knowing
replace the truth that European
been the key to world progress with "amulticulturalist,
globalist, egal
itarian history that tells something
good) about
(preferably something
remark in original).
everybody"
(p. 513, parenthetical
I share several of Landes's opinions
that knowl
against the concept
edge can only come through shared identity, as well as his dislike for
to make everyone
feel good about some ele
that is designed
history
am
ment of their heritage,
to blanket condem
and I
strongly opposed
as
nations
of Western
stop
expansion
rapacity. Yet I would
genocidal
How will Landes respond toWong's
far short of Landes's Eurocentrism.
a period
careful attempt to argue that China,
like Europe, experienced
economic
of premodern
and social growth characterized
by increasing
and demographic
about growth fostered
expansion? What
productivity
states based on a highly paternalistic
but remarkably effec
by Chinese
tive system of bureaucratic
rule in which
the economic
and social well
for its clarity and the author's concern with how positive
institutional
economics
notable
in non-West
has difficulty
the differences
that underlie
the situations
taking into account
ern settings. His account
to those concerned
is therefore particularly
recommended
with
the world beyond
the United
States and Western
Europe.
JOURNAL
420
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
FALL
1999
of the empire? My
being of the inhabitants was the primary concern
to Eurocentric
reading of Landes is that in his devotion
interpretations
to serious comparative
he remains opposed
such asWong's.
history
Andre
World
Gunder
Economy
Frank's
before
Championing
1800
of
a
in evaluating
the primacy of economic measures
politi
on culture as "bad
but flatly rejects Landes's
emphasis
Europocentric
historiography"
(p. 339) and argues that Europe belat
a
economic
world
it
system by means of wealth
preexisting
edly joined
extracted
from the Americas.
For Frank culture does not count for
Frank
accepts
cal economy,
is the shape and dynamism
the real force in human history
of
much;
the world economy.
Frank rejects the notion
that the world economy
is a recent creation associated with the spread of European
capitalism
nature of the modern
nation-state.
and the expansive
For him, there
was "a single global world economy with a worldwide
division of labor
trade from 1500 onward"
(p. 52). This world econ
a system and dynamic
roots in Afro-Asia
"whose
extended
back for millennia"
while
the
of Western
economy
(p. 52),
backward
and
He
notions
isolated.
the
of
remained
rejects
Europe
Landes and others about a long and distinct pattern of European
cul
ture that prepared
the West
for wealth
and power after 1800. For
"came late and was brief," implying,
Frank the rise of the West
too,
is already over (pp. xxiii-xxiv).
He believes
that the West's
dominance
was an unforeseen
that "the industrial revolution
took
event, which
as
a
a
struc
in
of
result
of
the
part
continuing
Europe
unequal
place
ture and uneven
as a whole"
in and of the world economy
process
success
not
is
him
West's
To
the
the
result
of
(p. 343).
pluck; rather,
West
the disadvantaged
became
the lucky beneficiary
of a sharp and
and multilateral
omy rested on
in the world
short discontinuity
So, mistaking
economy.
Europe's
recent and short-term
for a universal
and
truth, historians
advantage
a
scientists
social
have constructed
racist, Eurocentric
wrongheaded,
mira
economic
Frank goes on to suggest that the Asian
perspective.
cle of the 1980s and 1990s marks a return to Asia's previous
central
is blunted
place in the world economy. The edge of Frank's argument
economic
crisis that began in July 1997, some
somewhat by the Asian
months
after Frank completed
his manuscript.
Such a setback, how
ever, cannot dull Frank's ardor for his cause.
Frank is at some pains to distinguish
his present views about world
as
a
his
earlier
from
of dependency
position
history
leading proponent
Buck: Was
It Pluck or Luck That Made
theWest Grow Rich?
by Capitalism
theory best represented
Review
America
(New York: Monthly
sent position
and his earlier advocacy
421
and Underdevelopment
Press, 1967). Yet both
notions
of dependency
in Latin
his pre
of how
in Latin America
and North American
involvement
European
only
the underdevelopment
of those parts of the world, charac
promoted
terize Europe not as a center of progress but as a center of exploitation
a blistering
and rapacious engrossment.8
Landes delivers
condemna
tion of dependency
and dismisses Frank's cur
arguments
(p. 327-28)
rent arguments
about Europe as a late comer and free rider on the
as evidence
of Asia
of Frank's
incurable Europhobia.
It
prosperity
would be hard not to agree with Landes here, for Frank in both his old
and new interpretations
attacks Europe.
relentlessly
to dismiss Frank simply as a Euro
It would be a mistake,
however,
in his conception
for he presents
of an early modern
world
phobe,
a
to
dramatic
economy
concep
(1400-1800)
challenge
prevailing
tions. Frank argues for the existence
of an elaborate network
of trade
what we today would call the
the Orient?meaning
linking together
a global
Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia?into
sea
a
routes
vast
in
and
overland
and
economy
trading by
complex
network
of commerce.
The Portuguese
and successive Western
Euro
into this system by means
inserted themselves
pean seagoing nations
of military might,
but would have remained bit players without
their
use
to
as
means
to
the
and
silver
from
the
Americas
willingness
gold
as
in
themselves
roles
commercial
this
Asian
buy
significant
players
did not pass quickly by the boards in Frank's
economy. This condition
not central
to the world
eyes, for "Europe was certainly
economy
before 1800" (p. 5).
In the early part of his book, Frank refers again and again to the
ismore than the sum of its parts" (pp. 28, 29,
formulation
"the whole
and
declares
that
he is trying to describe
the whole of a world
33, 37)
not
to
in
centered
the
economy
Asia,
parts. The primary ques
analyze
tion about Frank's book then is, how well does he manage
to convince
us that such a world economy
existed? He fully recognizes
the chal
most
and
addresses
the
task.
Frank's
Indeed,
lenge
enthusiastically
8 Bruce
out this common
of Frank's inter
character
Cumings
pointed
anti-European
to me in conversation
the 18 November
pretations
1998 panel at the Social Sci
following
ence History Association
in Chicago.
in ReORIENT
Frank rejects the
meetings
Although
criticizes
label "Marxist" and specifically
the manifold
of Marxism
weaknesses
of
because
its European
in his former advocacy
both
of underdevelopment
and his present
blinkers,
as managing
a system in which
of a single world economy,
he sees the Europeans
advocacy
In this he echoes one of Marx's
they have a special ability to acquire and control
capital.
principal
insights
about
the
importance
of capital
and
its control
in economic
history.
JOURNAL
422
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
FALL
1999
is his clear formulation
of his own and
impressive quality as a historian
others' positions
and his ability to carefully argue on point against his
to Landes's elegant
In contrast
tableaus covering his argu
opponents.
ment, Frank gives us the clear thrust and parry of clashing arguments.
Frank makes a strong case for the integrated response of economies
to the increased presence ofWestern
and the new
money
New
forces
unleashed
World
These
created
what
crops.
by
productive
mean
he calls "horizontally
integrative macrohistory"
(pp. 226-57),
response across wide regions to the same forces. To test
ing a common
a major crisis similar to
this question,
Frank asks ifAsia experienced
around Asia
in Europe during the seventeenth
century
(p. 231). He concludes
that there was no general social crisis in Asia during that time, so that
its long-term
but that there was
Asia was able to continue
expansion,
a short-term global monetary
in the 1640s, based on
crisis culminating
a shortage of American
silver. As a consequence
of that shortage, the
that
rulers of Japan clamped down on foreign trade in an effort
Tokugawa
to save Japan's monetized
silver from flowing out to China,
thereby
the
fiscal
and
monetary
assuring
stability of their regime (pp. 246-47).
conclusion
that the
Frank then argues against the generally
accepted
as a
their
closed-country
Tokugawa
developed
policies
primarily
means
influence.9
of avoiding unwanted
foreign
forces
Another
key argument of Frank's is his belief that economic
own
are
so
not
In
"institutions
his
induce technological
words,
change.
as
are
economic
derivative
from
the
much determinant
of,
process
they
are only
instrumentalized
and its exigencies,
which
institutionally
the early
rather than determined"
during
(p. 206). Consequently,
contem
Western
could
of
the
industrial
revolution,
stages
Europeans
for
labor
because
of
the
relative
of
cheapness
capital
plate substituting
an
in
abundance
of
wealth
monetary
capital
Europe?made
possible by
the high cost of skilled labor and raw
derived from the Americas?and
it was economic
materials.
forces, not exceptionalist
Thus,
European
cultural values that brought about the industrial revolution.
from others' studies to challenge
Eurocen
Frank draws extensively
to
tric interpretations.
His arguments
surely will not be acceptable
as
of the
he questions
the internal dynamic
and insofar
Eurocentrists,
is really
that the rise of the West
industrial
revolution
by arguing
derived
from the prior development
of Asia,
he offers another
dynamic
9
to volume
in the introduction
Hall,
3 of the Cambridge History of Japan
John Whitney
Press, 1989), pp. 4-5; and Ronald Toby, State and Diplo
(New York: Cambridge
University
in Early Modern
Princeton
Press, 1984).
macy
University
Japan (Princeton:
Buck: Was
It Pluck or Luck That Made
theWest Grow Rich?
423
that might be used to explain
the industrial revolution
and the domi
nance of the West
since 1800.
For myself,
I find Frank's claims about one integrated global econ
to accept fully, but I do agree with
difficult
omy based in the Orient
was isolated and backward
his position
that the European
economy
at least
it is clear that China,
Southeast
1500. Although
Asia,
Asia
all had strong economies
linked by long-distance
and overland
seaborne
that a global
trade, I remain unconvinced
was
in
before
the
nineteenth
economy
century, even in view
operation
of the global spread of crops in the sixteenth
century and the world
wide circulation
of gold and silver in the sixteenth
and seventeenth
a
centuries.
Frank
fresh
and
Still,
presents
intriguing way of under
until
and South
standing the world
Eurocentric
history
in the period from 1400 to 1800. His challenge
to
on the
is justified and provides a fresh perspective
past.
R. Bin Wong's
Comparativist
Approach
to modern
like Frank, challenges
Eurocentric
his
Wong,
approaches
both
tory and argues that "Europe's leading role has been exaggerated
the
accepts with Landes
spatially and temporally"
(p. 281). Wong
of Europe's
transformation
and the
importance
through capitalism
in terms close to Frank's view that
but sees this situation
nation-state,
success is an unusual discontinuity.
current
the West's
Like Landes,
the role of culture, but he argues that history reveals
Wong
emphasizes
not a single path for humankind,
but multiple
pathways. He concen
trates on comparing China
and the West
and sees them as "shaped by
historical
both similar and different,
both shared and soli
processes
in China
and
suggests to him that responses
tary" (p. 293). History
to similar problems
in political
different
economy
Europe
produced
into a single European pattern.
solutions
that are not yet subsumed
to the same set of problems
It is this notion
of different
solutions
of political
that marks him as close to "old institutionalist
economy
in his interpretations.
economics"
It also sets him off from Landes and
in global his
Frank, who both argue that one system is really decisive
the idea that China
in
and Europe operated
tory. Wong
begins with
same
a
economic
in
the
situation
which
essentially
fragile population
to-resource
ratio existed. He believes
that both regions were subject to
eco
the same Smithian
that both experienced
meaning
dynamics,
nomic
of
labor
division
made
increasing
growth through
possible by
rates of eco
the spread of markets.
Both regions experienced
modest
424
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
FALL
1999
nomic
in the 1400-1800
and demographic
growth
period. But in
case the economy moved
these Smithian
beyond
dynamics
from overseas,
the exploitation
of
the capture of resources
through
sources of energy, the existence
insti
inanimate
of specialized financial
tutions, and an intensive burst of technological
change.10
Europe's
was
to go beyond
because he wanted
to have an
about
China
failed
questions
why
asking European-derived
to determine
what was the political
of
industrial revolution,
economy
in the period from 1400 to 1800?called
in
modern"
China
"early
Wong
led in this direction
and "late traditional"
of
historical
by historians
European
parlance
as lacking a "public sphere as an arena
China
China. He characterizes
can contest and influence
active populations
within which politically
or
as
state actions"
far
from being a despotic
but
nevertheless
116)
(p.
officials
and
local
elites
worked
disconnected
coopera
polity. Instead,
with
shared Confucian
moral principles.
They
tively in accordance
sustained public order based on established
property
rights and joint
for key institutions,
such as public granaries,
schools,
uses the mathematical
term fractal to
endeavors. Wong
that irregular patterns
society, meaning
explain this quality of Chinese
at
structures
in
certain
all
scales
from the largest to
themselves
repeat
invokes this fractal
the smallest (p. 121). As applied to China, Wong
to explain
for the social order was
how
the same agenda
quality
responsibilities
and charitable
at all levels within
the system by officials and elite members.
accepted
one
in
He contrasts
order with
the European
this fractal Chinese
uses this same
terms. Wong
which
claims were framed in oppositional
to explain how the Chinese
concept
polity could extend over such a
sustain a single
the European
empire while
polity could never
were
units
that
form
and
had
territorial
breaking
repeatedly
imperial
also explains
how the
This
fractal character
apart or recombining.
control over territory wrested
Chinese
empire could easily reestablish
or
its
into new areas. The Chi
its
extend
rule
from
rule
temporarily
huge
to find officials and elites and a peasantry
merely
and a new element
the basic Confucian
notions,
it is this fractal quality of China
that
For Wong
could be assimilated.
sets it apart from Europe.
nese
empire needed
to shoulder
willing
10Nathan
theWest Grew Rich: The Economic Trans
and L. E. Birdzell, How
Rosenberg
the arguments
of
(New York: Basic Books,
1986), advance
formation of the Industrial World
in their account
into two categories:
economics
the old institutional
growth
by separating
case they see innovative
In the European
accumulation
and innovation.
growth being fos
in territorial
and
the diffusion
of authority
forms involving
institutional
tered by various
to undertake
and a spirit of tech
class terms, the ability of small enterprises
experiments,
nological
innovation.
Buck: Was
Wong
It Pluck or Luck That Made
further
European political
in a struggle with
the West Grow Rich?
425
the difference
between
the Chinese
and
develops
economies
that
locked
states,
arguing
European
by
new
the elites over revenue extraction,
developed
to
mer
because
needed
borrow
from
money
they
stable agrarian economy
with a highly
organized
credit institutions
In China,
chants.
fractal
lines, the state did not need to find new sources of income
along
because Confucianism
allowed only a modest
level of taxation,
and
the ruler and the
there were no strong patterns of conflict between
of more complex
elites. In Europe, he sees the state's encouragement
to sustain itself as laying an institutional
institutions
financial
needed
for capitalism
that China
lacked.
who
have
those
historians
seen, asWong
does, that Europe
Among
resources and social
in terms of productive
and China were comparable
a
in the eighteenth
welfare
the nineteenth
century,
century marked
view
is
This
of
the
best
articulated
ways.
parting
probably
by John King
that "judged superficially
the Ch'ing
Fairbank, who wrote
regime by
the late eighteenth
century was at an unsurpassed height of power. Yet
foundation
In
century, it would prove a hollow colossus."11
by the mid-nineteenth
into a steep decline marked
this widely held view China
entered
by
and foreign pressures, while Europe
domestic
rebellion
leaped ahead
these conclusions
through the industrial revolution. Wong
challenges
center and locale
axis
of
that
"this
between
the
integration
by arguing
cen
in
the
the
nineteenth
century collapsed
forged during
eighteenth
the
without
basic social principles
the agenda
tury
composing
affecting
for local rule and order" (p. 122). He believes
that after 1850 the impe
its fractal structure
rial order showed remarkable
strength throughout
a broad range
and only succumbed when foreign imperialism presented
met
of new challenges
the
that
Manchu
dynasty
by adopting
foreign
derived
schools, police
forces,
institutions?specifically
foreign-style
and military units. These post-1900
reforms released forces that quickly
to create a stable
the imperial order and proved unable
overturned
replacement.
stress on the strength and resilience
of the Chinese
social
Wong's
order leads him to a series of arguments
about how the underlying
of the Chinese
fractal agrarian political
economy
qualities
shaped
traces how the agrarian and subsis
China. Wong
twentieth-century
era (1949-78)
tence focus of state policies
in the Maoist
and the com
munity-based
11 In his
China
nature
introduction,
(New York: Cambridge
of post-1978
"The Old
University
economic
Order,"
Press,
reform reflect
to volume
1989),
10 of
p. 34.
the heritage
the Cambridge
History
of
426
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
FALL
1999
of China's political
of the present cen
economy. He sees the concerns
in China as mirroring
tral government
the concerns of the imperial era
in that both employed
economic
"the logic of creating
comparable
across the entire country"
activities
He
that
182).
denies,
however,
(p.
the Communists
imitated their eighteenth-century
impe
consciously
rial predecessors.
even in a world marked
is an argument
This
against convergence,
not
mention
obvious
does
Samuel Hunting
Wong
by
globalization.
in which
ton's dark view of the world,
the reach of the Western
order
is seen as collapsing
into a clash of civilizations.
he
Instead,
argues that
in the case of China,
and by implication
elsewhere,
strong, self-sus
to
economies
continue
will
affect
the
future. These
taining political
He
will produce what he calls "hybrid evolution"
concludes
(p. 204).
into the
societies
that "the historical
different
trajectories
carrying
in
is
and
will
differ"
future
contrast,
present
arguing
(p. 294). Landes,
or assimilation
of the European
that convergence
pattern of industri
is the only way. The
and succeed;
the
alization
Japanese assimilate
states of East Africa
do not and fail. For Frank there was already one
before the industrial revolution.
True to his Europho
world economy
sees
economic
Frank
the
of
balance
bia,
power shifting back to Asia,
it had been
where
How
Did
the
before
1800.
Revolution
Industrial
Occur?
it was pluck or luck that made
To return to the question whether
the
we
see
West
that
each
of
these
authors
reaches
different
grow rich,
Lan
conclusions
about the source of the industrial revolution. When
their views on world history on 2 December
des and Frank debated
account
for the industrial
asked Frank how he would
1998, Landes
was
a
its
revolution
that empha
and
question
posing
impact. Landes
sizes the chief weakness
of Frank's account.12 For Landes, and indeed
that the industrial revolution
there is no escaping
historians,
in modern world history.
the great change
represents
in The Wealth
of the industrial revolution
and
Landes's discussion
for most
12 I did not
Center
attend
at Northeastern
2 December
1998, organized
History
by the World
vs. The Wealth
in Boston
under the title "ReORIENT
in History."
of the World
Economy
Jeffrey Sommers, my
some of its main
with
the afternoon
and discussed
conclusions
this debate
University
Two Views
and Poverty of Nations:
former student,
organized
me afterward.
on
It Pluck or Luck That Made
Buck: Was
theWest Grow Rich?
427
it as the coming
of different
represents
together
of Nations
to create a great river of
from within
the European
tradition
He
(pp. 186-195).
change that sweeps across Europe itself and beyond
a clear time period for it, from 1770 to 1780, and stresses
establishes
Poverty
streams
of the industrial revolution
rather than its
to him are its long and complex
roots in
rest
must
the
of
of
the
and
how
the
world
question
history
to the changes
that industrialization
While
admit
brings.
the industrial revolution
occurred repeatedly, Frank margin
as a dis
in his account.
Frank sees the industrial revolution
a
more
in
in
of
continuities
important history
discontinuity
the depth and thoroughness
matters most
speed. What
European
assimilate
ting that
alizes it
tracting
world history. He argues that historians
caught up
"agency" in human history miss the more
important
"structure" of human history, which he identifies as
to the industrial
attention
omy. So Frank believes
misplaced,
continuities
for it leads the historian
in world history.
away
from
the
in the
search for
of the
questions
the world econ
revolution
larger,
to be
long-term
of non-West
Both Landes's Eurocentrism,
with his dismissiveness
ern civilization,
out
views
and Frank's globalist
wash
the distinctive
ness of different
streams in world history. What Wong
in
accomplishes
use
to
is
his
of "old institutional
economics"
both
that China
establish
was on a different but comparable
an
track to Europe and to develop
draws on the
argument about why this difference matters
today. Wong
work of Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technology, Creativity and Eco
nomic Progress (New York: Oxford University
in which
Press, 1990),
as "the rare occurrence
characterizes
the industrial revolution
Mokyr
of intensive bursts of technological
and Wong
change"
(p. 53). Mokyr
differ over exactly how these bursts of innovation
in
occur, and Wong
stresses how similar situations may yield radically different
particular
. . suggests that the pres
outcomes.
"This argument.
Thus, he writes,
ence
some
in China
of
of expansion
similar to those in
dynamics
rather than causal connections
Europe makes
likely a set of contingent
between
commercial
and industrial breakthrough"
development
(p.
279). Mokyr himself has pointed out that those historians
arguing for
in human
and highly contingent,
long-separated
rapid bursts of change
from current thinking
about evolutionary
biol
history are borrowing
are altered by rapid shifts
ogy, in which
long periods of stable existence
to new vectors of evolution.13
These
ideas have been widely popular
13
Mokyr
expressed
mentioned
above
(note
this
3).
idea at the
1998 Social
Science
History
Association
meetings
428
journal
of
world
history,
fall
izedby Stephen JayGould inWonderful Life (New York:Norton,
where
never
he argues that natural
turn out the same way
A Revival
of
Political
1999
1989),
selection produces
that would
accidents
again in the evolutionary
process.14
Economy
in concerns,
In focusing on the strong differences
and con
arguments,
a
I have
reached by three authors,
clusions
great many other
ignored
I hope the result will be a
scholars who are asking similar questions.
more
to political
look at three radically different approaches
insightful
is a highly erudite and effective
of
economy. David Landes
champion
of European
the widely
held notion
and
he
exceptionalism,
ably
is an assimilative
defends
the notion
that modernization
process lead
In contrast, Andre Gunder
Frank is relentlessly
ing to convergence.
a
new
in
his views, but offers
iconoclastic
clear
for under
paradigm
the world since 1500. In my view, R. Bin Wong
best reflects
in world history. His
effort to include economic
reasoning
seems close to that of the "old institutionalist
economics"
approach
its tenets the belief that "all evolving
that includes among
political
are embedded
in social and cultural processes;
economies
individuals
are both products
an
and producers
of these processes."15
Such
standing
a serious
approach permits a shift away from concern with Europe to encompass
in human
of strong and different
the existence
evolutionary
paths
kind. The historian's
task is seen as identifying
these different
path
the political
of each, and then project
ways, characterizing
economy
to react, differently
to
ing how these have reacted, and will continue
the modern world.16
14 In the field of
The Crucible
Morris,
(New York:
of Creation
biology, Simon Conway
Gould's
conclusions.
He has argued for par
Press, 1998), has challenged
University
that several unrelated
allel convergence
species show similar anatomical
by demonstrating
to the same ecological
niche.
See New York Times,
15 December
1998, pp. Di,
adaptions
seem possible
to support ideas of contingency
it would
and conver
D6. Among
historians
taken by Landes and Wong.
gence at the same time, to judge by the logic of the positions
15This
is one of eight "Tenets of Institutional
Economics"
advocated
by the Associa
Oxford
tion for Evolutionary
the group identified with the old institutional
economics
Economics,
are a part of inquiry and must
is "Social value judgments
Another
themselves
be
is rejected." The positive
of inquiry; the normative-positive
dichotomy
objects
political
to
in contrast,
of positive
the importance
economy
school,
analysis meant
emphasizes
of normative
the importance
specific social values and downplays
analysis. Neil
accomplish
12 February
communication,
1999. See also Anne Mayhew,
Buchanan,
"Foreign
personal
position.
in John Adams
Growth
and Theories
of Value,"
Economic
and Anthony
Investment,
The Institutional
Economics
(Boston: Kluwer,
of the International
Economy
Scapenlanda,
1996), pp. 36-45
16Daedalus
to questions
is devoted
of "Early Modernities"
127, no. 3 (summer
1998)
on the past have been"
of "how narrow many
of our perspectives
based on the premise
Buck: Was
It Pluck or Luck That Made
theWest Grow Rich?
429
or "new
economics"
institutional
As yet the school of "positive
economics"
has not had a great impact on the study of
institutional
rational
world history. As Robert Bates sees it, efforts to introduce
into the study of economic
world
of
the
choice
require accept
history
actor is the basic unit of
individual
( 1 ) The
ing "four key postulates:
are rational actors. (3)
(2) Individuals,
analysis.
including politicians,
create
is relatively
incentives
institutions
for
autonomous;
social
Individual
(4)
rationality
implies
rationality."17
politicians.
seem much
too formalistic
Bates's framework will probably
Already,
it seems to me that the
and limiting to most historians. Nevertheless,
Politics
in his discussion
of information
by Wong
developed
in Europe and China
invites attempts
(pp. 231-51)
to
out
of
students
their analytical
economy
try
positive
by
political
soon
in
How
of
world
that
the
field
may come and
history.
approaches
how ready the readers of this and other historical
journals may be to
remain to be seen.
consider
this new approach
interest in
indicate a renewed
Taken
these three books
together,
kind and quality
of tax resistance
of political
of con
that represents a revitalization
economy
questions
cerns that have
and political
economists,
historians,
long fascinated
scientists. These
of the "rise of the
and indeed the question
concerns,
have enjoyed a prominent
West,"
place in the Journal ofWorld History
concerns
since its inception.18 These
will not replace cross-cultural
considerations
of gender, identity, and nationality,
but Iwould suggest
to be
that while both Landes's and Frank's approaches will continue
in their work,
it isWong's
scholars
by various
comparativist
or the
either on the "old instititionalist
economics"
approach?based
new "positive political
will probably be most copied
economy"?that
some
in the next
few years.19 Indeed, Wong
incorporates
already
into his account by stressing
aspects of rational choice
interpretations
used
around the world. A second col
(p. vi) and therefore covers a variety of early modernities
is promised
in the future. None
lection on the theme "Multiple Modernities"
of the con
to this collection
on political
as do Landes,
tributors
economy
lays the same emphasis
is that various parts of the world
the logic of their joint project
Still,
Frank, and Wong.
in the past and will
economies
different
do so in the future.
developed
political
17
Bates, "Macropolitical
p. 51.
Economy,"
18The
in the first issue of the journal was William
H. McNeill,
lead article
uThe Rise
1-22.
1 (1990):
after Twenty-Five
Years," Journal ofWorld History
of theWest
19 I have avoided
a discussion
of the differences
these authors about multicul
among
as wrong and anti-intellectual,
turalism. Landes attacks multiculturalism
but is less dismis
sive of that approach
than Samuel Huntington.
Frank embraces multiculturalism
fervently,
while Wong
but still strong defense. The world history
textbook
gives a much more muted
is a coauthor,
of which Wong
inWorld History
Societies and Cultures
(New York: Harper
as mild an endorsement
as one can imagine,
of multiculturalism
Collins,
1995), contains
where
the authors express "intellectual
respect for the integrity of all civilizations"
(p. xxv).
some degree of multiculturalism
coin among most world histori
is a common
In practice,
430
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
FALL
1999
out of a
how popular seizures of grain in Europe and China
developed
actors.
For
similar set of choices
rational
he
by
certainly
example,
assertion
could endorse Douglass
North's
that "institutional
change
is the key to
through time and hence
shapes the way societies evolve
historical
ignored by economic
understanding
change
theory and clio
metric history."20 Still, Wong
the formalism
stops short of embracing
as well as the
of the new rational choice
school of political
economy,
in explaining
rational choice
have
how,
approaches
from other cultures have reached
rational individuals
through politics,
outcomes.
It seems possible, however,
collective
that the work of polit
on
economics
ical scientists
using this new paradigm
development
difficulties
that
may come to affect the interpretation
eras.
the early modern
and modern
more
issue
serious
in
around the world
emerged
are the questions
tory. Those
20
Institutional
Institutions,
Press, 1990), p. 3.
University
ans. The
of world
history,
especially
in
is how historians
that have
different
understand
patterns
on human his
the past and the impacts of their differences
tried to address in this review article.
that I have
and Economic
(New York: Cambridge
Change
Performance